Interpreting empirical measures of integration and differentiation as indices of cortical performance and memory consolidation during wakefulness rather than consciousness per se is inconsistent with the literature. Recent studies show that these theory-inspired measures can dissociate from such processes and reliably index the brain's capacity for experience. We consider this as a positive trend in consciousness research.

The autopoietic theory and the enactive approach are two theoretical streams that, in spite of their historical link and conceptual affinities, offer very different views on the nature of living beings. In this paper, we compare these views and evaluate, in an exploratory way, their respective degrees of internal coherence. Focusing the analyses on certain key notions such as autonomy and organizational closure, we argue that while the autopoietic theory manages to elaborate an internally consistent conception of living beings, the (...) enactive approach presents an internal tension regarding its characterization of living beings as intentional systems directed at the environment. (shrink)

Mario Bunge, author of the monumental Treatise on Basic Philosophy, is widely renowned as a philosopher of science. In this new and ambitious work he shifts his attention to the social sciences and the social technologies. He considers a number of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, law, history, and management science. Bunge contends that social science research has fallen prey to a postmodern fascination with irrationalism and relativism. He urges social scientists to re-examine the philosophy and the (...) methodology at the base of their discipline. Bunge calls for objective and relevant fact-finding, rigorous theorizing, and empirical testing, as well as morally sensitive and socially responsible policy design. (shrink)

A discussion concerning whether to conceive Artificial Intelligence systems as responsible moral entities, also known as “artificial moral agents”, has been going on for some time. In this regard, we argue that the notion of “moral agency” is to be attributed only to humans based on their autonomy and sentience, which AI systems lack. We analyze human responsibility in the presence of AI systems in terms of meaningful control and due diligence and argue against fully automated systems in medicine. With (...) this perspective in mind, we focus on the use of AI-based diagnostic systems and shed light on the complex networks of persons, organizations and artifacts that come to be when AI systems are designed, developed, and used in medicine. We then discuss relational criteria of judgment in support of the attribution of responsibility to humans when adverse events are caused or induced by errors in AI systems. (shrink)

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forth an analysis of sensitivity which aims to discern individual from merely statistical evidence. We argue that sensitivity is not to be understood as a factive concept, but as a purely epistemic one. Our resulting analysis of epistemic sensitivity gives rise to an account of legal proof on which a defendant is only found liable based on epistemically sensitive evidence.

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

Deployment Realism resists Laudan’s and Lyons’ objections to the “No Miracle Argument” by arguing that a hypothesis is most probably true when it is deployed essentially in a novel prediction. However, Lyons criticized Psillos’ criterion of essentiality, maintaining that Deployment Realism should be committed to all the actually deployed assumptions. But since many actually deployed assumptions proved false, he concludes that the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism fail. I reply that the essentiality condition is required by Occam’s razor. In (...) fact, there is a simpler formulation of essentiality which escapes Lyons’ criticisms and rescues the No Miracle Argument and Deployment Realism from their purported historical counterexamples: a hypothesis is essential when it has no proper parts (in Yablo’s sense) sufficient to derive the same prediction. Although essentiality so conceived cannot be detected prospectively, this is just natural, and it is not a problem but an advantage for Deployment Realism. (shrink)

We put forth an analysis of causation. The analysis centers on the notion of a causal model that provides only partial information as to which events occur, but complete information about the dependences between the events. The basic idea is this: an event causes another just in case there is a causal model that is uninformative on both events and in which the first event makes a difference as to the occurrence of the other. We show that our analysis captures (...) more causal scenarios than the other counterfactual accounts to date. (shrink)

We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.

El intento de estas páginas es el de seleccionar dentro de la semántica del miedo que contribuye a organizar la imagen moderna del orden político y jurídico el elemento específico del pánico, en la hipótesis de que este último constituya una diferencia que es asimismo un recurso epistémico. Dicho de un modo directo: si el miedo se presenta como una referencia constitutiva del orden, de su constitución como de su mantenimiento, el pánico parece, en cambio, cargado de un signo contrario; (...) nos habla de la disolución de un agregado dado por supuesto y es inclusivo en el perimetrar los límites y las condiciones de posibilidad. El objetivo es aquel de repasar algunos momentos de la historia del pánico buscando argumentar que el pánico es una pasión política, en el sentido de que se refiere a aquello de lo que la político está hecha, y al mismo tiempo es expresión de un límite "pasional" de la política, en tanto que define políticamente un límite interno. Respecto a tal objetivo, esta aportación no reivindica más que los caracteres de un hilvanado necesitante de un desarrollo ulterior por lo que se refiere no solo a aquello que no se incluye (y es obviamente mucho), sino también a los nudos que de forma conscientemente provisional se indican. Además, se limita a una periodizacion histórica que es de alguna manera preliminar, deteniéndose en el umbral de la fase en la cual el pánico es una palabra de un discurso disciplinar, es parte del objeto de un saber codificado (psicología, sociología, ciencia política), incluso si no desempeña necesariamente un rol apaciguador. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

To go through the pages of the Autobiography of Mario Bunge is to accompany him through dozens of countries and examine the intellectual, political, philosophical and scientific spheres of the last hundred years. It is an experience that oscillates between two different worlds: the different and the similar, the professional and the personal. It is an established fact that one of his great loves was, and still is, science. He has always been dedicated to scientific work, teaching, research, and (...) training men and women in multiple disciplines. Life lessons fall like ripe fruit from this book, bringing us closer to a concept, a philosophical idea, a scientific digression, which had since been uncovered in numerous notes, articles or books. Bunge writes about the life experiences in this book with passion, naturalness and with a colloquial frankness, whether they be persecutions, banishment, imprisonment, successes, would-be losses, emotions, relationships, debates, impressions or opinions about people or things. In his pages we pass by the people with whom he shared a fruitful century of achievements and incredible depths of thought. Everything is remembered with sincerity and humor. This autobiography is, in truth, Bunge on Bunge, sharing everything that passes through the sieve of his memory, as he would say. Mario's many grandchildren are a testament to his proud standing as a family man, and at the age of 96 he gives us a book for everyone: for those who value the memories that hold the trauma of his life as well as for those who share his passion for science and culture. Also, perhaps, for some with whom he has had disagreements or controversy, for he still deserves recognition for being a staunch defender of his convictions. (shrink)

On the surface, the world of fashion may seem like a utopia: the glamour, the ability to purchase confidence and performance, giving people the freedom of self-expression. However, many of us are masked from the dystopia that drives this industry. The business models of fast fashion often thrive on exploiting land and people, through supply chains that are as opaque as offshore banking scandals, with many middlemen and much finger- pointing. The way clothing is consumed is much like a subscription (...) model, with consumers paying low costs more frequently, rather than investing a large amount into a long-lasting garment. This all results in poor-quality and -performance clothing, excessive waste of... (shrink)

Originally published as Scientific Research, this pair of volumes constitutes a fundamental treatise on the strategy of science. Mario Bunge, one of the major figures of the century in the development of a scientific epistemology, describes and analyzes scientific philosophy, as well as discloses its philosophical presuppositions. This work may be used as a map to identify the various stages in the road to scientific knowledge. Philosophy of Science is divided into two volumes, each with two parts. Part 1 (...) offers a preview of the scheme of science and the logical and semantical took that will be used throughout the work. The account of scientific research begins with part 2, where Bunge discusses formulating the problem to be solved, hypothesis, scientific law, and theory. The second volume opens with part 3, which deals with the application of theories to explanation, prediction, and action. This section is graced by an outstanding discussion of the philosophy of technology. Part 4 begins with measurement and experiment. It then examines risks in jumping to conclusions from data to hypotheses as well as the converse procedure. Bunge begins this mammoth work with a section entitled "How to Use This Book." He writes that it is intended for both independent reading and reference as well as for use in courses on scientific method and the philosophy of science. It suits a variety of purposes from introductory to advanced levels. Philosophy of Science is a versatile, informative, and useful text that will benefit professors, researchers, and students in a variety of disciplines, ranging from the behavioral and biological sciences to the physical sciences. (shrink)

This article seeks to investigate the role that a symbol—connected to a legal event and a collective trauma—has in the construction of a past imaginary. It begins with a theoretical reflection on the role of the symbol as proposed by Juri Lotman and the function of repetition in the consolidation of collective memory. It subsequently focuses on the semiotic resonance of one specific object: the bulletproof cabin of the Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann, used during his trial in Jerusalem, in 1961. (...) I consider the ‘afterlives’ of this object, examining the different ‘remakes’ of Eichmann’s cabin in several mediatic and artistic contexts, focusing on the modalities that have anchored it to the post-1961 imaginary of the perpetrator and the legal consequences of his actions. To do so, the article proposes a typology of uses of the cabin, identifying the different nuances of its representation and how they encapsulate the thorny issues surrounding that infamous legal event. (shrink)

According to St. Thomas, the formal constituent of the person is the act of being. This means that the person enriches human nature by moving it in the direction of morality, not through an ontological perfection of human nature, but because the person adds to human nature a perfection of its moral qualification, thanks to an act of being, created directly by God and, therefore, related, in terms of the constituent process, to divine goodness.

This paper considers Carson’s rewriting of Heracles’ tragic madness— through the art of collage, an assembling and disassambling of textual fragments, scraps of papers, drawings, chromatic smears, and sketches—as an imagistic site for theorizing the anti-normative materiality, physical and metaphysical, of par-a-noia. I make a case for a materiality of par-a-noia by proposing a comparison with Alain Badiou’s Marxist political formalism. The distinctive formal trait of H of H, verbal and pictorial juxtaposition, invites us to think of par-a-noia as an (...) aesthetico-political radicality located on the edge of a voiding of thought (noein), a radicality that, as I suggest at the end, can be aligned with modes of non-normate cognition, with neuroqueer countersociality. (shrink)

In 1951 Eric Voegelin dedicated a long and very dense essay to the Utopia of Thomas More, subsequently integrated in a larger portrait of the Renaissance political thought. The critical interpretation of Voegelin focuses on the breakdown of the traditional order and the emerging of a new vision of Man and Politics in the early sixteenth century, and particularly on the risks related to the mundane eschatology of which the work of More is involuntary and somewhat inconsistent anticipation.

In legal proceedings, a fact-finder needs to decide whether a defendant is guilty or not based on probabilistic evidence. We defend the thesis that the defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. We draw on Leitgeb’s stability theory for an appropriate notion of rational belief and show how our thesis solves the problem of statistical evidence. Finally, we defend our account of legal proof against challenges from (...) Staffel and compare it to a recent competitor put forth by Moss. (shrink)

This book presents a philosophical interpretation to numerical cognition based on dual process theories and heuristics. It shows how investigations in cognitive science can shed light on issues traditionally raised by philosophers of mathematics. The analysis will also help readers to better understand the relationship between current neuroscientific research and the philosophical reflection on mathematics. The author seeks to explain the acquisition of mathematical concepts. To accomplish this, he needs to answer two questions. How can the concepts of approximate numerosity (...) become an object of thought that is so accessible to our consciousness? How are these concepts refined and specified in such a way as to become numbers? Unfortunately, there is currently no model that can truly demonstrate the role of language in the development of numerical skills starting from approximate pre-verbal skills. However, the author details a solution to this problem: dual process theories. It is an approach widely used by theorists focusing on reasoning, decision making, social cognition, and consciousness. Here, he applies this approach to the studies on mathematical knowledge. He details the results brought about by psychological and neuroscientific studies conducted on numerical cognition by key neuroscientists. In the process, he develops the foundations of a new, potential philosophical explanation on mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

I confront Feyerabend's position and critical rationalism in order to have a foundation or starting point for my (historical) investigation. The main difference of his position towards falsificationism is the belief that different theories cannot be discussed rationally. Feyerabend is convinced that Galilei's observations with the telescope in the historical context of the Copernican revolution supports his criticism. In particular, he argues that the Copernican theory was supported by deficient hypotheses, and falsifications were disposed by ad hoc hypotheses and propaganda. (...) Furthermore, he claims that his philosophy of science reconstructs Galilei's defence of the Copernican theory. He introduces a central principle of his position (the principle of tenacity) in order to justify a research strategy of not eliminating falsified theories. He tries to show that the tenacious defence of a theory corresponds to Galilei's defence of the Copernican theory. Remarkably, Feyerabend's approach to explain the development of science earns an important support from his interpretation of Galilei's observations. On this basis I give a falsificationist interpretation of Galilei's observations with the telescope, and oppose this interpretation to Feyerabend's. From a falsificationist perspective, auxiliary hypotheses compete during the Copernican revolution which can (with some effort) be critically discussed. Then I analyse the historical case in order to test Feyerabend's interpretation of the Copernican revolution. Inter alias I investigate thoroughly whether Galilei, as Feyerabend claims, immunised falsifications of the Copernican theory by the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses. The investigation considers Galilei's explanation of Venus' phases, his establishment of the irradiation hypothesis, the explanation of the telescope's functionality, and the role of the reproducibility of the observations with the telescope. Finally I provide a rational reconstruction of Galilei's falsification of the Ptolemaic theory. The formalisation shows that Galilei was not a cautious critical rationalist, but a very confident scientist using the method of falsification. (shrink)

Through a close examination of philosopher Leopoldo Zea's historicist phenomenology, Mario Saenz offers fresh insights into the role of Mexican intellectuals in the creation of a Latin American "philosophy of liberation". While this philosophy of liberation has been widely recognized as the most intellectual political ideology to emerge from Latin America this century, few scholars have specifically explored the Mexican roots of this intellectual movement. Saenz redresses this imbalance by placing Zea and his contemporary intellectuals firmly within the context (...) of post-revolutionary Mexico, a political and social landscape that fostered criticisms of colonial and neo-colonial structures of dependence. Saenz demonstrates how Zea's philosophy was informed by a sense of Mexico's distinctive social and cultural identity. (shrink)

Starting from the idea that democracy always binds together a practice of domination and a project of liberation, Tronti formulates the conditions for a critique of democracy that would permit a rebirth of political thought in the current conjuncture. Bringing the heterodox Marxist traditions of ‘workerism’ and the ‘autonomy of the political’ together with the feminist thinking of difference, Tronti underscores the identitarian tendencies of democracy and the difficulties of combining democracy with a genuine notion of freedom. For Tronti, democracy (...) is increasingly synonymous with the pervasiveness of capitalism understood as ‘bourgeois society’, and the victory of ‘real democracy’ is the sociological victory of the bourgeoisie. The homo oeconomicus and the homo democraticus are fused into the dominant figure of democracy, the ‘mass bourgeois’. Against the depoliticizing consequences of ‘democratic Empire’, Tronti proposes a profound rethinking of our notion of politics, one which should not shy from reconsidering the elitist critiques of democracy. (shrink)

Agent Communication Languages (ACLs) have recently acquired a primary role in open multiagent systems, which need a standard communication framework shared by all interacting heterogeneous agents. According to the most important ACL standard proposals so far, agents are supposed to carry out the communication process by performing actions of a specific type, namely, communicative acts, whose semantics is defined in terms of the agents’ mental states. Although following the mainstream guidelines inspired by the Speech Act Theory, our work illustrates an (...) alternative model of agent communication, by shifting the focus from agents’ mental states to their social state. Taking an existing communicative act library, we provide a semantics for a significant set of acts based on the concept of commitment, and prove that our approach tackles some issues that have not been dealt with in an effective way yet and that may have hindered the rise of an universally accepted ACL standard. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 1 Seiten: 146-164.

The contributions to this book touch the different aspects of Popper's philosophy of science.

Las emociones fueron estudiadas por la psicología desde un enfoque primariamente fisiológico como una estrategia para validar empíricamente sus producciones. Esto fue una consecuencia del conductismo metodológico y su impronta en el campo de la investigación psicológica. En dicha tarea se tendió a disociar las emociones de las cogniciones y a presentarlas como resultados de meros procesos fisiológicos. En la década del 70 surgió la appraisal theory (Magda B. Arnold) proponiendo un enfoque distinto que rescata una dimensión cognitiva en las (...) emociones. Pero este enfoque ¿es realmente inédito? Aquí sostenemos que, si bien sus aportes son científicamente consistentes y novedosos, desde el contexto en que se formulan, abrevan en algunos elementos de la filosofía clásica de Aristóteles y santo Tomás de Aquino. Aquí nos circunscribiremos a revisar dos ensayos (Peters y Lazarus) a fin de vincular y ponderar una teoría psicológica con una filosofía subyacente. (shrink)

Philosophy is sometimes perceived as an abstract and nerdy discipline dealing with problems of its own creation in an isolated chamber of the Ivory Tower. And there is some truth to this view. But philosophy can help us deal with common problems, such as the disagreements we have in our everyday lives.