Televisión Española ha hecho posible la divulgación de temas médicos en la temporada de 2016 a través de los cuatro programas especializados en salud: Saber vivir, Centro médico, Esto es vida y El ojo clínico. Con el objetivo de conocer mejor su recepción por parte de los telespectadores, este estudio analiza, por un lado, los datos oficiales de audimetría y, por otro, los de una encuesta lanzada a través de las redes sociales. Con el cuestionario, al que han respondido 158 (...) seguidores de los programas, se ha medido la valoración y la confianza que los espectadores otorgan al tratamiento informativo y audiovisual de estos programas. Esta investigación se corresponde con la segunda fase de un proyecto más amplio en el que previamente se han estudiado los contenidos de los programas televisivos y su comunicación digital a través de Twitter. (shrink)

Invited papers from PT-AI 2011. - Vincent C. Müller: Introduction: Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence - Nick Bostrom: The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents - Hubert L. Dreyfus: A History of First Step Fallacies - Antoni Gomila, David Travieso and Lorena Lobo: Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic - J. Kevin O'Regan: How to Build a Robot that Is Conscious and Feels - Oron Shagrir: Computation, Implementation, Cognition.

What is computer-science about? CS is obviously the science of computers. But what exactly are computers? We know that there are physical computers, and, perhaps, also abstract computers. Let us limit the discussion here to physical entities and ask: What are physical computers? What does it mean for a physical entity to be a computer? The answer, it seems, is that physical computers are physical dynamical systems that implement formal entities such as Turing-machines. I do not think that this answer (...) is false. But it invites another, and troubling, question: What distinguishes computers from other physical dynamical systems? The difficulty is that, on the one hand, every physical system im-plements abstract formal entities such as sets of differential equations, while on the other hand we certainly do not want to count every dynamical system as a computer. After all, if CS is somehow distinctive, then there must be a difference between computers and other systems such as solar systems, stomachs, and carburetors. But what is the difference? (shrink)

In Representation Reconsidered , William Ramsey suggests that the notion of structural representation is posited by classical theories of cognition, but not by the ‘newer accounts’ (e.g. connectionist modeling). I challenge the assertion about the newer accounts. I argue that the newer accounts also posit structural representations; in fact, the notion plays a key theoretical role in the current computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. The argument rests on a close examination of computational work on the oculomotor system.

What does it mean to say that an object or system computes? What is it about laptops, smartphones, and nervous systems that they are considered to compute, and why does it seldom occur to us to describe stomachs, hurricanes, rocks, or chairs that way? Though computing systems are everywhere today, it is very difficult to answer these questions. The book aims to shed light on the subject by arguing for the semantic view of computation, which states that computingsystems are always (...) accompanied by representations. This view is presented as an alternative to non-semantic views such as the mechanistic account of computation. (shrink)

In this study I intend to prove that there is a close connection between ethical purposes of Environmental Philosophy as World Philosophy and the idea of sacred nature as part of the “world” in a phenomenological sense, which includes sacred space as defined in the philosophy of religion. The main points that intersect here are: the idea of sacred space; the perception of virtue in a sacred world; the beauty of creation: nature, life, human sensibility. The theoretical background of this (...) study contains points of view that express phenomenological, hermeneutic, theological, and aesthetic conceptions belonging to authors and exegetes such as Mircea Eliade, William E. Paden, David Cave, Ion Ianoși, Douglas Allen, Arnold Berleant, and Vincent Blok. I believe that the neglect of the environment-as-a-condition-of-life (the consequences of which can already be seen in ecological imbalances) is caused by, among other factors, the desacralization of human attitudes towards nature and the world of life. Few people still have a feeling of sacred nature or the aesthetic emotion of perceiving beauty in natural forms. The relationship with the environment and nature is reduced to its exploitation as a source of economic profit or as a way for spending free time, a source of personal comfort devoid of any spiritual significance. Surely we cannot go back to archaic religions or medieval Christianity, but we can reintegrate into our moral values something of those cultures’ admiration and respect for the beauty/sublimity of nature and the world as expressions of divine creation, as something sacred. Philosophical debates related to this retrieval and their dissemination could be part of solving the ecological problems of the contemporary world. (shrink)

Colonization has had extremely negative impacts on the mental health and wellness of Indigenous peoples throughout the world. In this paper we take up colonial processes as they relate to Indigenous lives and mental health in three contexts: Canada, Kenya and Australia. This work engages storytelling and the method of storywork (Archibald et al., 2019) as a way to preserve and pass on history and as a way of resisting colonial oppression. This work is grounded in an intersectional approach to (...) social justice and decolonization (Crenshaw, 1990; Hankivsky & Cormier, 2011), and supported sharing, knowledge co-creation and joint thematic narrative analysis of Indigenous experiences of mental health and justice systems across the three contexts. Our writing team represents a collaborative process between Indigenous and non-Indigenous authors where the members of the team most impacted by colonization use stories to reflect on the impact of colonization and its specific ties to psychiatric, justice and child welfare systems. This paper is presented in three main parts beginning with “Emile’s Story,” followed by “Remembering ‘Is That You Ruthie?’” and concluding with “Navigating Kenya’s Colonial Legacy.” This work engages a process of decolonization by challenging these destructive colonial narratives through storytelling. This paper will both document and demonstrate the importance of creating space for different forms of knowledge creation within academia. (shrink)

The semantic view of computation is the claim that semantic properties play an essential role in the individuation of physical computing systems such as laptops and brains. The main argument for the semantic view rests on the fact that some physical systems simultaneously implement different automata at the same time, in the same space, and even in the very same physical properties. Recently, several authors have challenged this argument. They accept the premise of simultaneous implementation but reject the semantic conclusion. (...) In this paper, I aim to explicate the semantic view and to address these objections. I first characterize the semantic view and distinguish it from other, closely related views. Then, I contend that the master argument for the semantic view survives the counter-arguments against it. One counter-argument is that computational individuation is not forced to choose between the implemented automata but rather always picks out a more basic computational structure. My response is that this move might undermine the notion of computational equivalence. Another counter-argument is that while computational individuation is forced to rely on extrinsic features, these features need not be semantic. My reply is that the semantic view better accounts for these extrinsic features than the proposed non-semantic alternatives. (shrink)

Las directrices anticipadas aún no se encuentran legisladas en todos los estados de la República mexicana. En algunos de los estados en los que sí se encuentran legisladas, se prohíbe expresamente su validez durante el periodo de gestación. Lo anterior representa dilemas bioéticos y jurídicos importantes, los cuales revisamos para esclarecer las diversas interrogantes que surgen en materia de la protección tanto del bebé como de la madre gestante. Concluimos que existe una necesidad de desarrollar una ley federal que homologue (...) las directrices anticipadas, garantizando una muerte digna a todos los mexicanos, y que establezca que en caso de encontrarse en periodo de gestación, se busque asesoría por un comité de bioética que apoye a determinar en cada caso particular, las condiciones que favorezcan el desarrollo y supervivencia del bebé, siempre que sea posible, sin recurrir a tratamientos y/o medidas extraordinarias que pongan el riesgo la muerte digna y libre de sufrimiento de la madre. (shrink)

En el panorama educativo internacional y actual domina una educación centrada en competencias. Tras esclarecer la base modernista de dicho modelo educativo, se explora como articular una concepción distinta a la imperante con la propuesta de Leonardo Polo. En el artículo, tras plantear que el punto central de una propuesta educativa poliana es el ser humano como hijo, descubriremos tres modelos educativos contrapuestos gracias a los Tres Radicales. Y, desde la antropología trascendental, planteamos una educación centrada en el Encuentro Interpersonal. (...) Por último, se ofrecen preguntas para formular una alternativa educativa en sintonía con la propuesta de Polo. (shrink)

The figure of chiasmus, which plays a key role inside Merleau-Ponty’s thought, makes it possible to address the way Castoriadis defines the imaginary throughout his entire work from a new perspective, as well as to shed light on some complexities concerning the relation between instituted and instituting. Tthis article emphasizes the intertwining of three pair of concepts, each of which corresponds to a different but yet interrelated aspect of his philosophy: psyche-society, tradition-innovation, and autonomy-heteronomy.

The importance of mathematics in the context of the scientific and technological development of humanity is determined by the possibility of creating mathematical models of the objects studied under the different branches of Science and Technology. The arithmetisation process that took place during the nineteenth century consisted of the quest to discover a new mathematical reality in which the validity of logic would stand as something essential and central. Nevertheless, in contrast to this process, the development of mathematical analysis within (...) a framework that largely involves intuition and geometry is a fact that cannot go unnoticed amongst the mathematics community, as we shall show in this paper through the research made by Bernhard Riemann on complex variables. (shrink)

The analysis, with the use of two state vectors, of a quantum system, during the time interval between two measurements, leads to some amazing results, which seem to contradict our usual “quantum common sense.” We explore the questions of compatibility with the conventional quantum theory, uniqueness of pre- and post-selected ensembles, commutativity, simultaneity and reality of strong and weak values in the intermediate time, and the meaning of the weak value. Common criticisms are shown to be unfounded.

Putnam (Representations and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988) and Searle (The rediscovery of the mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1992) famously argue that almost every physical system implements every finite computation. This universal implementation claim, if correct, puts at the risk of triviality certain functional and computational views of the mind. Several authors have offered theories of implementation that allegedly avoid the pitfalls of universal implementation. My aim in this paper is to suggest that these theories are still consistent with a (...) weaker result, which is the nomological possibility of systems that simultaneously implement different complex automata. Elsewhere I (Shagrir in J Cogn Sci, 2012) argue that this simultaneous implementation result challenges a computational sufficiency thesis (articulated by Chalmers in J Cogn Sci, 2012). My focus here is on theories of implementation. After presenting the basic simultaneous implementation construction, I argue that these theories do not avoid the simultaneous implementation result. The conclusion is that the idea that the implementation of the right kind of automaton suffices for a possession of a mind is dubious. (shrink)

Computational neuroscientists not only employ computer models and simulations in studying brain functions. They also view the modeled nervous system itself as computing. What does it mean to say that the brain computes? And what is the utility of the ‘brain-as-computer’ assumption in studying brain functions? In previous work, I have argued that a structural conception of computation is not adequate to address these questions. Here I outline an alternative conception of computation, which I call the analog-model. The term ‘analog-model’ (...) does not mean continuous, non-discrete or non-digital. It means that the functional performance of the system simulates mathematical relations in some other system, between what is being represented. The brain-as-computer view is invoked to demonstrate that the internal cellular activity is appropriate for the pertinent information-processing task.Keywords: Computation; Computational neuroscience; Analog computers; Representation; Simulation. (shrink)

A key component of scientific inquiry, especially inquiry devoted to developing mechanistic explanations, is delineating the phenomenon to be explained. The task of delineating phenomena, however, has not been sufficiently analyzed, even by the new mechanistic philosophers of science. We contend that Marr’s characterization of what he called the computational level provides a valuable resource for understanding what is involved in delineating phenomena. Unfortunately, the distinctive feature of Marr’s computational level, his dual emphasis on both what is computed and why (...) it is computed, has not been appreciated in philosophical discussions of Marr. Accordingly we offer a distinctive account of CL. This then allows us to develop two important points about delineating phenomena. First, the accounts of phenomena that figure in explanatory practice are typically not qualitative but precise, formal or mathematical, representations. Second, delineating phenomena requires consideration of the demands the environment places on the mechanism—identifying, as Marr put it, the basis of the computed function in the world. As valuable as Marr’s account of CL is in characterizing phenomena, we contend that ultimately he did not go far enough. Determining the relevant demands of the environment on the mechanism often requires detailed empirical investigation. Moreover, often phenomena are reconstituted in the course of inquiry on the mechanism itself. (shrink)

We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a function that is not Turing computable. Finally, we argue that the existence of the device does not refute the Church–Turing thesis, but nevertheless may be a counterexample to Gandy's thesis.

An underlying assumption in computational approaches in cognitive and brain sciences is that the nervous system is an input–output model of the world: Its input–output functions mirror certain relations in the target domains. I argue that the input–output modelling assumption plays distinct methodological and explanatory roles. Methodologically, input–output modelling serves to discover the computed function from environmental cues. Explanatorily, input–output modelling serves to account for the appropriateness of the computed function to the explanandum information-processing task. I compare very briefly the (...) modelling explanation to mechanistic and optimality explanations, noting that in both cases the explanations can be seen as complementary rather than contrastive or competing. (shrink)

According to Marr, a computational-level theory consists of two elements, the what and the why . This article highlights the distinct role of the Why element in the computational analysis of vision. Three theses are advanced: ( a ) that the Why element plays an explanatory role in computational-level theories, ( b ) that its goal is to explain why the computed function (specified by the What element) is appropriate for a given visual task, and ( c ) that the (...) explanation consists in showing that the functional relations between the representing cells are similar to the “external” mathematical relations between the entities that these cells represent. *Received September 2009; revised January 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Departments of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the (...) system, and it is contended that these features are certain aspects of mental content. The argument helps (section 3) to reassess the thesis known as computational externalism, namely, the thesis that computational theories of cognition make essential reference to features in the individual's environment. It is suggested that the familiar arguments for computational externalism?which rest on thought experiments and on exegesis of Marr's theories of vision?are unconvincing, but that they can be improved. A reconstruction of the visex/audex thought experiment is offered in section 3.1. An outline of a novel interpretation of Marr's theories of vision is presented in section 3.2. The corrected arguments support the claim that computational theories of cognition are intentional. Computational externalism is still pending, however, upon the thesis that psychological content is extrinsic. (shrink)

The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.

The view that the brain is a sort of computer has functioned as a theoretical guideline both in cognitive science and, more recently, in neuroscience. But since we can view every physical system as a computer, it has been less than clear what this view amounts to. By considering in some detail a seminal study in computational neuroscience, I first suggest that neuroscientists invoke the computational outlook to explain regularities that are formulated in terms of the information content of electrical (...) signals. I then indicate why computational theories have explanatory force with respect to these regularities:in a nutshell, they underscore correspondence relations between formal/mathematical properties of the electrical signals and formal/mathematical properties of the represented objects. I finally link my proposal to the philosophical thesis that content plays an essential role in computational taxonomy. (shrink)

There is an intensive discussion nowadays about the meaning of effective computability, with implications to the status and provability of the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT). I begin by reviewing what has become the dominant account of the way Turing and Church viewed, in 1936, effective computability. According to this account, to which I refer as the Gandy–Sieg account, Turing and Church aimed to characterize the functions that can be computed by a human computer. In addition, Turing provided a highly convincing argument (...) for CTT by analyzing the processes carried out by a human computer. I then contend that if the Gandy–Sieg account is correct, then the notion of effective computability has changed after 1936. Today computer scientists view effective computability in terms of finite machine computation. My contention is supported by the current formulations of CTT, which always refer to machine computation, and by the current argumentation for CTT, which is different from the main arguments advanced by Turing and Church. I finally turn to discuss Robin Gandy's characterization of machine computation. I suggest that there is an ambiguity regarding the types of machines Gandy was postulating. I offer three interpretations, which differ in their scope and limitations, and conclude that none provides the basis for claiming that Gandy characterized finite machine computation. (shrink)

Over the last 3 decades a vast literature has been dedicated to supervenience. Much of it has focused on the analysis of different concepts of supervenience and their philosophical consequences. This paper has two objectives. One is to provide a short, up-do-date, guide to the formal relations between the different concepts of supervenience. The other is to reassess the extent to which these concepts can establish metaphysical theses, especially about dependence. The conclusion is that strong global supervenience is the most (...) advantageous notion of supervenience that we have. (shrink)

Tradicionalmente la conceptualización del tópico persona se ha circunscrito a ámbitos como la teología, la filosofía o la antropología. Sin embargo, la incorporación del tópico a gran parte de los textos de naturaleza política, así como en las declaraciones de derechos y tratados internacionales adoptados a partir de la II Guerra Mundial ha supuesto la constitucionalización del mismo. Consecuentemente, como término constitucional su interpretación queda a merced de los actores jurídicos designados para ello en el sistema político constitucional. Es por (...) ello, que, con el fin de determinar el contenido de significado actual del tópico ha de atenderse a las sentencias que interpretan la norma fundante. En este artículo, centramos nuestro estudio en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional Español. Esto nos permite poner de relieve el concepto de persona en ellas contenido: su alcance y sus limitaciones. (shrink)

We solve the problem of formulating Brownian motion in a relativistically covariant framework in 3+1 dimensions. We obtain covariant Fokker–Planck equations with (for the isotropic case) a differential operator of invariant d’Alembert form. Treating the spacelike and timelike fluctuations separately in order to maintain the covariance property, we show that it is essential to take into account the analytic continuation of “unphysical” fluctuations.

Theodore Sider distinguishes two notions of global supervenience: strong global supervenience and weak global supervenience. He then discusses some applications to general metaphysical questions. Most interestingly, Sider employs the weak notion in order to undermine a familiar argument against coincident distinct entities. In what follows, I reexamine the two notions and distinguish them from a third, intermediate, notion (intermediate global supervenience). I argue that (a) weak global supervenience is not an adequate notion of dependence; (b) weak global supervenience does not (...) capture certain assumptions about coincidence relations; (c) these assumptions are better accommodated by the stronger notion of intermediate global supervenience; (d) intermediate global supervenience, however, is also not an adequate notion of dependence; and (e) strong global supervenience is an adequate notion of dependence. It also fits in with anti-individualism about the mental. It does not, however, serve to rebut arguments against coincident entities. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim contends that global supervenience is consistent with non-materialistic cases. Paull and Sider, Horgan, as well as Kim, attempt to defend it from these charges. It is shown here that their defense is only partially successful. Their defense meets one challenge to global supervenience---the hydrogen-atom case---but fails to meet other, ‘local’, cases. It is suggested that the other challenges can be met if global supervenience is combined with weak supervenience. The combination of global and weak supervenience constitutes a viable (...) picture of psychophysical relations, and is especially attractive to nonreductive materialists who are also anti-individualists. (shrink)

What does it mean to say that a physical system computes or, specifically, to say that the nervous system computes? One answer, endorsed here, is that computing is a sort of modeling. I trace this line of answer in the conceptual and philosophical work conducted over the last 3 decades by researchers associated with the University of California, San Diego. The linkage between their work and the modeling notion is no coincidence: the modeling notion aims to account for the computational (...) approach in neuroscience, and UCSD has been home to central studies in neurophilosophy, connectionism, and computational neuroscience. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience. It is argued here, however, that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role to play. It is shown that when the relevant sets include relations , strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct. It is then concluded that there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made with (...) the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the “local” (individual) one. (shrink)

Accelerating Turing machines have attracted much attention in the last decade or so. They have been described as “the work-horse of hypercomputation” (Potgieter and Rosinger 2010: 853). But do they really compute beyond the “Turing limit”—e.g., compute the halting function? We argue that the answer depends on what you mean by an accelerating Turing machine, on what you mean by computation, and even on what you mean by a Turing machine. We show first that in the current literature the term (...) “accelerating Turing machine” is used to refer to two very different species of accelerating machine, which we call end-stage-in and end-stage-out machines, respectively. We argue that end-stage-in accelerating machines are not Turing machines at all. We then present two differing conceptions of computation, the internal and the external, and introduce the notion of an epistemic embedding of a computation. We argue that no accelerating Turing machine computes the halting function in the internal sense. Finally, we distinguish between two very different conceptions of the Turing machine, the purist conception and the realist conception; and we argue that Turing himself was no subscriber to the purist conception. We conclude that under the realist conception, but not under the purist conception, an accelerating Turing machine is able to compute the halting function in the external sense. We adopt a relatively informal approach throughout, since we take the key issues to be philosophical rather than mathematical. (shrink)

Research has revealed that sex education policies are informed by national and local struggles over the meanings and consequences of gender, race, sexuality, and class categories. However, few studies have considered how policies are enacted in the classroom production of sex education to support or challenge gender, racial, sexual, and class hierarchies. This article draws on data obtained through semistructured in-depth interviews with 40 Latina youth to explore how heteronormativity, sexism, and racism operate together to structure the content and delivery (...) of school-based sex education. Findings suggest that some Latina youth encounter racialized heterogendered constructions and experiences that limit their access to sex-education-related information and reinforce existing inequalities. (shrink)

This paper challenges two orthodox theses: (a) that computational processes must be algorithmic; and (b) that all computed functions must be Turing-computable. Section 2 advances the claim that the works in computability theory, including Turing's analysis of the effective computable functions, do not substantiate the two theses. It is then shown (Section 3) that we can describe a system that computes a number-theoretic function which is not Turing-computable. The argument against the first thesis proceeds in two stages. It is first (...) shown (Section 4) that whether a process is algorithmic depends on the way we describe the process. It is then argued (Section 5) that systems compute even if their processes are not described as algorithmic. The paper concludes with a suggestion for a semantic approach to computation. (shrink)