Occam’s Razor and Non-Voluntarist Accounts of Political Authority

Dialogue 56 (1):159-173 (2017)
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Abstract

Certain non-voluntarists have recently defended political authority by advancing two-part views. First, they argue that the state, or the law, is best (or uniquely) capable of accomplishing something important. Second, they defend a substantive normative principle on which being so situated is sufficient for de jure authority. This paper uses widely accepted tenets to show that all such defenses of authority fail.

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Luke Maring
Northern Arizona University

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