A symposium on Michael Strevens' book "Tychomancy", concerning the psychological roots and historical significance of physical intuition about probability in physics, biology, and elsewhere.

Der Streit zwischen Leibniz und den Cartesianern über die Frage, ob die ,Quantität der Bewegung‘ (mv) oder die ,vis viva‘ (mv²) das richtige Maß der ,Kraft‘ in einem sich bewegenden Körper sei (beide Parteien stimmten darin überein, daß sich diese Kraft im Universum erhalte), wird im allgemeinen interpretiert als ein Wortstreit, in dem kein wirkliches Problem zur Diskussion stehe. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich anhand einer Analyse des Leibnizschen Standpunktes zu zeigen, daß diese Interpretation inkorrekt ist. Ich weise nach, daß (...) Leibniz' Verständnis der dynamischen Prinzipien tiefer reichte als das Descartes', und zwar sowohl im Hinblick auf die Folgezeit (Leibniz antizipierte moderne Lehren) als auch im Hinblick auf die Probleme, die zur Zeit des Streites zur Diskussion standen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOWGIAN BRUCE D. MARSHALL St. Olaf Oollege Northfield, Minnesota, 1JHE PURPOSE of this essay is to discuss the relation between Thomas Aquinas' account of religious and heological truth and a " posrtliberal " one sruch rus that sketched in George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine. Most reviewers assume that Lindbeck's.app:voach is on this point incompatible with the mainstream of the tmdition, and Colman O'Neill, writing (...) :in The Thomist symposium on Lindbeck's book, thinks it oontradicts Aquinas in particular. This paper presents the case to the contr:ary. Afte'I." outlining O'Neill's problem, it argues thart he mis11eads Lindbeck 'and,.at greater length, that Aquinas''S views on t:ruth :are, as Lindbeck affirms, compatible with postliberal emphases. I O'Neill's basic problem with Lindbeck's: "cultural linguistic " understanding of truth is thwt Lindbeck " would clearly have us puTify [Christi.an] language by ridding it of extra-linguistic accretions-in particular the intrusion of reference to objective reality. In the end the only thing that matters is scriptural discourse verified by action." 1 Lindbeck may not intend this " purification," 2 but whatever the intention, his 1 Colman E. O'Neill, "The Rule Theory of Doctrine and Propositional Truth," The Thomist 49 (1985), p. 422. 2 So Lindbeck writes: "The great strength of a cognitive-propositional theory of religion is that •.. it admits the possibility of [ontological] truth claims, and a crucial theological challenge to a cultural-linguistic approach is whether it also can do so." The Nature of Doctrine: Religion a,nd Theology in a, Postlibera,l Age (hereafter ND), (Philadelphia, 1984), pp. 63-4. 353 854 BRUCE D. MARSHALL view of •religious truth entails a raidical rejection of 1any claim that Christian beliefs!are onto1ogioally true, in other words, tha;t they rre£er or correspond •to reality. The reruson rllor this putative entailment lies in Lindbeck's manifest oontention (to be explained below) that truth claims in any l'eligion, including Christianity, are subject to 1a twofold criterion of coherence: they must fit wirth the wider linguistic (especially scriptural) paradigms of the 11eligion, and also with a range of practices appropriate to the belief the truth of which is being claimed. But, says O'Neill, Christian beliefs are not true because they cohere with anything, they are true (like all true propositions) "because of their reference to the real." a By introducing ;an irreducible element of coherence into his interpl'etation of Christian truth claims, Lindbeck inevitably " attaches to the ·term ' propositional truth '.a purely pra.gmatic signification," so that " a quite precise philosophical option has: been ma.de in faV'or of the moral or pragmatic definition of truth." 4 O'NeiiH'is point is that " ontological " or " propositional " truth has here been equa,ted with nothing more than the con£ormity of one's life to the patterns narrated in the!biblical story (O'Nei1l's "·scriptural dis-·oourse verified by 1action "), •such tha;t " no claims to objective truth" need be made for the story or any a.ssociated beliefs.5 Tihis, O'Neill alleges, is ·a " novel definition of ontological truth." 6 We ought to!'eject this novelty in favor of the under- •standing of Christian beliefs and their truth articulated by 'Ihomas Aquinas, whel"e it is firmly maintained against " the moral or pmgmatic definition of truth " that " propositions are true because of their I"eference ·to.the real." In order to undevstand the issues ·raised by O'Neill's criticism, it is important to bear in mind the distinction-often made but often overlooked ais well-between truth :and justis O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 430. 4 O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 429. 5 O'Neill," Propositional Truth," p. 420. 6 O'Neill, "Propositional Truth," p. 431. AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN 355 fica.tion. The very isisue of what it means to say that propositions 1 are true can be distinguished from the issue of ho,w one justifies, warrants, or tests the truth of propositions. So, for example, one might maintain that in regard to propositions, "true" should be defined as "oorresponds to reality," or perhaps "fitly expresses experience," or perhaps "is... (shrink)

Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction (...) of Kant’s Refutation that avoids the interpretative dilemma, though difficult questions about the argument remain. (shrink)

本书在对文学的总体认识上,着眼于主体心灵与客观世界的实践关系,正视与理解文学作为人类把握现实的价值意识形态的非实用性,创造了开放的有活力的价值论文艺学系统。.

In this account of his mature thinking, Peter Marshall develops a dynamic and organic philosophy for the coming millennium which he calls liberation ecology. Liberation ecology is holistic in viewing the world as a harmonious whole and all beings and things as interwoven threads in nature's web. It is intuitive in recognizing intuition as the main source of knowledge and the imagination as the great organ of morality. It is ecological in seeing human beings as fellow voyagers with other (...) species in the magnificent odyssey of evolution. Above all, it is libertarian in seeking to release humanity, society and nature from their existing burdens so that they can unfurl and realize together their full potential. Exploring our strengths and possibilities, this book presents the ideas and values needed to ride the winds of change at this crucial stage in our development and in the history of the world. It provides a new philosophy for a new era, an uplifting and inspired vision which combines ancient wisdom and modern insights, reason and feeling, science and poetry, myth and the marvellous. It offers a guide for the future on how to rive in the most fulfilling way and how to create a genuinely free and sustainable society in harmony with nature. (shrink)

Translator's introduction -- Mir Damad's introduction -- 1st qabas. On the kinds of creation (huduth) and the divisions of existence according to them, establishing the bases of judgment, and defining the area of dispute -- 2nd qabas. On the three kinds of essential antecedence and constructing the demonstration by way of essential priority (taqaddum bi'l-dhat) -- 3rd qabas. The two kinds of separate posteriority and constituting the demonstration by way of eternal priority -- 4th qabas. Quotations from the book of (...) god and the traditions of his messenger, and from the traditions of the lofty and pure imams -- 5th qabas. Concerning the mode of existence of the unqualified natures and the path of the demonstration by the mode of the existence of the nature -- 6th qabas. On the continuity of time and motion; setting up the course of the demonstration with respect to the continuity of the magnitude of time according to the natural system in two ways; establishing the finitude of extended continuous quantity; and invalidating a numerical infinity -- With respect to successive temporal creatures -- 7th qabas. A series of abridged arguments, unsound dialectical arguments, and criticism of certain syllogisms and controversial sophistical doubts according to the two extremes of the two groups -- 8th qabas. Inquiry into the power of God and his will after completing what remains in the care of the intellect, through the use of decisive utterance, to solve some of the difficulties and dilemmas caused by doubt and the confusions arising from idle fancies -- 9th qabas. On establishing the intelligible substances and the stages of the system of existence in the two chains of beginning and return -- 10th qabas. The decisive doctrine on the secret of predetermination (qada') and fate (qadar), how evil is related to predetermination, the colocynth of truth on prayer and its granting, and the return of the command to god in the beginning and the end -- Glossary-- Bibliography. (shrink)

On Islamic teachings, written by an army officer and educationist from Pakistan.

Peirce introduced Existential Graphs in late 1896, and they were systematically investigated in his 1903 Lowell Lectures. Alpha graphs for classical propositional logic constitute the first part of EGs. The second and the third parts are the beta graphs for first-order logic and the gamma graphs for modal and higher-order logics, among others. As a logical syntax, EGs are two-dimensional graphs, or diagrams, in contrast to the linear algebraic notations. Peirce's theory of EGs is not only a theory of logical (...) syntax but also a proof theory for many logics. A set of transformation rules of graphs defines a proof system for a graphical logic. In this... (shrink)

Explores the interplay between ancient wisdom and modern cosmology Connects the philosophy of the I Ching with key recent advances in cosmology, such as the Big Bang theory, Roger Penrose's cyclic conformal cosmology, and his and Stuart Hameroff's cosmic quantum brain dynamics Explains the Taoist cosmology of Heaven-Humanity Oneness in the context of Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionism, Thomas Berry's cosmogenetic trinity, and Brian Swimme's 12 cosmological powers Examines the holographic unity of Heaven, Earth, and Humankind at microcosmic, mesocosmic, and macrocosmic (...) scales Is the universe inert and empty, or is it some way responsive to consciousness? Breathing new life into a question that has perplexed philosophers since ancient times and scientists for the last century, physicist Zhen G. Ma, Ph.D., offers a quantitative "theory of everything" that beautifully integrates ancient I Ching philosophy, Eastern Taoism, modern cosmology, and the quantum brain dynamics of consciousness. Sharing insights from his years of research on space physics and black-hole spacetime at institutions in China, Canada, and the US, complemented by studies in quantum brain dynamics and cosmological powers with Brian Swimme at the California Institute of Integral Studies, Dr. Ma explains how his integrated theory draws primarily on two key paradigms in the philosophy of cosmology and consciousness: Swimme's cosmic creation story of the universe as a green dragon and Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff's cosmic consciousness. Extending these theories further, Dr. Ma shows how they harmonize not only with the ancient Eastern philosophy of Heaven-Humanity Oneness, but also with a holographic cosmic principle that connects the quantum-plasma brain with the universe and the Earth with Heaven. He then looks at this holographic unity in the cyclic process of birth, growth, decay, and death and shows how it resonates with Einstein-Friedmann's cosmological dynamics and Hawking-Penrose's quantum gravity model. Demonstrating a quantitative paradigm of everything, Dr. Ma shows how humanity is inextricably and holistically blended into the cosmic fabric of the universe. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:James's Faith-Ladder JAMES C. S. WERNHAM JAMES WROTE OFTEN of a "faith-ladder."' What he said about it has drawn some side-glances from critics, but not yet any sustained and careful look.' That is surprising, for what he says is puzzling enough to invite inquiry. It is also important enough to deserve it. His presentations of the ladder show significant variation, so it is useful to look at a generous (...) sample. In the interest of brevity the following six passages have been extracted from contexts which sometimes have an important bearing on them. The unquoted contexts will get attention as needed. 1. "The inner process is a succession of 'synthetic judgments'. What is so good, may be, ought to be, must be, shall be,--so far as I am concerned, I won't admit the opposite. ''s 2. "[W]e have a conception which being opposed by another is only probab /e. But we feel, it is so good that it isfit to be true, it ought to be true, it must be true etc. And then we say it shall be true for me, it/s true. ''4 3- "Its [faith's] natural logic is the Sorites: fit to be, ought to be, may be, must be, shall be, is etc.''5 4. "The following steps may be called the 'faith-ladder': ~. There is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true, nothing self-contradictory; ' To the best of my knowledge, the name "faith-ladder'"does not occur before 19o6. It occurs in "Faith and Reason" and in "Faith and the Right to Believe," both written in that year. But expositions of the thing predate the name. They are found as early as 1899, and in close connection with the will-to-believe doctrine. 9 Levinson's discussion is a partial exception. His treatment is more extended than most. See H. S. Levinson, $c/ence, Metaphysicsand the Chan~e of Salvation (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 161--67; also his The Religious Investigations of Wdliam James (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 198 0, 231-34. s Letter to Baldwin, quoted in'R. B. Perry, The Thoughtand Characterof WilliamJames, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935), 2: 243. 4 Letter to Marshall, Feb. 9, 1899, quoted in Perry, Thought and Character,2: 24~. 5 William James, A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard Universit~t Press, 1977), 199. [1o5] lO6 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28" 1 JANUARY I990 2. If might have been true under certain conditions; 3- It may be true even now; 4. It isfit to be true; 5- It ought to be true; 6. It must be true; 7- It s/m//be true, at any rate true for me. ''6 5. "Faith's form of argument is something like this: Considering a view of the world: 'It isfit to be true', she feels; 'it would be well if it were true; it might be true; it may be true; it ought to be true', she says; 'it must be true', she continues; 'it shall be true', she concludes, 'for me; that is, I will treat it as if it were true so far as my advocacy and actions are concerned'. ''7 6. "A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no matter how. Is it true or not? you ask. It might be true somewhere, you say, for it is not self-contradictory. It may be true, you continue, even here and now. It is fit to be true, it would be well if it were true, it ought to be true, you presently feel. It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers next; and then--as a final result--it shall be held for true, you decide; it shall be as if true, for you. ''s 9. Between these statements there are clear similarities and clear differences too. Some of them deserve to be noted, some to be noted and explored. a. In these accounts of it the ladder varies in the number of its rungs. By James's own count in one place, it has as many as seven. In... (shrink)

Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre les musiques de tous les temps et de toutes les cultures? Peut-on repérer des formes sonores identiques? Existe-t-il des principes d'organisation similaires?François-Bernard M‚che reprend ici la question des universaux en musique et montre en quoi le jeu musical est un jeu poétique et naturel, qui s'esquisse déjà dans le monde animal. On comprend mieux dés lors que l'homme puisse éprouver des émotions aussi intenses à l'écoute et au maniement des sons. On comprend mieux, aussi, que (...) la musique puisse être une sorte de lieu-test pour la distinction entre nature et culture. Compositeur et musicologue de réputation internationale, professeur à l'EHESS, François-Bernard M‚che a reçu le Grand Prix national de la Musique pour l'ensemble de son œuvre. (shrink)

In the West, the mission of cultural studies is often inextricably linked with practice, or intervention. Stuart Hall, the British scholar of cultural studies, believed that cultural studies is essentially "a sort of practice in which one constantly gives thought to intervening in the world, and the purpose of practice is always to reform, to effect change, and to have practical and actual effect on things."1.

Souvenir of the 12th anniversary of Bangladesh Darshan Samiti; comprises articles on the study and teaching of philosophy in Bangladesh.

In recent years much has been said about how new democracies are backsliding or have regressed since the turn of the century when hope and optimism about the future spread of democracy was widespread. However, ideas that democracy would spread were based on institutional and governance indicators rather than from the perspective of everyday citizens. When we look at public attitudes towards democracy during this period, we can see that such optimism was perhaps misplaced or premature. Drawing on findings from (...) the AsiaBarometer and the World Values Survey, this research finds that public attitudes during this time were not overly convinced by democracy and certainly not yet satisfied with their government's performance in terms of providing basic democratic freedoms and independence. (shrink)