Responsibility Magnets and Shelters in Institutional Action

In Säde Hormio & Bill Wringe (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology. Springer (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter investigates the Institutional Distribution Question for backwards-looking collective moral responsibility for institutional action, namely, the question how blame is to be distributed over members of an institution in virtue of its being collectively to blame for some harm. The distribution of blame over members of an institution for harms that the institution brings about must take into account the different institutional roles of its members. This is the primary difference between the question of distribution of responsibilities in unorganized groups and in institutional groups. A central goal of this chapter is to say how and why this makes a difference. The two central organizing ideas will be that of a role that is a responsibility magnet, that is, one which attracts individual responsibility for blameworthy institutional action and that of a role which is, at least in certain respects, a responsibility shelter. In a responsibility shelter, the occupier of the role is at least provisionally innocent of blame for institutional action that is itself blameworthy, even when the agent in the role makes a contribution to it. What roles are magnets or shelters can be sensitive to the context and type of action the institution undertakes. The central theoretical tool in determining what roles are magnets and what roles are shelters is how collectively accepted proxy agent roles structure trust and responsibility burdens in an institution.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Institutional Racism and Individual Responsibility.Michael O. Hardimon - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge. pp. 501-12.
Responsibility Without Wrongdoing or Blame.Julie Tannenbaum - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7:124-148.
Blame, Reproach, and Responsibility.Jeanette Kennett - 2020 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 27 (4):395-397.
From Individual to Collective Responsibility: There and Back Again.Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge. pp. 78-93.
Responsibility and appropriate blame: The no difference view.Leonhard Menges - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):393-409.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-09-16

Downloads
120 (#178,704)

6 months
120 (#43,705)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references