What role does language play in the process of building worldviews? To address this question, in the first section of this paper we will clarify what we mean by worldviews and how they differ, in our perspective, from cosmovisions. In a nutshell, we define worldviews as the biological interpretations agents create of the world around them and cosmovision the more general cultural-based reflections on it. After presenting our definition for worldview, we will also present the multi-shaped viewpoint that frames our (...) analysis, adopting three concepts that can help us explain how agents construct and develop their worldviews: saliences, pregnances, and abduction. While the notions of saliences and pregnances will explain how agents recognize anomalies in their worldview, the concept of abduction will help us discuss how they can learn to approach, explain, and use these anomalies to get new skills and abilities. This other point will lead us to discuss the role of language in this process, which will be describe as an artifact that permits the agent to use abduction to “normalize” and exploit anomalies, being now the ultimate artifact to build, develop, and update their worldviews. (shrink)

What I call theoretical abduction (sentential and model-based)certainly illustrates much of what is important in abductive reasoning, especially the objective of selecting and creating a set of hypotheses that are able to dispense good (preferred) explanations of data, but fails to account for many cases of explanation occurring in science or in everyday reasoning when the exploitation of the environment is crucial. The concept of manipulative abduction is devoted to capture the role of action in many interesting situations: action provides (...) otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses. Many external things, usually inert from the epistemological point of view, can be transformed into what I call epistemic mediators, which are illustrated in the last part of the paper, together with an analysis of the related notions of ``perceptual and inceptual rehearsal'' and of ``external representation''. (shrink)

I will analyse three fundamental ways of governing ignorance though abduction, which are essential from an eco-cognitive and eco-logical point of view, in which the central role in human cognition of natural and artefactual environment is taken into account. First of all, according to the so-called GW-schema, proposed by Gabbay and Woods, abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character: given the fact that the abduced hypotheses aim at becoming truths, the basic ignorance is neither solved nor left untouched. Second, I (...) will contend that abduction is not always ignorance preserving but also knowledge enhancing. Indeed, according to the eco-cognitive model of abduction, I myself have recently proposed, we can easily see that, occasionally, knowledge can be immediately increased (and ignorance ‘killed’) through abduction: in this perspective, abduction does not have to be rigidly conceptualized as an inference to the best explanation in the received sense, which is as an inference that, to grant truth, also takes advantage of an empirical evaluation phase or an inductive phase, as Peirce classified it. Finally, it is important to stress that abductive cognition is at the roots of two fundamental cognitive processes. On one side, abductive cognition constructs (and/or takes advantage of the exploitation of) embodiments, external representations, enactions, artefacts and props, which involve ignorant entities suitably transformed in cognitive representations and/or devices. On the other side, abductive cognition dominates those ‘special’ cognitive creative processes that lead to what I call the disseminated ‘computational domestication of ignorant entities’: I will illustrate the example of the recent unconventional computational domestication of ignorant entities, which creates novel cognitive embodiments (morphological computation). (shrink)

This article aims at commenting in a novel way on the concept of political correctness, by showing that, even if adopting a politically-correct behavior aims at promoting a precise moral outcome, violence can be still perpetrated, despite good intentions. To afford in a novel way the problem of political correctness, I will adopt a theoretical strategy that adheres to moral stoicism, the problem of “silence”, the “fascist state of the mind” and the concept of “overmorality”, which I have introduced in (...) my book Understanding Violence. The Intertwining of Morality, Religion, and Violence: A Philosophical Stance. I will demonstrate that political correctness certainly obeys the stoic moral rule, which teaches us that we have to diminish conflicts and, so, the potential for derived violence, by avoiding to pronounce words and expressions that can be offensive and so conflict making. Unfortunately, political correctness often increases the so-called already widespread overmorality, typical of our era, and postulates too many minor moral values to be attributed to individuals and groups, which must be respected. Therefore, engaging in political correctness obscures more serious issues regarding social, political and economic life, committing a sin of abstractness and idealization. At the same time, by discouraging the use of words and expressions, the intrinsic overmoralization at work creates potential new conflicts and potential derived violence. (shrink)

In my opinion, it is only in the framework of a research dealing with abductive cognition that we can analyze important cognitive aspects of human and machine capacities. From the point of view of human capacities the phenomenological concept of anticipation, which is related to the problem of the spontaneous generation of spatiality and its three-dimensionality, will be central. I will describe that anticipations can be seen as types of visual and manipulative abduction and also fruitful to illustrate, in the (...) case of human and machine capacities, the respective role of two kinds of strategic reasoning: locked and unlocked abductive strategies, which characterize the basic cognitive pro- cedure of “reading ahead”. The specificity of these contrasting inferential strategies is also related to their potentiality in producing different kinds of hypothetical outcomes, which in turn represent dissimilar levels of knowledge creativity. This diversity is also fundamental to depict the special character, the kind of creativity, and the limits of current computational deep learning AI systems, such as AlphaGo, which realize abductive cognitive processes. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende analizar la teoría moral que J. Rawls propuso en su famosa obra A Tbeory of Justice (1971). Este análisis se hace tratando tres conceptos básicos de la moral, como son bien, deber y virtud. Tales conceptos muestran que la visión del hombre y de la ética que Rawls propone es individualista, rasgo que dificulta seriamente la pretensión de universalidad que el autor dio a su teoría moral y política.

(2006). Introduction. World Futures: Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 153-156.

In this article the problem of _discoverability_ and _abductive creativity_ in scientific cognition will be characterized by the analysis of current difficulties that affect various aspects of the scientific enterprise such as in the case of the organization of Research and Development in biopharmaceutical companies. I will contend that this case symbolizes a paradigmatic example of what I have called “impoverished epistemic niches” in which it seems that some of the fundamental aspects that qualify modern science are jeopardized. To refer (...) to some recent challenges to the crucial role played in scientific abductive cognition by the so-called “maximization of eco-cognitive openness” and “optimization of eco-cognitive situatedness”, I will propose the new concept of “_epistemic irresponsibility_”. I will emphasize the importance of the so-called _knowledge in motion_ – in multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary scientific research: the concept of knowledge in motion is also the necessary conceptual premise of the analysis of various kinds of epistemic irresponsibility. I indeed will illustrate the current increasing expansion of commodification and commercialization of science, marketing of technoscientific products, impoverishment of the epistemic niches, showing that a consequence is and could further be an attack to the possibility of a further flourishing of human fecund and successful abductive creative cognition in science, and so at the same time human creativity severely compromised. (shrink)

El presente artículo es un reconocimiento y un homenaje a L'Höpital, de cuya muerte se ha cumplido recientemente el tercer centenario. En él se estudia la correspondencia L'Höpital-Leibniz para analizar el recientemente creado por Leibiz cálculo diferencial e integral y su ontología subyacente, así como la publicación del primer manual sobre la materia escrito por L'Höpital.

Our brains make up a series of signs and are engaged in making or manifesting or reacting to a series of signs: through this semiotic activity they are at the same time engaged in “being minds” and so in thinking intelligently. An important effect of this semiotic activity of brains is a continuous process of “externalization of the mind” that exhibits a new cognitive perspective on the mechanisms underling the semiotic emergence of abductive processes of meaning formation. To illustrate this (...) process I will take advantage of the analysis of some aspects of the cognitive interplay between internal and external representations. I consider this interplay critical in analyzing the relation between meaningful semiotic internal resources and devices and their dynamical interactions with the externalized semiotic materiality suitably stocked in the environment. Hence, minds are material, “extended” and artificial in themselves. A considerable part of human abductive thinking is occurring through an activity consisting in a kind of reification in the external environment and a subsequent re-projection and reinterpretation through new configurations of neural networks and chemical processes. I also illustrate how this activity takes advantage of hybrid representations and how it can nicely account for various processes of creative and selective abduction, bringing up the question of how multimodal aspects involving a full range of sensory modalities are important in hypothetical reasoning. (shrink)

This article examines contributions from members of the public featured in British television news coverage of the 2005 London bombings. Specifically, it explores how images captured by ordinary people on their mobile devices were used in the live news reportage of 7/7 and, given the current salience of commemorative journalism, how these were used in the tragedy’s first year anniversary coverage. The analysis reveals broadcasters’ selection of uniform, repetitive and ‘sanitized’ mobile media footage, as well as a tendency towards non-attribution. (...) This article contributes to the scant body of discourse analytic research into ‘participatory journalism’ practices, particularly their interaction with ‘traditional’ forms of journalism. (shrink)

Voces técnicas mínimas que forman el lenguaje filosófico, extraídas de los libros de Filosofía de Bachillerato, Ética y textos de COU.

This paper examines the email discursive practices of particular speakers of two different languages, namely Peninsular Spanish and British English. More specifically, our study focuses on (in)formality and (in)directness therein, for these lie at the heart of considerable scholarly debate regarding, respectively (i) the general stylistic drift towards orality and informality in technology-mediated communication, and (ii) the degree of communicative (in)directness - within broader politeness orientations - of speakers of different languages, specifically an orientation towards directness in Peninsular Spanish vis-à-vis (...) indirectness in British English. The aim of this paper is thus to investigate the role of (in)formality and (in)directness in email messages sent by members of two groups of undergraduate students to their university lecturers. To this end, a corpus of 100 impromptu emails was compiled and analysed. Results revealed complex, fluctuating patterns regarding levels of (in)formality and (in)directness that underlined cross-cultural variation in the way that different sociopragmatic principles found expression in a specific computer-mediated communicative situation. (shrink)

This article explores the issue of discoverability and abductive creativity in scientific cognition, focusing on the challenges faced by biopharmaceutical companies in their R&D organization. The author argues that these companies are generating “impoverished epistemic niches”, which threaten fundamental aspects of modern science. The author proposes the concept of epistemic irresponsibility, emphasizing the importance of “knowledge in motion” in multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary scientific research. The increasing expansion of commodification and commercialization of science, marketing of technoscientific products, and the impoverishment (...) of epistemic niches seem to already threaten the flourishing of human creativity and successful abductive creative cognition in science. (shrink)

Morality is the effort to guide one’s conduct by reasons, that is, to do what there are the best reasons for doing. From a cognitive perspective, there are many types of moral hypotheses that provide good reasons in practical and moral deliberation and action. They can take the form of principles, rules, prototypes, previous analogical cases, examples, images, feelings, metaphors, narratives, and so on. I will address the central problems of the logical structure of reasons and of inferring reasons taking (...) advantage of the fundamental distinction, suggested by Searle, between internal and external reasons. What, then, is the role of internal reasons? The answer is that they serve, in a certain way, to mediate between external and internal obligations by connecting them both logically and causally in practical and moral cognition and illustrating the relative importance of abductive cognition. Internal reasons might be based on a desire or an intention, for instance, while external reasons may be grounded in external obligations and duties that we may recognize as such. (shrink)

Le sentenze che oggi vengono pronunciate contro i criminali psicopatici evitano accuratamente di far leva su considerazioni “morali”. Solitamente l’attribuzione di responsabilità morale ai criminali si basa spesso sul concetto cognitivo di infermità mentale, in maniera tale che il giudizio morale sulla condotta morale dei “criminali psicopatici” in questi casi venga tendenzialmente sterilizzato. La posizione che qui vorrei proporre individua oscurità e limiti epistemici nelle teorie e nei metodi correntemente impiegati nelle società occidentali per alleggerire le responsabilità morali, le quali, (...) pertanto, risultano in parte inaffidabili. Per supportare questa conclusione intendo far leva sui miei più recenti studi di carattere cognitivo, vertenti sulla dimensione plurale dei contesti morali, sulla co-evoluzione geni/nicchia cognitiva e sul concetto di libero arbitrio. (shrink)

I will analyse some properties of abduction that are essential from a logical standpoint. When dealing with the so-called ‘inferential problem’, I will opt for the more general concepts of input and output instead of those of premisses and conclusions, and show that in this framework two consequences can be derived that help clarify basic logical aspects of abductive reasoning: (i) it is more natural to accept the ‘multimodal’ and ‘context-dependent’ character of the inferences involved, (ii) inferences are not merely (...) conceived of in the terms of the process leading to the ‘generation of an output’ or to the proof of it, as in the traditional and standard view of deductive proofs, but rather, from this perspective abductive inferences can be seen as related to logical processes in which input and output fail to hold each other in an expected relation, with the solution involving the modification of inputs, not that of outputs. I will also describe that if we wish to naturalize the logic of the abductive processes and its special consequence relation, we should refer to the following main aspects: ‘optimization of situatedness’, ‘maximization of changeability’ of both input and output, and high ‘information-sensitiveness’. (shrink)

Humans continuously delegate and distribute cognitive functions to the environment to lessen their limits. They build models, representations, and other various mediating structures, that are thought to be good to think. The case of scientific innovation is particularly important: the main aim of this paper is to revise and criticize the concept of scientific innovation, reframing it in what I will call an eco-epistemic perspective, taking advantage of recent results coming from the area of distributed cognition (common coding) and abductive (...) cognition (manipulative). Taking advantage of this eco-cognitive perspective the article outlines how innovative scientific modeling activity can be better described taking advantage of the concept of “epistemic warfare”, which sees scientific enterprise as a complicated struggle for rational knowledge in which it is crucial to distinguish epistemic (for example scientific models) from non epistemic (for example fictions, falsities, propaganda) weapons. (shrink)

Many important concepts of the calculus are difficult to grasp, and they may appear epistemologically unjustified. For example, how does a real function appear in “small” neighborhoods of its points? How does it appear at infinity? Diagrams allow us to overcome the difficulty in constructing representations of mathematical critical situations and objects. For example, they actually reveal the behavior of a real function not “close to” a point (as in the standard limit theory) but “in” the point. We are interested (...) in our research in the diagrams which play an optical role –microscopes and “microscopes within microscopes”, telescopes, windows, a mirror role (to externalize rough mental models), and an unveiling role (to help create new and interesting mathematical concepts, theories, and structures). In this paper we describe some examples of optical diagrams as a particular kind of epistemic mediator able to perform the explanatory abductive task of providing a better understanding of the calculus, through a non-standard model of analysis. We also maintain they can be used in many other different epistemological and cognitive situations. (shrink)