This chapter introduces psychologism as the thesis that social facts can explained in terms of more basic facts about individuals, their psychological states, their actions, their relations, and their environments. It argues psychologism should be our default stance toward social reality. It reviews psychologistic approaches to shared intention and how shared intentions can help explain conventions, status functions, and organizations. It provides a deflationary account of corporate attitudes. It argues that neither physical nor social externalism about thought content are incompatible (...) with psychologism. It argues that social construction views of the self that conflict with psychologism are implausible. Finally, it points out that it is no objection to psychologism that social facts can change without changes in psychological facts because this is compatible with psychologism as explained here. (shrink)

The notion of natural kinds has been widely criticized in philosophy of science but also appears indispensable for philosophical engagement with classificatory practices. Rather than addressing this tension through a new definition of “natural kind”, this article suggests materiality as a substitute for naturalness in philosophical debates about scientific classification. It is argued that a theory of material kinds provides an alternative and more inclusive entry point for analyzing classificatory practices, which is specified through an account of “restricted malleability” of (...) materiality and further analyzed as (1) gradual, (2)multi-dimensional, (3) scalable, (4) interactive, and (5) purpose sensitive. Such 1. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the Institutional Distribution Question for backwards-looking collective moral responsibility for institutional action, namely, the question how blame is to be distributed over members of an institution in virtue of its being collectively to blame for some harm. The distribution of blame over members of an institution for harms that the institution brings about must take into account the different institutional roles of its members. This is the primary difference between the question of distribution of responsibilities in unorganized (...) groups and in institutional groups. A central goal of this chapter is to say how and why this makes a difference. The two central organizing ideas will be that of a role that is a responsibility magnet, that is, one which attracts individual responsibility for blameworthy institutional action and that of a role which is, at least in certain respects, a responsibility shelter. In a responsibility shelter, the occupier of the role is at least provisionally innocent of blame for institutional action that is itself blameworthy, even when the agent in the role makes a contribution to it. What roles are magnets or shelters can be sensitive to the context and type of action the institution undertakes. The central theoretical tool in determining what roles are magnets and what roles are shelters is how collectively accepted proxy agent roles structure trust and responsibility burdens in an institution. (shrink)

Are computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways. This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of (...) a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”. (shrink)

Selon une opinion largement répandue, Husserl n’aurait fait de l’histoire le thème de ses réflexions que dans la dernière période de sa vie. Et de fait il y a bien quelque chose de nouveau dans la fondation historico-philosophique de la phénoménologie menée à bien dans la Krisis. Cependant la maxime à laquelle sera consacrée la présente méditation provient d’un manuscrit rédigé en 1921. Il s’agit d’un...

Excerpt from Vorlesungen Über das Wesen der Religion: Nebst Zusätzen und Anmerkungen Sch reihe fie meinen fammtliehen qberfen 016 ben achten sbanb an, weil ber 6chlu6 mit bem i'befen be6 @heiftenthume ein finniofer, bem b[an' bee 3bee, biz meiner (R)efammtaugahe 511 @mnbe liegt, burchauo miberfpmhenbee Ware. S>iefer gnfolge habe ich ba qbefen be6 (shtiftenthumo an meiner erften, b. H. Fruhften thrift gemacht, unb bahn abfiehttich bte @efammtauagabe mit ben (erlauterungen unb @rgangungen gum qbefen be6 @hriftenthumo begonnen. Sda nun aber bafl'elbe (...) buch auch in hie (c)efammtauogabe mit aufgenommen merben mute, fo eefcheint e6 feet bem (R)ruef nach 16 mein Iehte6 bert, mein Ieter qbifle unb (c)ebanfe. S)tefer trugerifche 6chein mu bahn auf; gehoben, ba6 (shetflenthum auf ben *blah guruefgebrangt werben, ber ihm in %ahrhcit gebuhrt. $dte6 gefehieht aber bureh btefeoflefungen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

A famous passage in the first Critique (A 557 f.) often gives rise to the belief that Kant had not yet delivered a full treatment of freedom in 1781 and intended to shift this treatment to future writings. However, a closer inspection of the passage reveals that, to the contrary, Kant claims that due to the limitations of human reason his critical account of freedom given thus far must be considered complete. And indeed, this account reappears unchanged in the Groundwork. (...) When considered in this light, not only do the exact achievements of the first Critique concerning Kant’s doctrine of freedom become evident, but so too does the further development of this doctrine. In 1785, the Groundwork supplies a new conceptual link between freedom and the moral law (and with it an explanation of the possibility of categorical imperatives). And thanks to this very link, Kant is able, in the second Critique (1787/88), to remedy a ‘dogmatic’ mistake (discovered by a reviewer in 1786) in his 1781/85 account of freedom. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'un individu? Tentative de réponse grâce aux apports de la métaphysique, de la philosophie du langage, de la philosophie des sciences du vivant, de la philosophie des sciences cognitives, de la philosophie politique et de la philosophie des sciences sociales.

Excerpt from Die Weltanschauungen der Großen Philosophen der Neuzeit Der Hufforberung, Die I'leuauflage Diefes mit Beifall aufgenomme nen Büchleins 3u beforgen, glaubte ich mich um fo weniger ent3iehen 3u fallen, als mich mit Dem früh verftorbenen Derfaffer manche the meinfamieit Der über3eugung verbanb. Ba Der bisherige Umfang nicht wefenilüh uberfchritten werben follie, habe ich mich Darauf bee fchränit, Die bio; unb bibliographifchen Eingaben 3u revibieren, ein paar £iteraturvermerie hin3u3ufügen fowie einige ftiliftifche mängel3u befeitigen. Ilm übrigen erforberte Die Dietat Beibehaltung Des (...) Gertes auch Dort, wo Dem Derfaffer Die verantwortung überlaffen bleiben muß. Nur an wenigen Stellen habe ich eine. Durch Die Buchftaben R. 5. Als von mir herrührenb geienn3eichnete - Elnmeriung beigefügt. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Der Rassenkampf - Soziologische Untersuchungen ist ein unveränderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1883. Hansebooks ist Herausgeber von Literatur zu unterschiedlichen Themengebieten wie Forschung und Wissenschaft, Reisen und Expeditionen, Kochen und Ernährung, Medizin und weiteren Genres. Der Schwerpunkt des Verlages liegt auf dem Erhalt historischer Literatur. Viele Werke historischer Schriftsteller und Wissenschaftler sind heute nur noch als Antiquitäten erhältlich. Hansebooks verlegt diese Bücher neu und trägt damit zum Erhalt selten gewordener Literatur und historischem Wissen auch für die Zukunft (...) bei. (shrink)

More than a hundred years after the publication of Cours de linguistique générale, Saussure is still considered the ‘revolutionary founder’ of structuralism. Saussure’s name is almost symbiotically connected with the idea of structuralism. This volume opens the view from different disciplinary perspectives for a Saussurean thinking also beyond the boundaries of the structuralist epistemes.