According to UNESCO guidelines, one of the four forms of bioethics committees in medicine are the Hospital Ethics Committees. The purpose of this study was to evaluate how the above guidelines are implemented in real practice. There were 111 hospitals selected out of 176 Polish clinical hospitals and hospitals accredited by Center of Monitoring Quality in Health System. The study was conducted by the survey method. There were 56 hospitals that responded to the survey. The number of HECs members fluctuated (...) between 3 and 16 members, where usually 5 members were part of the board committee. The composition of the HECs for professions other than physicians was diverse and non-standardized. Only 55 % of HECs had a professional set of standards. 98 % of HECs had specific tasks. 62 % of HECs were asked for their expertise, and 55 % prepared <6.88 % of the opinions were related to interpersonal relations between hospital personnel, patients and their families with emphasis on the interactions between superiors and their inferiors or hospital staff and patients and their families. Only 12 % of the opinions were reported by the respondents as related to ethical dilemmas. In conclusion, few Polish hospitals have HECs, and the structure, services and workload are not always adequate. To ensure a reliable operation of HECs requires the development of relevant legislation, standard operating procedures and well trained members. (shrink)

This article seeks to justify the claim that Thomas Aquinas proposed a concept of natural law which is immune to the argument against the recognition of an objective grounding of the good formulated by a well-known representative of the liberal tradition, Isaiah Berlin, in his famous essay “Two Concepts of Freedom.” I argue that Aquinas’s concept of freedom takes into account the very same values and goals that Berlin set out to defend when he composed his critique of natural law. (...) In particular, the article suggests that Aquinas recognizes freedom as a greater perfection of man than rationality, and that this freedom is realized, among other things, through the co-construction of the good that gives a goal and a shape to human action and to the whole of a person’s life. I argue that the co-construction of such a good involves the co-construction of natural law in the strict sense of the term. Indeed, the content of natural law can be understood as a set of goods which are goals that inform human action. From a human perspective, natural law is not a pre-existing recipe which has merely to be “read.” Defining the concrete content of natural law is an ongoing process. The process of defining natural law’s content takes humanly knowable, objective elements into account, and so draws on knowledge. Yet free choice also plays an important part in this process. When speaking of the process of defining the content of natural law, therefore, and in determining what here-and-now is to be done, it is reasonable to describe man as a creator of the natural law, or as a legislator, just as the members of a parliament are the creators of civil law — bearing in mind that only a just law is truly law and therefore the creation of both civil and natural law reaches only as far is the scope of just actions directed by these laws. From the perspective of human action, we may speak of each person’s free choice to establish a given good as the end of a specific act, and in so doing to declare that action proper under natural law in the strict sense of the term (which differs from the rules of natural law). An appreciation of what is particular and individual (particulare et individuum), and an appreciation of free choice that goes hand-in-hand with this, is deeply embedded in Thomas’s system of thought. Particularity and individuality has its basis in an especially excellent way of human existence. (shrink)

An axiological analysis of the basis of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, determined mainly in the Preamble, makes it possible to put forward a thesis that this axiology is not, at least in reference to the principle, eclectic. In respect of the meta-axiological settlements, this is a tradition of natural-law type, recognizing the objective grounding of values and law. The accepted solutions are also convergent with the axiology typical of the international protection of human rights. -/- Résumé (...) L’analyse des fondements axiologiques de la Constitution polonaise de 1997, inscrits avant tout dans le préambule, permet de formuler la thèse selon laquelle cette axiologie n’est pas, en principe, éclectique. La réflexion sur les valeurs s’inscrit dans la vision classique des fondements du droit, remontant à l’antiquité. Partant de là, se dégage une tradition juridique appuyée sur le droit naturel, reconnaissant la force objective des valeurs et du droit. Ces conclusions rejoignent l’axiologie classique de la protection internationale des droits de l’Homme. -/- Zusammenfassung Die Analyse der vor allem durch die Präambel definierten axiologischen Grundlagen der Verfassung der Republik Polen von 1997 ermöglicht die Aufstellung der These, dass diese Axiologie nicht eklektisch ist, zumindest nicht prinzipiell. Hier enthüllt sich ein Denken von den Werten, das sich in die klassische, bis in die Antike zurückreichende Reflexion über die Grundlagen des Rechts einfügt. Wegen der metaaxiologischen Entscheidungen ist das eine Tradition naturrechtlichen Typs, die die objektive Begründung der Werte und des Rechts anerkennt. Die angenommenen Lösungen stimmen auch mit der für den internationalen Schutz der Menschenrechte typischen Axiologie überein. (shrink)

The article provides an analysis of the European Court of Human Rights judgments in the case of Lautsi v. Italy (application no. 30814/06), also known as the Italian crucifix case. The applicant claimed that displaying crucifixes in the Italian State-school classrooms attended by her children was contrary to the principle of secularism, by which she wished to bring up her children, and therefore infringed her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions, and (...) also breached her freedom of conviction and religion, as protected by Article 9 of the Convention. In its judgment of November 3, 2009, the seven-judge Chamber declared that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to education) of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) of the Convention. The judgment was given unanimously and none of the judges appended a separate opinion. The Italian Government asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. In the judgment of the Grand Chamber, delivered on March 18, 2011, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two (and with separate opinions of six judges), that there had been no violation of Protocol No. 1 and no violation of the Convention itself. The analysis in the article is focused on selected principal factors determining the Court's decision. It shows that the proposal for the Court to recognize secular convictions as those protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 or Article 9 of the Convention has no sufficient basis in the Convention itself and in earlier Court's case-law and, even, may be considered as promotion of religious intolerance, threatening the freedom to publicly manifest a religion or belief, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. -/- Opracowanie zawiera analizę wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału, które zapadły w sprawie Soile Lautsi (app. 30814/06), zwaną „włoska sprawa krzyża” (Italian Crucifix Case). W sprawie tej skarżąca zarzucała, że okazywanie znaku krzyża w klasach włoskich szkół państwowych, do których uczęszczały jej dzieci, jest sprzeczne z zasadą sekularyzmu, zgodnie z którą chciała ona wychować swoje dzieci i dlatego stanowi naruszenie jej prawa do wychowania i nauczania zgodnego z jej religijnymi i filozoficznymi (moralnymi) przekonaniami, oraz stanowi naruszenie wolności religijnej, gwarantowanej art. 9 Konwencji. W wyroku siedmioosobowej izby ogłoszonym 3 listopada 2009 r. izba uznała naruszenie art. 2 (Prawo do nauki) Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 do Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności w powiązaniu z art. 9 (Wolność myśli, sumienia i wyznania) Konwencji. Wyrok zapadł jednomyślnie i żaden z sędziów nie dołączył do wyroku swoich uwag. Rząd Włoch złożył wniosek w trybie przewidzianym art. 43 Konwencji o przekazanie sprawy do Wielkiej Izby. W wyroku Wielkiej Izby ogłoszonym 18 marca 2011 r. Trybunał uznał zdecydowaną większością głosów – 15 za wobec 2 przeciw (sześciu sędziów dołączyło swoje uwagi), że nie doszło do naruszenia ani Protokołu nr 1, ani samej Konwencji. Analizy koncentrują się na wybranych zagadnieniach, kluczowych dla argumentacji Trybunału. Analizy te pokazują, że postulowanie przez izbę uznania za prawo podmiotowe radykalnie pojętej negatywnej wolności religijnej, oraz postulowanie - tak przez izbę, jak i przez Wielką Izbę - ochrony przekonań sekularystycznych jako przekonań chronionych art. 2 Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 lub art. 9 Konwencji, nie posiada należytego uzasadnienia ani w samej Konwencji, ani w dotychczasowym orzecznictwie Trybunału, a co więcej – może być uznane za propagowanie nietolerancji religijnej, godzącej przede wszystkim chronioną art. 9 Konwencji wolność publicznego uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych i filozoficznych. (shrink)

Dawkins’ Ballet in the Garden of Theology. A Critical Assessment of Richard Dawkins’ Epistemological Theses on Theistic Beliefs from the God Delusion. Part II My paper presents an analysis and assessment of Richard Dawkins’ assumption from his book The God Delusion that there are no reason against treating belief in God as a scientific hypothesis, because even if the God existence is not disprovable, we could and maybe should ask if His existence is probable or highly improbable. My first aim (...) is to examine Dawkins' argumentation against if he is aware multiple possible ways interpretation of the claim that religious belief in God, construed as the hypothesis that existence of Creator may be treated as a scientific kind of hypothesis. My second aim is to show a nature of relation between his scientific God-hypothesis and his criticism of Thomas Henry Huxley agnosticism. I maintain that the he can't treat his probabilistic account of theism/atheism controversy as a ground for possible evidence for his controversial claim, that scientific knowledge could solve the problem of God's existence. As the matter of facts , things are just the opposite. I argue for claim that his construal of belief in God in terms of probabilistic scientific hypothesis is normatively weak and he can't use it in argumentation against rationality of belief in God even if he would be succesfully show that God-hypothesis is very weak and improbable explanation of origins and complexity of life. (shrink)

For a complete Heyting lattice , we define a category Etale (). We show that the category Etale () is equivalent to the category of the sheaves over , Sh(), hence also with -valued sets, see [2], [1]. The category Etale() is a generalization of the category Etale (X), see [1], where X is a topological space.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Citation Information -- Introduction -- 1 Philosophy and Performance of Neoliberal Ideologies: History, Politics and Human Subjects -- 2 Neo-Liberal Education Policy and the Ideology of Choice -- 3 Varieties of Neo-Liberalism: a Foucaultian Perspective -- 4 The Labouring Sleepwalker: Evocation and Expression as Modes of Qualitative Educational Research -- 5 The Learning Society, the Unfinished Cosmopolitan, and Governing Education, Public Health and Crime Prevention at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century -- (...) 6 What Were You Thinking? A Deleuzian/Guattarian Analysis of Communication in the Mathematics Classroom -- 7 (Re)Visioning the Centre: Education Reform and the 'Ideal' Citizen of the Future -- 8 Biopolitical Utopianism in Educational Theory -- 9 A Place Pedagogy for 'Global Contemporaneity' -- 10 Antonio Gramsci and Feminism: The Elusive Nature of Power -- 11 Foucault, Educational Research and the Issue of Autonomy -- Index. (shrink)

Logic, language and information integration is one of areas broadly explored nowadays and at the same time promising. Authors use that approach in their 8 years long research into Structured Semantic Knowledge Base System. The aim of this paper is to present authors idea of system capable of generating synergy effect while storing various type of information. The key assumption, which has been adopted, is the thesis that the attempt to find universal way of the reality description is very inefficient (...) solution. Combination of several solutions into one system must be based on the principle of supporting rather than on redundancy, ambiguity or mutual antagonism areas of logic, language and information. Natural language processing in the context of logics or information processing is ineffective, not to say pointless in the means of certainty. It is simply caused by the fact that natural languages have been formed long time ago as the main communication channel, rather than for automatic information processing. It was one of the reasons that logic has been founded as the universal language of mathematics and formalized communication in more extensive sense. Information processing however brought more sophisticated problems that mathematics could not smoothly solve, what made computer science appear. Studies over artificial intelligence revealed even more complex issues to solve. The unity of those three areas: logics, language and information is a necessity to acquire complementarity and synergy. (shrink)

In the paper I analyse some problems with the relation of properties to object. Such kind of relation is usually called “inherence,” “possessing” or “characterization.” I start with Lowe’s concept of inherence contained in his four-category ontology because I think it generates some very interested issues. Lowe thinks that inherence holds between modes and objects as well as between kinds and universal properties. I argue that there cannot be universal properties but only universals which are instantiated by entities which are (...) properties. Thus property-universals cannot inhere in anything. I also stress that we need a concept of explanatory dependence in order to correctly characterize inherence. Finally I draw attention to great importance of the problem of relationships of kinds to property-universals to the doctrine of substantialism. Key words E.J. LOWE, ONTOLOGY, INHERENCE. (shrink)

The paper presents some historical (Plato, Aristotle, Plotin, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas) and main contemporary topics about different accounts of goodness of God understood as ontological goodness, perfection and as ethical goodness - impeccability and benevolence. The arguments for goodness of God are presented, mainly from stance of Thomas Aquinas classical theism as well as arguments against compatibility of essential goodness and omnipotence (N. Pike) and being an moral agent. The article draws perspective of different philosophical issues connected with goodness of (...) God, like a problem of evil, the Euthyphro dilemma, divine command ethics and divine motivation theory. (shrink)

On Relation between the Individual Character of Propositional Knowledge and Its Value -/- The paper presents two aspects of human propositional knowledge, objective and subjective. The former is based on the truth condition, and the latter on the belief condition. Then several problems of the value of knowledge are briefly presented. The last part contains two arguments for the sine qua non belief condition of knowledge, one of which concerns the problem of epistemic luck assumed in virtue.

Multi-agent systems where the agents are developed by parties with competing interests, and where there is no access to an agent’s internal state, are often classified as ‘open’. The members of such systems may inadvertently fail to, or even deliberately choose not to, conform to the system specification. Consequently, it is necessary to specify the normative relations that may exist between the members, such as permission, obligation, and institutional power. We present a framework being developed for executable specification of open (...) multi-agent systems. We adopt a bird’s eye view of these systems, as opposed to an agent’s perspective whereby it reasons about how it should act. This paper is devoted to the presentation of various examples from the NetBill protocol formalised in terms of institutional power, permission and obligation. We express the system specification in the Event Calculus and execute the specification by means of a logic programming implementation. We also give several example formalisations of sanctions for dealing with violations of permissions and obligations. We distinguish between an open multi-agent system and the procedure by which an agent enters and leaves the system. We present examples from the specification of a role-management protocol for NetBill, and demonstrate the interplay between such a protocol and the corresponding multi-agent system. (shrink)

Obwohl Gesundheit für alle Menschen essentiell ist, unterliegt das Verständnis des Begriffs »Gesundheit« jeweils historisch, regional und kulturell unterschiedlichen Einflüssen. Mit verschiedenen Festlegungen von »Gesundheit und Krankheit« werden auch die Aufgaben der Medizin unterschiedlich definiert. Dieser Band ist dem Thema »Verständnis von Gesundheit« gewidmet, einem der Kernthemen der interdisziplinären Arbeitsgruppe der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften »Zukunft der Medizin: Gesundheit für alle«. Es wird u.a. der Frage nachgegangen, wie die Medizin Krankheiten nicht nur immer besser therapieren kann, sondern wie sie außerdem (...) besser imstande sein könnte, Gesundheit zu bewahren. Die Beiträge zeigen historische Kontinuitäten auf und verbinden diese mit kulturgeschichtlichen Besonderheiten aus allen Regionen der Welt, Europa, China, Indien, Afrika, Südamerika sowie mit philosophischen Aspekten, z.B. der Frage der Verantwortung für die eigene Gesundheit. So ergibt sich ein holistischer Gesundheitsbegriff, aus dem neue Perspektiven für die evidenzbasierte Medizin erwachsen. Ein eigener Buchteil ist dem Verständnis von Gesundheit aus Sicht einzelner Patienten und den Empfehlungen an die Politik gewidmet. (shrink)

The Uppsala School in philosophy and the Vienna Circle are prima facie similar currents in contemporary philosophy. Both reject metaphysics, claim that reality is a spatio­‑temporal realm and adhere to noncognitivism in terms of values. However, justifications of these assumptions are quite different. In the following article we reconstruct main theses of both mentioned currents and then we indicate their impact on one of the major jurisprudential movements, namely Scandinavian Legal Realism. We focus on Alf Ross’ legal philosophy, as it (...) was an attempt to accommodate both: the philosophy of the Uppsala School and of the Vienna Circle. We trace those two sources of inspiration in Ross’ theory of legal validity and of legal concepts. (shrink)

W artykule analizuje się pojęcie „proposition" (sądu w sensie logicznym) wprowadzone w pracy D. Vandervekena "What is a Proposition", stosując metody algebraiczne. Analiza ta umożliwia głębsze zrozumienie tego pojęcia, prowadzi m.in. do uogólnienia pojęcia „mocnej implikacji" (§5), jej głównym rezultatem jest pewna reprezentacja pojęcia „proposition” (§ 6).

In philosophical literature terms: „natural theology” (or „rational theology”) and „philosophical theology” are used as exchangeable. The author argues that natural and philosophical theology are different philosophical disciplines. It is possible to point out a philosophic theology, different from natural theology, the former aims are not only supposed to show that God exists but to unifícate, interpret and explain (understand) religious faith and her tasks are not primary apologetic. The author considers that the aims of the latter discipline are bound (...) with the preference of cognitive values such as certainty, rationality and being able to use one ’s rationality to convince your opponent. In the end of this article author introduces a sketch of method of philosophical theology as different form natural theology, which could overcome one-sided views about role of philosophical argument in study of religious belief and faith and their propositional content and lead not only to a more adequate analysis of the researched reality but also to the development of other disciplines. (shrink)

The uniqueness of Poland’s experience with the 2020 coronavirus lays in the interplay of two factors: the decisive governmental response to the pandemic, and the overlap of the pandemic with the country’s presidential election scheduled on May 10, 2020. The government’s fast reaction, combined with the citizens’ discipline, resulted in the suppression of the virus’s spread. The ratings of the current President Duda skyrocketed well above 50% needed for re-election in the first round. However, the expectation was that they would (...) be going down with the pandemic and lockdown fatigue. For almost two months, the government tried to organize the elections under the normal schedule while the opposition tried to block them. Finally, the opposition won, and the elections were rescheduled on June 28, with the President Duda’s ratings substantially lower. Nevertheless, in the runoff on July 11, Duda won. Our conclusion goes against the common opinion that electoral engineering is always one-sided. The reconstruction of the pre-electoral political maneuvers shows that many independent players were simultaneously involved in complex engineering, and that the final outcome was hard to predict until almost the very end. (shrink)

Cleve Staples Lewis w książce Cuda sformułował argument antynaturalistyczny, który nazwał kardynalną trudnością naturalizmu. Trudność ta ma polegać na tym, że jeśli przyjmiemy naturalizm z zasadą domknięcia kauzalnego, to wszystkie przekonania są faktami, których istnienie można w pełni wyjaśnić poprzez przeszły stan wszechświata oraz jego przemiany rządzone prawami fizyki. Naturalizm jest stanowiskiem, które składa się z przekonań i jeśli aspiruje do oceny bycia racjonalnym stanowiskiem, to powinien być przyjęty ze względu na rozumowanie. To jednak wydaje się być wykluczone ze względu (...) na naturalizm. Peter Van Inwagen w 2011 r. przedstawił krytykę argumentu Lewisa, sugerując, że opiera się on na nieuzasadnionym przekonaniu, że wyjaśnienia kauzalne jako takie oraz wyjaśnienia poprzez rozumowanie wykluczają się. Badam argumentacje obu autorów, dokładnie analizując argument Van Inwagena. Twierdzę, że: po pierwsze, nie uzasadnił on twierdzenia, że powyższe przekonanie przypisane Lewisowi jest faktycznie przesłanką jego rozumowania. Po drugie, przedstawiam na czym polega wytworzenie pewnego przekonania zarazem kauzalnie jak i poprzez rozumowanie. Po trzecie, analizuję tekst Lewisa, wykazując, że wspiera on możliwość spójności dwóch odmiennych rodzajów poprawnych wyjaśnień, ale argumentuję, że zasadniczą dla Lewisa jest teza, iż naturalizm nie pozostawia miejsca na wglądy będące elementem rozumowania i dlatego naturalizm wyklucza ową spójność. Po czwarte, badam przykład Phoebe podany przez Van Inwagena i konkluduję, że nie wystarcza on do stwierdzenia spójności obu typów wyjaśnień. Konkluduję, że artykuł Van Inwagena nie zawiera argumentu podważającego stanowisko Lewisa. (shrink)