Manuscripts excavated and looted from tombs in recent decades have greatly enriched our understanding of Western Han verse. Some of these documents have been designated by scholars as poems, and a few have even been assigned to particular poetic genres. In this article, however, I am less concerned with sorting texts into neat formal or generic categories and more interested in exploring the range of texts and contexts in which verse was employed. To that end, I introduce, analyze, and at (...) least partially translate five new or little-known texts retrieved from various Western Han sites that make extensive use of rhyme and metrical rhythm: *Xiangma jing 相馬經 from Mawangdui M3, Tang Le 唐勒 from Yin- queshan M1, Wang Ji 妄稽 and Fan yin 反淫 from the looted Peking University manuscript corpus, and *Daowang fu 悼亡賦 from Haihunhou M1. Some of these documents are very similar to sources in the transmitted literature, while others are quite different from any verse previously known from the period. Taken together, however, they greatly enhance our understanding of the different ways verse functioned in various Western Han cultural contexts. (shrink)

Prior to the emergence of the formalized commentarial traditions of the Early Imperial era (221 BCE–220 CE), the Odes seem typically to have been encountered “in motion” or “in use” as quoted speech in early historical and philosophical works. By studying the way the Odes are used in an understudied text—the Guoyu 國語 (Discourses of the states), probably compiled in the late Warring States era (ca. 475–221 BCE)—this article explores how historical speeches and anecdotes were used as an early form (...) of commentary, variously contextualizing, explaining, paraphrasing, glossing, and interpreting the Odes. Before the invention of comprehensive, systematic commentaries associating each poem with a particular historical context and meaning, texts like the Guoyu provided early readers with guides to understanding and using classical texts, and many of their exegetical forms and strategies anticipate the commentarial traditions of the early empires. This article shows that historical speeches were one way in which early Chinese elites were trained in how to read and use the Odes appositely and sensitively, and that we can think of such speeches as a form of commentary. (shrink)

A signal challenge of twenty-first century psychiatry is the effective treatment of existential/spiritual suffering in palliative care. This chapter will concentrate on research to assess the therapeutic potential of psilocybin to assuage that suffering. If a “psychedelic experience” can facilitate an acceptance of impending death, and reduce the existential suffering of those who endure it, it could prove to be a valuable intervention where one is sorely needed. The therapeutic use of psilocybin with dying patients (hereinafter patients) raises numerous questions (...) about research trial design, the model of psychiatry that might accommodate it, and the kind of experience it induces. Are these the sorts of experience that psychiatric treatment should effect on troubled patients? Is spiritual care within the ambit of psychiatry? There are epistemological questions as to the veridicality of the psychedelic experience. How much credence should we give it? I will argue in cautious support of ongoing research to evaluate the therapeutic use of psilocybin in palliative care. This argument can be extended to research on its therapeutic use in psychotherapy. The chapter will focus on four questions: (1) what is the ethical justification for this research on patients? (2) What types of research trial design are best used to assess the purported benefits of a psychedelic drug experience? (3) What is the epistemic warrant of the “mystical” and “noetic” facets of this experience? (4) What models of (a) psychiatry and (b) drug action could accommodate the therapeutic use of psilocybin in palliative care? (shrink)

This essay argues that the practice ofmedicine is not a phronetic activity in theoriginal Aristotelian sense of that term. Jonsen andToulmin are two philosophers who have conflated thetechne of medicine with phronesis. Thisconflation ignores Aristotle's crucial distinctionbetween techne and phronesis and his useof the medical analogy. It is argued that medicalreasoning is similar to phronesis but does notexemplify it. Phronesis will not save thelife of medical ethics. The concept could be utilized as amoral prosthetic.

Socially responsible investment (SRI) has increasingly assumed a major role in global equity markets. In this article we argue that the continued growth in investors seeking to align their ethical concerns with their investment strategies may influence the way in which the employment relationship is managed in publicly-listed corporations. After tracing the historical development of SRI, its implications for the conduct of human resource management (HRM) are examined. We conclude by analysing a number of the key problems associated with investor (...) confidence in SRI funds and present a range of suggested techniques for improving screening methodologies. (shrink)

Individuals are more likely to remember emotional than neutral information, but this benefit does not always extend to the surrounding background information. This memory narrowing is theorised to be linked to the availability of attentional resources at encoding. In contrast to the predictions of this theoretical account, altering participants' attentional resources at encoding by dividing attention did not affect emotion-induced memory narrowing. Attention was divided using three separate manipulations: a digit ordering task (Experiment 1), an arithmetic task (Experiment 2) and (...) an auditory discrimination task (Experiment 3). Across all three experiments, divided attention decreased memory across the board but did not affect the degree of memory narrowing. These findings suggest that theories to explain memory narrowing must be expanded to include other potential mechanisms beyond the limitations of attentional resources. (shrink)

The standard approach to ethics in psychotherapy is to focus on the therapist. Although normative “boundary” ethics revolves around what the therapist ought, or ought not, to do, virtue ethics can revolve around the kind of person the therapist ought to be. One can thus apply virtue ethical theory to clinical practice and argue for therapist virtues that are relevant to meeting professional standards and to working effectively through the problems that arise in psychotherapy. Considerably less attention has been paid (...) to how virtue ethics relates to the patient. The ethics of psychotherapy can also revolve around the sort of person the patient should be. I argue that there are nascent virtues which the patient can bring to psychotherapy that, when cultivated with the therapist, can facilitate a beneficial outcome and virtues that can be seen as psychotherapeutic goals toward which the patient ought to strive. (shrink)

Grunbaum claims that the remedial failure of atreatment's characteristic factors is thegeneric, objective property of a placebo. Hestipulates that a treatment is placebic if thisremedial failure exacerbates the targetdisorder. This stipulation can subsume asplacebic effects that might be solelypharmacological, e.g., paradoxical reactions tocertain psychiatric drugs. If that exacerbationcan be explained pharmacologically, then wemight question whether Grunbaum's definitionalscheme captures the core identity of what weusually intend by the placebo concept. Ipropose that this core identity is bestcaptured by a symbolic meaning hypothesis (...) inwhich psychological factors exert thedeterminative influence. (shrink)

Some authors argue that the ethics of medical care and the ethics of research differ, and that it is a mistake to conflate the two. They propose “that medical research and medical treatment are two distinct forms of activities, governed by different ethical principles.” This raises the question of whether physicians who are also clinical investigators may separate their role as physician from that of researcher when they are involved in clinical trials, thereby avoiding the obligations required in the physician-patient (...) relationship. Miller and Brody suggest that medical training is to blame for what they believe is the physicians’ tendency to confound the obligations of research and practice. “Physician-investigators, after all, went to medical school” they explain. They believe that considering research with patients outside the ethical framework of the physician-patient relationship may be “difficult and threatening” to physicians who have “psychological needs” to consider the ethical obligations flowing from their relationship with their patients. (shrink)

We agree that evolutionary perspectives may help us organize many divergent realms of the science of human behavior. Nevertheless, an imperative to unite all social science under an evolutionary framework risks turning off researchers who have their own theoretical perspectives that can be informed by evolutionary theory without being exclusively defined by it. We propose a few considerations for scholars interested in joining the evolutionary and social sciences.

Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on (...) the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is “no,” then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is “yes” and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation. (shrink)

This study reassesses the concept of the Anthropocene as a new geological age as it is influencing contemporary debates in social theory. As a unit of geological time whose changes are allegedly caused, directly and indirectly, by human beings, this scientific concept challenges the existing constructions of theoretical binaries, such as nature/culture, environment/society, objectivity/subjectivity or happenstance/design, in social theory. The analysis suggests many understandings of the Anthropocene in social theory are politicized over-interpretations of natural events, and these moves appear to (...) be developing moral rhetorics of, and operational plans for, managing the Anthropocene to create specific outcomes for those who are the managers as well as the managed. The fact that human beings do not, in fact, have this measure of technical control is ignored by advocates of Anthropocenarian politics to advance their policy agendas. (shrink)

Essays from the cutting edge of psychedelic research, from Breaking Convention 2017.

No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly restrictive in prohibiting a range of reasonable preferences. And theories designed to accommodate such preferences (for example, Buchak's (2013) Risk‐Weighted Expected Utility Theory) violate the Betweenness axiom, which requires that you are indifferent to randomizing over two options between which you are already indifferent. Betweenness has been overlooked by philosophers, and we argue that it is a compelling normative constraint. Furthermore, neither Expected nor Risk‐Weighted Expected Utility Theory (...) allow for stakes‐sensitive risk‐attitudes—they require that risk matters in the same way whether you are gambling for loose change or millions of dollars. We provide a novel normative interpretation of Weighted‐Linear Utility Theory that solves all of these problems. (shrink)

With by far the lowest population density in the United States, myriad challenges attach to healthcare delivery in Alaska. In the “Size, Population, and Accessibility” section, we characterize this geographic context, including how it is exacerbated by lack of infrastructure. In the “Distributing Healthcare” section, we turn to healthcare economics and staffing, showing how these bear on delivery—and are exacerbated by geography. In the “Health Care in Rural Alaska” section, we turn to rural care, exploring in more depth what healthcare (...) delivery looks like outside of Alaska’s major cities. This discussion continues in the “Alaska’s Native Villages” section, which specifically analyzes healthcare in Alaska’s indigenous villages, some of the smallest and most isolated communities in the United States. Though many of the ways we could improve Alaskan health care for Alaskan residents are limited by its unique features, the “Justice and Healthcare Delivery” and “Technology and Telemedicine” sections consider ways in which certain policies and technology—including telemedicine—could mitigate the challenges developed in previous sections. (shrink)

Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, (...) incongruent proximal goals. Instead they can be represented in relation to a single proximal goal – especially if the movements are, or appear to be, mechanically linked to a more distal joint action goal. To test this, we implemented a paradigm in which participants produced finger movements that were either congruent or incongruent with those of a virtual partner, and either with or without a joint action goal (the joint flipping of a switch, which turned on two light bulbs). Our findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that visuomotor interference effects can be reduced when two physically incongruent actions are represented as mechanically interdependent contributions to a joint action goal. (shrink)

Chimpanzee and hunter-gatherer intergroup aggression differ in important ways, including humans having the ability to form peaceful relationships and alliances among groups. This paper nevertheless evaluates the hypothesis that intergroup aggression evolved according to the same functional principles in the two species—selection favoring a tendency to kill members of neighboring groups when killing could be carried out safely. According to this idea chimpanzees and humans are equally risk-averse when fighting. When self-sacrificial war practices are found in humans, therefore, they result (...) from cultural systems of reward, punishment, and coercion rather than evolved adaptations to greater risk-taking. To test this “chimpanzee model,” we review intergroup fighting in chimpanzees and nomadic hunter-gatherers living with other nomadic hunter-gatherers as neighbors. Whether humans have evolved specific psychological adaptations for war is unknown, but current evidence suggests that the chimpanzee model is an appropriate starting point for analyzing the biological and cultural evolution of warfare. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss how Causal Decision Theory should be modified to handle a class of problematic cases involving deterministic laws. Causal Decision Theory, as it stands, is problematically biased against your endorsing deterministic propositions (for example it tells you to deny Newtonian physics, regardless of how confident you are of its truth). Our response is that this is not a problem for Causal Decision Theory per se, but arises because of the standard method for assessing the truth of (...) certain counterfactuals. The truth of deterministic laws is `modally fragile' on the standard semantics for counterfactuals: if determinism is true and you were to do otherwise, the laws would be different. We provide two ways of avoiding this problem: 1) supplement the standard semantics for counterfactuals with impossible worlds, or 2) introduce rigid designators into the description of problematic decision situations. We argue that both of these approaches are well-motivated and can be readily incorporated into Lewisian Causal Decision Theory. (shrink)

On December 17, 1999, President Clinton signed the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, which instituted a 90-day comment period for the amended Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Final Rule, a comprehensive set of guidelines that would affect how organs are allocated throughout the country. Barring further legislative action, the Final Rule, which has been over five years in the making, will be effective on March 16,2000.The Final Rule, issued by the Department of Health and Human (...) Services pursuant to the National Organ Transplant Act, was originally publishedApril 2, 1998. It provided a number of substantive changes to the process through which organs are allocated by the United Network for Organ Sharing, a private, non-profit organization charged with administering the national organ transplantation network. (shrink)

What are the relationships between doubt and truth, thinking and writing in Montaigne’s Essais? We usually see Montaigne’s doubt through the lens of ancient schools of Scepticism and yet he notes that the Pyrrhonians ‘ne peuvent exprimer leur generale conception en aucune maniere de parler’: these philosophers describe their doubtful thought in negative affirmations but these are affirmations – ‘propositions affirmatives’ – all the same. This thesis approaches Montaigne’s doubt differently: I investigate the Essais not as an attempt to indicate (...) or describe doubtful, ‘double et divers’ thought but as a tool for thinking doubtfully in writing. Montaigne’s literary use of language is therefore central to my analysis. Irony, ambiguity, the practices of rewriting and overwriting, the ‘polyphony’ of cited authors who advocate different positions: these afford ways of thinking that sustain duality and doubt. I focus on Montaigne’s engagement with Seneca and Plutarch, ancient authors who are, superficially, unrelated to doubt: the Essais constitute a particular form of humanistic engagement with ancient texts, concerned with practices and forms of writing as much as, if not more than, with philosophical concepts. These ‘dogmatic’ authors – they defend philosophical positions of certainty – were, counter-intuitively, seen by Montaigne to have a ‘forme d’escrire douteuse et irresolue’. This doubtful ‘forme’ shaped Montaigne’s own and it was, I argue, in working with and on these authors – reading, writing, and thinking with them – that he constructed a way of writing doubtful in both form and thought: a text that is double, unresolved, ambiguous, and yet ‘truthful’ in its capacity to perform and make legible the complex, multiple nature of his thought and his thinking. (shrink)

Some theorists have argued recently that Berlinian value pluralism points not to liberalism, as Berlin supposed, but, in effect, to some form of communitarianism. To what extent is this true, and, to the extent that it is true, what kind of communitarianism fits best with the pluralist outlook? I argue that pluralists should acknowledge community as an important source of value and as a substantial value in itself, but they should also be prepared to question traditions and to respect values (...) other than community. In particular, pluralism points to personal autonomy as playing a special role when we must choose among incommensurable goods in conflict. Consequently, the pluralist outlook is at odds with conservative communitarianisms that tend to place existing traditions beyond question, and with radical variants of communitarianism, such as Marxism and classical anarchism, which look forward to future communities in which the need to cope with hard public choices has largely been eliminated. Rather, Berlinian pluralism fits best with a liberal or moderate kind of communitarianism that balances community with other goods, especially personal autonomy. (shrink)

Lisa Tessman (2016: 164) recounts the case of a Jewish mother, running from Nazis, who faced a terrible choice. She could (a) drown her infant, or (b) accept the virtual certainty that her baby’s cries would doom the refugee group she was fleeing with. Given those options, (b) is worse. If the whole group is discovered, many will die, including the infant. Still, preemptively drowning a baby—indeed one’s own baby—is a terrible act. To make sense of cases like this, Tessman (...) turns to the concept of moral failure: an act that violates an important moral value such that the loss cannot be fully redeemed by gains elsewhere. I will argue that criminal justice needs a moral framework like Tessman’s. It needs to make sense of the fact that some options are genuinely better than others, without letting honorifics like ‘justice’ obscure the equally important fact the best available option might be terrible. More specifically, I will argue that when punishment involves prison, as it often does, it is a moral failure. It can be justified only in the sense that preemptively drowning an infant can be justified: like the fleeing mother, society might on some terrible occasions find itself with no better alternative. (shrink)

Imagine a moral agent with the native capacity to act rightly in every kind of circumstance. She will never, that is, find herself thrust into conditions she isn’t equipped to handle. Relationships turned tricky, evolving challenges of parenthood, or living in the midst of a global pandemic—she is never mistaken about what must be done, nor does she lack the skills to do it. When we are thrust into a new kind of circumstance, by contrast, we often need time to (...) practice discernment, new forms of compassion, different kinds of courage, or whatever else conditions call for. Unfortunately, such practice usually takes the form of on-the-job training—it is hard to cultivate the skills of an excellent parent, for example, until we actually are parents. Even more unfortunately, on-the-job training basically guarantees mistakes. This paper focuses on errors that (a) cause harm to others, and that (b) we make non-culpably because our skills are (understandably) not yet up to snuff. It argues that agent regret—the attitude singled out for non-culpable failures by much moral philosophy—is inapt in such cases. Rather, we need an attitude I will call stoic determination. (shrink)

This Article argues that just as the act of forcing sex upon a rapist is itself rape, the execution of a murderer is itself murder. Part I clears the way by defeating three simple, but common, arguments that capital punishment is not murder. Part II shows that despite moral theorists' best attempts to show otherwise, executions seem to instantiate all the morally relevant properties of murder. Part III notes a lacuna in the literature on capital punishment: Even if there is (...) a good moral reason to execute murderers, the distinction between capital punishment and murder requires a plausible account of the state's right to execute citizens. We have no such account. (shrink)

Certain non-voluntarists have recently defended political authority by advancing two-part views. First, they argue that the state, or the law, is best (or uniquely) capable of accomplishing something important. Second, they defend a substantive normative principle on which being so situated is sufficient for de jure authority. This paper uses widely accepted tenets to show that all such defenses of authority fail.

The best arguments against gun control invoke moral rights—it might be good if there were fewer guns in circulation, but there is a moral right to own firearms. Rather than emphasizing the potential benefits of gun control, this paper meets the best arguments on their home turf. I argue that there simply is no moral right to keep guns on one’s person or in one’s residence. In fact, our moral rights support the mutual disarmament of citizens and police.

Consider people’s ordinary concept of belief. This concept seems to pick out a particular psychological state. Indeed, one natural view would be that the concept of belief works much like the concepts one finds in cognitive science – not quite as rigorous or precise, perhaps, but still the same basic type of notion. But now suppose we turn to other concepts that people ordinarily use to understand the mind. Suppose we consider the concept happiness. Or the concept love. How are (...) these concepts to be understood? One obvious hypothesis would be that they are best understood as being more or less like the concept of belief. Maybe these concepts, too, pick out a particular mental state and thereby enable people to predict, explain and understand others’ behavior. We will argue that this hypothesis is mistaken. Instead, we suggest that the different concepts people use to understand the mind are fundamentally different from each other. Some of these concepts do indeed serve simply to pick out a particular mental state, but others allow a role for evaluative judgments. So, for example, our claim will be that when people are wondering whether a given agent is truly ‘happy’ or ‘in love,’ they are not merely trying to figure out whether this agent has a particular sort of mental state. They are also concerned in a central way with evaluating the agent herself. In short, our aim is to point to a striking sort of difference between the different concepts that people use to pick out psychological attitudes. We will be.. (shrink)

Institutional review boards, tasked with facilitating ethical research, are often pulled in competing directions. In what we call the protection-inclusion dilemma, we acknowledge the tensions IRBs face in aiming to both protect potential research participants from harm and include under-represented populations in research. In this manuscript, we examine the history of protectionism that has dominated research ethics oversight in the United States, as well as two responses to such protectionism: inclusion initiatives and critiques of the term vulnerability. We look at (...) what we know about IRB decision-making in relation to protecting and including “vulnerable” groups in research and examine the lack of regulatory guidance related to this dilemma, which encourages protection over inclusion within IRB practice. Finally, we offer recommendations related to how IRBs might strike a better balance between inclusion and protection in research ethics oversight. (shrink)

This article responds to Tim Hsiao's "The Moral Case for Gun Ownership".

In recent years, attempts to reconcile God's exhaustive providential control over the future and human freedom frequently appeal to Molinism. Through the theory of Middle Knowledge, it is claimed, God can exercise meticulous providence over free creatures while preserving the libertarian agency of those creatures. Historically, both Thomist and Reformed theologians have critiqued the theory of Middle Knowledge for effectively eliminating God's aseity, making God's knowledge in some sense dependent on some non-God reality. In this paper, I aim to push (...) the discussion forward by integrating Thomist, Molinist, and Reformed perspectives in the view I call Molinist Thomist Calvinism. By resourcing each of these views, I try to offer a coherent way to affirm God's meticulous providence, including God's unconditional election of some and not others, and morally significant human freedom. (shrink)

Recent research on the evolution of religion has focused on whether religion is an unselected by-product of evolutionary processes or if it is instead an adaptation by natural selection. Adaptive hypotheses for religion include direct fitness benefits from improved health and indirect fitness benefits mediated by costly signals and/or cultural group selection. Herein, I propose that religious denominations achieve indirect fitness gains for members through the use of ecologically arbitrary beliefs, rituals, and moral rules that function as recognition markers of (...) cultural inheritance analogous to kin and species recognition of genetic inheritance in biology. This recognition signal hypotheses could act in concert with either costly signaling or cultural group selection to produce evolutionarily altruistic behaviors within denominations. Using a cultural phylogenetic analysis, I show that a large set of religious behaviors among extant Christian denominations supports the prediction of the recognition signal hypothesis that characters change more frequently near historical schisms. By incorporating demographic data into the model, I show that more-distinctive denominations, as measured through dissimilar characteristics, appear to be protected from intrusion by nonmembers in mixed-denomination households, and that they may be experiencing greater biological growth of their populations even in the present day. (shrink)

If panpsychism is true, it suggests that consciousness pervades not only our brains and bodies but also the entire universe, prompting a reevaluation of our existential attitudes. Hence, panpsychism potentially fulfills psychological needs typically addressed by religious beliefs, such as a sense of belonging and purpose but also transcendence. The discussion is organized into two main areas: the implications of panpsychism for basic human existential needs, such as feelings of kinship, ommunication, and loneliness; and for greater existential questions relating to (...) mystical experiences including transcendent unity and alleviation of the fear of death. In conclusion panpsychism may provide a deeper meaning in life for some people but its broader impact depends on individual dispositions and the cultural context in which it is embedded. (shrink)

Sijilmassi et al. suggest that group myths explaining the shared history of a people succeed and propagate by leveraging cognitive cues from fitness interdependence. We offer an alternative and mutually compatible account rooting the success of group myths in cues from a different cognitive domain: The development of self-concepts.