Once More about Moore’s Paradox in Epistemic Logic and Belief Change Theory

Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (3):77-99 (2018)
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Abstract

In this article, it was first presented Moore’s paradox per se and after the author focused on the logical perspective — at first he analyzed these considerations in the field of so-called standard epistemic logic and after on the formal theory of belief change.

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00357685

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10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-4

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Marek Lechniak
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Searle - 1969 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (1):59-61.

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