Higher education institutions are expected to produce quality and competitive graduates for the job market and nation-building. In realizing this role, Bukidnon State University needs to ensure that graduates may land a job-relevant and align with their education and training. With this, a tracer study was conducted to verify whether the three batches of graduates are employed and are employable. It ascertained their employability based on their work experience from graduation to the present job. It employed a cross-sectional method and (...) data mining for the information of 326 graduates. The results revealed that the majority of graduates had jobs relevant to their education and training; yet, there was a significant difference in the employability of graduates across batches, except in terms of gender. Biological Science, Social Studies, and Math graduates were employable within the first six and twelve months compared to graduates from other curricula. It was claimed that the BukSU had prepared BSE graduates for employment. However, these results have implications for strategic options in improving the programs. The study made some recommendations for future tracer initiatives. (shrink)

En este artículo ofrecemos la historia de Magisterio de “Santa Ana”, erigida en 1962 en el colegio de San Ana de Sevilla y fusionada con la del “Cardenal Spínola” de las Esclavas del Divino Corazón y con la de “San Rafael” de los Salesianos. La primera parte, escrita por los profesores Holgado Barroso y Márquez de la Plata, está dedicada al estudio de la creación de las Escuelas de Magisterio de la Iglesia, a la ley de educación primaria de (...) 1945 y al plan de estudios de 1950. En la segunda parte, el profesor Martín Riego nos ofrece una visión histórica de la Escuela de Magisterio de “Santa Ana”: creación de la misma, edificio, profesores, alumnos, etc. (shrink)

Summary The recovery of the prejudice as well as of the authority and tradition that Gadamer accomplishes is made with the following goal: to point out the function of the dialogue, which has a main role in the legitimation and acceptance of the tradition. The philosopher introduces the dialogue conditions between tradition and the present time, all together with their prejudices and the mutual influences of the several horizons. Also, he includes the privileged condition granted by the distance of time. (...) Gadamer wants to make possible to each and everyone to have what he calls Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein, especially those who investigate history. We cannot consider history as an object that accepts submissively a complete investigation as well as a definitive analysis. Gadamer try to alert us for the danger that is inserted on the lack of our dialogue capability, which will maintain veiled precisely the kind of knowledge that we most want and need to know. The faith and the search for an objective and absolute knowledge or an absolutely objective knowledge is a mistake and an ingenuousness. This systematic failure cost us the lack of a closer understanding of the historical truth and it disables us of reaching the authentic Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein. (shrink)

Presupposition, vagueness, and oddness can lead to some sentences failing to have a clear truth value. The homogeneity property of plural predication with definite descriptions may also create truth-value gaps: The books are written in Dutch is true if all relevant books are in Dutch, false if none of them are, and neither true nor false if, say, half of the books are written in Dutch. We study the projection property of homogeneity by deploying methods of general interest to identify (...) truth-value gaps. Method A consists in collecting both truth judgments and, independently, falsity judgments. The second method, employed in experiment series B and C, is based on one-shot ternary judgments: completely true vs. completely false vs. neither. After a calibration of these methods, we use them to demonstrate that homogeneity projects out of negation, the scope of universal sentences and the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers such as exactly two, to some extent. We assess our results in light of different theoretical approaches to homogeneity—approaches based on presuppositions, scalar implicatures, and something like supervaluations, respectively. We identify free parameters in these theories and assess various variants of them based on our results. Our experimental paradigms may be of broader significance insofar as they can be applied to other phenomena which result in the failure of a sentence to have a definite truth value. (shrink)

Es indudable que el inconsciente colectivo estudiado por Jung y su escuela psicoanalítica, nos ha demostrado fehacientemente que las conductas observadas y aprendidas en la infancia tanto en la familia como en la sociedad, se reproducen de manera muy similar en las generaciones jóvenes.

Neil Levy (2007) argues that empirical data shows that psychopaths lack the moral knowledge required for moral responsibility. His account is intriguing, and it offers a promising way to think about the significance of psychopaths for work on moral responsibility. In what follows we focus on three lines of concern connected to Levy's account: his interpretation of the data, the scope of exculpation, and the significance of biological explanations for anti-social behavior.

Analytic Metaphysics represents a recent evolution of one of the oldest philosophical disciplines, now redefined by the methods of analytic philosophy. This contemporary approach reformulates the traditional ontological questions about existence, reality, and the nature of the Universe, prioritizing rigorous logical analysis and language. Analytic metaphysics, contrasted with continental ontology or traditional metaphysics, has surpassed the popularity of classical metaphysics, establishing itself as the predominant metaphysical stream in philosophical thought. In this special issue of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (Portuguese (...) Journal of Philosophy), we reflect on the current dynamics of analytic metaphysics, emphasizing its continuity with the metaphysical tradition or on new perspectives and pivotal issues driving analytic ontology. Analytic metaphysics, as a contemporary branch of philosophical research, originated from the analytic tradition. This movement emerged in the early 20th century, driven by a desire for greater clarity and rigor in philosophical inquiry. Philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein were pioneers of this movement, advocating a methodology based on precise linguistic argumentation and rigorous logical analysis. Despite the advancements promoted by analytic philosophy, this period was also marked by a profound crisis for metaphysics. Influenced by the rigidity and the spectrum of the new logical positivism, the philosophical community began to view metaphysics with increasing skepticism, often considering it speculative and devoid of any meaningful or empirical content. This view became dominant, dismissing traditional metaphysical questions as pseudo-questions, i.e., devoid of empirical content and therefore devoid of real meaning. However, this trend began to shift under the influence of figures such as W. Quine, who played a key role in revitalizing metaphysics within the analytic tradition, and is often considered the founder of the new “analytic metaphysics.” Notably, his challenge to the then analytic-synthetic distinction in his famous paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” had profound implications for logical positivism and the verification principle. Quine argued that there was no clear boundary between purely analytic propositions (known through understanding alone) and synthetic propositions (known through experience), thus breaking the dogmatic boundaries between conceptual analysis and empirical representation. This perspective opened the possibility of reappreciating ontological questions that had until then been marginalized. (shrink)

This paper critiques the contemporary reliance on linguistic analysis in metaphysics, arguing that it leads to the representational fallacy – a tendency to derive ontological conclusions from linguistic properties rather than from reality. We trace the historical roots of this issue to the Kantian and linguistic turns, which shifted metaphysical focus from ontology to semantics, situating language at the center of the philosophical inquiry. We examine how this fallacy manifests in the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists of time. Both camps (...) rely on Structural Linguistic Representationalism – the assumption that language directly mirrors reality –, presupposing a necessary correspondence between linguistic structures and ontological facts. We argue that this dependence is misguided, as language alone cannot adequately capture the fundamental nature of reality. In addressing this issue, we analyze two approaches within the B-theory of time: the truth-conditions approach and the truthmaker approach. We contend that the truth-conditions approach reiterates the representational fallacy by deriving ontological conclusions from linguistic structures. In contrast, the truthmaker approach presents a more promising framework by shifting focus from language to ontology, grounding metaphysical explanations in the structure of reality in itself. We conclude that the pursuit of an absolute linguistic model to reveal the ultimate nature of reality is unjustified and hinders metaphysical investigation. Instead, we advocate grounding ontological inquiries in reality, using language as a tool rather than a source of metaphysical truth. (shrink)

In their fine overview of supported decision making for persons with dynamic cognitive and functional impairments “at the margins of autonomy,” Peterson, Karlawish, and Largent query whether...

Manuel DeLanda is a distinguished writer, artist and philosopher. In his new book, he offers a fascinating look at how the contemporary world is characterized by an extraordinary social complexity. Since most social entities, from small communities to large nation-states, would disappear altogether if human minds ceased to exist, Delanda proposes a novel approach to social ontology that asserts the autonomy of social entities from the conceptions we have of them.

Traditional attempts to understanding inductive reasoning in science have typically involved analyzing language, focusing on statements or propositions. However, recent arguments suggest that this approach misconceives induction, prompting the need for a new perspective. This study offers a fresh view on induction by integrating William Whewell's theory of induction, which distinguishes two forms of reasoning: interpretation and representation. This perspective suggests that induction can be seen as a reasoning process based on semantic and pragmatic models rather than statements or propositions.

There is a familiar chain of reasoning that goes something like this: if everything is caused, no one is free, and thus, no one can be morally responsible. Reasoning like this has made scientific explanations of human behavior (e.g., biology, psychology, and neuroscience) threatening to familiar ideas of responsibility, blameworthiness, and merit. Rather than directly attacking the chain of reasoning that gives rise to these worries, I explore an alternative approach, one that begins by considering the "use" of moral responsibility. (...) What role does the concept play for us? What structure, if any, would an ideal set of practices and attitudes about moral responsibility have to it? I outline a new account of responsibility and consider what it might mean for traditional worries about causal, scientific explanations of human behavior. (shrink)

Composition as Identity claims that a composite object is identical to its parts taken collectively. This is often understood as reducing the identity of composite objects to the identity of their parts. The author argues that Composition as Identity is not such a reduction. His central claim is that an intensional notion of composition, which is sensitive to the arrangement of the composing objects, avoids criticisms based on an extensional understanding of composition. The key is to understand composition as an (...) intensional kind of identity relation, many-one identity. Eventually, the author suggests an arrangement condition for many-one identity that allows him to distinguish between composite objects, even if they have the same parts. (shrink)

We initiate the study of reducts of relational structures up to primitive positive interdefinability: After providing the tools for such a study, we apply these tools in order to obtain a classification of the reducts of the logic of equality. It turns out that there exists a continum of such reducts. Equivalently, expressed in the language of universal algebra, we classify those locally closed clones over a countable domain which contain all permutations of the domain.

Martin [4, Theorems 1 and 2] proved that a Turing degree a is the degree of a maximal set if, and only if, a′ = 0″. Lachlan has shown that maximal sets have minimal many-one degrees [2, §1] and that every nonrecursive r.e. Turing degree contains a minimal many-one degree [2, Theorem 4]. Our aim here is to show that any r.e. Turing degree a of a maximal set contains an infinite number of maximal sets whose many-one degrees are pairwise (...) incomparable; hence such Turing degrees contain an infinite number of distinct minimal many-one degrees. This theorem has been proved by Yates [6, Theorem 5] in the case when a = 0′. The need for this theorem first came to our attention as a result of work done by the author [3, Theorem 2.3]. There we looked at the structure / obtained from the recursive functions of one variable under the equivalence relation f ~ g if, and only if, f(x) = g(x) a.e., that is, for all but finitely many x ∈, where M is a maximal set, and M is its complement. We showed that / 1 ≡ / 2 if, and only if, 1 = m 2, i.e., 1. and 2 have the same many-one degree. However, it might be possible that some Turing degree of a maximal set contains exactly one many-one degree of a maximal set. Theorem 1 was proved to show that this was not the case, and hence that the theory of / is not an invariant of Turing degree. (shrink)

En este trabajo se ofrece una introducción a esa área de investigación filosófica de la mente. Se abordarán, en primer lugar, algunos aspectos de su evolución histórica como disciplina diferenciada. En segundo lugar, se describirán las principales opciones existentes a la hora de conceptualizar las relaciones de lo mental con el mundo estudiado por las ciencias naturales. Se precisarán también algunos de los conceptos más recurrentes en la actual filosofía de la mente, proporcionándose a continuación una panorámica general de los (...) autores más representativos en este terreno. Por último, se comentan varios grupos importantes de problemas abiertos. La actual filosofía de la mente nos mostraría, sobre todo, una nueva forma de hacer filosofía que pone constantemente en práctica la inexistencia de fronteras claramente definidas entre filosofía y ciencia. (shrink)