Des « libertés» proclamées en 1789 à la loi sur la librairie de 1810, les dynamiques qui traversent le monde de l'imprimé constituent encore un des objets les plus originaux pour renouveler l'histoire des savoirs d'une période révolutionnaire riche en bouleversements institutionnels et en mutations épistémologiques. Dans la perspective d'une histoire sociale des savoirs, l'analyse des actions construites par et dans l'imprimé permet de préciser la compréhension des transformations sociales, institutionnelles et théoriques qui caractérisent cette période. Alors que le chantier (...) reste encore largement ouvert, il s'agit de présenter ici quelques jalons d'une analyse visant à replacer l'imprimé au coeur des interrogations sur les mutations des sociabilités, des identités et des productions intellectuelles en Révolution. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from statistical (...) behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities. (shrink)

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

Mario Bunge, author of the monumental Treatise on Basic Philosophy, is widely renowned as a philosopher of science. In this new and ambitious work he shifts his attention to the social sciences and the social technologies. He considers a number of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, law, history, and management science. Bunge contends that social science research has fallen prey to a postmodern fascination with irrationalism and relativism. He urges social scientists to re-examine the philosophy and the (...) methodology at the base of their discipline. Bunge calls for objective and relevant fact-finding, rigorous theorizing, and empirical testing, as well as morally sensitive and socially responsible policy design. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

On the surface, the world of fashion may seem like a utopia: the glamour, the ability to purchase confidence and performance, giving people the freedom of self-expression. However, many of us are masked from the dystopia that drives this industry. The business models of fast fashion often thrive on exploiting land and people, through supply chains that are as opaque as offshore banking scandals, with many middlemen and much finger- pointing. The way clothing is consumed is much like a subscription (...) model, with consumers paying low costs more frequently, rather than investing a large amount into a long-lasting garment. This all results in poor-quality and -performance clothing, excessive waste of... (shrink)

This interview seeks to highlight some of the main characteristics of the new pandemic world, besides the main contradictions the philosophical thought runs into in this difficult time. Between a political world which is unable to react and the scientific world which is usually moved by political aims, this work tries to understand if there is any room for a role of a long range philosophical thought, which is able to defend its clarity prerogatives but it is also able to (...) speak with other disciplines which seem increasingly deafer. (shrink)

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

Mario Mignucci; XII*—The Stoic Analysis of the Sorites, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 231–246, https://doi.org.

We argue that the asymmetry between diverging and converging electromagnetic waves is just one of many asymmetries in observed phenomena that can be explained by a past hypothesis and statistical postulate (together assigning probabilities to different states of matter and field in the early universe). The arrow of electromagnetic radiation is thus absorbed into a broader account of temporal asymmetries in nature. We give an accessible introduction to the problem of explaining the arrow of radiation and compare our preferred strategy (...) for explaining the arrow to three alternatives: (i) modifying the laws of electromagnetism by adding a radiation condition requiring that electromagnetic fields always be attributable to past sources, (ii) removing electromagnetic fields and having particles interact directly with one another through retarded action-at-a-distance, (iii) adopting the Wheeler-Feynman approach and having particles interact directly through half-retarded half-advanced action-at-a-distance. In addition to the asymmetry between diverging and converging waves, we also consider the related asymmetry of radiation reaction. (shrink)

I confront Feyerabend's position and critical rationalism in order to have a foundation or starting point for my (historical) investigation. The main difference of his position towards falsificationism is the belief that different theories cannot be discussed rationally. Feyerabend is convinced that Galilei's observations with the telescope in the historical context of the Copernican revolution supports his criticism. In particular, he argues that the Copernican theory was supported by deficient hypotheses, and falsifications were disposed by ad hoc hypotheses and propaganda. (...) Furthermore, he claims that his philosophy of science reconstructs Galilei's defence of the Copernican theory. He introduces a central principle of his position (the principle of tenacity) in order to justify a research strategy of not eliminating falsified theories. He tries to show that the tenacious defence of a theory corresponds to Galilei's defence of the Copernican theory. Remarkably, Feyerabend's approach to explain the development of science earns an important support from his interpretation of Galilei's observations. On this basis I give a falsificationist interpretation of Galilei's observations with the telescope, and oppose this interpretation to Feyerabend's. From a falsificationist perspective, auxiliary hypotheses compete during the Copernican revolution which can (with some effort) be critically discussed. Then I analyse the historical case in order to test Feyerabend's interpretation of the Copernican revolution. Inter alias I investigate thoroughly whether Galilei, as Feyerabend claims, immunised falsifications of the Copernican theory by the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses. The investigation considers Galilei's explanation of Venus' phases, his establishment of the irradiation hypothesis, the explanation of the telescope's functionality, and the role of the reproducibility of the observations with the telescope. Finally I provide a rational reconstruction of Galilei's falsification of the Ptolemaic theory. The formalisation shows that Galilei was not a cautious critical rationalist, but a very confident scientist using the method of falsification. (shrink)

Biomedical research, on the one hand, contributes to important goals from generation of knowledge about the human body to the development and testing of therapeutics of all kinds. On the other hand, it can produce serious and sometimes unforeseeable consequences. In the ethical analysis of these two aspects of biomedical research, two important argumentative strategies play a major role. First, slippery slope arguments are used to warn of potential risks and to highlight knowledge-based limitations. Second, a dual-use problem describes the (...) challenge that already established techniques can be used for both morally wrong and morally right purposes. These two argumentative strategies appear to share several similarities, which will be investigated in this article. For this purpose, the article will first provide clear working definitions for both types of argument. This lays the foundation for the further ethical analysis. In a second step, and in order to investigate the similarities and differences of the argumentative strategies with an example from current ethical debates, CRISPR-Cas9, a currently very promising tool of genome editing, will be examined. The extent to which the possible applications of this genome editing tool can be addressed by slippery slope arguments or the dual use problem will be investigated. For this purpose, selected studies involving the use of CRISPR-Cas9 will be examined. Based on this two-step, analytic and example-based comparison of slippery-slope argumentation and dual-use considerations, the article will detail the ethically relevant difference between the two argumentative strategies and at the same time contribute to the ongoing ethical debate about CRISPR-Cas9. (shrink)

We show that in an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group finite definable extensions of a definable group which is defined in a reduct are already defined in the reduct. A similar result is proved for finite topological extensions of definable groups defined in o-minimal expansions of the ordered set of real numbers.

This paper aims to examine Hegel’s formulation of aesthetics during the years between the Gymnasium in Stuttgart and the sojourn in Frankfurt. In this period Hegel’s thought was primarily focused on moral, political and religious problems. By following a particular route through the juvenile texts, it is possible how- ever to examine a group of meditations concerning the theme of beauty, the status of ancient Greece and the role of sensibility in the process of aesthetic education of man.

Ossip K. Flechtheim war Politologe, Rechtssoziologe, Historiker und Mitbegrunder der Zukunftsforschung. Der in der Ukraine geborene Forscher und Universitatslehrer wirkte in Deutschland, der Schweiz und den USA. Sein Leben wurde durch die Bruche und Katastrophen des 20. Jahrhunderts gepragt.Flechtheim schrieb uber Kardinalprobleme seiner Zeit: Krieg und Frieden, Demokratie und Diktatur, Faschismus und Antifaschismus, Kommunismus und Nord-Sud-Konflikt. Er war ein Wegbereiter des Faches Politische Wissenschaft in Deutschland und befasste sich schon fruh mit dem Verhaltnis von Okonomie und Okologie.

Many people want to spend the last stages of their lives at home, in familiar surroundings, and possibly with people they know. However, this increasing desire on the part of older, ill, or even dying people also makes support from other people unavoidable, which in many cases involves family members, loved ones, or even friends. These family caregivers care for the person concerned, even though they lack the professional skills of nursing staff, for example, and have usually not been prepared (...) for this task. This article focuses on the ethical significance of the moral identity of family caregivers. While the effects of this care constellation on the caregivers have often been discussed in the scientific literature, ethical considerations regarding moral identity have so far been neglected. In the first step, the question of what is actually meant by the term moral identity is examined. The second step shifts attention to those people who have taken on the care of a loved one. The relevance of this previously discussed identity is emphasized by using study results and work in this context, and placed in relation to family caregivers. The third step shows that (1) moral identity must be understood as a necessary prerequisite for adequate and humane care, (2) this identity can be enhanced through the caregiving relationship, and (3) the activities undertaken by family caregivers reveal their moral identity. These considerations are finally summarized, provided with ethical aspects, and awareness of this important work of family caregivers is raised. (shrink)