Advances at the interface between the biological sciences and engineering are giving rise to emerging research fields such as synthetic biology. Harnessing the potential of synthetic biology requires timely and adequate translation into clinical practice. However, the translational research enterprise is currently facing fundamental obstacles that slow down the transition of scientific discoveries from the laboratory to the patient bedside. These obstacles including scarce financial resources and deficiency of organizational and logistic settings are widely discussed as primary impediments to translational (...) research. In addition, a number of socio-ethical considerations inherent in translational research need to be addressed. As the translational capacity of synthetic biology is tightly linked to its social acceptance and ethical approval, ethical limitations may—together with financial and organizational problems—be co-determinants of suboptimal translation. Therefore, an early assessment of such limitations will contribute to proactively favor successful translation and prevent the promising potential of synthetic biology from remaining under-expressed. Through the discussion of two case-specific inventions in synthetic biology and their associated ethical implications, we illustrate the socio-ethical challenges ahead in the process of implementing synthetic biology into clinical practice. Since reducing the translational lag is essential for delivering the benefits of basic biomedical research to society at large and promoting global health, we advocate a moral obligation to accelerating translational research: the “translational imperative.”. (shrink)

The author group of above-mentioned review paper was incorrectly published in the online article.

In this volume, three aspects are examined: a) normal subjects, where new findings on spatial behavior are described. b) brain-lesioned subjects, where the ...

The heart of the matter -- The evolution of the French medicine -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of interest in France -- The rise of a protected medical market : the United States before 1950 -- The commercial transformation : the United States, 1950-1980 -- The logic of medical markets : the United States, 1980 to the present -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of interest in the United States -- The evolution of Japanese medicine -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of (...) interest in Japan -- Reforms -- Professionalism reconsidered. (shrink)

Leibniz defends concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work has been revisionist, greatly downplaying the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This (...) paper argues against such revisionism; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his “mature” years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances asefficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances. (shrink)

Ethics education in the professions has become close to compulsory with continuing education following suit. What is the de facto as opposed to the de jure function of an ethics education program? Have they increased compliance with laws and codes of conduct? Is that the goal? What would an ethics education program look like that was not primarily concerned with compliance with relevant laws or professional codes and not merely an exercise in good public relations? I argue that, ultimately, ethics (...) education is about happiness… not happiness as we generally think of it today, but in the Aristotelian sense of “fulfillment” and the collateral good that is generated for clients and the profession. As a result of this point of view I argue that ethics is not a subject in the normal sense of the term but a meta-subject which implies that teaching ethics as a class or stand alone module in a law, policy or practice management course is usually ineffective. Another implication is that the richest source for moral reflection within a profession are case studies generated by students in clinical assignments, despite the inherent risks associated with making these cases prominent. (shrink)

Contemporary financial markets have recently witnessed a sea change with the ‘algorithmic revolution’, as trading automats are used to ease the execution sequences and reduce market impact. Being constantly monitored, they take an active part in the shaping of markets, and sometimes generate crises when ‘they mess up’ or when they entail situations where traders cannot go backwards. Algorithms are software codes coding practices in an IT significant ‘textual’ device, designed to replicate trading patterns. To be accepted, however, they need (...) to comply with regulatory texts, which are nothing else but codes of conduct coding accepted practices in the markets. In this article, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork in order to open these black boxes, while trying to describe their existence as devices encapsulating several points of views. I address the question of a possible misalignment between those visions, and more specifically try to draw the consequences raised by such discrepancies as regards the future of financial regulation. (shrink)

Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive (...) the boundary between self and other. However, I argue that (1) the idea of unearthing an exception to the Cartesian thesis is, on further reflection, not a realistic prospect and that (2) this casts doubt on the attempt to conjoin first-person phenomenology and third-person cognitive science in the service of philosophical debates. (shrink)

This thought-provoking collection sheds light on the plight of our nonhuman primate cousins--and what we can do to help.

If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes, was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard over the (...) plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but [he] thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain, and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. (shrink)

Un des principaux intérêts de la linguistique antique dans l'aire grécoromaine est la pluralité des points de vue portés sur le langage, la diversité des modes d'approche et d'analyse du domaine abordé: le langage n'était pas perçu de la même façon selon qu'il était analysé sous l'angle de la grammaire, de la rhétorique ou de la philosophie, et l'histoire des idées linguistiques de l'Antiquité est faite de la combinaison de ces points de vue. Cette pluralité a entraîné dans l'Antiquité elle-même (...) d'incessants problèmes de frontières entre les différentes disciplines concernées, avec toutes sortes d'exclusions, de tentatives hégémoniques, de contestations et de redéfinitions de chacun des domaines. Curieusement, le traitement moderne de l'histoire de la linguistique antique a volontiers reproduit cette situation conflictuelle: il est constant au XIXe siècle, et au XXe siècle jusqu'à une date récente, de présenter la grammaire comme «fille de la philosophie», non pas tant pour souligner une filiation génétique quelconque que pour installer un rapport hiérarchique et afficher d'entrée de jeu la primauté de la philosophie et l'incapacité supposée de la linguistique antique à s'affranchir de ses origines et à fonder l'autonomie de son champ d'analyse. À vrai dire, cette vision des choses avait changé depuis une vingtaine d'années, les chercheurs renonçant à cette conception, au profit d'une étude de la spécificité de chaque point de vue. Cependant, peut-être parce que chaque génération cherche à se démarquer de la précédente, une jeune chercheuse, Frédérique Ildefonse, propose dans cette Naissance de la grammaire dans l'Antiquité grecque une reprise de l'interprétation «philosophique» de la linguistique antique, et à vrai dire il n'est pas inintéressant en effet de réexaminer aujourd'hui, à l'aune des progrès accomplis ces dernières années, ce qui était le socle de la réflexion d'un Lersch ou d'un Steinthal. (shrink)

��Is moral judgment accomplished by intuition or conscious reasoning? An answer demands a detailed account of the moral principles in question. We investigated three principles that guide moral judgments: (a) Harm caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no physical contact. Asking whether (...) these principles are invoked to explain moral judgments, we found that subjects generally appealed to the first and third principles in their justifications, but not to the second. This finding has significance for methods and theories of moral psychology: The moral principles used in judgment must be directly compared with those articulated in justification, and doing so shows that some moral principles are available to conscious reasoning whereas others are not. (shrink)

It is argued that the finitist interpretation of wittgenstein fails to take seriously his claim that philosophy is a descriptive activity. Wittgenstein's concentration on relatively simple mathematical examples is not to be explained in terms of finitism, But rather in terms of the fact that with them the central philosophical task of a clear 'ubersicht' of its subject matter is more tractable than with more complex mathematics. Other aspects of wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics are touched on: his view that mathematical (...) propositions are 'grammatical propositions' (and so, Strictly speaking, Not genuine propositions at all) and his view that in mathematics 'everything is algorithm, Nothing meaning'. His views on consistency and his anti-Foundationalism are linked with this central thesis. (shrink)

La théologie chrétienne contient ou implique une métaphysique de la médiation universelle du Verbe incarné. Montrer que le rationalisme critique ne peut ignorer le problème de la médiation et qu'il y a place dans la philosophic la plus jalousement autonome pour une ouverture sur le surnaturel chrétien, telle fut la têche à laquelle Maurice Blondel consacra sa vie. Ses écrits ne laissent aucun doute: la recherche part de la foi, de l'Éivangile, de la christologie de S. Jean et de S. (...) Paul, et fraie son chemin vers le discours philosophique. Dans l'ordre de l'expression et de l'exposition cependant, Blondel ne pouvait prétendre au statut de philosophe sans passer par des prémisses et des méthodes purement philosophiques. Comment ajuster ceci è cela? Comment obtenir un discours philosophique si la recherche est théologique? Comment rester d'accord avec l'intention théologique si les principes sont purement philosophiques? Il faut ici un moyen terme, une médiation entre le croyant et le philosophe, è savoir la conviction indivisiblement rationnelle et religieuse que la philosophic ne tolère pas d'être contredite par la foi, ni la foi par la philosophic. Ce point de coincidence est une condition de possibilité de l'entreprise blondélienne. II ne faut pas l'oublier en abordant l'étude de Jacques Flamand sur la médiation chez Blondel. (shrink)

We describe the emergence of a new field, Mind Brain and Education, dedicated to the science of learning, as well as the roles researchers, policy makers, and educators need to play in developing this collaborative effort. The article highlights the challenges that MBE faces and the strategy researchers and educators in Texas are developing to meet these challenges. In particular, through the creation of a Research Schools Network, educators and researchers are creating an infrastructure to identify and test ideas critical (...) to educators. This network builds on Dewey's laboratory school by creating new responsibilities and partnerships. To this end we identify four critical objectives: develop a clear vision; build trusting relationships; set a standard for rigorous research and scholarship; and, promote meaningful assessment tools. (shrink)

Giorgio Colli ha sido uno de los autores contemporáneos que más han contribuido a revisar la figura de Apolo, entendiéndola como una potencia expresiva vinculada tanto a los designios asociados a su arco como a los coligados a su lira. Una ambigüedad expresiva que examinamos en este artículo y que, veremos, articulará simbólicamente la reforma histórica que Colli detectará en el paso de la sabiduría oral a la filosofía griega escrita, pero también la que se producirá entre una ontología-política arcaica (...) de ámbito contingente y una politeia, ya clásica, ligada a la necesidad, y de carácter retórico, estetizado y comunicativo. (shrink)

I applaud Fenton and Wiers' attempt to find a demarcation point between cases of addiction that fall within the range of normal function and those that may count as disease. However, I argue that continua don't offer demarcation points, the mechanisms involved are not demonstrably different, and trying to pin down subjectivity doesn't help.

Ainslie’s contribution offers a useful refinement of his powerful model of intertemporal bargaining. However, he focuses mostly on the cognitive mechanisms of choice. I suggest that these interact with emotional, personality, and developmental dynamics that cannot be ignored, either psychologically or neurally.

Although I reject neuronormativity -- an idea central to the Brain Disease Model of Addiction -- Henden and Gjelsvik argue that the disease definition might refer to normativity in nonneural domains. They profess that a cognitive dysfunction, or a mismatch of evolutionary intentions, could also qualify as norm violations, thus legitimizing the disease label. The need for dividing lines is questioned as well. I rebut these criticisms in turn, but I must admit they are thought provoking.

Health authorities increasingly request that general practitioners use information and communication technologies such as electronic patient records for accountability purposes. This article deals with the use of EPRs among general practitioners in Britain. It examines two ways in which GPs use the EPR for accountability purposes. One way is to generate audit reports on the basis of the information that has been entered into the record. The other is to let the computer intervene in the clinical process through prompts. The (...) article argues that GPs' ambivalence toward using the EPR makes them active in finding ways that turn the EPR into a meaningful tool for them, that is, a tool that helps them provide what they see as good care. The article's main contribution is to show how accountability and autonomy are coproduced; less professional autonomy does not follow from more requests to document one's work. Instead, new forms of autonomy are produced in the sociotechnical network that is made up by health policy and local engagements with patients and technology. (shrink)

"We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all possible worlds, yet do not causally interact. So what are we? Leibniz is known for many things, including the ideality of space and time, calculus, plans for a universal language, theodicy, and ecumenism. But he is not known for his ideas on the self and personal identity. This book shows that Leibniz offers an original, internally coherent theory of personal identity, a theory (...) that stands on its own even next to Locke's contemporaneous and more famous version. This book will appeal not only to students of Leibniz's thought but also to philosophers and psychologists interested in methodological problems in understanding or formulating theories of self and personal identity. (shrink)

The common view of the “Arab street” fails to capture essential dimensions of the role of public opinion and public discourse in the politics of Arab states. The rising importance of transnational Arab television and print media has created a public arena outside the control of states. Arguments about issues of shared concern in this Arabist public sphere have had important implications for political identity, beliefs, expectations, and behavior. Arab responses to the ongoing crisis in Iraq demonstrate the political significance (...) of these debates. (shrink)

Berridge's nuanced approach to the conceptualization of addiction as a disease is easier for me to accept than most others. In fact, Berridge and I agree on many core features of addiction, but still not on how to label it. When competing definitions reach a standoff on intellectual grounds, we should look at the clinical utility of each. And here I think that Berridge misses a critical insight. Yet, we end by agreeing to keep listening to each other.

The main result of this paper is the equivalence of several definition schemas of bar recursion occurring in the literature on functionals of finite type. We present the theory of functionals of finite type, in [T] denoted byqf-WE-HA ω, which is necessary for giving the equivalence proofs. Moreover we prove two results on this theory that cannot be found in the literature, namely the deduction theorem and a derivation of Spector's rule of extensionality from [S]: ifP→T 1=T 2 and Q[X∶≡T1], (...) then P→Q[X∶≡ T2], from the at first sight weaker rule obtained by omitting “P→”. (shrink)