Debates on situated affectivity have mainly focused on tools that exert some positive influence on affective experience. Far less attention has been paid to artifacts that interact with the expression of affect, or to those that exert some negative influence. To shed light on that shadowy corner of our affective social lives, I describe the workings of an atypical socio-affective artifact, namely, sunglasses. Drawing on insights from psychology and other social sciences, I construe sunglasses as a social shield that helps (...) us block spontaneous emotional expressions, as well as affecting other social processes that heavily depend on the eye region: gaze direction detection, identity recognition, and the sense of intimacy afforded by eye contact. (shrink)

Inspired by the literature on extended/scaffolded mind, a debate concerning the contribution of extra-bodily resources to our (extended) emotions is recently gaining traction. Within this debate, inspired by the literature on cognitive artifacts introduces the notion of “affective artifacts”, indicating those objects that exert persistent effects on our feelings, possibly altering our self. However, by focusing on feelings, this notion neglects other facets of emotional episodes. Following Scarnatino’s tripartition between feeling, appraisal, and motivational theories of emotion, I present three varieties (...) of affective artifacts: Feeling, Evaluative and Motivational Artifacts. (shrink)

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...) will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6). (shrink)

Munch-Jurisic’s book thoroughly describes several cases of severe distresses reported and expressed by perpetrators of tremendous acts such as mass murders. Arguing against a simplistic reading according to which these signs of distress are straightforward manifestations of some innate moral nature, and against the optimistic reading according to which they will lead to prosocial behaviors, Munch-Jursic offers compelling reasons to adopt a more complex theory of emotion. In this commentary, I aim to stress the implications of her book for the (...) debate on moral enhancement and for emotion theory in general. However, while I concur with Munch-Jurisic that emotion theory must make room for complexity and indeterminacy, I challenge her claim that motivational theories of emotion are ill-equipped to face the challenges she poses. (shrink)

In their attempt to connect the workings of the human mind with their neural realizers, cognitive neuroscientists often bracket out individual differences to build a single, abstract model that purportedly represents (almost) every human being’s brain. In this paper I first examine the rationale behind this model, which I call ‘Platonic Brain Model’. Then I argue that it is to be surpassed in favor of multiple models allowing for patterned inter-individual differences. I introduce the debate on legitimate (and illegitimate) ways (...) of mapping neural structures and cognitive functions, endorsing a view according to which function-structure mapping is context-sensitive. Building on the discussion of the ongoing debate on the function(s) of the so-called Fusiform “Face” Area, I show the necessity of indexing function-structure mappings to some populations of subjects, clustered on the basis of factors such as their expertise in a given domain. (shrink)

A historical and philosophical reassessment of the impact of Aristotle and early-modern Aristotelianism on the development of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant and Aristotle reassesses the prevailing understanding of Kant as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher. Taking epistemology, logic, and methodology to be the key disciplines through which Kant’s transcendental philosophy stood as an independent form of philosophy, Marco Sgarbi shows that Kant drew important elements of his logic and metaphysical doctrines from Aristotelian ideas that were absent in other philosophical traditions, such (...) as the distinction of matter and form of knowledge, the division of transcendental logic into analytic and dialectic, the theory of categories and schema, and the methodological issues of the architectonic. Drawing from unpublished documents including lectures, catalogues, academic programs, and the Aristotelian-Scholastic handbooks that were officially adopted at Königsberg University where Kant taught, Sgarbi further demonstrates the historical and philosophical importance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism to these disciplines from the late sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Since cognitive neuroscience aims at giving an integrated account of mind and brain, its ontology should include both neural and cognitive entities and specify their relations. According to what we call the standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience, the aim of cognitive neuroscience should be to establish one-to-one mappings between neural and cognitive entities. Where such entities do not yet closely align, this can be achieved by reforming the cognitive ontology, the neural ontology, or both. In order to assess the (...) limits and the possibilities of the SOFCN, we will examine a paradigmatic case study: the concept of Broca’s area, which indicates an alleged mapping between the left inferofrontal gyrus and the production of language. We review evidence showing that such a mapping does not hold, thus calling into question either the status of Broca’s area or the validity of the SOFCN. We then propose some strategies for addressing the issue and suggest that it may be solved within the SOFCN by adopting both of the following strategies: first, more accurately defining the relevant neural structures and second, switching the focus of neural ontology from structures to events, individuated by a where conjoint with a how. (shrink)

What is mathematics about? And if it is about some sort of mathematical reality, how can we have access to it? This is the problem raised by Plato, which still today is the subject of lively philosophical disputes. This book traces the history of the problem, from its origins to its contemporary treatment. It discusses the answers given by Aristotle, Proclus and Kant, through Frege's and Russell's versions of logicism, Hilbert's formalism, Gödel's platonism, up to the the current debate on (...) Benacerraf's dilemma and the indispensability argument. Through the considerations of themes in the philosophy of language, ontology, and the philosophy of science, the book aims at offering an historically-informed introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, approached through the lenses of its most fundamental problem. (shrink)

Social norms have played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation, serving to stabilize prosocial and egalitarian behavior despite the self-serving motives of individuals. Young children’s behavior mostly conforms to social norms, as they follow adult behavioral directives and instructions. But it turns out that even preschool children also actively enforce social norms on others, often using generic normative language to do so. This behavior is not easily explained by individualistic motives; it is more likely a result of (...) children’s growing identification with their cultural group, which leads to prosocial motives for preserving its ways of doing things. (shrink)

Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804645.

Human social life is structured by social norms creating both obligations and entitlements. Recent research has found that young children enforce simple obligations against norm violators by protesting. It is not known, however, whether they understand entitlements in the sense that they will actively object to a second party attempting to interfere in something that a third party is entitled to do — what we call counter-protest. In two studies, we found that 3-year-old children understand when a person is entitled (...) to do something, and so they actively defend this person’s entitlement against unjustified interference from second parties. In some cases, they even enforce second-order entitlements, for example, in the case of ownership where an owner is entitled to entitle others to use the owner’s property. (shrink)

This paper replies to objections that have been raised against my operational-Kantian account of thought experiments by Fehige 2012 and 2013. Fehige also sketches an alternative Neo-Kantian account that utilizes Michael Friedman’s concept of a contingent and changeable a priori. To this I shall reply, first, that Fehige’s objections not only neglect some fundamental points I had made as regards the realizability of TEs, but also underestimate the principle of empiricism, which was rightly defended by Kant. Secondly, in opposition to (...) what he states, my account does not differ in a very essential way from the empiricist solutions either as regards the power of TEs to predict something new about empirical reality, or as regards the criteria for telling apart good from bad TEs. Thirdly, in the light of the Kantian definition of the a priori, Friedman’s corresponding notion is contrary both to the spirit and to the letter of Kant’s philosophy; moreover, from a theoretical point of view, a material a priori is theoretically untenable since, counter to Friedman’s own intentions, it leads to relativism. -/- . (shrink)

By inserting the dialogue between Einstein, Schlick and Reichenbach into a wider network of debates about the epistemology of geometry, this paper shows that not only did Einstein and Logical Empiricists come to disagree about the role, principled or provisional, played by rods and clocks in General Relativity, but also that in their lifelong interchange, they never clearly identified the problem they were discussing. Einstein’s reflections on geometry can be understood only in the context of his ”measuring rod objection” against (...) Weyl. On the contrary, Logical Empiricists, though carefully analyzing the Einstein–Weyl debate, tried to interpret Einstein’s epistemology of geometry as a continuation of the Helmholtz–Poincaré debate by other means. The origin of the misunderstanding, it is argued, should be found in the failed appreciation of the difference between a “Helmholtzian” and a “Riemannian” tradition. The epistemological problems raised by General Relativity are extraneous to the first tradition and can only be understood in the context of the latter, the philosophical significance of which, however, still needs to be fully explored. (shrink)

The notion of schema has been given a major role by Recanati within his conception of primary pragmatic processes, conceived as a type of associative process. I intend to show that Recanati’s considerations on schemata may challenge the relevance theorist’s argument against associative explanations in pragmatics, and support an argument in favor of associative (versus inferential) explanations. More generally, associative relations can be shown to be schematic, that is, they have enough structure to license inferential effects without any appeal to (...) genuine inferential processes. Associative processes are thus able to explain a number of pragmatic and linguistic phenomena which have instead been thought to require specialized inferential processes. (shrink)

Cognitive Robotics can be defined as the study of cognitive phenomena by their modeling in physical artifacts such as robots. This is a very lively and fascinating field which has already given fundamental contributions to our understanding of natural cognition. Nonetheless, robotics has to date addressed mainly very basic, low­level cognitive phenomena like sensory­motor coordination, perception, and navigation, and it is not clear how the current approach might scale up to explain high­level human cognition. In this paper we argue that (...) a promising way to do that is to merge current ideas and methods of 'embodied cognition' with the Russian tradition of theoretical psychology which views language not only as a communication system but also as a cognitive tool, that is by developing a Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics. We substantiate this idea by discussing several domains in which language can improve basic cognitive abilities and permit the development of high­level cognition: learning, categorization, abstraction, memory, voluntary control, and mental life. (shrink)

Many versions of the ontological argument have two shortcomings: First, despite the arguments put forward, for example, by Hugh Chandler and Nathan Salmon, they assume that S5 is the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality. Second, despite the classical arguments put forward, for example, by David Hume and Immanuel Kant or the more recent arguments put forward, for example, by John Findlay and Richard Swinburne, they assume that necessary existence is possible. The aim of the paper is to develop an (...) alternative version of the ontological argument that, by an appeal to the logic of ‘actually’, avoids these two shortcomings. The version helps to leave aside unnecessary debates about the modal logic S5 or about the possibility of necessary existence and to focus on the actual challenge for the debate about the ontological argument: the challenge to evaluate the claim that it is possible that God exists. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim at identifying a concept of man that can represent a reference point for those who work or supervise social processes characterized by commercial or economic purposes. Economic, management, and organizational theories and ideas have a large impact on the way we think of ourselves, and we act accordingly. By making a radical departure from the ontological assumptions, this paper proposes a shifting of the current paradigm in terms of how we theorize about man. In order (...) to do this, we analyze the ontological level of the relationship between the idea of happiness and the concept of man from medieval scholastics, and the relationship between the idea of happiness and functionalism in social science. We first prove the formal equivalence between the structures of human choice as described in the qq. 6–21 Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the model of problem-solving behavior as conceptualized in popular management models. Then we show that the Aquinas theory of action could provide a more adequate view of economy and business in the sociocultural and environmental context in which they operate. Finally, we present the implications of this study for management theory, practice, and education. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to compare three alternative formal reconstructions of van Inwagen’s famous argument for incompatibilism. In the first part of my paper, I examine van Inwagen’s own reconstruction within a propositional modal logic. I point out that, due to the expressive limitations of his propositional modal logic, van Inwagen is unable to argue directly (that is, within his formal framework) for incompatibilism. In the second part of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen’s argument within (...) a first-order predicate logic. I show, however, that even though this reconstruction is not susceptible to the same objection, this reconstruction can be shown to be inconsistent (given van Inwagen’s own assumptions). At the end of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen’s argument within a quantified counterfactual logic with propositional quantifiers. I show that within this formal framework van Inwagen would not only be able to argue directly for incompatibilism, he would also be able to argue for crucial assumptions of his argument. (shrink)

Emoticons and facial emojis are ubiquitous in contemporary digital communication, where it has been proposed that they make up for the lack of social information from real faces. In this paper, I construe them as cultural artifacts that exploit the neurocognitive mechanisms for face perception. Building on a step-by-step comparison of psychological evidence on the perception of faces vis-à-vis the perception of emoticons/emojis, I assess to what extent they do effectively vicariate real faces with respect to the following four domains: (...) (1) the expression of emotions, (2) the cultural norms for expressing emotions, (3) conveying non-affective social information, and (4) attention prioritization. (shrink)

It is well known that the validity of Choice Principles is problematic in non-standard Set Theories which do not abide by the Limitation of Size Principle. In this paper we discuss the consistency of various Choice Principles with respect to the Generalized Positive Comprehension Principle . The Principle GPC allows to take as sets those classes which can be specified by Generalized Positive Formulae, e.g. the universe. In particular we give a complete characterization of which choice principles hold in Hyperuniverses. (...) Hyperuniverses are structures which arose independently in Non-well-founded Set Theory and in Mathematical Semantics of Concurrent Programming Languages and are hitherto the only existing models of GPC. Hyperuniverses are naturally endowed with a κ-compact uniform κ-topology and are uniformly isomorphic to their exponential space, i.e. the space of their closed subsets endowed with the Exponential Uniformity. (shrink)

The role of conscious attention in language processing has been scarcely considered, despite the wide-spread assumption that verbal utterances manage to attract and manipulate the addressee’s attention. Here I claim that this assumption is to be understood not as a figure of speech but instead in terms of attentional processes proper. This hypothesis can explain a fact that has been noticed by supporters of Relevance Theory in pragmatics: the special role played by speaker-related information in utterance interpretation. I argue that (...) representation of the speaker in working memory reliably enhances the activation of speaker-related information and, consequently, the role it plays in determining the content of interpretations. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen’s original formulation of the Consequence Argument employed an inference rule that was shown to be invalid given van Inwagen’s interpretation of the modal operators in the Consequence Argument. In response, van Inwagen recently suggested a revised interpretation of his modal operators. Following up on a debate between Blum and Schnieder, I analyze van Inwagen’s revised interpretation in terms of explanatory notions and I argue that van Inwagen faces a dilemma: he either has to admit that beta entails (...) fatalism, or he has to admit that a new counterexample invalidates beta. Either way, it seems reasonable to reject beta and to conclude that the Consequence Argument fails. Further, I argue that Widerker’s well-known substitute for rule beta is faced with a similar dilemma and, therefore, is bound to fail as well. I conclude that, if the modal operators are interpreted in terms of explanatory notions, neither van Inwagen’s nor Widerker’s rule of inference turns out to be valid. (shrink)

My main purpose here is to provide an account of context selection in utterance understanding in terms of the role played by schemata and goals in top-down processing. The general idea is that information is organized hierarchically, with items iteratively organized in chunks—here called “schemata”—at multiple levels, so that the activation of any items spreads to schemata that are the most accessible due to previous experience. The activation of a schema, in turn, activates its other components, so as to predict (...) a likely context for the original item. Since each input activates its own schemata, conflicting schemata compete with (and inhibit) each other, while multiple activations of a schema raise its likelihood to win the competition. There is therefore a double movement—with bottom-up activation of schemata enabling top-down prediction of other contextual components—triggered by multiple sources. Another claim of the paper is that goals are represented by schemata placed at the highest-levels of the executive hierarchy, in accordance with Fuster’s model of the brain as a hierarchically organized perception action cycle. This account can be considered, in part at least, a development of ideas contained in Relevance Theory, though it may imply that some other claims of the theory are in need of revision. Therefore, a secondary purpose of the paper is a contribution to the analysis of that theory. (shrink)

The concepts and powerful mathematical tools of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) yield illuminating methods of studying cognitive processes, and are even claimed by some to enable us to bridge the notorious explanatory gap separating mind and matter. This article includes an analysis of some of the conceptual and empirical progress Dynamical Systems Theory is claimed to accomodate. While sympathetic to the dynamicist program in principle, this article will attempt to formulate a series of problems the proponents of the approach in (...) question will need to face if they wish to prolong their optimism. The main points to be addressed involve the reductive tendencies inherent in Dynamical Systems Theory, its somewhat muddled position relative to connectionism, the metaphorical nature DST-C exhibits which hinders its explanatory potential, and DST-C's problematic account of causality. Brief discussions of the mathematical and philosophical backgrounds of DST, seminal experimental work and possible adaptations of the theory or alternative suggestions (dynamicist connectionism, neurophenomenology, R&D theory) are included. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that a theory of logical validity should not interpret its own language, because a Russellian argument shows that self-applicability is inconsistent with the ability to capture all the interpretations of its own language. First, I set up a formal system to examine the Russellian argument. I then defend the need for self-applicability. I argue that self-applicability seems to be implied by generality, and that the Russellian argument rests on a test for meaning that is biased against self-applicability. (...) I propose an alternative test which is unproblematic for self-applicability. I conclude that self-applicability can be vindicated and the Russellian argument can be resisted. (shrink)

In his Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie, Ernst Cassirer presents relativity theory as the last manifestation of the tradition of the “physics of principles” that, starting from the nineteenth century, has progressively prevailed over that of the “physics of models.” In particular, according to Cassirer, the relativity principle plays a role similar to the energy principle in previous physics. In this article, I argue that this comparison represents the core of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian interpretation of relativity. Cassirer pointed out that before and after (...) Kant, the history of physics presents significant instances in which the search for formal conditions that the laws of nature must satisfy preceded and made possible the direct search for such laws. In his earlier years, Cassirer seems to have regarded principles like the energy principle, the relativity principle, and the principle of least action as a constitutive but provisional form of a priori, imposing specific limitations on the form of the allowable laws of nature. Only in his later years, by attributing an autonomous status to these statements of principle, did Cassirer attribute a definitive but merely regulative meaning to the a priori. This does not impose specific requirements on natural laws but only a motivation to search for them. (shrink)

We consider algebras on binary relations with two main operators: relational composition and dynamic negation. Relational composition has its standard interpretation, while dynamic negation is an operator familiar to students of Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL) (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991): given a relation R its dynamic negation R is a test that contains precisely those pairs (s,s) for which s is not in the domain of R. These two operators comprise precisely the propositional part of DPL.This paper contains a finite equational (...) axiomatization for these dynamic relation algebras. The completenessresult uses techniques from modal logic. We also lookat the variety generated by the class of dynamic relation algebras and note that there exist nonrepresentable algebras in this variety, ones which cannot be construedas spaces of relations. These results are also proved for an extension to a signature containing atomic tests and union. (shrink)

Riassunto : Questo articolo ambisce a fornire una ricostruzione razionale dell’ontologia della neuroscienza cognitiva. Questa dovrebbe soddisfare tre desiderata : un’ontologia delle funzioni cognitive che descriva tutte le operazioni della mente; un’ontologia delle strutture neurali che descriva tutte le parti del cervello; una corrispondenza biunivoca tra ogni funzione cognitiva e una corrispettiva struttura neurale. Saranno brevemente esaminati i presupposti che stanno alla base di questi desiderata, nonché alcune critiche mosse dagli scettici. Dopo aver vagliato alcune possibili contro-obiezioni agli argomenti scettici, (...) si noterà come tuttavia la migliore difesa di quest’agenda di ricerca passi dal successo empirico delle euristiche che prescrive: di conseguenza, saranno descritte le strategie euristiche attraverso cui psicologia e neuroscienze, vincolandosi reciprocamente, forniscono dei criteri per selezionare funzioni cognitive e strutture neurali. Parole chiave : Filosofia delle scienze cognitive; Filosofia delle neuroscienze; Filosofia della mente; Storia delle scienze cognitive; Ontologia cognitiva The Ontological Agenda of Cognitive Neuroscience: Neuroscience as an “Arbiter” for Psychological Categories: This article aims at providing a rational reconstruction of the ontology of Cognitive Neuroscience. That should satisfy three desiderata : an ontology of cognitive functions describing any operation of the mind; an ontology of neural structure describing any part of the brain; a one-to-one correspondence between each cognitive function and a given neural structure. The assumptions sustaining these desiderata will be examined, as well as some skeptical arguments against them. Then, after having surveyed some possible counterarguments to the skeptical objections, it will be argued that the strongest defense of this research agenda is the empirical success of the heuristics that it prescribes. Thus, such heuristics will be described, showing how the mutual constraints of psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides some criteria for choosing cognitive functions and neural structures. Keywords: Philosophy of Cognitive Science; Philosophy of Neuroscience; Philosophy of Mind; History of Cognitive Science; Cognitive Ontology. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Nach einer von Athen beförderten literarisch-philosophischen Tradition scheint überwiegend die Herrschaft einzelner den Greek way of politics in Sizilien geprägt zu haben: Als Charakteristikum der sikeliotischen Staatenwelt werden die häufigen Verfassungswechsel von der Oligarchie in die Tyrannis herausgehoben. Insbesondere im Rahmen zwischenstädtischer Bündnisse gegen die im Westteil der Insel herrschenden Punier zeigt sich jedoch an den Fallbeispielen von Akragas und Syrakus, dass der jeweilige Bürgerverband durch seine beschlussfähigen Polis-Gremien etwa in Bezug auf die Mehrheitswahl der mit außerordentlichen Kompetenzen ausgestatteten (...) Funktionsträger am politischen Leben aktiv teilnahm. Das spätarchaische und klassische Sizilien bot für die Bildung eines provinzialrömischen Städtebunds genügend föderale Vorstrukturen. (shrink)

Michel Maffesoli es un crítico de la modernidad; su crítica se hace a nombre de un posmodernismo que, a diferencia de otras variantes, es claramente optimista, vitalista y afirmativo. Los conceptos de razón, historia y progreso son puestos en cuestión y son reemplazados por la razón sensible, el destino y la comunidad.

Questo saggio si concentra sul tema dell’ordine dell’anima ( _ ordo animae _ ) nell’etica di Alberto Magno (1200 ca.-1280). Ispirandosi a varie _ sententiae _ bibliche e integrandole con la fondamentale idea dell’ _ Etica Nicomachea _ di Aristotele per cui il fine della filosofia morale è diventare buoni ( _ ut boni fiamus _ ), Alberto concepisce l’etica non come mero “discorso filosofico”, per prendere a prestito un’etichetta da Pierre Hadot, ma come un’attività la cui preoccupazione primaria è (...) l’ordinamento – e la trasformazione e liberazione che ne seguono – di sé. Il fatto che Alberto sviluppi tale riflessione sia nei suoi commenti filosofici che in quelli biblici, affidandosi in entrambi i casi sia a fonti aristoteliche che scritturiste, testimonia poi che la sua filosofia e la sua esegesi biblica, solitamente ritratte come radicalmente separate, sono, in realtà, profondamente connesse. _ This essay focuses on the theme of the order of the soul ( _ ordo animae _ ) in the ethics of Albert the Great (1200 ca.-1280). Drawing on several biblical _ sententiae _ and integrating them with the fundamental idea of Aristotle’s _ Nicomachean Ethics _ that the end of moral philosophy is to become good ( _ ut boni fiamus _ ), Albert conceives of ethics not as a mere “philosophical discourse”, to borrow a label from Pierre Hadot, but as an activity whose primary concern is the ordering – and the consequent transformation and liberation – of the self. The fact that Albert develops such a reflection in both his philosophical and biblical commentaries, relying in either case on both Aristotelian and scriptural sources, testifies then that his philosophy and biblical exegesis, which are usually portrayed as radically separate, are, in fact, deeply connected. _. (shrink)

This article aims to introduce some features of the literary output of Gling-ras-pa Padma rdo-rje, who was the teacher of the ‘Brug-pa bKa’-brgyud-pa school’s founder, gTsan-pa rGya-ras Ye-shes rdo-rje in Tibet. The work that I draw upon here is titled A Torch of Crucial Points. A Condensation and Presentation of all Dharmas that are to be Practiced, a presentation of the entire outline of Buddhist practice that resembles the doctrinal stages literary genre. Based on an edition and translation of the (...) fifth chapter of the 17 that comprise the work, here I focus on several concepts, such as the three natures and the allground consciousness, that pertain to the system of Yogācāra and the terminology related to it. These are shown as they appear in the framework of the work, which is heavily influenced by the tradition of Mahāmudrā and the background of its author’s life as a wandering yogin in the lineage of Mi-la ras-pa. (shrink)

The Oscar Wilde trials (1895) have usually been interpreted either as a historical document which gives insight into the regulation of sexuality in the late nineteenth century, or as literary biography explicating the playwright's life and works. Taking its cue from recent scholarship in ‘law and literature’, and also from Wilde's own conception of the relationship between art and life, this article proposes a reading of the trials which blurs the distinction between legal history and literary criticism by considering them (...) as a form of literature. It argues that the trial transcripts enact and reflect Wilde's vision of what literature is and how it should be read, and as such should be given a place amongst his literary works, alongside such aesthetic manifestos as ‘The Decay of Lying’ and ‘The Critic as Artist’. (shrink)