Band 1. Paradigmen personaler Identität -- Band 2. Soziale Gruppen und Identitätspraktiken.

Introducing formal causation / Ludger Jansen and Petter Sandstad -- Form, intention, information : from scholastic logic to artificial intelligence / Gyula Klima -- Formal causation : accidental and substantial / David S. Oderberg -- A non-hylomorphic account of formal causation / Petter Sandstad and Ludger Jansen -- Formal causes for powers theorists / Giacomo Giannini and Stephen Mumford -- Away with dispositional essences in trope theory / Jani Hakkarainen and Markku Keinänen -- Functional powers / Michele Paolini (...) Paoletti -- An Aristotelian approach to existential dependence / Benjamin Schnieder and Jonas Werner -- Finean feature dependence and the Aristotelian alternative / Wolfgang Sattler -- A problem for natural-kind essentialism and formal causes / José Tomás Alvarado and Matthew Tugby -- Form as cause and the formal cause : Aristotle's answer / James G. Lennox -- Form, cause, and explanation in biology : a neo-Aristotelian perspective / Christopher J. Austin -- Formal explanation and mechanisms of conceptual representation / Sandeep Prasada. (shrink)

Se olharmos para Alberto Magno apartir de nossa época, provavelmente não perce-beremos sua importância como filósofo, poismuito do que ele realizou pode parecer comoalgo natural, que sempre foi assim. Entretanto,seus textos sobre a teologia como ciência, sobrea separação entre filosofia e teologia e sobre aética como ciência prática, por exemplo, sobrevi-vem até hoje.

In what follows, I argue that the thinkers of the twelfth to thirteenth century rediscovered and passed on the questions of metaphysics; in what I call the second beginning of metaphysics they also developed those questions in such a way that they could be received into the thinking of the modern era in the first place. It was precisely the theological context which forced this development and lead the theologians of the Latin West, inspired by their Arabic predecessors, to redesign (...) metaphysics according to the rules of Aristotle’s logic and philosophy of science. Put differently, through the challenge of theology medieval metaphysics was forced to become what it had claimed to be from the onset: first philosophy. (shrink)

Ludger Schwarte (Münster, 1965) es profesor de filosofía en la Kunstakademie de Düsseldorf. Es ampliamente considerado como uno de los representantes más importantes de la filosofía de la arquitectura, una disciplina que ha venido desarrollándose rápidamente en las últimas dos décadas y cuya actualidad es cada vez mayor. En su monumental libro Philosophie der Architektur (2009), desarrolla una filosofía política ―y no meramente estética o simbólica― de la arquitectura. Su original planteamiento consiste en entender la arquitectura, en primer lugar, (...) como construcción de posibilidades, esto es, en su capacidad de instaurar, definir o movilizar los fundamentos del «mundo de la vida» vigente en cada caso a través de la producción de espacios, registros temporales y medios de interacción que determinan nuestra experiencia. En este sentido, para Schwarte la filosofía de la arquitectura tiene una importancia fundamental en la medida en que ayuda a rastrear la génesis de una especie de «sentido fundamental» que constituye la raíz común de las formas de vida y de los órdenes lingüísticos. El presente artículo, la primera traducción del autor alemán al español, ofrece una síntesis de su proyecto de una filosofía de la arquitectura. (shrink)

Imagination is often considered the pinnacle of representational cognition. Looking at the concrete details of imagining in context, this paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature that is challenging this representational view by offering a relational and radically situated alternative. On the basis of observing architects in the process of making an architectural art installation, we show how to consider imagination not as de-contextualized achievement by an individual but as an opening up to larger-scale “affordances,” i.e. the unfolding possibilities (...) for action. We show how the architects coordinate the enactment of multiple affordances across different timescales, from small-scale affordances of picking up a mobile phone to the large-scale affordance of making the installation that takes months to unfold. These affordances get co-determined as they are jointly enacted. It is within this determining process that imagination too finds its place. On our view it is the indeterminacy of multiple affordances unfolding in action simultaneously that can be experienced as imaginative. The indeterminate character of this coordinative process allows activities to widen and open up, letting new possibilities for action enter into them. (shrink)

Die Vertreibung jüdischer Psychoanalytiker aus NS-Deutschland ging damit einher, dass sie von ihren eigenen Kollegen aus der DPG gedrängt wurden. Dieser Bruch hat die Wiederanknüpfung echter Beziehungen zwischen beiden Gruppen nach dem Zusammenbruch des NS-Regimes und der deutschen Niederlage im Zweiten Weltkrieg erheblich belastet. Anhand erhaltener Korrespondenzen wird diese gestörte Nachkriegskommunikation rekonstruiert und auf ihre Langzeitfolgen geprüft.

This paper undertakes a philosophical analysis of the speech given by the German writer Martin Walser when the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade was awarded to him in 1998. I reconstruct Walser's infamous claims about the Holocaust and his critique against its presence in the media and discuss Walser's proclamation of a right for disregarding his claims about German normality and his views about private commemoration.

_Religion, War and the Crisis of Modernity: A Special Issue Dedicated to the Philosophy of Jan Patočka_ _The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Ivan Chvatík, Nicolas de Warren, James Dodd, Eddo Evink, Ludger Hagedorn, Jean-Luc Marion, Claire Perryman-Holt, Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Michael Staudigl, Christian (...) Sternad, and Ľubica Učník. (shrink)

Die Tradition der Metaphysik, auf die sich die Neuzeit bezieht verdankt ihre Physiognomie den systematischen Ansätzen, die den nach Aristoteles „zweiten“ Anfang der Metaphysik im 13. Jhd. Bestimmen. Der Zusammenhang, der die mittelalterliche Metaphysik mit der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik und Metaphysikkritik verbindet, ist jedoch immer noch zu wenig erforscht. Die vorliegende Untersuchung greift den einflußreichsten der mittelalterlichen Ansätze, den des Johannes Duns Scotus, auf und verfolgt seine Rezeption und Transformation über Francisco Suárez und Christian Wolff zu Immanuel Kant und Charles Sanders (...) Peirce. Nach Duns Scotus ist Metaphysik als Wissenschaft vom Seienden als Seienden nur dann möglich, wenn man sie nicht als Wissenschaft vom ersten ausgezeichneten Seienden, sondern als Wissenschaft vom ersterkannten Begriff des Seienden versteht. Da dieser Begriff nur im Rückgang auf die Voraussetzungen unserer kategorialen Prädikate erfaßt und nur im Durchgang durch seine modalen Bestimmungen entfaltet werden kann, faßt Scotus Metaphysik strikt als „Transzendentalwissenschaft“ (scientia transcendens) und ordnet ihr als Inhalt die formalmodale Bestimmung und Explikation der „ratio entis“ zu. Die Erkenntnis des unendlichen Seienden ist Teil dieser Explikation und nur als solche möglich. Die neuzeitliche Gestalt der Metaphysik, die sich auf der bisher meist herangezogenen Folie der Metaphysik des Thomas von Aquin als Traditionsbruch darstellt, erweist sich im Blick auf das Konzept des Scotus als Resultat einer kritischen Transformation. (shrink)

In order to develop the ontology of tendencies for use in the representation of medical knowledge, tendencies are compared with other kinds of entities possessing the realizable-realization structure, specifically: dispositions, propensities, abilities and virtues. The peculiarities of tendencies are discussed and a standard schema of tendency ascription is developed in order to represent the relations between the ascriptions of tendency tokens to particulars and the ascriptions of tendency types to universals. Two nonstandard cases and their epistemic variants are discussed.

A popular argument goes thus: This is a construction, hence it is not real. Adding an appropriate adjective (social, mental, human, …) in front of “construction” or cognate terms like “(legal) fiction” yields a whole family of related arguments, all of which, or so I will argue, are fallacious. Contrary to popular opinion, these arguments fail both on the epistemic and the ontic sense of construction. Ontic constructions exist at least at one point in time, while epistemic constructions may well (...) correspond to reality. The motivation behind these fallacious arguments can often be found in a misconceived conception of ontology and reality. A full theory of reality must take constructed entities into account because important domains of reality (mental life, social reality, technical artefacts, art and fiction) essentially depend on mental or social constructions. (shrink)

Die Rede von Kollektiven, in der politischen Theorie, aber auch in Theorien kollektiven Handelns, unterstellt bereits den Status des Kollektivs. Das Volk der Gesetzgebung wird in seiner Existenz und Identität vorausgesetzt. Der Akt der Konstitution unterstellt ebenso ein bereits konstituiertes Volk wie auch die Regeln, nach denen sich dieses Volk eine Verfassung gibt. Was sind Vorformen des Kollektivs, was leitet die Formierung an? Mein Beitrag untersucht die ästhetischen Grundlagen der Formierung von Kollektiven und die Aspekte, die die Effektivität von Partizipationsformaten (...) betreffen. (shrink)

The architecture of cities provides infrastructures for thousands of people.Yet if it seems that the primary task of this architecture is to make the administration of many people, their living together, their work, their leisure, possible on a rational and dense basis, we ought not oversee that the fulfillment of these functions is not a sufficient condition of what makes a city. Important characteristics of urbanity rather enable the meeting of a multitude of people. Cities count among the conditions for (...) social events insofar as they assemble. In my paper, I propose to analyze this architectural condition as the decisive difference between »Being With« in contrast to just »Being next to«. (shrink)

After a short sketch of Lowe’s account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi (...) to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case. (shrink)

The smooth integration of the natural sciences with everyday lived experience is an important ambition of radical embodied cognitive science. In this paper we start from Koffka’s recommendation in his Principles of Gestalt Psychology that to realize this ambition psychology should be a “science of molar behaviour”. Molar behavior refers to the purposeful behaviour of the whole organism directed at an environment that is meaningfully structured for the animal. Koffka made a sharp distinction between the “behavioural environment” and the “geographical (...) environment”. We show how this distinction picks out the difference between the environment as perceived by an individual organism, and the shared publicly available environment. The ecological psychologist James Gibson was later critical of Koffka for inserting a private phenomenal reality in between animals and the shared environment. Gibson tried to make do with just the concept of affordances in his explanation of molar behaviour. We argue however that psychology as a science of molar behaviour will need to make appeal both to the concepts of shared publicly available affordances, and of the multiplicity of relevant affordances that invite an individual to act. A version of Koffka’s distinction between the two environments remains alive today in a distinction we have made between the field and landscape of affordances. Having distinguished the two environments, we go on to provide an account of how the two environments are related. Koffka suggested that the behavioural environment forms out of the causal interaction of the individual with a pre-existing, ready-made geographical environment. We argue that such an account of the relation between the two environments fails to do justice to the complex entanglement of the social with the material aspects of the geographical environment. To better account for this sociomaterial reality of the geographical environment, we propose a process-perspective on our distinction between the landscape and field of affordances. While the two environments can be conceptually distinguished, we argue they should also be viewed as standing in a relation of reciprocal and mutual dependence. (shrink)

My text adopts Joseph Beuys’ reflections on the revolution that we are, on anti-art, and on the plastic process, highlights parallels in Hannah Arendt and Cornelius Castoriadis and attempts to develop guidelines for the plastic democracy of the future from them.

In der Geschichte der Philosophie waren Bilder oft dem Verdacht des Lügens ausgesetzt. Doch wenn sie lügen können, können sie dann auch die Wahrheit sagen?0Der Vorwurf des Lügens unterstellt nicht, dass jemand beim Gebrauch eines Bildes die Unwahrheit sagt, sondern dass Bilder selbst agieren. Viele Kulturtechniken unterstellen Bildern eine Wahrheitsfähigkeit, ein Potenzial der Verifizierung und Bezeugung. In Bildern wird etwas anschaulich, auf das sich die visuelle Wahrheitsgewinnung stützen kann. Das vorliegende Buch versucht eine systematische Bestimmung dieser »pikturalen Evidenz±: Bilder »sagen± (...) die Wahrheit nicht, aber sie können Sachverhalte überprüfbar präsentieren. Sie können Aspekte der Wirklichkeit erhellen, die außerhalb des pikturalen Objekts nicht wahrnehmbar sind. Um diese Wahrheitsfähigkeit präzise zu erfassen, gilt es, Gestaltungseigenschaften von Bildern sowie Funktionen und Wirkungsweisen ins Zentrum der Analyse zu stellen. Es zeigt sich, dass die pikturale Evidenz weniger aus der Bezugnahme auf ein Vorbild herrührt, noch aus den ästhetischen Qualitäten der Abbildung, sondern aus einer Anschaulichkeit, die nur das Bild als ein gestaltetes Ding eröffnet. (shrink)

Functional explanations apply not only in cases of normal functioning, but also in the case of malfunctioning. According to a straightforward analysis, a bearer of the function to F is malfunctioning if and only if it does not F although it should do so. This makes malfunctions and malfunctionings analogous to negative causation and thus peculiarly problematic, because they seem to involve absent dispositions and absent processes. This analysis seems also to require that the function to F cannot be identical (...) with the disposition to F. Then we seem to be trapped in a dilemma: Either the realm of functions is separated from the realm of dispositions; then it seems that functions cannot be causally efficacious. Alternatively, functions are considered to be identical with dispositions; but then malfunctioning seems to be conceptually impossible. The paper defends and further develops the thesis of Röhl and Jansen that functions are not a special type of dispositions. For this purpose, it first reviews different varieties of malfunction and malfunctioning and suggests definitions of both malfunction and malfunctioning. It reviews how causal, etiological and intentional theories of functions can deal with these problems. In particular, the paper discusses the special-disposition account of the Basic Formal Ontology. Spear, Ceusters and Smith :103--128, 2016) have defended the special-disposition account of the Basic Formal Ontology by suggesting various strategies how a special-disposition account can deal with malfunctions. On the one side, the paper evaluates these strategies and indicates several problems arising from them. On the other hand, it describes how to account for the non-optionality and the causal efficacy of functions, if functions are not dispositions. While function types are not identical to disposition types, there are important interrelations between functions and dispositions, namely heuristically, from a design perspective for artefact functions, and from an evolutionary perspective for types of biological functions. (shrink)

It has long been a standard practice for the natural sciences to classify things. Thus, it is no wonder that, for two and a half millennia, philosophers have been reflecting on classifications, from Plato and Aristotle to contemporary philosophy of science. Some of the results of these reflections will be presented in this chapter. I will start by discussing a parody of a classification, namely: the purportedly ancient Chinese classification of animals described by Jorge Luis Borges. I will show that (...) many of the mistakes that account for the comic features of this parody appear in real-life scientific databases as well. As examples of the latter, I will discuss the terminology database of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) of the United States, the NCI Thesaurus. (shrink)