A topos version of Cantor’s back and forth theorem is established and used to prove that the ordered structure of the rational numbers (Q, <) is homogeneous in any topos with natural numbers object. The notion of effective homogeneity is introduced, and it is shown that (Q, <) is a minimal effectively homogeneous structure, that is, it can be embedded in every other effectively homogeneous ordered structure.

In 1996, W. Veldman and F. Waaldijk present a constructive (intuitionistic) proof for the homogeneity of the ordered structure of the Cauchy real numbers, and so this result holds in any topos with natural number object. However, it is well known that the real numbers objects obtained by the traditional constructions of Cauchy sequences and Dedekind cuts are not necessarily isomorphic in an arbitrary topos with natural numbers object. Consequently, Veldman and Waaldijk's result does not apply to the ordered structure (...) of Dedekind real numbers in toposes. The main result to be proved in the present paper is that the ordered structure of the Dedekind real numbers object is homogeneous, in any topos with natural numbers object. This result is obtained within the framework of local set theory. (shrink)

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. Moreover, discussions of propositional and doxastic justification (...) have rarely focused on broader meta-epistemological issues, and yet meta-epistemological positions can have important implications for first-order views about this distinction. This volume addresses these and other issues by bringing together 16 essays that advance the state-of-the-art thinking on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of issues previously neglected in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

The study of human behaviour, and the minds that produce that behaviour, has been an occupation of scholars, artists, and philosophers for millennia. But it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that psychology came into its own as a distinct field of study—and, more importantly, as a scientifically legitimate field of study. When we view psychology as a science, certain questions naturally emerge: what sorts of phenomena does psychology seek to explain? What is distinctive about the kinds (...) of explanations adduced in this science? How do these explanations integrate with theories and explanations in other fields of study? Does psychology aim to explain all mental phenomena, or are there some areas, such as consciousness, that will be forever beyond its explanatory powers? Due to its very nature, psychology is a field that both philosophers and scientists have critically examined over the years. This critical examination has, in turn, generated a literature that is voluminous, heavily contested, and increasingly technical. To help users to make sense of this large and complex scholarly corpus, this new four-volume collection from Routledge is both comprehensive and sensitive to the ongoing nature of debates in the field. Two expert editors have carefully assembled classic contributions, as well as more recent work, to create an indispensable ‘mini library’ of the best and most influential scholarship in the philosophy of psychology. With a comprehensive index and newly written introductions by the editors, The Philosophy of Psychology will be welcomed by a broad range of scholars, researchers, and advanced students, especially those working in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and cognitive science. (shrink)

El último año un número significativo de países desarrollados y del tercer mundo iniciaron procesos de transformación social y política a partir de levantamientos, revoluciones y movimientos impulsados por una ciudadanía hasta ahora distanciada e incluso segregada de la esfera política. En algunos países el imperio del mercado, en otros la fuerza represiva de regímenes autoritarios, en los más privilegiados, un nihilismo extendido producto del bienestar material acumulado, venía desde hace añ..

Epistemic value is a kind of value possessed by knowledge, and perhaps other epistemic goods such as justification and understanding. The problem of explaining the value of knowledge is perennial in philosophy, going back at least as far as Plato’s Meno. One formulation of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is valuable. Another version of the problem is to explain why and in what sense knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief or opinion. This (...) article looks at various formulations of the value problem and various accounts of the value of knowledge in ancient and modern philosophy. The article then considers some contemporary discussions of the value problem, including the charge that reliabilist accounts cannot account for the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Various virtue-theoretic accounts of epistemic value are discussed as possible improvements over process reliabilism, and the epistemic value of understanding (as compared to knowledge) is considered. (shrink)

Durante la primera década del siglo XX el 90% de los migrantes provenía de Europa y se dirigía a cinco países: EEUU, Argentina, Canadá, Brasil y Australia. Hoy esa misma proporción de migrantes proviene de tres continentes: Asia, África y Latinoamérica y se dirige a cuatro grandes regiones: Europa, Norteamérica, Asia Pacífico y El Golfo Pérsico. Las migraciones se han mundializado no tanto por la magnitud de los flujos, que sigue estando por debajo del 5% de la población mundial, sino (...) por el .. (shrink)

El presente artículo no trata de analizar procesos o estructuras, como es habitual en la Ciencia Política, sino de dilucidar aquello que, según Aristóteles, hace posible y es constitutivo de la vida política del ciudadano. La Política en Aristóteles es resultado de una prudencia y ciencia arquitectónica. Y el instrumento generador de esa arquitectura es el lenguaje. El uso de ese instrumento social de carácter fundamental para la constitución de una sociedad humana y de su organización política se denomina Retórica. (...) Un instrumento es un medio de obtener formas y fines determinados, pero cuando el instrumento adquiere un carácter fundamental deja de ser un simple medio para nuestros fines, determinando incluso el fin y la estructura que está por elaborar. Y esa instrumentalidad que nos dirige y orienta corre el riesgo de pasarnos totalmente inadvertida, formando parte de lo inconsciente colectivo. Considerando la Retórica como el uso consciente del lenguaje, quiere el autor reivindicar el valor de una consciencia retórica sin la cual no es posible la coordinación de la acción de todos y la de cada uno en una comunidad social y política. (shrink)

El tema que trata este libro persigue dos objetivos principales. Por una parte, estudiar los saberes en el Renacimiento y en el Barroco, acercándose, entre otros autores, a Werner Rolewinck, Alfonso de la Torre, Pico de la Mirándola, Tomás Moro, Francisco de Vitoria y la escolástica, el Brocense, Montaigne, Descartes-San Agustín, Sebastián Izquierdo, Hobbes, hasta llegar a Leibniz. Y, por otra, elaborar una teoría de los saberes, esto es, considerarlos como modelos de significación y de ordenación del mundo, que van (...) configurando Europa y la modernidad europea. Así este libro reconstruye la historia de las variaciones de un discurso, el de los saberes en general y de sus disciplinas en particular. Muestra ese incesante esfuerzo por ordenar y comprender la realidad, que acabará sustituyendo un modelo teológico, o relaborando sus fundamentos, al ir pasando a primer plano la existencia, el sujeto moderno, encarnada en hombres concretos de «carne y hueso», con nombre y rostro. Y expresa la ensoñación de Europa, que a través de los mismos, fue buscando y ensayando: la concordia racional y mejor república que cabía esperar. (shrink)

Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) (...) y de la teoría de las Ideas -es decir, como la base de la epistemología platónica presente en los diálogos de madurez-. The article seeks to trace the image Plato has of Heraclitus and connect it with the argumentative structure of the Cratylus in order to understand the textual needs that give rise to the doctrine of perpetual flux, that is, the discussion regarding the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names. The inclusion of Heraclitus's testimony makes it possible to trace the alleged consolidation of the thesis regarding primary and secondary names as the axis of separation between two levels of reality (one stable, the other, changing) and the theory of Ideas -that is, as the basis of Plato's epistemology as set forth in the late dialogues-. (shrink)

For over eight hundred years, philosophers—men and women—who called themselves Cynics, literally "dogs" in their language, roamed the streets and byways of the Hellenistic world, teaching strange ideas and practicing a bizarre way of life. Among them, the most important and distinctive was Diogenes of Sinope, who became the archetype of Classical Cynicism. In this comprehensive, thoroughly researched, and engaging book, philosopher Luis E. Navia undertakes the task of reconstructing Diogenes' life and extracting from him lessons that are valuable in (...) our time. The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a biographical sketch of Diogenes constructed on the basis of ancient testimonies. In Chapter 2, the practice of Cynicism, as exemplified by Diogenes, is elucidated. This "war against the world," as Navia describes it, especially the rhetoric of Cynicism, was the primary medium used by the Cynics to convey their message. Chapter 3 clarifies the roots and basis of the Cynic metamorphosis, that is, the process by which Diogenes transformed himself into a dog. This process involves complex psychological, sociological, and philosophical factors, chief among which was Socrates' influence on Diogenes through the agency of Antisthenes. Chapter 4 reconstructs the philosophy of Diogenes by identifying twelve principles of his thought. In Chapter 5, the influence of Diogenes is discussed. Navia emphasizes the vast difference between Diogenes' ideas and style of life on the one hand and, on the other, what is nowadays called cynicism. The book provides abundant references to ancient testimonies and modern scholarship. It includes an extensively annotated translation of Diogenes Laertius's biography of Diogenes and a comprehensive bibliography. (shrink)

En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y (...) de las identidades prácticas e incluso de la identidad personal. Después de exponer las ideas centrales del libro, presento dos objeciones: primero, critico la equiparación del imperativo categórico con la autoconstitución exitosa, pues no toda falla de auto-constitución es una falla moral. Segundo, argumento que la tesis de que la identidad personal es producto de la autoconstitución es problemática y que, al defenderla, Korsgaard confunde identidad práctica con identidad personal. In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity -which consists in making cohere diverging impulses for action- is for human agents a constant activity called "self-constitution." According to Korsgaard, this activity is the source of normativity, of human practical identities and even of personal identity. After explaining the main ideas of the book, I present two objections. First, I criticize the linkage of the categorical imperative to successful self-constitution, for not every failure of the latter counts as a moral failure. Second, I argue that the thesis that personal identity is a product of self-constitution is problematic and that it betrays a confusion between practical identity and personal identity. (shrink)

In this paper the history of the term "secularity" is studied highlighting its relation with the meaning of "saeculum" in Christian literature, concluding that, although the usage of this term has been extended to other areas, the notion of secularity presupposes a Christian view of the world. Following San Josemaría Escrivá three dimensions of secularity are considered: the sociological and theological features of secularity; the value of earthly realities, and the connection between laity and conscience of Christian and priestly sense (...) of existence. (shrink)

Essays on the role of the body in self-consciousness, showing that full-fledged, linguistic self-consciousness is built on a rich foundation of primitive, nonconceptual self-consciousness. These essays explore how the rich and sophisticated forms of self-consciousness with which we are most familiar—as philosophers, psychologists, and as ordinary, reflective individuals—depend on a complex underpinning that has been largely invisible to students of the self and self-consciousness. José Luis Bermúdez, extending the insights of his groundbreaking 1998 book, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, argues that (...) full-fledged, linguistic self-consciousness is built on a rich foundation of primitive, nonconceptual self-consciousness, and that these more primitive forms of self-consciousness persist in ways that frame self-conscious thought. They extend throughout the animal kingdom, and some are present in newborn human infants. Bermúdez makes the case that these primitive forms of self-awareness can indeed be described as forms of self-consciousness, arguing that they share certain structural and epistemological features with full-fledged, linguistic self-consciousness. He offers accounts of certain important classes of states of nonconceptual content, including the self-specifying dimension of visual perception and the content of bodily awareness, considering how they represent the self. And he explores the general role of nonconceptual self-consciousness in our cognitive and affective lives, examining in several essays the relation between nonconceptual awareness of our bodies and what has been called our “sense of ownership” for our own bodies. (shrink)

The article identifies a latent debate in the recent literature on the role and worth of experiments in economics and other social sciences concerning the relationship between the external and the internal validity of experimental designs. Our work identifies two incompatible views regarding the relationship between internal and external validity of experiments. While in the methodological literature references to the idea that there is a trade-off between the internal and external validity of experiments abound, this view coexists with the position (...) stating that internal validity is rather a prerequisite of external validity. By identifying the contours of this implicit debate in the recent methodological literature around the use of experiments in the social sciences we call attention upon a series of insufficiently conceptualized issues regarding the central notions of internal and external validity and we question the standard view positing a trade-off between the two. This article stands against common associations of internal validity and external validity with the distinction between field and laboratory experiments and assesses critically the arguments that link the artificiality of experimental settings done in the laboratory with the purported trade-off between internal and external validity. (shrink)