Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism

Noûs 40 (2):307-330 (2006)
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10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00611.x

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Lynne Baker
Saint Mary's College of California

Citations of this work

Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
In defence of the Four-Case Argument.Benjamin Matheson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1963-1982.
A hard-line reply to the multiple-case manipulation argument.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):160-170.
Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Do we have free will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.

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