The involvement of developing countries in international clinical trials is necessary for the development of appropriate medicines for local populations. However, the absence of appropriate structures for ethical review represents a barrier for certain countries. Currently there is very little information available on existing structures dedicated to ethics in western and central Africa. This article briefly describes historical milestones in the development of networks dedicated to capacity building in ethical review in these regions and outlines the major conclusions of two (...) workshops on this issue, which were held in September and October 2002 in Libreville, Gabon, and Paris, France. The workshops were the culmination of collaboration between the African Malaria Network Trust (AMANET) and the Pan African Bioethics Initiative (PABIN). They produced an update on ethics organizations with regard to mission, function, activities, members, and contact people, in eight countries within the regions discussed. As a result of the commitment of mandated delegates, a further prominent outcome followed these workshops: the creation of national structures, where none existed before, dedicated to the ethical review of clinical trials. (shrink)

The idea of a single scientific method, shared across specialties and teachable to ten-year-olds, is just over a hundred years old. For centuries prior, science had meant a kind of knowledge, made from facts gathered through direct observation or deduced from first principles. But during the nineteenth century, science came to mean something else: a way of thinking. The Scientific Method tells the story of how this approach took hold in laboratories, the field, and eventually classrooms, where science was once (...) taught as a natural process. Henry M. Cowles reveals the intertwined histories of evolution and experiment, from Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection to John Dewey's vision for science education. Darwin portrayed nature as akin to a man of science, experimenting through evolution, while his followers turned his theory onto the mind itself. Psychologists reimagined the scientific method as a problem-solving adaptation, a basic feature of cognition that had helped humans prosper. This was how Dewey and other educators taught science at the turn of the twentieth century-but their organic account was not to last. Soon, the scientific method was reimagined as a means of controlling nature, not a product of it. By shedding its roots in evolutionary theory, the scientific method came to seem far less natural, but far more powerful. This book reveals the origin of a fundamental modern concept. Once seen as a natural adaptation, the method soon became a symbol of science's power over nature, a power that, until recently, has rarely been called into question. (shrink)

Although a good deal has been written about Kant's conception of free will in recent years, there has been no serious attempt to examine in detail the development of his views on the topic. This book endeavours to remedy the situation by tracing Kant's thoughts on free will from his earliest discussions of it in the 1750s through to his last accounts in the 1790s. This developmental approach is of interest for at least two reasons. First, it shows that the (...) path that led Kant to view freedom as a transcendental power that is both radically distinct from and compatible with the causality of nature was a winding one. Second, it indicates that, despite the variety of views of free will that Kant held at various times, the concept occupied a central place in his thought, because it was the point of union between his theoretical and practical philosophy. (shrink)

Selection bias? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9490-4 Authors Henry M. Cowles, Program in History of Science, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

For William Whewell and, later, Charles Peirce, the methods of science merited scientific examination themselves. Looking to history to build an inductive account of the scientific process, both men transformed scientific methods into scientific evidence. What resulted was a peculiar instance of what Ian Hacking calls “the looping effects of human kinds,” in which classifying human behavior changes that behavior. In the cases of Whewell and Peirce, the behavior in question was their own: namely, scientific study. This essay brings Hacking’s (...) formulation to bear on the status of science in nineteenth-century intellectual history, revealing the continued entanglement of science and philosophy even as they were being prized apart. Focusing on how Whewell and Peirce turned themselves into “scientific kinds,” the essay reveals the slippage between “what” and “how” across what Peirce once called “the age of methods.”. (shrink)

Within contemporary science, it is common practice to compare data points to the average, i.e., to the statistical mean. Because this practice is so familiar, it might at first appear not to be the sort of thing that requires explanation. But recent research in cognitive science and in the history of science gives us reason to adopt the opposite perspective. Cognitive science research on the ways people ordinarily make sense of the world suggests that, instead of using a purely statistical (...) notion of the average, people tend to use a value-laden notion of the normal. Similarly, historical research on the scientific practices used in other time periods indicates that, prior to the nineteenth century, scientists tended to make use of a notion of the normal that was overtly value-laden. These findings give us reason to rethink certain familiar facts about scientific practice. In particular, they suggest that the fact that scientists so often make use of the statistical average should be seen as a highly surprising fact, the sort of thing that calls out for explanation. (shrink)

CHAPTER I GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE SUBJECT THERE is some difficulty in defining the subject of Ethics in a manner which can fairly claim general acceptance ...

This is the first comprehensive study of the sublime in Lucan. Drawing upon renewed literary-critical interest in the tradition of philosophical aesthetics, Henry Day argues that the category of the sublime offers a means of moving beyond readings of Lucan's Bellum Civile in terms of the poem's political commitment or, alternatively, nihilism. Demonstrating in dialogue with theorists from Burke and Kant to Freud, Lyotard and Ankersmit the continuing vitality of Longinus' foundational treatise On the Sublime, Day charts Lucan's complex (...) and instructive exploration of the relationship between sublimity and ethical discourses of freedom and oppression. Through the Bellum Civile's cataclysmic vision of civil war and metapoetic accounts of its own genesis, through its heated linguistic texture and proclaimed effects upon future readers and, most powerfully of all, through its representation of its twin protagonists Caesar and Pompey, Lucan's great epic emerges as a central text in the history of the sublime. (shrink)

Christof Koch and Klaus Hepp, in a recent essay in this journal1, issued a challenge to “those who call upon consciousness to carry the burden of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics.” Lest absence of a response be construed as admission of a failure of the idea that consciousness can play, via quantum measurement effects, a crucial role in neurodynamics, or that this idea has been in any rational way damaged by the arguments put forth in the cited article, I (...) respond here to that challenge. (shrink)

History is a potential tool for cognitive scientists interested in metacognitive categories like “creativity” and “innovation.” As a way of thinking, history suggests alternative accounts of the development of innovation and growth, for example. Life History Theory is one such account, but its roots in the Industrial Revolution make it a problematic tool for telling the history of that period.

This volume, originally published in 2002, assembles the historical sequence of writings that Kant published between 1783 and 1796 to popularize, summarize, amplify and defend the doctrines of his masterpiece, the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781. The best known of them, the Prolegomena, is often recommended to beginning students, but the other texts are also vintage Kant and are important sources for a fully rounded picture of Kant's intellectual development. As with other volumes in the series there are copious (...) linguistic notes and a glossary of key terms. The editorial introductions and explanatory notes shed light on the critical reception accorded Kant by the metaphysicians of his day and on Kant's own efforts to derail his opponents. (shrink)

Norbert Wiener and J.B.S. Haldane suggested during the early thirties that the profound changes in our conception of matter entailed by quantum theory opens the way for our thoughts, and other experiential or mind-like qualities, to play a role in nature that is causally interactive and effective, rather than purely epiphenomenal, as required by classical mechanics. The mathematical basis of this suggestion is described here, and it is then shown how, by giving mind this efficacious role in natural process, the (...) classical character of our perceptions of the quantum universe can be seen to be a consequence of evolutionary pressures for the survival of the species. (shrink)

It is argued that the principles of classical physics are inimical to the development of a satisfactory science of consciousness The problem is that insofar as the classical principles are valid consciousness can have no e ect on the behavior and hence on the survival prospects of the organisms in which it inheres Thus within the classical framework it is not possible to explain in natural terms the development of consciousness to the high level form found in human beings In (...) quantum theory on the other hand consciousness can be dynamically e cacious quantum the ory does allows consciousness to in uence behavior and thence to evolve in accordance with the principles of natural selection However this evo lutionary requirement places important constraints upon the details of the formulation of the quantum dynamical principles.. (shrink)

Reproduction of the original: Theology and the Social Consciousness by Henry Churchill King.

Although it is, often considered a form of anti-realism, here it is argued that Bohr's complementarity viewpoint must accept entity realism based on its analysis of the causal interaction involved in observation. However, because Bohr accepts the quantum postulate he must reject the view that the goal of theory is to represent the independently existing object apart from observation. Thus he abandons the spectator account of knowledge and with it the correspondence theory of truth. In this respect his view is (...) parallel to the positions held by Hacking, Cartwright, and Ellis. (shrink)

"The Bush administration and Congress are in concert on the goal of developing a fleet of unmanned aircraft that can reduce both defense costs and aircrew losses in combat by taking on at least the most dangerous combat missions. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) will be neither inexpensive enough to be readily expendable nor-- at least in early development-- capable of performing every combat mission alongside or in lieu of manned sorties. Yet the tremendous potential of such systems is widely (...) recognized, and allies as well as potential adversaries are moving quickly to mount their own research and development programs. The United States is committed to fielding UCAV capabilities by 2010, principally for the missions of suppression of enemy air defense and deep strike, which are among the highest risk tasks for the Air Force and naval aviation."--Overview. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Kant's thesis in the Tugendlehre that there are certain ends that we are obligated to adopt. It contends that none of the three arguments which Kant advances in support of this thesis succeeds and that the attempted reconstruction by Nelson Potter likewise fails. It then maintains that the argument does work, if one brings in, as an implicit premise, transcendental freedom. Finally, it is argued that this late doctrine of obligatory ends marks a significant advance over the (...) treatment of broad duties in the Grundlegung and can serve as a basis for defending Kant's ethics against the familiar emptiness charge. Der Beitrag untersucht die These Kants in der Tugendlehre , daß es bestimmte Zwecke gibt, zu deren Verfolgung wir verpflichtet sind. Dabei stellt sich heraus, daß keines der drei Argumente, die Kant zur Stützung dieser These verwendet, durchgreift und daß der diesbezügliche Rekonstruktionsversuch von Nelson Potter ebenso fehlschlägt. Es wird weiterhin die Ansicht vertreten, daß die Argumentation dann überzeugt, wenn man die transzendentale Freiheit als Prämisse einbezieht. Schließlich wird gezeigt, daß diese späte Lehre Kants von den Zwecken, die zugleich Pflicht sind, einen erheblichen Fortschritt gegenüber der Behandlung der weiten Pflichten in der Grundlegung bedeutet und eine Grundlage dafür bietet, Kants Ethik gegen den üblichen Vorwurf des leeren Formalismus in Schutz zu nehmen. (shrink)

It is argued on the basis of certain mathematical characteristics that classical mechanics is not constitutionally suited to accommodate consciousness, whereas quantum mechanics is. These mathematical characteristics pertain to the nature of the information represented in the state of the brain, and the way this information enters into the dynamics.

A criterion for the existence of human free will is specified: a human action is asserted to be a manifestations of human free-will if this action is a specific physical action that is experienced as being consciously chosen and willed to occur by a human agent, and is not determined within physical theory either in terms of the physically described aspects of nature or by any non-human agency. This criterion is tied to the structure of a physical theory. It is (...) noted that the orthodox quantum mechanics that flows from John von Neumann’s analysis of the process of measurement in quantum theory is described in terms of three processes that are effectively based on a three-level conception of reality. Von Neumann’s “Process 2” is the deterministic evolution, via the Schroedinger equation, of a physically described aspect of reality, the quantum state. His “Process 1” is the physically described aspect of a psychophysical probing action whose psychologically described aspect is an increment in the knowledge of a probing agent/observer. Process 3, in Dirac’s words, is “a choice on the part of nature” of the response to such a probing action. It is argued here that all three levels of this quantum structure, the physically described quantum state, the probing knowledge-acquiring agents, and the response-choosing nature, are all best conceived as idea-like in character. Quantum mechanics, though puzzling when viewed from the inappropriate perspective of the mechanistic classical physics, becomes rationally coherent when the underlying reality is conceived to be not a physically described classical monism, but rather an ideabased quantum triality. This idea-based conception of reality evades the pitfalls of nonphysics-based idealism by being erected directly upon the basic concepts of pragmatic empirically validated quantum mechanics. However, the dynamical structure of quantum theory contains certain causal gaps.. (shrink)

It is widely believed by both scientists and philosophers that consciousness, as we experience it, was not always present in this universe, but emerged gradually from a more purely physical stratum in conjunction with the development of biological systems, and, in particular, nervous systems. But if one assumes that the physical foundation from which consciousness emerged is adequately described by classical physical theory then one is put in a quandry by the deterministic character of that theory. For the dynamical completeness (...) of classical physical theory entails that either the emerging structure causes actual violations of the deterministic laws or that this emerging structure makes no actual difference to the course of physical events. The second option seems implausible, because then there could be no feed back that would allow survival considerations to lead to the gradual development and.. (shrink)

Classical mechanics is based upon a mechanical picture of nature that is fundamentally incorrect It has been replaced at the basic level by a radically di erent theory quantum mechanics This change entails an enormous shift in our basic conception of nature one that can profoundly alter the scienti c image of man himself Self image is the foundation of values and the replacement of the mechanistic self image derived from classical mechanics by one concordant with quantum mechanics may pro (...) vide the foundation of a moral order better suited to our times a self image that endows human life with meaning responsibility and a deeper linkage to nature as a whole.. (shrink)

Theme 1 pertains to "importance." By ‘most important’ I mean most important to human beings. Physicists have generally shied away from the problems of human beings, and the role of our minds in nature, because they are so complex: these problems have been set aside for a later time. But that time has now arrived. The needed technologies, funding, and interest are all at hand. Moreover, the advances in technology now allow scores of laboratories to participate, and the number will (...) soon grow to hundreds: the data will come from many diverse sources, not just a few billion dollar facilities. (shrink)