Results for 'Lynne Casper'

972 found
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  1. The American family in 1990: growing diversity and inequality.Sara McLanahan, Lynne Casper, S. J. Rogers, I. Speizer, W. H. Mosley, A. J. Coale, E. J. Clegg, J. F. Cross, G. Mboup & R. F. Tas - 1995 - Journal of Biosocial Science 27 (1):3-17.
  2.  58
    Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains (...)
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  3. Integrity.Lynne McFall - 1987 - Ethics 98 (1):5-20.
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  4. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Lynne Rudder Baker & Paul M. Churchland - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):906.
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  5. Why Constitution is Not Identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599.
  6.  88
    Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - Princeton University Press.
    "This book is a comprehensive attack on several of the views that have been most influential in the philosophy of psychology during the last two decades. Professor Baker argues that mentalistic notions should not be eliminated, and need not be explained in terms of other notions, in cognitive science.' The book is interesting and shows an honest concern for clear argumentation. It deserves a wide readership." --Tyler Burge, University of California at Los Angeles"This book is a provocative and relentlessly argued (...)
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  7. Metaphysics and mental causation.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - In Pascal Engel, Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-96.
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of (...)
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  8. Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (3):333-348.
    Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution (...)
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  9. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):127-129.
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  10. The ontology of artifacts.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):99 – 111.
    Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par with other material objects. I formulate a nonreductive theory that regards artifacts as constituted by - but not identical to - aggregates of particles. After setting out the theory, I rebut a number of arguments that disparage the ontological status of artifacts.
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  11. Derogatory Terms: Racism, Sexism and the Inferential Role Theory of Meaning.Lynne Tirrell - 1999 - In Kelly Oliver & Christina Hendricks, Language and Liberation: Feminism, Philosophy, and Language. SUNY Press.
    Derogatory terms (racist, sexist, ethnic, and homophobic epithets) are bully words with ontological force: they serve to establish and maintain a corrupt social system fuelled by distinctions designed to justify relations of dominance and subordination. No wonder they have occasioned public outcry and legal response. The inferential role analysis developed here helps move us away from thinking of the harms as being located in connotation (representing mere speaker bias) or denotation (holding that the terms fail to refer due to inaccurate (...)
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  12.  50
    Mad for Foucault.Lynne Huffer & Elizabeth Wilson - 2010 - Theory, Culture and Society 27 (7-8):324-338.
    This two-part article summarizes the major arguments of Lynne Huffer’s 2010 book, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory. The second part of the piece is a dialogue between Huffer and feminist theorist Elizabeth Wilson about the implications of the book’s arguments about rethinking queer theory, interiority, psychic life, lived experience and received understandings of Michel Foucault’s work.
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  13. (1 other version)Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):61-66.
     
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  14.  46
    Judgment and Justification.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (3):481.
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  15. Sound to meaning correspondences facilitate word learning.Lynne C. Nygaard, Allison E. Cook & Laura L. Namy - 2009 - Cognition 112 (1):181-186.
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  16. A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):148-151.
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  17.  56
    The Semantics of Prosody: Acoustic and Perceptual Evidence of Prosodic Correlates to Word Meaning.Lynne C. Nygaard, Debora S. Herold & Laura L. Namy - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (1):127-146.
    This investigation examined whether speakers produce reliable prosodic correlates to meaning across semantic domains and whether listeners use these cues to derive word meaning from novel words. Speakers were asked to produce phrases in infant‐directed speech in which novel words were used to convey one of two meanings from a set of antonym pairs (e.g., big/small). Acoustic analyses revealed that some acoustic features were correlated with overall valence of the meaning. However, each word meaning also displayed a unique acoustic signature, (...)
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  18. Naturalism and the first-person perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Georg Gasser, How Successful is Naturalism? Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 203-226.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  19. Making sense of ourselves: self-narratives and personal identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):7-15.
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes ‘us’ refers to real (...)
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  20. A metaphysics of ordinary things and why we need it.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Philosophy 83 (1):5-24.
    Metaphysics has enjoyed a vigorous revival in the last few decades. Even so, there has been little ontological interest in the things that we interact with everyday—trees, tables, other people.1 It is not that metaphysicians ignore ordinary things altogether. Indeed, they are happy to say that sentences like ‘The daffodils are out early this year’ or ‘My computer crashed again’ are true. But they take the truth of such sentences not to require that a full description of reality mention daffodils (...)
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  21. (3 other versions)Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):143-147.
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  22. Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):144-165.
    relation between, say, a lump of clay and a statue that it makes up, or between a red and white piece of metal and a stop sign, or between a person and her body? Assuming that there is a single relation between members of each of these pairs, is the relation “strict” identity, “contingent” identity or something else?1 Although this question has generated substantial controversy recently,2 I believe that there is philo- sophical gain to be had from thinking through the (...)
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  23.  71
    Phonological development in relation to native language and literacy: Variations on a theme in six alphabetic orthographies.Lynne G. Duncan, São Luís Castro, Sylvia Defior, Philip Hk Seymour, Sheila Baillie, Jacqueline Leybaert, Philippe Mousty, Nathalie Genard, Menelaos Sarris & Costas D. Porpodas - 2013 - Cognition 127 (3):398-419.
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  24. (1 other version)The first-person perspective: A test for naturalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For (...)
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  25.  39
    Pain perception in fish.Lynne Sneddon - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):9-10.
    Pain assessment in fish is particularly challenging due toBioscience Building, Liverpool, L69 7ZB their evolutionary distance from humans, their lack of audible vocalization, and apparently expressionless demeanour. However, there are criteria that can be used to gauge whether pain perception occurs using carefully executed scientific approaches. Here, the standards for pain in fish are discussed and can be considered in three ways: neural detection and processing of pain; adverse responses to pain; and consciously experiencing pain. Many procedures that we subject (...)
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  26. (1 other version)When does a person begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
    According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, (...)
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  27. On Making Things Up.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):31-51.
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  28. Three-Dimensionalism Rescued: A Brief Reply to Michael Della Rocca.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):166-170.
  29. 'Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist' ?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
    Although prominent Christian theologians and philosophers have assumed the truth of mind/body dualism, I want to raise the question of whether the Christian ought to be a mind/body dualist. First, I sketch a picture of mind, and of human persons, that is not a form of mind/body dualism. Then, I argue that the nondualistic picture is compatible with a major traditional Christian doctrine, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. Finally, I suggest that if a Christian need not be (...)
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  30. Temporal Becoming: The Argument From Physics.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1974 - Philosophical Forum 6 (2):218-236.
    Arguments about temporal becoming often get nowhere. One reason for the impasse lies in the fact that the issue has been formulated as a choice between science on the one hand and common sense (or ordinary language) on the other as the primary source of ontological commitment.' Often' proponents of attributing temporal becoming to the physical universe look to everyday temporal concepts, find them infested with notions involving temporal becoming and conclude that becoming is a basic feature of the physical (...)
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  31. From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.
  32. Updating Anselm Again.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (1):23-32.
    I set out four general facts about things that we can refer to and talk about, whether they exist or not. Then, I set out an argument for the existence of God. Myargument, like Anselm’s original argument, is a reductio ad absurdum: It shows that the assumption that God does not exist leads to a contradiction. Theargument is short and in ordinary language. Each line of the argument, other than the reductio premise, is justified by one of the general facts. (...)
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  33. (1 other version)The ontological status of persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  34. Formal criteria for the concept of human flourishing: the first step in defending flourishing as an ideal aim of education.Lynne S. Wolbert, Doret J. de Ruyter & Anders Schinkel - 2015 - Ethics and Education 10 (1):118-129.
    Human flourishing is the topic of an increasing number of books and articles in educational philosophy. Flourishing should be regarded as an ideal aim of education. If this is defended, the first step should be to elucidate what is meant by flourishing, and what exactly the concept entails. Listing formal criteria can facilitate reflection on the ideal of flourishing as an aim of education. We took Aristotelian eudaimonia as a prototype to construct two criteria for the concept of human flourishing: (...)
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  35. Temporal reality.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein, Time and Identity. Bradford.
    Nonphilosophers, if they think of philosophy at all, wonder why people work in metaphysics. After all, metaphysics, as Auden once said of poetry, makes nothing happen.1 Yet some very intelligent people are driven to spend their lives exploring metaphysical theses. Part of what motivates metaphysicians is the appeal of grizzly puzzles (like the paradox of the heap or the puzzle of the ship of Theseus). But the main reason to work in metaphysics, for me at least, is to understand the (...)
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  36. The shrinking difference between artifacts and natural objects.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers.
    Artifacts are objects intentionally made to serve a given purpose; natural objects come into being without human intervention. I shall argue that this difference does not signal any ontological deficiency in artifacts qua artifacts. After sketching my view of artifacts as ordinary objects, I’ll argue that ways of demarcating genuine substances do not draw a line with artifacts on one side and natural objects on the other. Finally, I’ll suggest that philosophers have downgraded artifacts because they think of metaphysics as (...)
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  37.  37
    Implicit Memory and Metacognition.Lynne M. Reder - 1996 - Lawrence Erlbaum.
    The editor of this volume takes it to mean that a prior experience affects behavior without the individual's appreciation (ability to report) of this...
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  38. Christian materialism in a scientific age.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
    Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the (...)
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  39.  11
    Conclusion.Rosi Braidotti, Hiltraud Casper-Hehne, Marjan Ivković & Daan F. Oostveen - 2024 - In Rosi Braidotti, Hiltraud Casper-Hehne, Marjan Ivković & Daan F. Oostveen, The Edinburgh Companion to the New European Humanities. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 423-426.
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  40. (1 other version)What Am I?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151-159.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable---namely, that he was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously (...)
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  41. Technology and the Future of Persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - The Monist 96 (1):37-53.
  42. Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
  43.  51
    How important are rhyme and analogy in beginning reading?Lynne G. Duncan, Philip H. K. Seymour & Shirley Hill - 1997 - Cognition 63 (2):171-208.
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  44.  10
    The Rhetorics of Feminism: Readings in Contemporary Cultural Theory and the Popular Press.Lynne Pearce & Walter J. Ong - 2004 - Psychology Press.
    This work explores the vast differences between oral and literate cultures, offering an account of the intellectual, literary and social effects of writing, print and electronic technology.
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  45.  53
    What Is A Woman?: And Other Essays.Lynne Huffer & Toril Moi - 2001 - Substance 30 (1/2):262.
  46.  48
    The role of community consultation in the ethical conduct of research without consent.Lynne D. Richardson, Rosamond Rhodes, Deborah Fish Ragin & Ilene Wilets - 2006 - American Journal of Bioethics 6 (3):33 – 35.
  47.  52
    (1 other version)The threat of cognitive suicide.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1987 - In Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. Princeton University Press. pp. 134-148.
  48. De re belief in action.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (3):363-387.
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  49. Social externalism and first-person authority.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
    Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on (...)
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  50. Response to Eric Olson.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (S1):43-45.
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