The paper is a contribution to the object ontology. The general approach assumed in the investigation is that of Roman Ingarden's The Controversy Over the Existence of the World where an object is the subject-of-properties. The analysis of the form and the mode of existence of properties leads to the rejection of both negative and general properties. Each property is an individual qualitative moment of a particular object. Its form reveals existential heteronomy: the quality of the property is not immanent (...) but refers to the object. The subject of properties has not its own qualitative content: its form is just the internal causality establishing the unity of an object. An object is not causally isolated from other objects, but external causation differs from internal either by being ramified in case of the composition and destruction of an object or reciprocal in case of interaction between coexisting objects. (shrink)

Ingarden conceives ontology as a philosophia prima, which deals with being as purely possible. It is an intuitive and a priori analysis of the content of the relevant ideas. It consists of three parts: existential, formal and material ontology. Existential ontology deals with the possible modes of existence. Problems of factual existence pertain to metaphysics, which is a separate branch of theoretical philosophy, based on ontology.

Tekst, nawiązujący do artykułu Stanisława Judyckiego „Bóg i uniwersalia”, zawiera analizę zasadniczych stanowisk w sporze o uniwersalia i przedstawia własną interpretację niektórych kluczowych kwestii tej problematyki — zwłaszcza koncepcji tak zwanego realizmu umiarkowanego, przypisywanego Arystotelesowi. Wspomniana jest też ewentualność wykorzystania tego rodzaju rozważań w innym zagadnieniu klasycznej metafizyki — w kwestii istnienia Absolutu.

The paper aims at a critical investigation of the famous initial chapter of the so called "transcendental deduction of categories" from Hegel's "Science of Logic". At first, some graphic interpretation of the dialectic of becoming is proposed to show how different aspects of it fit the general "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" scheme ruling the transcendental deduction. Then the question is put forward whether the notions involved in Hegel's doctrine of becoming can really serve any explanation or clarification of it. The not very surprising (...) answer is that instead of explaining anything they badly need explanation themselves. A suspicion arises that Hegel's actual intention could have been rather to completely confuse a reader at the very beginning of the exposition of his system, with the hope that after such a shocking treatment he will loose his criticism altogether. Such tactics can be very effective sometimes, as the famous Blitzkrieg invented by German General Staff showed once. (shrink)

The paper refers to the author's informal considerations from his article „The ontology of founding” (published in „Filozofia Nauki”, 1995, no 1-2). The starting point of the paper is a definition of „monadic whole”, i.e. such a whole, which contains no elements mutually linked up by moments of unity. Then definitions of „part stricto sensu”, „whole (in general)”, „identity of two wholes” etc., are formulated. Using the conceptual apparatus, introduced by these definitions, the author gives some theorems withoutlines of their (...) proofs. In conclusion, the explicative power of the presented formalization with reference to remaining categorial notions of ontology (i.e. notions of property, relation, universals), and in comparison to some other modern theories of parts and wholes, is discussed. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to provide information on the evolution of three correlated notions listed above. Only constructive standpoints, assuming possibility of the relevant sciences are taken into account, no criticism of metaphysics as such, etc. is mentioned. Included are some opinions on the methodology of these disciplines. As Polish reader still cannot find information concerning many basic issues in this field of study, some elements of doxography are also included to fill the most nagging gaps. This provisional (...) survey is intended to serve as a complementary source of information in the field of ontology for students of philosophy. (shrink)

The paper develops the argument presented in my earlier article, Intentional Reference and Its Object in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism. It contains further considerations on the proper understanding of Husserl’s notion of noema. My aim is not only to present an interpretation of Husserl’s text, but primarily to understand what constitutes an intentional reference of an act of consciousness. I agree with some of Husserl’s claims in Ideas, Book I, that noema, sense and intentional object are basically the same. This standpoint (...) implies, however, a drastic reinterpretation of the notion of an object. I refer to Ingarden’s conception of a purely intentional object to show the difficulties connected with regarding noema as an object separate from consciousness but still existentially dependent on it. Analyzing Husserlian notion of a noematic core I emphasize the relevance of universals for Husserl’s theory of consciousness. (shrink)

The following issues are considered in the paper: The proper understanding of the ‘attempt to doubt’ recommended by Husserl in Ideas, Book I, as a point of departure on a way to the transcendental reduction. How intentional reference of an act of consciousness is possible and what it consists in, according to Husserl. A logical dependence between the characteristics of intentional reference and the standpoint of transcendental idealism in Husserl’s Ideas, Book I. How to understand Husserl’s claim that the intentional (...) object is equivalent to sense. I arrive at the conclusion that a fully consistent interpretation of Husserl’s declarations regarding the aforementioned issues does not seem to be possible; for one needs to modify Husserl’s standpoint in certain respects. These considerations will be carried on in an article titled ‘The Noema as Sense. The Problem of the Object of Consciousness in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism’, forthcoming in Diametros. (shrink)

The problems investigated in the paper concern mainly the question: What do components of the predicative sentence „A is b” refer to? The following particular issues are considered: the Aristotelian distinction between particularity and ontic self-sufficiency; the interpretation of different kinds of predication based on that distinction; a debate on different standpoints in the controversy concerning the nature of the predicate referent, in particular a contemporary version of nominalism called The Resemblance Theory of Universals (with the related problem of the (...) ontic status of the relation of temporal existence in general and different kinds of this relation; and finally different dimensions of the complexity of a thing. A former version of the paper was published in English in The Proceedings of The Second German-Polish Workshop on Logic and Logical Philosophy (Nicolaus Copernicus University Press, Toruń 1998). (shrink)

The Aristotelian double characterization of a primary substanceexploits the difference between the part-whole relation and the non-linguisticrelation of predication. A problem arises whether and how the second relationcould be reduced to something else. Such a reduction is explicitly declared orat least implicitly assumed in all version of conceptualism and nominalism.The moderate realism is often interpreted as a reductionism of this kindbut such interpretations do not seem corect. Only the so called resemblancetheory can be regarded as a successful attempt at the (...) reduction in question.However, it seems that the predication per se cannot be disposed of even inthis way. If so, then the nature of the relation of predication still waits fora precise analysia and description. This would provide an insight into theessence of a universal being. (shrink)

Klasyczny rachunek zdań w ujęciu semantycznym, uważany niekiedy za idealizację opisowej części języka naturalnego czy też za teorię spójników zdaniowych, traktuje negację jako czystą funkcję prawdziwościową. Przyzwyczajeni do takiego ujęcia, uważamy je za adekwatne, ściśle oddające sens, jaki ma ten funktor w zdaniach opisowych. Tymczasem okazuje się, że w refleksji filozoficznej przypisywano negacji i inne, bardzo różnorodne role. Na przykładzie tego, co o negacji i zdaniach przeczących mówią: Parmenides, sofiści, Platon, Arystoteles, a z filozofów nowożytnych i współczesnych Kant, Hegel, Bergson, (...) fenomenologowie Reinach i Ingarden, Ludwig Wittgenstein, przedstawiciele brytyjskiej filozofii analitycznej J.L. Austin i A.J. Ayer czy wreszcie Martin Heidegger, można zauważyć zależność funkcji semantycznych przypisywanych negacji od takich czy innych rozstrzygnięć ontologicznych dokonywanych przez tych myślicieli. Pamiętając o tym, warto jednak wyróżnić interpretację negacji jako funkcji prawdziwościowej - nie dlatego, żeby była ona jedynie poprawna, lecz ze względu na to, że interpretacja taka jako najmniej zaangażowana ontologicznie daje się uzgodnić z większością innych tu wymienionych. W tym i tylko tym znaczeniu może ona być uważana za uprzywilejowaną w stosunku do innych. (shrink)

My aim is to show that the elaborated and very attractive theory of the purely intentional object developed by Roman Ingarden within the framework of his ontology is nevertheless untenable. The main reason of this is the false assumption, generally accepted in phenomenology, that some existing object always corresponds to an act of consciousness. This general issue has been investigated in my paper "On Intending and Being Intended" (to appear in Studia Philosophiae Christianae). In the present paper however I am (...) dealing with the more detailed question of the relation between Ingarden's theory of the purely intentional object and his ontology. I maintain that the existential and formal description of the purely intentional object contradicts the general characteristics of the object as such, developed in Ingarden's Hauptwerk: "Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt". With this respect three main objections can be mentioned: inconsistency in the existential characterization of the purely intentional being, incomprehensibility of the formal "two-sidedness" of the purely intentional object and finally - lack of the authentic unity of the intentional content. (shrink)

Remarks on Barbara Tuchańska’s “Cultural Ontology” , Diametros – An Online Journal of Philosophy, no. 41 , B. Tuchańska, “ Cultural Ontology: the Cultural Constitution of Being ” , Diametros – An Online Journal of Philosophy, no. 42 ).

Ajdukiewicz podejmował kilkakrotnie próbę analizy i krytyki metafizycznego idealizmu zarówno w jego wersji obiektywnej, jak subiektywnej. Angażował do tego celu pewne pojęcia i wyniki współczesnej metalogiki, co stanowiło przykład zastosowania właściwej mu metody analizy filozoficznej, zwanej metody parafraz. Analiza Ajdukiewiczowskiej argumentacji ukazuje jej dalece niekonkluzywny charakter, jak również zdaje się wykazywać, że metoda parafraz nie znajduje tu swego efektywnego zastosowania. Konkluzją przedstawionych rozważań jest hipoteza, iż fundamentalne przekonania metafizyczne nie poddają się krytyce o charakterze semiotycznym.