All these extracts are linked by his general epistemology, especially his distinction between two types of knowledge: ‘paradisiac’ or Type 1, which is that of everyday awareness and the current methods, concepts and presuppositions of the sciences of nature and humanity, plus mathematics and philosophy, and accumulates in ‘plus knowledge’ and resolves problems in standard ways; and ‘Luciferican’ or Type 2, which opens up the ‘mysteries’ of new realms of reality which do not fit the current methods, concepts and presuppositions, (...) and so results in ‘minus’ knowledge, the awareness that there are things which at the moment we cannot understand. For these ‘mysteries’ new methods, concepts and presuppositions are required, which ‘abyssal’ categories can supply, ones below those we normally employ and may be aware of. It is part of man’s role in the cosmos to reveal such mysteries.. (shrink)

As Roger Ariew shows, one of the most fascinating challenges for the authors trying to create a Cartesian complete course on philosophy was coming up with a Cartesian Logic based on the existing texts of the master. Were the few simple rules from the Discourse on Method the "logic" of Descartes? Were the Rules for the Direction of the Mind "logic"? How can we even have a logic without syllogism? When looking at the authors studied by Ariew one finds that (...) the best that they could come up was adding some Cartesian elements on what remains basically a traditional Aristotelian Logic. It seems that there was no Cartesian Logic after all.I want to show here that Cartesian Logic is something else, not exactly... (shrink)

Philosophy has been dominated by the view that emotions do a perfect job in producing knowledge about the inner and the outer world. Until recently this was the mark of standard naturalism but with the early Sartre and Merleau-Ponty it became central to contemporary phenomenology. In part because there is a persistent difficulty in understanding the relation between reasoning and feeling. In part because there is no scientific evidence for the ability to reason. There are many accounts of emotion but (...) few attempts to understand reasoning. My assumption is that emotions assist only with collecting data while reasoning is responsible for generating meaning about the inner and outer world. In order to understand that, we must approach reasoning without mixing ontology with metaphysics. Second, we must provide a compelling realistic model of reasoning. In this paper I sketch out a version of it. Overall, I argue that that we must find a way to re-integrate reasoning within the contemporary philosophical and scientific vocabulary if we wish to understand the conscious mind. (shrink)

In the last decades, there has been a far-reaching debate about whether reason is a natural power of the human animal or a socio-historical achievement. This paper brings out and criticizes two paradigmatic views of reason entangled in that dilemma: the substantive view which construes reason as a primitive power possessing the basic forms of intelligibility; and the derivative view which traces back reason to non-rational, natural-historic processes. I approach the issue by discussing how Aristotle addresses the underlying predicament in (...) Metaphysics Theta. The predicament persuades us to overdetermine or underdetermine our natural potentiality for reason because it ignores what I call Aristotle's main insight: the understanding from which rational capacities are exercised is acquired by undertaking appropriate activities. The measure of rational capacities is neither merely naturally determined nor merely socio-historically inherited but relies on the engagement with the things falling under the purview of the pertaining activities. We must recover this Aristotelian insight, I argue, to avoid succumbing to either the substantive or the derivative view of reason. (shrink)

This article briefly compares and contrasts Kantian and Marxist thinking, trying to show how the second derived from the first.

La phénoménologie se trouve dans une impasse et cela est la conséquence du refus de dialoguer avec les sciences empiriques. On s'interroge ici sur la possibilité de dépasser l'intreprétation transcendantale du sujet pour l'inscrire définitivement dans la réalité naturelle. En prenant l'idée de la reconstruction cognitive-intentionnelle comme hypothèse de travail, on élabore un concept du sujet naturel. Ainsi, l'analyse des expressions phénoménologiques montre que la structuration ontologique du sujet se réalise dans et à travers la réalité.

'you'll find another man to harvest, Glycerion: let this one go' The Greek satirist Lucian was a brilliantly entertaining writer who invented the comic dialogue as a vehicle for satiric comment. His influence was immense, not only in the Greek world, but on later European writers such as Rabelais and Swift. His dialogues puncture the pretensions of pompous philosophers and describe the daily lives of Greek courtesans; they are peopled by politicians, historians and ordinary citizens, as well as by (...) gods and mythic figures. This selection provides a cross-section of Lucian's styles and satirical targets, from serious polemic to lighter squibs and character portrayals. It includes How to Write History and his most famous piece, A True History, a fabulous tale of space travel and a monstrous whale which prefigures the fantasies of Jules Verne. This lively new translation is both accurate and idiomatic, and the introduction highlights Lucian's importance in his own and later times. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

The article discusses the beginning and the end of the »age of secularisation«: Differening from other definitions it argues for a late beginning after the Second World War and an early end by the mid-1980s. The age of secularisation is characterised by an open relationship of the churches to secular society - the exact character of which, however, was much disputed among reformers and conservatives within the churches. By the mid-1980s this openness began to be replaced by a more self (...) concerned attitude of the churches, which today causes some problems for the interreligious dialogue. (shrink)

This article argues for the establishment of a new, "annalistic" model of history and historical investigation. This implies a new concept of historical event: instead of being seen as an element within a historical narrative, the historical event is defined as the common reference point of many narratives that can be told about it. The annalistic model also implies a new concept of historical change: instead of being defined as the change of an "object" within a set of given historical (...) parameters, historical change has to be perceived as the change of parameters related to a given historical object. A new concept of history follows from the annalistic model: instead of history being a metaphysical unity of space and time , in which everything is linked to everything, it is instead the product of historical judgment carried out by those who design stories about their own past, present, and future. To the "annalist" a world is imaginable in which no history has existed, exists, or will exist. The article analyzes three aspects of the concept of historical time: it demonstrates the huge variety of temporal structures in history; it argues for the foundation of the representation of historical time in linguistic concepts; and it discusses the relationship of fictionality and reality in historical discourse. Finally, the annalistic model is compared to the traditional concept of history established by historicism in the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Considering the dialectical structure of tragic thought in classical philosophy, one can read Nietzsche’s conception of the tragic in a dialectical way. Reading Nietzsche\'s The Birth of Tragedy in this way is justified, as long as the Apollonian and Dionysian are understood as contrasting impulses who work together in their “reciprocal necessity”. Beginning of the fifth chapter of this book, however, there is a second design of the tragic experience; here Nietzsche emphasizes that Dionysian is the affirmative dimension of the (...) tragic. This non dialectical conception of tragic, as Nietzsche builds it along his work, stresses the non necessity to justify life, the affirmation of life as it is, without deploring and rebuilding it, and without giving it an alien meaning. This conception cancels the negativity which founds the dialectical conception of the tragic, in so far as suffering, vain, and finiteness are no longer seen as opposed to life and in need of an appoint justification: they belong to it. The philosophical task is to ask: of what does the tragic of an absolute affirmation of life consist of, if the dialectic contradiction is repealed. (shrink)

As forças pessoais/de caráter são as características psicológicas positivas que se refletem nos pensamentos, sentimentos e comportamentos. Esse artigo objetivou descrever as forças pessoais/de caráter mais prevalentes em 60 profissionais de Tecnologia da Informação e comparar quatro grupos distintos nos cargos de Atendimento e Suporte Técnico, Desenvolvedor de Software, Gestor e Líder Técnico em um Parque Tecnológico do Sul do Brasil. Estudo com delineamento quantitativo, descritivo, comparativo e transversal com aplicação online de um Questionário Sócio Demográfico e Laboral e da (...) Escala das Forças de Caráter. As forças mais prevalentes são a imparcialidade, a curiosidade, a bondade, o pensamento crítico e o amor ao aprendizado. As forças com menor prevalência são a apreciação do belo, a espiritualidade, o perdão, a inteligência social e a sensatez. As implicações práticas sugerem que as características psicológicas positivas sejam fortalecidas em processos de desenvolvimento pessoal e profissional dos trabalhadores de TI no âmbito organizacional. (shrink)

This collection uses economic analysis to study some of the most pressing issues in corporate law. The last decade has brought certain corporate transactions and arrangements to the forefront of public attention and public debate. At the same time, a new mode of corporate law analysis has been developed - one that uses the tools of economics to identify the consequences and desirable features of corporate law rules. By bringing together work at the frontier of this method of analysis, the (...) volume provides a good picture of the power, current state, and future direction of the economic analysis of corporate law. Written by some of the most prominent contributors to the field, many of the chapters focus directly on the corporate control transactions that have recently attracted the most interest and controversy - corporate takeovers, buy-outs, recapitalizations, and reorganizations. (shrink)

Defining the "person" is not an easy task and not even a direct possibility. One cannot generate a definition with tremendous implications without properly understanding the ontological makeup of "person". From this point of view philosophy and science have more or less proven that they aren’t able to share the same conclusions regarding the ontological features of “person”. In part because philosophy and science do not share the same general concept of reality. As long as there is a debate regarding (...) the nature of reality and, inevitably, of what can be incorporated within such reality it is almost impossible to find a common ground. But disagreements with respect to the ultimate nature of reality occur within the field of philosophy for here too, there isn’t one, but multiple accounts of reality. On their turn philosophical accounts of reality differ dramatically and in some cases are fundamentally opposed. To some extent, the same can be claimed about science. Psychology is certainly under different epistemological constraints than cosmology. Therefore, when one speaks about “persons” he has first to account that the divide between fields and within the fields is already a serious obstacle in defining the ‘person”. Ideally, a definition of “person” should emerge from a unified conceptual paradigm but that is an epistemological ambition almost impossible to fulfill in the current context. In the absence of a common epistemological ground the task of identifying and describing the features of “person” is almost impossible to accomplish. If however we put aside the debate regarding the ultimate nature of reality while adopting at the same a phenomenological realistic attitude, we could at least begin to formulate some of the epistemological qualifiers which may be beneficial for our task. It is certainly the absence of such qualifiers that blocks a coherent philosophical investigation into the ontological makeup of “person”. I believe that in order to overcome such conceptual crisis we should first identify its philosophical origins and sketch some of the premises which will later lead not only to the conception of proper qualifiers, but also to a proper epistemological approach on “person”. (shrink)

Concerns regarding the possibility of a phenomenological science of consciousness emerged almost from its inception. Naturalism was quick to attack phenomenology. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others have too argued that a phenomenological science of consciousness can succeed if repositioning classical phenomenology from an existentialist perspective. One way to close this debate is to revisit several key classical phenomenological concepts. In this paper I depart from the premise that it is possible to have a phenomenological science of consciousness (...) but in order to do that we must distinguish between the problem of objectivity and the problem of consciousness keeping in mind that the two are intimately related. I will be discussing some of the differences between universally valid and experimental statements and make some remarks with respect to the phenomenological origins of consciousness without getting in too many details. The present purpose is to tackle some of these epistemological and ontological aspects pertaining to science and consciousness without making strong claims. (shrink)

Hegel und Heidegger teilen die Ansicht, dass das, was den Bedeutungsgehalt von Begriffen konstituiert, in ihrer unmittelbaren Verständlichkeit verborgen liegt. Dieser Gedanke bildet den Kern einer Konzeption der Negativität im Sinne einer Auffassung der Art und Weise, in der Sinn von Latenz geprägt ist. Hegel und Heidegger verstehen aber die Natur jener Latenz und das Verhältnis von Sinn und Begriff verschieden. Denn mit einer solchen Konzeption der Negativität ist die Frage verbunden, ob die Konstitution von Sinn begrifflich artikulierbar ist und (...) ob Sinn überhaupt begrifflich verfasst ist. Dieser Frage geht das Buch nach, indem es Hegel und Heidegger in ein Gespräch bringt, um den Stellenwert des begrifflichen Vermögens in der Konstitution und Artikulation von Sinn zu klären. Dabei wird eine Kritik an der Auffassung formuliert, dass die Quelle von Sinn nichtbegrifflich und unbegreiflich ist, und argumentiert, dass nur die begriffliche Artikulation von Bedeutungen die semantische Fülle der Welt verbürgt. (shrink)

The present ecumenical inter-religious dia- logue is more centered on the relationship between politics and traditional forms of reli- giosity expressed at societal level. It is obvi- ous that after the events of 11th September 2001 the next century will be more focused on cultural and religious dimensions than the last one. From this perspective I present in this paper the stage of inter-religious dia- logue from major Christian churches’ point of view and how churches understand their role within the (...) broader European context and world affairs’ challenges. (shrink)

"Previously unpublished images from glass-plate negatives taken by Walter Schneider capture the years of transition from agrarian to industrial society in America and beyond.

In “On the Abolition of All Political Parties,” Simone Weil poses the hypothetical predicament of a person who is intent on solving highly complex mathematical problems but is flogged every time the answer he arrives at is an even number. The person will oscillate between his genuine desire for the truth and the painful cries of his body. “[I]nevitably,” Weil writes, “he will make many mistakes—even if he happens to be very intelligent, very brave and deeply attached to the truth.” (...) She then asks: “What should he do?” Weil’s answer may surprise many readers, even though she claims it is “simple.” If possible, “he must run away” from those who wield the whip. It would have been best, she avers, had he avoided these associations in the first place. Elsewhere in her writings, Weil openly endorses the argument for the lesser evil, justifying active, potentially violent, resistance instead of a pacifist ethic of refusal. This essay analyses the tension between Weil’s ethic of “running away” and her acceptance of the lesser evil. (shrink)

In this paper, I will try to analyze St. Augustine’s and Dante’s views towards history by showing how their visions can be articulated into particular models of history, i.e. a particular schema that describes the unfolding of history with its specific focal points, and to what extent this model differs from one author to another. If in Augustine’s case, by exploring his division of sacred history in component parts, that can be found throughout his work, I will argue for a (...) Christocentric model, in Dante’s case, by analyzing his work on political philosophy, De monarchia, I will argue for a teleological model of history. (shrink)

Relatively recent literature on supposition theory seems to use different modern logical tools of interpretation that can be generally described as formalizations. Since the act of formalizing may be understood as a process of changing its object in the sense of making it more formal, an assessment of this kind of approaches is necessary. Accordingly, our main goal in this paper is to analyze the formality of Peter of Spain’s theory of supposition and to evaluate its interpretation as a quantification (...) theory. Our main thesis is that although Peter’s theory presents certain weak notions of formality, the formality presupposed by the quantificational interpretation is nowhere to be found in his considerations. (shrink)

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From a classical phenomenological point of view, to reason is to have a conscious intentional experience. A conscious experience can be described as a predicative reconstruction of whatever reason might be concerned with while the intentional aspect can be deduced from the effort of disclosing specialized propositional insights into whatever reasoning is concerned with. Husserl argued that the task of phenomenology is to pave the way toward a science of consciousness in which reason as key feature of conscious life will (...) be properly treated. However, contemporary phenomenology adopted an entirely different perspective on this matter. Conscious experiences are now described from a perspective reminiscent to traditional empiricism while the search for universal objectivity is abandoned in favor of contextual truths. The current situation raises several questions how did we get here, does making sense entail emotions, does the emotivist reconsideration of consciousness solve the problem of objectivity, should a future science of consciousness stress the role of emotions as a solution to subjectivism and yet to be considered a phenomenological science of consciousness. In this paper, I only begin to tackle these problems. (shrink)