BackgroundThis research explores how the COVID-19 pandemic has changed the ways doctors make end-of-life decisions, particularly around Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR), treatment escalation and doctors’ views on the legalisation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.MethodsThe research was conducted between May and August 2021, during which COVID-19 hospital cases were relatively low and pressures on NHS resources were near normal levels. Data were collected via online survey sent to doctors of all levels and specialties, who have worked in the NHS (...) during the pandemic.Results231 participants completed the survey. The research found that over half of participants reported making more patients DNACPR than prepandemic, and this was due, at least in part, to an increased focus on factors including patient age, Clinical Frailty Scores and resource limitations. In addition, a sizeable minority of participants reported that they now had a higher threshold for escalating patients to ITU and a lower threshold for palliating patients, with many attributing these changes to formative experiences gained during the pandemic. Finally, our study found that there has not been a statistically significant change in the views of clinicians on the legalisation of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide since the start of the pandemic.ConclusionThe COVID-19 pandemic appears to have altered several aspects of end-of-life decision making, and many of these changes have remained even as COVID-19 hospital cases have declined. (shrink)

The central aim of this book is to answer two questions: Are alternatives for choice ever incomparable? and, In what ways can items be compared? The arguments offered suggest that alternatives for choice no matter how different are never incomparable, and that the ways in which items can be compared are richer and more varied than commonly supposed. This work is the first book length treatment of the topics of incomparability, value, and practical reason.

The purpose of this study was to identify how older Korean people seek information and their desire to participate in decision making about their health care. A total of 165 elderly people living in Seoul, South Korea, participated in the study. Data were collected during individual interviews using the Autonomy Preference Index. The mean information-seeking score was high. The mean score for their desire to participate with a physician in decision making was lower, but this was higher when (...) family members were involved. The study indicates that many older people want to receive information about their health care. Families (or guardians), as well as older people themselves, should be included in the decision-making process. Nurses can encourage older people to express their wishes, while treating each individual with respect. (shrink)

The role of the state has occupied centre stage in the development of economics as an independent discipline and is one of the most contentious issues addressed by contemporary economists and political economists. The immediate post-war years saw a swing in economic theory towards interventionism, motivated by the urgent need for reconstruction in advanced capitalist countries, the establishment of socialism in parts of Asia and Eastern Europe, and the liberation of many developing nations from colonialism. After a quarter of a (...) century of interventionist policies, a vigourous backlash against state intervention began with the discrediting of welfare statism in advanced capitalist countries, grew through the spread of liberalisation programmes among developing nations during the 1980s, and culminated in the dismantling of socialist central planning since 1989. In this volume, ten distinguished contributors examine patterns of interventionism and anit-interventionism in a wide variety of historical, political and institutional contexts and within different theoretical traditions. Their primary focus is on the internal factors which shape the role of the state and determine its effectiveness in promoting economic change. They explain the growing disenchantment with the Neo-Liberal, anti-interventionist programme--even in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, where the initial optimism in the efficacy of the free market is fading fast. The overall conclusion of the empirical and theoretical analysis is that the simplistic notion of politics fundamental to Neo-Liberal arguments makes them at best misleading and at worst deceitful. Although one can talk of certain general principles, there is no hard and fast rule to determine the optimal degree and the desirable areas of state intervention, which can only be determined in the concrete historical, institutional, and geographical context. The challenge is to form a new synthesis in which the valid insights of Neo-Liberalism are stripped of their ideological baggage and intergrated into a wider and more objective intellectual framework. (shrink)

Like other sciences, biosemiotics also has its time-honoured archive, consisting of writings by those who have been invented and revered as ancestors of the discipline. One such example is Jakob von Uexküll. As to the people who ‘invented’ him, they are either, to paraphrase a French cliché, ‘agents du cosmopolitisme sémiotique’ like Thomas Sebeok, or de jure and de facto progenitor like Thure von Uexküll. In the archive is the special issue of Semiotica 42. 1 (1982) edited by the late (...) Sebeok and introduced by Thure von Uexküll. It is in the opening essay that Thure von UexküIl tries to restore Jakob von Uexküll’s role as a precursor of semiotics by negotiating the Elder with Saussure and the linguistics-oriented ‘semiology’ in his wake. However, semiotic mapping, in the strictly ‘disciplinary’ sense, of Jakob von Uexküll is no easy task because he ‘knew neither Peirce nor Saussure and did not use their terminology’ (Thure von Uexküll 1982,2). Because Thure prefers to call the Elder’s science ‘general semiotics’ (Thure von Uexküll 1982), this paper begins by assessing Thure von Uexküll’s semiotic configuration of Jakob, probe into the force and limits of the linguistic analogy, revisit the already time-honoured debate on the primary and secondary modelling systems, which was made famous by the Moscow-Tartu semioticians in the early 1970s, but severely criticized by Sebeok and his followers. The paper engages Sebeok from several fronts, directed first at his relegation of the Saussurian linguistic model, then at his critique of the Primary Modelling System, and finally at his reservation about evolutionism in light of the current debate on gene/meme co-evolution. (shrink)

Historians often feel that standard philosophical doctrines about the nature and development of science are not adequate for representing the real history of science. However, when philosophers of science fail to make sense of certain historical events, it is also possible that there is something wrong with the standard historical descriptions of those events, precluding any sensible explanation. If so, philosophical failure can be useful as a guide for improving historiography, and this constitutes a significant mode of productive interaction between (...) the history and the philosophy of science. I illustrate this methodological claim through the case of the Chemical Revolution. I argue that no standard philosophical theory of scientific method can explain why European chemists made a sudden and nearly unanimous switch of allegiance from the phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's theory. A careful re-examination of the history reveals that the shift was neither so quick nor so unanimous as imagined even by many historians. In closing I offer brief reflections on how best to explain the general drift toward Lavoisier's theory that did take place. (shrink)

Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general satisfaction.

What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what (...) it is to be a rational agent. (shrink)

Most psychological studies investigating the balance between stability and flexibility in decision making use specific restrictions in their scenarios. These restrictions are likely to affect decision process, and it is unclear which of the findings can be transferred to more naturalistic decision contexts that call for a balance between stability and flexibility. Therefore, the present study used a scenario that is inspired by the problem structure found in a particular domain: Adapt/Exchange decisions in modular chemical plants. In this setting, (...) we investigated whether participants engage in a thorough comparison of options and whether they perseverate on their previous choices when decision sequences increasingly favour one or the other option. The results suggest that instead of comparing options, participants used a satisficing strategy, checking whether Adapt was good enough and only computing an Exchange solution when it was not. Sequence effects were found, but their direction was opposite to the choice perseveration predicted from the literature: In sequences initially favouring Adapt, participants started exploring the Exchange option early on, while in sequences initially demanding Exchange, they preferred Adapt as soon as it became possible. The results raise questions about the application of psychological theories to complex decisions between qualitatively different options. (shrink)

The aim of the inquiry is to interpret the Yijing consistently in terms of time and creativity. In the course of analysis of cosmology, changes and constancy, the self and community in the Yijing, this inquiry suggests that time and creativity play a significant role to understand the whole text. ;In the Yijing, change and time are the ultimate facts of the world. As there is no external agency, every being is in the middle of self-realizing process. It is (...) an one-world view in the sense that myriad things generate and produce in the same field. They are unique and self-determining in that they have freedom to make a decision to construct themselves in their own way. ;There are various kinds of term for change and constancy in the Yijing. While bian tends to be employed as discontinuous breakthrough from one to another, tong refers to continuity. The compound biantong, a dynamic concept of concord of the opposites, seems to signify effective change under the changing environment and "to hit the mark timely." ;Constancy in the Yijing is full blossom of realization and unbounded movement of dao. ;In the Yijing, instead of defining general quality of human being, human being is characterized as temporally self-creative. Image and word play a reinforcing role in the creative process of person-making. Images and words point out the experience of perceiver to orient oneself to the goal of maximizing one's potency. This process suggests a magnifying process of the person. ;Time and creativity play a primary role in making many kinds of interpersonal relationships. Interweaving interpersonal relationship is serial and continuous. At the same time, relationships are discontinuous in that they do not repeat and duplicate what the initiators achieved. The process formulates seamless network of persons. (shrink)

***Translated a Korean-language book to English with Dr. Chang-Seong Hong*** Venerable Hyun-Eung's Enlightenment and History is the first book of Buddhist philosophy of history published in South Korea; possibly the first of its kind in the world. In this book of telling points and clear visions, Hyun-Eung discusses East Asian Buddhist traditions in light of Western-philosophical perspectives and presents his views on the theory and praxis in contemporary Buddhism in a way that Western readers can easily understand. East Asian Buddhist (...) philosophy has had little introduction to English-speaking societies compared with the philosophies of other traditions in Buddhism. This book provides penetrating insight into such major issues of East Asian Mahayana Buddhism as enlightenment, compassion, emptiness, and sudden enlightenment in the Zen traditions. Hyun-Eung s approach is creative, clear, logical, and methodologically modernized. Hyun-Eung s Buddhist philosophy of history is not a mere product of armchair philosophy. He wrote most essays in this book during the 1980 s while South Korea was undergoing serious political turmoil as it tried to overthrow a government backed by military generals. This book presents a philosophy that evolved from his contemplations on the real issues of South Korean society. Defining the ideal form of life as the life of bodhisattva in Mahayana Buddhism, Hyun-Eung summarizes the theme of this book as follows: My book Enlightenment and History is a collection of essays that interpret Buddhist doctrines under a new light. In particular, this book interprets bodhisattva as the combination of bodhi (enlightenment) and sattva (life, history), and defines the life of bodhisattva as enlightenment s becoming history and history s becoming enlightenment. This is the representative of all the new interpretations in this book. Also, I classify the issue of fact judgments on how to understand facts and phenomena as the area of bodhi (enlightenment) and the issue of value judgments on how to live life as the area of sattva (history), and thereby I make their logical differences clear. However, at the same time, I claim that harmonizing these two areas into one area of life is the model of a nice and practical life, which is the bodhisattva that Mahayana Buddhism praises. From Introduction. (shrink)

Most mass incidents are created by economic or social concerns brought on by fast socioeconomic change and poor local government. The number of mass occurrences in China has significantly increased in recent years, putting the country’s steady growth and public behavior decision-making in harm. We examine the factors that influence public behavior decision-making in the following significant factors, contributing to the development of effective prevention and response strategies. The structural equation approach is used to analyze the main (...) determinants influencing public behavioral decisions in the aftermath of mass incidents using surveys of a large population. The finding shows that media plays a mediating role in the relationship between mass occurrences and influencing factors impacting public emotion. The direct and indirect effects of public behavior decision-making and its role increasingly social changes as things happen, government credibility, media plays mediating role in public emotional factors. All directly impact public behavior decision-making, while emotional factors have an indirect impact via media intermediaries. The escalation of public behavior decisions is seen as a result of structural transmission and the increase of dynamic as well as other factors. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to outline a version of “non-attachment” that is conceptually clear and practically viable. We turn to the Buddhist traditions for their wealth of insights into non-attachment, but our goal is not exegetical. We are not constrained by the Buddhist traditions and turn to Anglophone moral psychology as well to point out a close connection between non-attachment and adaptive preference. We offer the reason for adopting the outlined version of non-attachment and depict what it is (...) like in practice to live with no attachment. (shrink)

The appearance of mass media and a versatile medium of videos can serve the convenience and instructive information for children; on the other hand, it could abet them in implicit image consumption. Now is the time for kids' to be in need of thinking power which enables them to make a choice, applications andcriticism of information within such visual cultures. In spite of these social changes, the realities are that our curriculum still doesn't meet a learner's demand properly. This research, (...) in this context, is aimed at looking out on the currently implemented art appreciation learning process in a critical fashion, and also aimed at suggesting a plan for visual culture learning by applying the philosophy program for kids as a new alternative. The purpose of such education is toenhance the capability to solve a variety of problems they are facing in the course of daily life by reflecting their matter of concern in a curriculum. What we have to pay attention to in visual culture learning is 'visual literacy.' Such an interpretative faculty of a critical reading of images is a must especially when kids should make a judgment of value hidden in images in their daily events, make an analysis of an ideological message and make an information-oriented decision. Therefore, learners have to enrich their higher-order thinking power as well as critical thinking faculty in modern society. If there is no objection to these social surroundings, it is quite natural that philosophy education, which forms a base of a higher-order thinking for children should be handled significantly at school. (shrink)

End-of-life decision making frequently occurs in the intensive care unit (ICU). There is a lack of information on how a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order affects treatments received by critically ill patients in ICUs. The objectives of this study were: (1) to compare the use of life support therapies between patients with a DNR order and those without; (2) to examine life support therapies prior to and after the issuance of a DNR order; and (3) to determine the clinical factors that (...) influence the initiation of a DNR order in ICUs in Taiwan. A prospective, descriptive, and correlational study was conducted. A total of 202 patients comprising 133 (65.8%) who had a DNR order, and 69 (34.1%) who did not, participated in this study. In the last 48 hours of their lives, patients who had a DNR order were less likely to receive life support therapies than those who did not have a DNR order. Older age, being unmarried, the presence of an adult child as a surrogate decision maker, a perceived inability to survive ultimate discharge from the ICU, and longer hospitalization in the ICU were significant predictors of issuing a DNR order for critically ill patients. This study will draw attention to how, when, and by whom, critically ill patients’ preferences about DNR are elicited and honored. (shrink)

I propose a reformulation of realism, as the pursuit of ontological plausibility in our systems of knowledge. This is dubbed plausibility realism, for convenience of reference. Plausibility realism is non-empiricist, in the sense that it uses ontological plausibility as an independent criterion from empirical adequacy in evaluating systems of knowledge. Ontological plausibility is conceived as a precondition for intelligibility, nor for Truth; therefore, the function of plausibilty realism is to facilitate the kind of understanding that is not reducible to mere (...) description or prediction. Difficulties in making objective judgements of ontological plausibility can be ameliorated if we adhere to the most basic ontological principles. The workings of plausibility realism are illustrated through a detailed discussion of how one ontological principle, which I call the principle of single value, can be employed with great effect. Throughout the paper the discussion draws on concrete examples from the history of science. (shrink)

This chapter advances a contextual view of evidence, through a reconsideration of Hempel's paradox of confirmation. The initial view regarding Hempel's paradox is that a non-black non-raven does confirm ‘All ravens are black’, but only in certain contexts. The chapter begins by reformulating the paradox as a puzzle about how the same entity can have variable evidential values for a given proposition. It then offers a three-stage solution to the reformulated paradox. The situation makes better sense when we reach a (...) deeper propositional understanding of evidence, recognising that each entity can be represented in multiple observational propositions. Some anti-contextualist intuitions can be defused by distinguishing two different senses of the word ‘evidence’, one applying to objects or events and the other applying to propositions; only the latter is relevant to inference. A fuller understanding comes from analysing the constitution and use of evidence in terms of epistemic action. These reflections on the ravens paradox suggest a general philosophical framework more suitable for understanding the function of evidence in scientific and everyday practices. (shrink)

This study is a comparison of the validity of theory of reasoned action and theory of planned behavior as applied to the area of moral behavior (i.e., illegal copying of software) using structural equation modeling. Data were collected from 181 university students on the various components of the theories and used to asses the influence of attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control on the intention to make unauthorized software copies. Theory of planned behavior was found to be better than (...) the theory of reasoned action in predicting unethical behavior. A modified version of the theory of planned behavior, with a causal path linking subjective norm to attitude, provided a significant improvement on model fit. The results indicated that perceived behavioral control is a better predictor of behavioral intention then attitude. The direct effect of subjective norm on behavioral intention was not significant, but the indirect effect through attitude was highly significant. Applicability of the theory of planned behavior for moral behavior and the implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

This paper will introduce “lexical silencing” as a new linguistic phenomenon, i.e., positive statements about something are made more difficult to express when the only (or the predominant) word for it in a language is a negative word. A good example is the term “political correctness,” which carries negative connotations in English but has no easy alternative to replace it. Suppose a supporter attempts to explicitly endorse it by saying something like “Political correctness should be a fundamental value of the (...) society.” Positive statements like this sound somewhat weird and even self-defeating to the hearers, and are therefore difficult to be expressed in the public discourse. Moreover, I will identify at least two linguistic mechanisms of lexical silencing: First, slurs can make it difficult to say something positive about a group because slurs provide the illocutionary force of derogation, which conflicts with forces like praising. Second, what I call “loaded words” (e.g., “political correctness”) are not explicitly derogatory like slurs, but they can achieve similar effects by producing perlocutionary effects on the psycho-linguistic process of hearers. This paper will also discuss the various sources of lexical silencing and possible strategies for mitigating them. (shrink)

Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

Building on my previous writings on presentism, pluralism, and “complementary science”, I develop an activist view of historiography. I begin by recognizing the inevitability of presentism. Our own purposes and perspectives do and should guide the production of our accounts of the past; like funerals, history-writing is for the living. There are different kinds of presentist history, depending on the historians’ purposes and perspectives. My particular inclination is pluralist. Science remembers its own history from a particular perspective, which views the (...) past as imperfect versions of the present; if professional historians of science shared this perspective, our work would be redundant. Instead, we can make it our task to illuminate the aspects of the past of science that scientists themselves tend to ignore and forget. History of science can also take a more productive role in the creation and improvement of scientific knowledge. Scientific progress as we know it tends to involve the shutting down of alternative paths of inquiry, resulting in a loss of potential and actual knowledge. A critical and sympathetic engagement with the past allows us to recover the lost paths, which can also suggest new paths. These points will be illustrated by a number of examples, especially from the history of chemistry and physics, including the recovery and extension of past experiments. (shrink)

In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...) question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views. (shrink)

Researchers have iterated that the future of synthetic biology and biotechnology lies in novel consumer applications of crossing biology with engineering. However, if the new biology’s future is to be sustainable, early and serious efforts must be made towards social sustainability. Therefore, the crux of new applications of synthetic biology and biotechnology is public understanding and acceptance. The RASVaccine is a novel recombinant design not found in nature that re-engineers a common bacteria to produce a strong immune response in humans. (...) Synthesis of the RASVaccine has the potential to improve public health as an inexpensive, non-injectable product. But how can scientists move forward to create a dialogue of creating a ‘common sense’ of this new technology in order to promote social sustainability? This paper delves into public issues raised around these novel technologies and uses the RASVaccine as an example of meeting the public with a common sense of its possibilities and limitations. (shrink)

Modern consumers face a dramatic rise in web-based technological advancements and have trouble making rational and proper decisions when they shop online. When they try to make decisions about products and services, they also feel pressured against time when sorting among all of the unnecessary items in the flood of information available on the web. In this sense, they need to use consumer decision-making creativity to make rational decisions. However, unexplored research questions on this subject remain. First, in (...) what ways do task difficulty and time constraints affect visual attention on exploitative and exploratory activities differently? Second, how does the location of the reference influence the level of visual attention to exploitative and exploratory activities depending on affordance theory? Third, how do exploratory and exploitative activities affect CDMC? Eye-tracking experiments were conducted with 70 participants to obtain relevant metrics such as total fixation duration, fixation count, and visit count to answer these research questions. Our findings suggest that task difficulty influences exploitative activity, whereas time constraint is related to the exploratory activity. The result of the location of hints aligns with the affordance theory for the exploitative activity. Besides, exploratory activity positively affected CDMC, but exploitative activity did not show any effect. (shrink)

In recent decades, several authors have claimed that an epoch-making change in the development of science is taking place. A closer examination of this claim shows that these authors take different – and problematic – concepts of an epochal break as their points of departure. In order to facilitate an evaluation of the current development of science, I would like to propose a concept of an epochal change according to which it is not necessarily a discontinuous process (...) that typically begins in a subarea of the sciences, has far-reaching consequences for the entire system of the sciences, and can be observed by contemporaries as early as during its initial phase. Taking this concept as my point of departure, I discuss various candidates for the status of an epochal transformation in the recent development of the sciences. Although there are sound reasons to doubt that an epochal break is currently taking place, one must concede that the sciences are probably in a profound transformation, which could unfold in various directions, perhaps even leading to epoch-making new characterizations of the sciences. (shrink)

As two defining properties of mental phenomena, consciousness and intentionality have some deep connections. These connections may be either grounded by a more fundamental mental property, or governed by some bridge laws, or accepted as a brute unexplainable fact. This paper argues, on the one hand, that we do not have justifications for believing in the existence of a new fundamental mental property, although we have motivations for making an inference to such a new mental property. On the other (...) hand, this paper demonstrates that Husserl took these connections to be governed by some bridge laws and to be realized by the mapping function of what he called apprehension. (shrink)

What, exactly, is so hard about hard choices? I suggest that what is distinctively hard about hard choices is that they present us with the volitional difficulty of putting ourselves behind an alternative and thereby making it true of ourselves that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. Making it true through your commitments that, for instance, you have most reason to be a philosopher rather than a lawyer makes the choice between the careers (...) hard. This answer is in contrast to that of Sergio Tenenbaum, who understands the hardness of a hard choice as a deliberative difficulty in specifying our alternatives and ends in ways that conform with certain proposed constraints of rationality. For Tenenbaum, the hardness of hard choices is not distinctive to such choices but is a general difficulty rational agents face when they need to further specify their alternatives and ends, even if the choice is easy. (shrink)

We suggest that the linguistic characteristics of letters also need to be considered to fully understand how a reader processes printed words. For example, studies in Korean showed that unambiguity in the assignment of letters to their appropriate onset, vowel, or coda slot is one of the main sources of the letter-transposition effect. Indeed, the cognitive system that processes Korean is tuned to the structure of the Korean writing system.

‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...) exercise of the will can afford us special freedom in determining our reasons? I argue that normative approaches to answering this question prove to be inadequate. To vindicate the thought that normative powers can make our reasons ‘up to us’, we need an altogether different approach to understanding them, one that is located not in the normative but in the metaphysical. I end the paper by sketching a metaphysical explanation of normative powers. This metaphysical defence of normative powers provides a window into a different, more agent-centered way of thinking about rational agency. (shrink)

This paper investigates two puzzles in practical reason and proposes a solution to them. First, sometimes, when we are practically certain that neither of two alternatives is better than or as good as the other with respect to what matters in the choice between them, it nevertheless seems perfectly rational to continue to deliberate, and sometimes the result of that deliberation is a conclusion that one alternative is better, where there is no error in one’s previous judgment. Second, there are (...) striking differences between rational agents – some rational agents have most reason to pursue careers on Wall Street while others have most reason to take up a career in teaching, or scuba diving, or working for political causes. These differences aren’t plausibly explained by ‘passive’ facts about our psychology or their causal interaction with our environment; instead, these facts seem in some sense to ‘express who we are’. But what is this sense? These puzzles disappear if we adopt a novel view about the source of the normativity of reasons – some reasons are given to us and others are reasons in virtue of an act of will. We make certain considerations reasons through an act of will and thus sometimes make it true through an act of agency that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. (shrink)

The purposes of research were to describe the neonatal clinicians' personal views and attitudes on neonatal ethical decision-making, to identify factors that might affect these attitudes and to compare the attitudes between neonatal physicians and neonatal nurses in Taiwan. Research was a cross-sectional design and a questionnaire was used to reach different research purposes. A convenient sample was used to recruit 24 physicians and 80 neonatal nurses from four neonatal intensive care units in Taiwan. Most participants agreed with suggesting (...) a do not resuscitate (DNR) order to parents for dying neonates (86.5%). However, the majority agreed with talking to patients about DNR orders is difficult (76.9%). Most participants agree that review by the clinical ethics committee is needed before the recommendation of ‘DNR’ to parents (94.23%) and nurses were significantly more likely than physicians to agree to this (p=0.043). During the end-of-life care, most clinicians accepted to continue current treatment without adding others (70%) and withholding of emergency treatments (75%); however, active euthanasia, the administration of drug to end-of-life, was not considered acceptable by both physicians and nurses in this research (96%). Based on our research results, providing continuing educational training and a formal consulting service in moral courage for neonatal clinicians are needed. In Taiwan, neonatal physicians and nurses hold similar values and attitudes towards end-of-life decisions for neonates. In order to improve the clinicians' communication skills with parents about DNR options and to change clinicians' attitudes for providing enough pain-relief medicine to dying neonates, providing continuing educational training and a formal consulting service in moral courage are needed. (shrink)

This chapter argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model—as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you make (...) a promise to x, then you have a reason to x’. Instead, internal commitments are that in virtue of which one has the special reasons of committed relationships; they are the grounds of such reasons. In this way, the will is a source of practical normativity. (shrink)

This book focuses on the fundamental principles behind scientific methods. The author uses concrete examples and illustrations to introduce and explain principles. He also uses analogies to connect different methods or problems to arrive at a general principle or common notion. The book explains how the principles of scientific methods are not only applicable to scientific research but also in our daily lives. It shows how the scientific method is used to understand how and why things happen, to make predictions, (...) to present mistakes, and to solve problems. (shrink)

When ancient Chinese philosophy culminated in the sixth to third centuries BCE, “hundreds of flowers [intellectual schools] were blooming”, yet not many theoreticians were particularly interested in questions regarding the relationship between animal and human life — despite their profuse discussion of, and heated debates about, both “nature” and “human nature” in their writings. This indifferent attitude towards creatures lower than humans is best illustrated by Confucius (551–479 BCE), who observed: “It is impossible to associate with birds and beasts, as (...) if they were the same as us.” Later, however, this condescending attitude of the Sage would be challenged by the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi (370 to 301 BCE), who untiringly advocates the equity of all creatures in the universe — a place where both living and fabulous organisms cohabit and co-evolve with one another, as well as with their environments. Morever, even Confucius’s descendent Mencius (c.372–289 BCE) did not endorse his mentor’s position, for the latter’s own writings are likewise inhabited by all kinds of creatures which not only serve the passive role of poetic figuration, but actually also construct their respective Umwelten, paralleled by the umwelt-construction of human beings. Recent advances in biosemiotics and ecosemiotics have enabled us to reread some of these philosophical texts, and to shed new light on this obscure aspect of Chinese thinking. This paper will draw upon the sign reflections of C. S. Peirce (1839–1914) and Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), and make use of a composite analytical method of text semiotics and dialogue studies, to examine a number of political and ethical allegories by Zhuangzi and Mencius. Acknowledging the necessarycircularity of interpretation and the homogeneity of observer and observed, the essay explores the ways in which ancient philosophical texts can be made compatible with contemporary biological and semiotic thinking. (shrink)

The metaphor of parasites or parasitism has dominated literary critical discourse since the 1970s, prominent examples being Michel Serres in France and J. Hillis Miller in America. In their writings the relationship between text and paratext, literature and criticism, is often likened to that between host and parasite, and can be therefore deconstructed. Their writings, along with those by Derrida, Barthes, and Thom, seem to be suggesting the possibility of a semiotics of parasitism. Unfortunately, none of these writers has drawn (...) enough on the biological foundation of parasitism. Curiously, even in biology, parasitism is already a metaphor through which the signified of an ecological phenomenon involving two organisms is expressed by the signifier of “[eating] food at another’s [side] table”. This paper will make some preliminary remarks on semiotics of parasitism, based on the notions of Umwelt (Jakob von Uexküll) and structural coupling (Maturana and Varela). It will look into the phenomenon of co-evolutionary process in community ecology. With reference to empirical history, the project will briefly surveythe literary and medical praxis of the 17th century England where large number of creative writings referred to the phenomenon of parasitism, which was deeply embedded in religious practice (e.g., the Eucharist) and political life (e.g., the courtier ecology in monarchy) of the times. Finally, it will touch upon the possible ‘parasitic’ relationship between language and biology. (shrink)

What can we conclude from a mere handful of case studies? The field of HPS has witnessed too many hasty philosophical generalizations based on a small number of conveniently chosen case studies. One might even speculate that dissatisfaction with such methodological shoddiness contributed decisively to a widespread disillusionment with the whole HPS enterprise. Without specifying clear mechanisms for history-philosophy interaction, we are condemned to either making unwarranted generalizations from history, or writing entirely "local" histories with no bearing on an (...) overall understanding of the scientific process. I propose a move away from the habit of viewing historical cases as an inductive evidence-base for general philosophical theses. The relation between historical and philosophical studies should not be seen as one between the particular and the general, but as a relation between the concrete and the abstract. An abstract framework is necessary for telling any concrete story at all. In this paper I explore how doing concrete history can help our abstract philosophizing. In the absence of ready-made philosophical concepts appropriate for understanding a given historical episode, the historian is compelled to craft new abstract philosophical concepts. Therefore, history-writing can be a very effective method of philosophical discovery. I will illustrate these claims through a discussion of two investigations in HPS from my own recent and current work: (1) temperature measurement and epistemic iteration; (2)constitution and laboratory practices in the Chemical Revolution. (This will also raise, and solve, a problem of reflexivity: how can we use case studies to show how to go beyond case studies?). (shrink)

In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’ (CP 2.281, 285) Peirce uses ‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford’s English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato, namely, the Sophist. In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists’ profession, the mysterious ‘stranger’, who is most likely Socrates’ (...) persona, makes the famous distinction between eikon (likeness) and phantasma (semblance) (236a,b). For all his broad knowledge in ancient philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this parallel; nor has any Peircean scholar identified it. There seems to be little problem with eikon as likeness, but phantasma may give rise to a puzzle which this paper will attempt to solve. Plato uses two pairs of words: what eikon is to phantasma is eikastikén (the making of likeness [235d]) to phantastikén (semblance making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because of the act of icon-making, which is none other than indexicality. Witness what Peirce says about the relationship between photographs and the objects they represent: “But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature.” (Ibid.) Thus the iconicity which links the representamen (sign) and its object is made possible not only by an interpretant, but also by idexisation. Their possible etymological and epistemological links aside, the Peircean example of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and sculpturing in the Sophist, clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. The paper will therefore reread the Peircean iconicity by closely analysing this relatively obscure Platonic text, and by so doing restore to the text its hidden semiotic dimension. (shrink)

The modern doctor-patient relationship displays a patient-centred, mutual-participation characteristic rather than the former active-passive or guidance-cooperation models in terms of medical decision making. Respecting the wishes of patients, amounting to more than mere concern for their welfare, has become the feature central to certain modern bioethics theories. A group of ethical principles such as respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice has been proposed by bioethicists and widely adopted by many medical societies as an ethical guide to how doctors, (...) in their daily practice, should treat their patients. However, seeing patients as persons who are rational, self-conscious beings capable of valuing their own lives, and who are consequently entitled to the liberty and rights to choose for themselves, is in general the backbone of Western bioethical principles.Since Confucian philosophy has long been a representative of the East-Asia cultural tradition and Confucian bioethics has recently been developed as a theory of applied ethics, examining Confucius's idea of “persons” may shed some light on the current bioethical debates. Confucius's concept of persons, which is best interpreted via his theories of “chun-tze”, (the morally ideal person) encapsulating a two-dimensional approach, (the “autonomous person” and the “relational person”), provides a more comprehensive model regarding what a person is and how he/she should be treated. This two-dimensional approach sees a person not only as a rational, autonomous agent but also as a relational, altruistic identity whose self actualisation involves incessant participating in and promoting of the welfare of his fellow persons. Hence this may balance the current bioethical trend whereby “respect for autonomy” often triumphs. (shrink)

What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...) for the possibility of rational choice is that one alternative is not worse than the others. Each challenge is questioned. If comparativism is correct, then no matter what normative theory you favor, your answer to the question, ‘What makes my choice rational?’ must be comparative in form. In this way, comparativism provides a framework for normative theorizing. (shrink)