Most contemporary models and tests for mental competence do not make adequate provision for the positive influence of emotion in the determination of competence. This most likely is due to a reliance on an outdated view of emotion according to which these models are essentially noncognitive. Leading developments in modern emotion theory indicate that this noncognitive theory of emotion is no longer tenable. Emotions, in fact, are essentially representational in a manner that makes them “cognitive” in an important sense. This (...) requires a reassessment of the place of emotion in the theory of mental competence. Building on Benjamin Freedman’s “recognizable reasons” account of competence, it will be argued that (1) emotions form a class of recognizable reasons of their own, and (2) that competence to consent is a matter of practical, rather than theoretical, reasoning. Emotions, then, are an essential ingredient in mental competence, and the cognitive bias that permeates the theory of mental competence today must be rejected. (shrink)

Capturing the inimitable enthusiasm of Louis Pojman's much acclaimed teaching, PHILOSOPHY: THE PURSUIT OF WISDOM introduces students to all the core topics in philosophy. Beginning with an inquiry into the nature and purpose of philosophy, this text moves through many traditional discussions--such as the existence of God, the problems of knowledge, the freewill/determinism debate, and the foundations of ethics--concluding with an exploration into existentialism and the meaning of life.

Recent experiments have shown that certain fluid-mechanical systems, namely oil droplets bouncing on oil films, can mimic a wide range of quantum phenomena, including double-slit interference, quantization of angular momentum and Zeeman splitting. Here I investigate what can be learned from these systems concerning no-go theorems as those of Bell and Kochen-Specker. In particular, a model for the Bell experiment is proposed that includes variables describing a ‘background’ field or medium. This field mimics the surface wave that accompanies the droplets (...) in the fluid-mechanical experiments. It appears that quite generally such a model can violate the Bell inequality and reproduce the quantum statistics, even if it is based on local dynamics only. The reason is that measurement independence is not valid in such models. This opens the door for local ‘background-based’ theories, describing the interaction of particles and analyzers with a background field, to complete quantum mechanics. Experiments to test these ideas are also proposed. (shrink)

The Good Rebel is a philosophical work, the methodology of which is nonetheless literary and historical. The book provides an original but historically informed and socially relevant commentary on modern conceptions of personal autonomy. Communitarian authors provide effective critiques of a liberal preoccupation with individualistic personal autonomy. Groarke does not contest the liberal emphasis on autonomy: instead he contests the way in which contemporary liberals define the concept of autonomy.

Dans cet article je présente et discute l'ouvrage de Roberta Dreon, Human Landscapes: Contributions to a Pragmatic Anthropology (Suny Press, 2022). Je le fais à partir de deux questions. La première concerne les avantages d'une anthropologie pragmatiste par rapport à des tentatives similaires, inspirées soit de la phénoménologie post-husserlienne (notamment les recherches actuelles sur le caractère incarné de l'esprit et de la cognition), soit de l'herméneutique philosophique. La seconde question porte sur la contribution possible d'une anthropologie philosophique à une critique (...) culturelle, c'est-à-dire à la critique d’erreurs, de confusions, et d’illusions existant dans notre manière moderne de penser, dans les idéaux que nous nous sommes donnés, dans nos habitudes collectives et dans nos “imaginaires sociaux.”. (shrink)

If thought and being are defined as empirical thinking and being, the case is different. Here truth means the truth of the natural, social, and historical sciences. But it is equally true at this level that truth is not a reality. For the knowing subject and the object of his knowing are always contingently coming to be and passing away, so that empirical knowledge is varying and unconsummated. Truth is here an ideal, a desideratum, something pursued but never possessed. The (...) best results of scientific cognition are problematic. (shrink)