The precarious rights of senior citizens, especially those who are highly educated and who are expected to counsel and guide the younger generations, has stimulated the creation internationally of advocacy associations and opinion leader groups. The strength of these groups, however, varies from country to country. In some countries, they are supported and are the focus of intense interest; in others, they are practically ignored. For this is reason we believe that the creation of a network of all these associations (...) is essential. The proposed network would act as a support for the already-existing policies of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, of independent experts, and of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People. All three have long ago recommended the creation of a recognized instrument for uniting presently scattered efforts. The proposed network, therefore, will seek to promote the international exchange of relevant expertise, and it will reinforce the commitments and actions that single countries are currently taking to meet these objectives. For example, informative public events can be organised to promote particular support initiatives and to provide an opportunity for new members of the network to be presented. The network will promote health for senior citizens, disease prevention, senior mobility, safe free time for seniors, alimentary education, protection against new risks and dangers, as well as equity in the services necessary for seniors to adopt new information and communication technologies. In the case of retired academic members, the network will promote equality with respect to continuing use of digital technologies (particularly email), continuing access to research libraries, and the guaranteed ability for seniors to fund their own research programs and to deliver free seminars. (shrink)

S pamfletom Avtoemancipacija! (1882), temeljnim besedilom zgodnjega judovskega nacionalizma, je Leon Pinsker po nekaterih argumentih uveljavil sionizem kot nemško govoreče in pišoče gibanje. Kmalu po izidu pamfleta je priznani jidiš pisatelj Šolem Jankev Abramovič objavil njegov prevod v jidiš (1884). V Abramovičevi različici so nemški oziroma zahodnoevropski politični in kulturni koncepti ter besednjak prirejeni vzhodnoevropskemu, judovskemu, jidiš govorečemu okolju, kar vključuje spremembe v besedišču, retoričnih strategijah in kulturnih referencah. Abramovič je pamflet predelal v skladu s svojim razmislekom o stiski Judov (...) v Ruskem imperiju in njeni mogoči nacionalistični rešitvi, s čimer se je ukvarjal tudi v svojih sočasnih romanih. V članku primerjam, kako so v obeh besedilih izraženi nekateri družbenopolitični koncepti, da bi ugotovil, ali Abramovič s svojo ideološko skepso prefinjeno priredi tudi vsebino nacionalistične teze. (shrink)

Many countries employ systemic methods of protecting consumers from unfair business practices. One such practice is the use of abusive clauses in business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts, which unfairly impose additional obligations on the consumer or deprive them of their due rights. This article presents an information system that utilizes artificial intelligence methods to automate contract analysis and to detect abusive clauses. The goal of the system is to support the entire administrative process, from contract acquisition, through text extraction and the recommendation (...) of potentially abusive clauses, to the generation of official administrative documents that can be sent to court or to the owners of firms. This article focuses on the components that use machine learning methods. The first is an intelligent crawler that is responsible for automatically detecting contract templates on websites and retrieving them into the system. The second is a document analysis module that implements a clause recommendation algorithm. The algorithm employs transformer-based language models and information retrieval methods to identify abusive passages in text. Our solution achieved first place in a competition on the automatic analysis of B2C contracts organized by the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), and has since been implemented as an official tool to support the contract analysis process in Poland. (shrink)

The action language C+ of Giunchiglia, Lee, Lifschitz, McCain and Turner is a high-level, logical formalism for the representation of domains involving action and change. However, one cannot directly express relationships which hold between states more than one time-step distant, or even say that one action determines another at the next time. We present C+timed, a generalization of C+ which removes these limitations. As for C+, translations to the language of causal theories are given. We also define a new kind (...) of transition system called a ‘run system’ to provide a graphical semantics. Finally, we show how domains involving prohibition and permission can be modelled, by incorporating the ideas of another extension of C+. (shrink)

This paper proposes a unified dependent type analysis of three puzzling phenomena: inversely linked interpretations, weak definite readings in possessives and Haddock-type readings. We argue that the three problematic readings have the same underlying surface structure, and that the surface structure postulated can be interpreted properly and compositionally using dependent types. The dependent type account proposed is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to formally connect the three phenomena. A further advantage of our proposal over previous analyses is (...) that it offers a principled solution to the puzzle of why both inversely linked interpretations and weak definite readings are blocked with certain prepositions. (shrink)

Author: Pepliński Marek Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S ANALYSIS OF MEANING OF “HAPPINESS” (Władysława Tatarkiewicza analiza terminu „szczęście”) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 633-674 Keywords: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF HAPPINESS, EMOTION, PLEASURE, EUDAIMONIA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: marek[DOT]peplinski[AT]univ[DOT]gda[DOT]pl www:Władysław Tatarkiewicz work on philosophical and moral psychology, particularly on theory of happiness is still example of the best kind of analytical and close to phenomenological analysis of (...) our speaking and thinking about the topics in question. He distinguishes four main different meanings of Polish word ‘szczęście’ and present a new classification of them based on two principles: the opposition of subjective and objective and between ordinary and philosophical language. Accordingly we can speak about luck, positive psychological states like different kinds of good emotions or feelings and pleasure, Greek eudaimonia and specifically philosophical, a very correct concept of happiness as a rationally justified deep and comprehensive satisfaction of one’s life taken in its wholeness. In this paper I present critically his classification and argue that subjective meanings are always related to objective concepts. (shrink)

The paper links higher education reforms and welfare states reforms in postcommunist Central European countries. It links current higher education debates (and reform pressures) and public sector debates (and reform pressures), stressing the importance of communist-era legacies in both areas. It refers to existing typologies of both higher education governance and welfare state regimes and concludes that the lack of the inclusion of Central Europe in any of them is a serious theoretical drawback in comparative social research. The region should (...) still, after more than two decades of transition and heavy international policy advising, be viewed as a “laboratory of social experimentation”. It is still too risky to suggest generalizations about how Central European higher education and welfare systems fit existing typologies. Consequently, the “transition” period is by no means over: it is over in terms of politics and economics but not in terms of social arrangements. Both higher education and welfare states should be viewed as “work in progress”: permanently under reform pressures, and with unclear future. (shrink)

The author examines the arguments for applicability of the limitation clause which specifies the requirements for limitation of constitutional freedoms and rights (Article 31 para. 3 of the Constitution) to the right to protection of life (Article 38). Even if there is almost a general acceptance of such applicability, this approach does not hold up to criticism based on the rule existing in the Polish legal order that treaty commitments concerning human rights have supremacy over national statutory regulations. Due to (...) an international pattern which does not provide application of the limitation clause to the right to life protection, despite the recognition — at the level of a constitutional standard — of applicability of the clause of Article 31 para. 3 to Article 38, and to protection of life in general, this will be made impossible at any attempt to formulate a statutory standard. He also points out the defectiveness of the reasoning leading to acceptance of certain limitations of a particular value (e.g. life) on the basis of the ex definitione exemptions existing in the international standard to the assumption of applicability of the limitation clause when shaping statutory standards in the Polish legal system. The discussed issues are related to the question of interpretation of the inviolability of human rights. This term takes different meaning in the context of: 1) inviolability of all human rights understood in abstracto as normative structures of a general and abstract nature; 2) right protecting certain values with no exception; 3) rights to which an application of the limitation clause is forbidden; 4) rights not subject to derogation; 5) inviolability of understood in concreto, as that is (here and now) due to the subject of dignity; 6) inviolable essence of freedoms and rights. One should also clearly distinguish between (7) the descriptive and (8) the normative meaning of inviolability. -/- Punktem wyjścia jest analiza argumentacji na rzecz tezy o stosowalności do prawa do ochrony życia (art. 38 Konstytucji RP), klauzuli limitacyjnej określającej warunki ograniczania konstytucyjnych wolności i praw (art. 31 ust. 3). Mimo niemal powszechnej akceptacji tej tezy, nie wytrzymuje ona krytyki opartej na pierwszeństwie, które w polskim porządku prawnym mają zobowiązania traktowe dotyczące praw człowieka, wobec regulacji ustawowych. Ze względu na wzorzec międzynarodowy, który nie przewiduje stosowania klasycznej klauzuli limitacyjnej do prawa do życia, mimo uznania - na poziomie standardu konstytucyjnego - stosowalności klauzuli z art. 31 ust. 3 do art. 38 i ochrony życia w ogóle, stosowalność tej klauzuli będzie uniemożliwiona przy każdej próbie formułowania standardu ustawowego. Autor zwraca uwagę na wadliwość wnioskowania prowadzącego od uznania dopuszczalności pewnych ograniczeń ochrony jakiejś wartości (np. życia) na podstawie wyjątków ex definitione obecnych w standardzie międzynarodowym, do tezy o stosowalności klauzuli limitacyjnej przy kształtowaniu standardu ustawowego w polskim systemie prawnym. (shrink)

Author: Jedliński Marek Title: WESTERN CULTURE THROUGH THE EYES OF RUSSIAN ROMANTICS. ON CAPITALISM AND RATIONALISM (Kultura Zachodu oczami romantyków rosyjskich. Rzecz o kapitalizmie i racjonalizmie) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 373-383 Keywords: RUSSIAN ROMANTIC, WESTERN CULTURE, CAPITALISM, RATIONALISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article presents Russian Romantics’ reflections on Western culture, highlighting their views on capitalism and rationalism. Russian thinkers regarded farewell with religious outlook (...) and the associated development of capitalism as unambiguously negative. According to them, capitalism led to egocentric perception of reality and finally to demise of culture. They called capitalism ‘a contemporary form of barbarism’ as it encouraged fighting and increased the desire to possess. They claimed it would precipitate an acute crisis resulting in regression of civilization. The capitalism-induced process of degradation of Western culture was accelerated by the affirmation of reason. Rationalism limited human freedom. The views were expressed in the oeuvre of the poet Alexei Khomakov and of the historians Stepan Shevyriov and Mikhail Pogodin, as well as, in a more structured manner, in Vladimir Odoyevsky’s novel titled ‘Russian Nights’ (1844). (shrink)

Author: Siwiec Marek Kazimierz Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S VIEWS ON CREATIVITY WITH REGARDS to a Creative Source (Koncepcja twórczości Władysława Tatarkiewicza a twórcze źródło) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 573-590 Keywords: CREATIVITY, CREATIVE SOURCE, PLURALISTIC AESTHETICS, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, KARL JASPERS, BARBARA SKARGA, GEORG SIMMEL Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In the essay – which consists of the three parts – the author tries to show Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s views (...) on problems of the creativity as a basis to considerations on the creative source. In the first part the author outlines a point of view of a creator such as an artist, a poet, a composer. In the second part we can see the author sketching the problems of creativity and the creator itself. At the beginning he focuses on the Tatarkiewicz’s programme of pluralistic aesthetics with important discerning notions of aesthetics explicite and aesthetics implicite. The latter relates to works of art and the aesthetics views of the artists which can be found within. Afterwards he discusses main notions of the creator and the creativity i.e. poetic creativity, divine creativity, artistic creativity, human creativity. More carefully he examines contemporary approach of the creativity by Tatarkiewicz and analyses two criteria of it: high level of a novelty and a large outlay of an intellectual energy. The author notices a certain difficulty of the approach, namely a repetition of the intellectual energy in both criteria, yet he proposes a solution to the issue: first criterion relates to potential energy as a certain possibility, whereas the second relates to energy effectively implemented by the creator. He also discusses relation between the creativity and culture. In the third part the author approaches the problems of the creative source. He discusses views of Karl Jaspers, Barbara Skarga and Georg Simmel. In the conclusion the author defines the creative source as a task and a way of the creator. He points out that Tatarkiewicz’s view can be good groundwork to developing further considerations on the issue of the creative source. (shrink)

In the paper I analyse some problems with the relation of properties to object. Such kind of relation is usually called “inherence,” “possessing” or “characterization.” I start with Lowe’s concept of inherence contained in his four-category ontology because I think it generates some very interested issues. Lowe thinks that inherence holds between modes and objects as well as between kinds and universal properties. I argue that there cannot be universal properties but only universals which are instantiated by entities which are (...) properties. Thus property-universals cannot inhere in anything. I also stress that we need a concept of explanatory dependence in order to correctly characterize inherence. Finally I draw attention to great importance of the problem of relationships of kinds to property-universals to the doctrine of substantialism. Key words E.J. LOWE, ONTOLOGY, INHERENCE. (shrink)

The author examines the so-called paradox of identity through time. As he argues, the paradox is often elaborated by enumeration of several theses which generate a contradiction. According to these conditions, change is paradoxical and even impossible because it seems that objects persist as unchanging, or that every change destroys an object and generates a new one . In the first part of the paper the author discusses Roxanne Marie Kurtz’s version of such a view. Subsequently he analyses typical attempts (...) to resolve the paradox. The third section is devoted to applicability of the relation “=” to the correct formulation of the problem of identity through time. He argues that analytic philosophers too hastily decided that identity through time is a strict logical identity holding between quite mysterious “object before change” and “object after change”. It seems that such a view follows from the unjustified presupposition that logic is prior to ontology, i.e. that logic provides a categorial basis for ontology. Apart from this, the exact ontological status of the states described by expressions “object before change” and “object after change” escape our knowledge. In the fourth section he examines the condition of a-temporal exemplification based on the condition of simple exemplification . He argues that the latter is equivocal because one can distinguish several kinds of dependence . Some of them do not have to imply the extrinsic character of the properties involved in change. Key words IDENTITY, TIME, PARADOX. (shrink)

Choć samo zjawisko wykluczenia społecznego nie jest nowe, to jego waga, zwłaszcza w perspektywie praw człowieka, została doceniona stosunkowo niedawno. „Wykluczenie społeczne” nie jest kategorią konstytucyjną. Celem opracowania jest ogólne usytuowanie problematyki wykluczenia w kontekście zagadnień konstytucyjnych. Zmierza się do dookreślenia, czym jest wykluczenie społeczne oraz do wskazania zasadniczych konstytucyjnych punktów odniesienia, pozwalających na podjęcie tego problemu. Właściwe wykluczeniu społecznemu jest złożoność przyczyn - sam brak środków finansowych nie musi prowadzić do wykluczenia, choć proces wykluczania może być zainicjowany jednym wydarzeniem. (...) Jednak wykluczenia nie można adekwatnie scharakteryzować jedynie poprzez jego przyczyny. Wielowymiarowość dotyczy także przejawów wykluczenia. O wykluczeniu społecznym w sensie właściwym mówi się wówczas, gdy ograniczenia dotyczą jednocześnie wielu sfer życia społecznego. Chodzi przy tym o sfery fundamentalne, istotne . Charakterystyczne dla wykluczenia jest dłuższe trwanie w czasie. Często ma wymiar przestrzenny – procesy wykluczania prowadzą do wyodrębnienia obszarów, enklaw zamieszkanych przez wykluczanych, co jeszcze bardziej utrwala stan wykluczenia. Procesy wykluczania prowadzą niekiedy do zjawiska zwanego dziedziczeniem biedy czy wykluczenia. Ochrona przed wykluczeniem, wolność od niego, została uznana za prawo człowieka; prawo niesprowadzalne do tradycyjnie formułowanych praw gospodarczych, socjalnych i kulturalnych; mimo że wykluczenie społeczne dotyczy przede wszystkim udziału w życiu gospodarczym, społecznym i kulturalnym. Wykluczenie jest powiązane z naruszeniem zasady równości, jednak nie daje się ująć jedynie w perspektywie tej zasady, przy czym w szeregu istotnych punktów różni się od dyskryminacji w korzystaniu z praw człowieka. Poszukując w Konstytucji RP, w której brak jest kategorii „wykluczenia społecznego” zasadniczych punktów odniesienia należy poszukiwać w zasadzie godności z art. 30 oraz – w stosunku do obywateli – w art. 1. Jako pomocnicze punkty odniesienia można wskazać zasady sprawiedliwości społecznej, solidarności oraz równości, a także konstytucyjny katalog wolności i praw, przede wszystkim wolności i praw ekonomicznych, socjalnych i kulturalnych. (shrink)

Formalization of reasoning which accepts rules of inference leading to conclusions whose logical values are not smaller than the logical value of the “weakest” premise leads to the concept of consequence operation preserving degrees of truth. Several examples of such consequence operation have already been considered . In the present paper we give a general notion of the consequence operation preserving degrees of truth and its characterization in terms of projective generation and selfextensionality.

The article deals with relations between the individual and human rights on the one hand, and the State on the other, in the context of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The author poses the question whether the idea of subordination of the State to the individual is really a central idea of that constitution. He puts forward many arguments against such suggestion. These arguments relate, above all, to the arrangement of the constitution: a chapter concerning human rights is (...) chapter II, while chapter I deals with foundation of the State; the goals of the State are specified in the preamble including the following initial phrase “the existence and future of Poland as our Homeland” and in Article 5 where human rights are as subject of protection by the State is mentioned after independence and integrity of [its] territory; a general concept of human rights protection adopted in the constitution is dominated by the structures typical of law in its objective sense; the way of regulation admissible limitations on human rights differs from international standards; possibility of claiming human rights is constitutionally guaranteed, mostly by constitutional complaint which is above all aimed at correction of legal system, rather than claiming of rights by the individual; Article 1 (“The Republic of Poland shall be the common good of all its citizens”) interpreted as referring to Article 1 paragraph 1 of the April Constitution of 1935, one of the main ideas of which was precedence of the State over the individual. He also analyses the arguments in favour of the recognition of the idea of subordination of the State. Nevertheless, they cannot be accepted as resolving the question of whether it is a central idea of the constitution. These arguments include in particular: the principle of subsidiarity contained in the preamble, even if it has not been appropriately emphasized there; recognition of inherent and inalienable dignity of the person, but it was not until Article 30 that this provision has been contained and it does not determine the relations between the human dignity and rights and the State. The author suggests that the only conclusive way to justify the subordination of the State in relation to the individual as a central idea of the constitution is by means of Article 1. Taking into account, above all, preparatory work, we should reject the interpretation of that article referring to the April (1935) Constitution. Essential interpretative context may be found in preparatory work and social teachings of the Catholic Church, referred to therein. In that case, the common good means the entirety of the conditions of social life which favour the human development. These conditions include above all the respect for human dignity. Such interpretation of Article 1 gives priority to proposals on what the State should be to serve the individual rather than to safeguard obligations of citizens in relation to the State. (shrink)

The article provides an analysis of the European Court of Human Rights judgments in the case of Lautsi v. Italy (application no. 30814/06), also known as the Italian crucifix case. The applicant claimed that displaying crucifixes in the Italian State-school classrooms attended by her children was contrary to the principle of secularism, by which she wished to bring up her children, and therefore infringed her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions, and (...) also breached her freedom of conviction and religion, as protected by Article 9 of the Convention. In its judgment of November 3, 2009, the seven-judge Chamber declared that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to education) of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) of the Convention. The judgment was given unanimously and none of the judges appended a separate opinion. The Italian Government asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. In the judgment of the Grand Chamber, delivered on March 18, 2011, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two (and with separate opinions of six judges), that there had been no violation of Protocol No. 1 and no violation of the Convention itself. The analysis in the article is focused on selected principal factors determining the Court's decision. It shows that the proposal for the Court to recognize secular convictions as those protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 or Article 9 of the Convention has no sufficient basis in the Convention itself and in earlier Court's case-law and, even, may be considered as promotion of religious intolerance, threatening the freedom to publicly manifest a religion or belief, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. -/- Opracowanie zawiera analizę wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału, które zapadły w sprawie Soile Lautsi (app. 30814/06), zwaną „włoska sprawa krzyża” (Italian Crucifix Case). W sprawie tej skarżąca zarzucała, że okazywanie znaku krzyża w klasach włoskich szkół państwowych, do których uczęszczały jej dzieci, jest sprzeczne z zasadą sekularyzmu, zgodnie z którą chciała ona wychować swoje dzieci i dlatego stanowi naruszenie jej prawa do wychowania i nauczania zgodnego z jej religijnymi i filozoficznymi (moralnymi) przekonaniami, oraz stanowi naruszenie wolności religijnej, gwarantowanej art. 9 Konwencji. W wyroku siedmioosobowej izby ogłoszonym 3 listopada 2009 r. izba uznała naruszenie art. 2 (Prawo do nauki) Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 do Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności w powiązaniu z art. 9 (Wolność myśli, sumienia i wyznania) Konwencji. Wyrok zapadł jednomyślnie i żaden z sędziów nie dołączył do wyroku swoich uwag. Rząd Włoch złożył wniosek w trybie przewidzianym art. 43 Konwencji o przekazanie sprawy do Wielkiej Izby. W wyroku Wielkiej Izby ogłoszonym 18 marca 2011 r. Trybunał uznał zdecydowaną większością głosów – 15 za wobec 2 przeciw (sześciu sędziów dołączyło swoje uwagi), że nie doszło do naruszenia ani Protokołu nr 1, ani samej Konwencji. Analizy koncentrują się na wybranych zagadnieniach, kluczowych dla argumentacji Trybunału. Analizy te pokazują, że postulowanie przez izbę uznania za prawo podmiotowe radykalnie pojętej negatywnej wolności religijnej, oraz postulowanie - tak przez izbę, jak i przez Wielką Izbę - ochrony przekonań sekularystycznych jako przekonań chronionych art. 2 Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 lub art. 9 Konwencji, nie posiada należytego uzasadnienia ani w samej Konwencji, ani w dotychczasowym orzecznictwie Trybunału, a co więcej – może być uznane za propagowanie nietolerancji religijnej, godzącej przede wszystkim chronioną art. 9 Konwencji wolność publicznego uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych i filozoficznych. (shrink)

This essay is an introduction to a lecture course "Elements of Descriptive Psychology" delivered by Anton Marty in around 1903/04. Marty offered courses on descriptive psychology at regular intervals in the course of his career at the University of Prague. The content of these courses follows closely the ideas of Marty’s teacher Franz Brentano, though with some interesting divergences and extrapolations. The present work is a historical and systematic introduction to an extract from notes taken of Marty’s lecture, with some (...) discussion of the work of Dilthey on similar topics, and of Marty’s influence on Franz Kafka and on the Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer. (shrink)

This article first of all attempts to assess the proposals of 2006–2007 to amend Poland’s Constitution, aimed mostly at strengthening constitutional protection of unborn human life. Parliamentary work on this proposal begins with the submission of the Deputy’s bill on amendment of the Constitution, published in the Sejm Paper No. 993 of September 5, 2006, and ends with a series of votes at the 39th sitting of the Sejm of the fifth term of office, held on April 13, 2007, on (...) which it was decided not to adopt any amendment. In the course of the legislative process, several modifi cation were offered not only to Article 38 concerning protection of life, but also to Article 30 dealing with dignity as a source of rights. Each of these proposals had drawbacks, including inter alia: the lack of a definite period of protection or entitlement to dignity, resulting in the decreased protection in relation to issues concerning euthanasia; the application of new categories granting a specific status to unborn human life; specifying the standards for protection by means of legislative acts ranking lower than a constitution, resulting in the transfer of life protection into the sphere of regulation of ordinary legislation. The most conducive for strengthening of the protection of unborn human life, even if not free of imperfections, was an amendment of Article 30 proposed by the Committee in the following wording: “The inherent and inalienable dignity, conferred on the person from the moment of conception, shall be a source of freedoms and rights of persons and citizens. It shall be inviolable; the respect and protection thereof shall be the obligation of public authorities.” From the rejection of the proposals it is diffi cult to draw conclusions that are vital for interpretation of the existing provisions. However, a conclusion that the intention of the authors of the constitution was not to strengthen the constitutional protection of life is not legitimate, mostly because of their doubts about formal correctness of the proposed amendments (when deciding to reject them), particularly the doubts about legal consequences of their adoption. -/- Streszczenie Zasadniczym celem opracowania jest próba całościowej oceny propozycji nowelizacji Konstytucji RP mającej miejsce w latach 2006-2007, zmierzającej przede wszystkim do wzmocnienia konstytucyjnej ochrony życia człowieka przed narodzeniem. Prace parlamentarne nad analizowaną nowelizacją otwiera poselski projekt ustawy o zmianie Konstytucji zawarty w druku sejmowym 993 z dnia 5 września 2006 (projekt wpłynął do Sejmu 7 września); zamyka seria głosowań na 39 posiedzeniu Sejmu V kadencji, dnia 13 kwietnia 2007 roku; głosowań, które przesądziły o niewprowadzeniu żadnych zmian. W trakcie procesu legislacyjnego proponowano szereg formuł, zmieniających nie tylko art. 38 dotyczący ochrony życia, ale także art. 30, który dotyczy godności jako źródła praw. W zasadzie wszystkie zgłoszone propozycje posiadały wady, wśród których najważniejsze to: brak domknięcia okresu ochrony lub przysługiwania godności, skutkujący obniżeniem ochrony w kwestiach związanych z eutanazją; stosowanie nowych kategorii, prowadzące do nadania specyficznego statusu człowiekowi przed narodzeniem; określanie standardu ochrony za pośrednictwem aktów o randze niższej od konstytucji, prowadzące do przesunięcia ochrony życia przed narodzeniem w sferę ustawodawstwa zwykłego. Z punktu widzenia celu, jakim było wzmocnienie konstytucyjnej ochrony życia człowieka przed narodzeniem i wzmocnienie jego pozycji prawnej, najlepsza, choć nie pozbawiona usterek, była zaproponowana przez Komisję zmiana brzmienia art. 30 prowadząca do formuły: „Źródłem wolności i praw człowieka i obywatela jest przyrodzona i niezbywalna godność człowieka, przynależna mu od chwili poczęcia. Jest ona nienaruszalna, a jej poszanowanie i ochrona jest obowiązkiem władz publicznych.”. Na podstawie odrzucenia propozycji zmian trudno wyciągać wnioski istotne dla interpretacji aktualnie obowiązujących przepisów; wniosek, że ustrojodawca nie chciał wzmocnienia konstytucyjnej ochrony życie nie jest prawomocny, przede wszystkim ze względu na – istotne w procesie podejmowania decyzji o odrzuceniu propozycji zmian – wątpliwości, co do formalnej poprawności formułowanych propozycji, w tym wątpliwości co do konsekwencji prawnych ich przyjęcia. (shrink)

Celem opracowania jest dookreślenie tego, czym jest prywatność. Interesuje mnie prywatność w aspekcie nor¬matywnym, jako coś, co uważamy za nasze dobro; coś, czego się domagamy, co jest naszym prawem, i to nie tylko w sensie moralnym, ale także chronionym prawem pozytywnym. Prywatność jest czymś relacyjnym, i to przynajmniej w dwojakim znaczeniu. Po pierwsze, konstytuowana jest poprzez relację oddzielenia od czegoś - państwa, zakładu pracy (pracodawcy), rozmaitych instytucji. Po drugie, to, co prywatne z punktu widzenia jednych relacji - np. relacji jednostki (...) do państwa, do sprawowanych urzędów - nie musi być prywatne z punktu widzenia pracy zawodowej. Prywatność nie jest oparta na prostej opozycji pomiędzy tym, co społeczne, grupowe, a tym, co osobiste, indywidualne; podmiotem prywatności może być podmiot zbiorowy i nie wobec każdej grupy społecznej można się sensownie domagać prywatności. Prywatność pozwala w pełni dysponować tym, co „moje”. Sfera prywatna daje szczególne możliwości realizacji moich własnych celów, uzyskuję przestrzeń indywidualizacji, realizacji siebie jako niepowtarzalnej jednostki, której też sam jestem autorem. W sferze prywatnej podmioty stają się też podmiotami tworzącymi przestrzeń normatywną, uznając reguły rozpoznawane jako wyraz tego, co naturalne, zastane, i tworząc lub współtworząc z innymi uczestnikami tej sfery własne reguły, realizując przez to istotny wymiar autonomii osoby. Prywatność daje wreszcie przestrzeń dla rozwoju relacji ściśle osobowych, opartych na wyłączności tego, co między osobami się rozgrywa. Mając na uwadze zbieżność dążenia do ograniczania prywatności z wprowadzaniem elementów totalitarnych, można także zauważyć, że ochrona prywatności nie tylko chroni jednostki, ale i potrzebna jest sferze publicznej jako jeden ze środków przeciwko wadom rozwiązań totalitarnych. (shrink)

The Polish society has perceived privatization as an issue of special importance which enables a free market economy in a short time. Privatization has always raised hopes and expectations. It is the lack of experience in the field of ownership transformations, the level of their complexity and the economic, legal, psychological and other conditionings that have confronted those transformations with many hindrances. They have also raised numerous moral and ethical dilemmas among the staff of privatized companies and founding organs including (...) the staff of the Voivodship Council of Łódź. The decisions of the Working Board of one company about the future path of privatization have raised concerns among the staff uncertain of the fate of their place of work. In such cases the voice of the staff, which previously contributed to the company’s financial status, has always been decisive when choosing the path of privatization; this concerns mostly workers’ partnerships. It was John Paul II’s words about people of conscience who are needed in Poland, which were said in Skoczów, that were crucial for privatization decisions by the Voivodship Council of Łódź. (shrink)

The paper outlines ongoing research on logic-based tools for the analysis and representation of legal contracts, of the kind frequently encountered in large-scale engineering projects and complex, long-term trading agreements. We consider both contract formation and contract performance, in each case identifying the representational issues and the prospects for providing automated support tools.

Artykuł jest odpowiedzią na polemikę Stanisława Ruczaja z argumentem z Wcielenia, który został zaprezentowany w książce Ukrytość i Wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga. Ruczaj zarzuca tzw. obronie inkarnacyjnej, że nie rozważa ona możliwości, zgodnie z którą Bóg jest zarazem wcielony, jak i nieukryty. W niniejszym artykule koncentruję się na uzasadnieniu, dlaczego uważam, że jest możliwe, iż owa opcja jest dla Boga wykluczona. Według mnie istnieją racje przemawiające za tym, że jest ona (a) logicznie sprzeczna, (...) (b) niespójna z doskonałym moralnie charakterem Boga, (c) nie skutkowałaby wyeliminowaniem niewiary bez oporu we Wcielenie. (shrink)

On Conditions of Participation: The Deficits of Public Reason The paper analyzes the conditions of civic participation that are elucidated by criticism of the deficits of public reason. The interpretation proceeds in three steps. First, the idea of public reason and discourse is analyzed, followed by an explanation of democratic deficit and of the social deficit in the second and third steps, respectively. These deficits are analyzed as an essential limit to political and social conditions of the participation of citizens. (...) The analysis focuses thereby on the theory of public reason by one of the most influential political philosophers of the last decades, John Rawls. The paper identifies two main pitfalls in his theory: first, the deficit following from an inadequate integration of an individual into society, which, in this case, represents democratic deficit, second, the deficit linked with underrating the socio-distributive dimension of justice, which means a social deficit. (shrink)

Wywiad przeprowadzono 2 września 2021 (forma: Zoom); opublikowano 27 sierpnia 2023.

In this paper I would like to argue that Stoic logic is a kind ofrelevant logic rather than the classical logic. To realize this purpose I willtry to keep as close as possible to Stoic calculus as expressed with the helpof their arguments.

Zaionc, M., λ-Definability on free algebras, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 51 279-300. A λ-language over a simple type structure is considered. There is a natural isomorphism which identifies free algebras with nonempty second-order types. If A is a free algebra determined by the signature SA = [α1,...,αn], then by a type τA we mean τ1,...,τn→0 where τi=0αi→0. It can be seen that closed terms of the type τA reflex constructions in the algebra A. Therefore any term of the (...) type n→τA defines some n-ary mapping in algebra A. The problem is to characterize λ-definable mappings in any free algebra. It is proved that the set of λ-definable operations is the minimal set that contains constant functions and projections and is closed under composition and limited recursion. This result is a generalization of the result of Schwichtenberg and Statman which characterize the λ-definable functions over the natural number type →, i.e algebra [1, 0], as well as of the result of Zaionc for λ-definable word operations over type n→, i.e algebra [1,...,1,0], and of the results about λ-definable tree operations , i.e in algebra [2, 0]. Some of the examples in Section 5 are based on a publication of Zaionc. (shrink)

Using the Makkai's duality for first-order logic, we characterise effective descent morphisms in 2-categories of pretoposes and Barr-exact categories. In both cases they coincide with conservative morphisms. We show that in those 2-categories the 2-coregular factorisations are exactly quotient-conservative factorisations. We also prove a generalisation of the Makkai duality for pseudoelementary categories.