Several visual and emotional processes reflect similar underlying patterns of cortical activation. Characteristic individual perceptual style was measured by lateral attentional errors in a standard visual line-bisecting task. The direction of error indicates a predominance of activation in the contralateral prefrontal cortex. Individual differences in mood were measured by the self-endorsement of emotional adjectives. A total of 27 right-handed adults responded to the trait version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). As predicted, rightward errors in visual line bisecting (...) correlated positively and significantly with the Positive Affect subscale. The scale adjectives determined and strong had significant correlations with the visual bisecting measure. The negative affect subscale was correlated with neither the line bisecting measure nor the positive subscale. An extension from trait to state measures tested the self-description of current affect using related synonyms and antonyms in a subset of 22 of the participants. Active, dominant, mighty, powerful, and strong were significantly associated with rightward bisecting errors, whereas passive and cooperative were correlated with errors in the opposite direction. The results were incompatible with the valence model (positive-negative), direction model (approach-withdrawal), and movement model (approach-resistance) of the lateral prefrontal substrate of emotion. The action tendency model (active approach-passive yielding) was supported. (shrink)

Individualism: The Cultural Logic of Modernity is an edited collection of sixteen essays on the idea of the modern sovereign individual in the western cultural tradition. Reconsidering the eighteenth-century realist novel, twentieth-century modernism, and underappreciated topics on individualism and literature, this volume provocatively revises and enriches our understanding of individualism as the generative premise of modernity itself.

Prolonged solitary confinement has become a widespread and standard practice in U.S. prisons—even though it consistently drives healthy prisoners insane, makes the mentally ill sicker, and, according to the testimony of prisoners, threatens to reduce life to a living death. In this profoundly important and original book, Lisa Guenther examines the death-in-life experience of solitary confinement in America from the early nineteenth century to today’s supermax prisons. Documenting how solitary confinement undermines prisoners’ sense of identity and their ability to (...) understand the world, Guenther demonstrates the real effects of forcibly isolating a person for weeks, months, or years. -/- Drawing on the testimony of prisoners and the work of philosophers and social activists from Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to Frantz Fanon and Angela Davis, the author defines solitary confinement as a kind of social death. It argues that isolation exposes the relational structure of being by showing what happens when that structure is abused—when prisoners are deprived of the concrete relations with others on which our existence as sense-making creatures depends. Solitary confinement is beyond a form of racial or political violence; it is an assault on being. (shrink)

Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefs.

Language is the original technological prosthesis mediating all transfer of human cognition. The relationships between language, communication and cognition have long been the subject of scientific, philosophic and linguistic inquiry. However, it is through contemporary advancements in neuroscience that we now have unprecedented access to the inner workings of the human brain. Particularly, consumer grade neural scanning technologies like the Muse headset allow non-scientists to view, manipulate and draw conclusions from data generated by their own neural processes. Hence, artists Minka (...) Stoyanova and Lisa Park SoYoung have created an artistic experimental system that utilizes these technologies to address the possibility of communication beyond the confines of linguistic signification. Performing Hypo-Linguistics uses Muse brain sensors to create an abstract audio-visual communication system and feedback loop. Through the visualization and sonification of their respective brain data, these artists perform communication that is both outside of conscious control and beyond sign-based systems of linguistic representation. In this article, we discuss the philosophic and scientific groundwork that supports the creation of this system; our processes of sonification and visualization of the Muse-generated brain data (including the modes by which we actively avoided signification and expected technological aesthetics of data representation); and the outcomes of the performances or the realized interaction between the performers. As deep-learning algorithms become increasingly able to teach computers to mimic human language, it becomes ever more apparent that language is not, in fact, the purview of the human, but only one technological mode invented to facilitate the transfer of information. As with all systems of communication, noise is introduced in this process of transfer. This artistic research seeks to highlight that reality while considering the potentials for alternative forms of technologically mediated communication beyond linguistic signification and below the level of consciousness. (shrink)

Elise Reimarus was among the leading women intellectuals of eighteenth-century Hamburg. Rarely acknowledged today, her surviving writings contribute to central literary and philosophical debates in Europe at the time. This paper traces Reimarus’s intervention in controversy surrounding Joseph Addison’s tragedy Cato (1713) and its dramatization of republican liberty and virtue. Long erased from the literary canon, Reimarus’s German translation and adaptation (ca. 1776) radicalizes Addison’s critique of Cato’s Stoic leadership style. By rewriting the love-plots and foregrounding the women characters’ private (...) lives, her Cato engenders an alternative “art of politics”—one that steers a consequentialist path toward the common good. (shrink)

This paper explores Ronald Dworkin’s influential theory of constructive interpretation. It points out that this theory admits of two readings, which I call the “undemanding” and the “demanding” conceptions of constructive interpretation respectively. As I argue, Dworkin’s own presentation of the theory equivocates between these two conceptions, the former of which is utterly unproblematic, but the latter of which incorporates certain philosophical prejudices as to what it must mean for a practice to be purposive.

It was an afternoon in the early stages of the pandemic when Lisa Richardson and I ran into each other at the hospital coffee line. Standing six feet apart and decked out in masks, scrub caps, and face shields, we were almost unrecognizable to one another and to ourselves. The pandemic was of course top of mind, but our conversation quickly turned to what was being articulated about the pandemic and why it was being heralded as a "disaster for (...) feminism". As Audre Lorde reminds us, "There is no such thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not live single issue lives," and we were beginning to see how many issues intersected in the pandemic moment. The United Nations was calling... (shrink)

Moral asepsis in education Abstract: The purpose of this article is to question the alleged dissociation between ethics and morals and its consequences for the education, from a hermeneutic perspective. Starting from the hypothesis that theorizations and educational and pedagogical ramifications have been disregarding the discussions on morals and their normative, prescriptive and even pragmatic demands, for the adoption of a posture of permanent suspension, relativization and criticism, at theoretical and practical levels. Such a perspective, in educational contexts, would lead (...) to the abandonment and refusal of reasonable and minimally stable values, which are essential to the justification of the very reason for educating. Consequently, these writings have three key purposes: to understand the causes of the controversial, although necessary, dissociation between ethics and morals; to question the relationship between human becoming, its educational capacity and the moral subject; and to demonstrate the correspondence between ethics, morals and education. Keywords: Ethics; Moral; Education; Human Condition. De la asepsia moral en la educación Resumen: El presente artículo problematiza, a la luz de una perspectiva hermenéutica, el supuesto de la disociabilidad entre la ética y la moral y sus consecuencias para la educación. Parte de la hipótesis que las teorizaciones y desdoblamientos educativos y pedagógicos han pasado a través de los debates sobre la moral y sus demandas normativas, prescriptivas y hasta pragmáticas, en el nombre de la adopción, tanto a nivel teórico como práctico, una postura de permanente suspensión, relativización y crítica. En contextos educativos, tal perspectiva conduciría al abandono y rechazo de valores razonables y mínimamente estables, indispensables para la justificación de la propria razón para educar. Ante esto, estos escritos se orientan según tres propósitos fundamentales: comprender las causas de la controvertida, aunque necesaria, disociación entre ética y moral; problematizar la relación entre el devenir humano, su educabilidad y la cuestión moral; y demostrar la copertenencia entre ética, moral y educación. Palabras clave: Ética; Moral; Educación; Condición humana. Da assepsia moral na educação Resumo: O presente artigo problematiza, à luz de uma perspectiva hermenêutica, o suposto da dissociabilidade entre ética e moral e suas consequências para a educação. Parte da hipótese de que as teorizações e os desdobramentos educacionais e pedagógicos têm preterido as discussões sobre a moral e as suas demandas normativas, prescritivas e até pragmáticas, em nome da adoção, tanto em nível teórico quanto prático, de uma postura de permanente suspensão, relativização e crítica. Em contextos educativos, tal perspectiva estaria conduzindo ao abandono e à recusa de valores razoáveis e minimamente estáveis, indispensáveis à justificação da própria razão de educar. Diante disso, estes escritos orientam-se segundo três propósitos fundamentais: compreender as causas da controversa, apesar de necessária, dissociação entre ética e moral; problematizar a relação entre o devir humano, a sua educabilidade e a questão moral; e demonstrar a copertença entre ética, moral e educação. Palavras-chave: Ética; Moral; Educação; Condição Humana. Data de registro: 21/05/2020 Data de aceite: 29/09/2021. (shrink)

O tema da ética tem ganhado espaço em praticamente todos os campos e setores da nossa sociedade, sejam eles acadêmicos, educacionais, profissionais, empresariais, políticos e científicos. Contudo, as discussões em seu entorno têm se pulverizado numa variedade imensa de abordagens, pautadas em distintas e até mesmo contraditórias bases teóricas, perspectivas e interpretações. Diante disso, estes escritos objetivam distinguir, problematizar e relacionar as noções de moral, ética e deontologia no intuito de preservar tanto o sentido filosófico das proposições éticas quanto o (...) rigor argumentativo das discussões emergentes tanto de contextos teóricos não-filosóficos como e de situações vivenciais. (shrink)

This research brings together insights from philosophy, political theory, and consumer research in conceptualizing and empirically examining the social dimension of negative and positive freedom in consumption. Drawing from ethnographic observations and interviews with Moroccan women regarding their shopping at the supermarket, the findings detail the roles of husbands, store employees, extended family members and friends as constrainer, protector, enabler, facilitator, indulger, and witness. The discussion explains a ‘domino effect’ in such innovative marketplaces, as these market and social actors together (...) enact positive and negative forms of freedom in consumption in ways that co-disrupt social traditions. Implications for business ethics emphasize the need for greater theoretical understanding and practical transparency and accountability regarding the shared, yet disparate responsibilities among businesses and consumers for the changes to social traditions that result in the joint enactment of women’s freedom in consumption. (shrink)

Philosophers and physicians alike tend to discuss the physician-patient relationship in terms of physician privilege and patient autonomy, stressing the duty of the physician to respect the autonomy and the variously elaborated rights of the patient. The authors of this article argue that such emphasis on rights was initially productive, in a first generation of debate on medical ethical issues, but that it is now time for a second generation effort that will stress the importance of the unique experiential aspects (...) of the physician-patient relationship — mutual trust, suffering and healing. We attempt here to initiate this second-generation discussion, presenting the first generation's philosophical background, criticizing it from the perspective of clinical experience, and seeking a synthesis in the relational qualities of patient and physician interacting in a medical context. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The primary aim of the paper is to apply the concept of retribution to nuclear defence policy. Nuclear defence policy, as I conceive it, is concerned with addressing the threat Soviet nuclear weapons pose for Western security. I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, MAD is not a retributive doctrine—that in fact it violates two constitutive principles of retribution: culpability and proportionality. After explicating these constitutive principles, I apply them to retaliatory strategy—showing that the culpability criterion restricts retaliation to (...) the agents of aggression while the proportionality criterion requires a just measure of retaliation. The result is a defence policy continuous with the just war tradition—one which rules out deterrence based on threats against the civilian population. I show why a retributive policy requires non‐nuclear forces and discuss the feasiblity of replacing all nuclear forces with conventional weapons. I anticipate and answer major objections to the denuclearization of U.S. and NATO forces. Finally, I conclude that an advocate of a retributive policy—specifically, a policy calling for a proportional or measured response against combatants only—must be willing, in the name of justice, to accept the risk of making war more thinkable by making it less horrible. (shrink)

When phenomenological descriptions of perceptual experience are given it often seems that the distinction between mode and content of perceptual experience is not given the attention it deserves and that consequently certain philosophical difficulties develop which might have been avoided. While it will no doubt be admitted that the distinction between the “how” and the “what” of appearing is of importance in the phenomenology of perception, at first sight the making of such a distinction may seem so simple as to (...) be hardly worth discussing. It may seem to involve a mere matter of distinguishing modifiers of the verb “to perceive” from this verb's direct objects and their modifiers, but further consideration shows the situation is not that simple. In some cases there are alternative ways of phenomenological description such that what one description seems to indicate to be content is what the other description seems to indicate to be mode, and yet the two descriptions are seen to be equivalent in intent. If we analyze one expression in accordance with its grammar then the alternative expression must be considered idiomatic, that is, not analyzable in accordance with its grammar, for otherwise the two expressions could not be considered compatible. (shrink)

Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, (...) we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical. (shrink)

Imagination plays a rich epistemic role in our cognitive lives. For example, if I want to learn whether my luggage will fit into the overhead compartment on a plane, I might imagine trying to fit it into the overhead compartment and form a justified belief on the basis of this imagining. But what explains the fact that imagination has the power to justify beliefs, and what is the structure of imaginative justification? In this paper, I answer these questions by arguing (...) that imaginings manifest an epistemic status: they are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified. This epistemic status grounds their ability to justify beliefs, and they accrue this status in virtue of being based on evidence. Thus, imaginings are best understood as justified justifiers. I argue for this view by way of showing how it offers a satisfying explanation of certain key features of imaginative justification that would otherwise be puzzling. I also argue that imaginings exhibit a number of markers of the basing relation, which further motivates the view that imaginings can be based on evidence. The arguments in this paper have theoretically fruitful implications not only for the epistemology of imagination, but for accounts of reasoning and epistemic normativity more generally. (shrink)

An influential objection to the epistemic power of the imagination holds that it is uninformative. You cannot get more out of the imagination than you put into it, and therefore learning from the imagination is impossible. This paper argues, against this view, that the imagination is robustly informative. Moreover, it defends a novel account of how the imagination informs, according to which the imagination is informative in virtue of its analog representational format. The core idea is that analog representations represent (...) relations ‘for free,’ and this explains how the imagination can contain more information than is put into it. This account makes important contributions to both philosophy of mind, by showing how the imagination can generate new content that is not represented by a subject’s antecedent mental states, and epistemology, by showing how the imagination can generate new justification that is not conferred by a subject’s antecedent evidence. (shrink)

This chapter argues that epistemic uses of the imagination are a sui generis form of reasoning. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, there are imaginings which instantiate the epistemic structure of reasoning. Second, reasoning with imagination is not reducible to reasoning with doxastic states. Thus, the epistemic role of the imagination is that it is a distinctive way of reasoning out what follows from our prior evidence. This view has a number of important implications for the epistemology of the (...) imagination. For one thing, it clarifies the epistemic role of widely invoked “constraints” on the imagination. For another, it highlights important and underappreciated disanalogies between how perceptual experiences and imaginings justify beliefs. Ultimately, the view that we can reason with imagination offers an illuminating and theoretically fruitful framework through which to understand the epistemic structure of the imagination. (shrink)

Circumcision is often claimed to be simpler, safer and more cost-effective when performed in the neonatal period as opposed to later in life, with a greater benefit-to-risk ratio. In the first part of this paper, we critically examine the evidence base for these claims, and find that it is not as robust as is commonly assumed. In the second part, we demonstrate that, even if one simply grants these claims for the sake of argument, it still does not follow that (...) neonatal circumcision is ethically permissible absent urgent medical necessity. Based on a careful consideration of the relevant evidence, arguments and counterarguments, we conclude that medically unnecessary penile circumcision—like other medically unnecessary genital procedures, such as ‘cosmetic’ labiaplasty—should not be performed on individuals who are too young (or otherwise unable) to provide meaningful consent to the procedure. (shrink)

I argue for the existence of imaginative beliefs: mental states that are imaginative in format and doxastic in attitude. I advance two arguments for this thesis. First, there are imaginings that play the functional roles of belief. Second, there are imaginings that play the epistemic roles of belief. These arguments supply both descriptive and normative grounds for positing imaginative beliefs. I also argue that this view fares better than alternatives that posit distinct imaginative and doxastic states to account for the (...) same phenomena. Along the way, I demonstrate the theoretical significance of imaginative beliefs by showing how they pose a challenge for standard taxonomies of the mind, clarify the sense in which imagination is occurrent and voluntary, explain the justificatory role of the imagination, and point to a deep but underappreciated symmetry between imagistic and non-imagistic thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Lisa’s StoryLisa P. (wife of patient) and Jeanne KerwinMy husband suffered from sudden onset of heart failure with a very low ejection fraction and was on IV Milrinone at the age of 47. One of the most powerful things he told me was that he was not afraid to die and therefore did not want to move forward with Milrinone. He eventually “did it for the kids.” After (...) the Milrinone drip was no longer working, he was offered an LVAD (left ventricular assist device) to keep him alive. He refused, but the doctor again convinced him to “do it for your kids” and said, “we put these devices in 80-year-olds.” He did not have time to explore any other options and reluctantly accepted the LVAD. It was implanted in May of 2014 in a very long and complicated surgery with a long and difficult recovery. He was in the hospital for a long time, and then he refused to go to rehab upon discharge, making it difficult for our family to manage, as he was extremely weak and needed care of his wound dressing. He worried about the financial [End Page 7] impact of a heart transplant and the medications required, as we were already struggling with the medical bills. He refused to have more surgery with the potential complications and never agreed to get on the transplant waiting list.After the implanted LVAD, my husband was not able to do most of what he loved in life. He couldn’t work (he was a truck driver), he couldn’t go fishing or swimming in the ocean, he couldn’t go hunting and fishing, and his overall physical condition was so poor that he couldn’t cook, garden and, most aggravating to him, he could not take a regular hot shower. The LVAD had to be covered with plastic in order to avoid getting the drive-line area wet, so bathing was a complicated process. He had trouble with stairs, had neuropathic pain in his legs from diabetes, and because of the pain medications, he felt cloudy and dizzy and slept most of the day in his recliner. I took care of him, even after I had to go back to work, and at the same time, I managed our two children (ages 9 and 12 at the time of LVAD).After almost two years of living with the LVAD, multiple hospitalizations for GI bleeds then seizures, more medications, and weekly blood draws for INR1, my husband requested that the LVAD be de-activated and that he be allowed to die of his heart failure. He described his life as “miserable.” He watched as his misery impacted his children and me. He suffered daily and had none of the joys that made life worth living for him. When we approached the cardiac team that implanted and monitored his LVAD with his request, they said “no.” They would not de-activate the LVAD because it was working. It was keeping him alive and he had no other terminal illness. His palliative doctor, who was treating his pain, also heard his request and told us to call for an “ethics consult” to determine if he would be “allowed” to have the LVAD de-activated. We got the number and called on March 31, 2016.At the time of the call to Ethics, we had no idea what “Ethics” was, other than a general definition of the word ethics as in professional behaviors and such. We did not know what to expect but we called. We would never have known to call “Ethics” if the palliative doctor had not advised us to do so, and my husband might have suffered a longer, more painful life both mentally and physically prolonged by the LVAD.We explained the request to the ethics consultant. She listened to my husband describe his daily living and his dissatisfaction with the quality of his life, his physical and emotional suffering, and his wish to rid himself of the LVAD and allow nature to take its course. There was actually no decision to be made on his part. He had already made up... (shrink)

Drawing on her 35-year plus experience in the classroom, Lisa Lee has transformed her extensive and authentic teaching experience into a contagious passion and energy with a specialization in Gifted and Talented programs and a focus on the students who don't always fit in a box. The Heart of Teaching is a book about her experience as a teacher, and the students she both taught and learned from, and the lessons she garnered as someone who always taught from the (...) heart. (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophers have been skeptical that the imagination can justify beliefs about the actual world. After all, how could merely imagining something give you any reason to believe that it is true? However, within the past decade or so, a lively debate has emerged over whether the imagination can justify empirical belief and, if so, how. This paper provides a critical overview of the recent literature on the epistemology of imagination and points to avenues for future research.

Edited by Lisa Cassidy and Mianna Lotz, Philosophies of Adoption: Perspectives and Reflections explores contemporary philosophical analysis of adoption, providing insight into new and underexplored topics in the field. Three scholarly developments are central to the emerging philosophical discourse on adoption explored in this volume: a problematizing of the adoption triangle or "triad", a critique of the so-called “bio-normative family", and an attention to specific issues in transracial and First Nations adoption. The book’s contributors expand on all three of (...) these areas by addressing a range of questions—How does being adopted shape self-knowledge and identity? What challenges arise at the intersection of race and adoption? What can be learned about epistemic justice, identity, and belonging from transracial adoption? What are the narratives told about adoption?—to show how current conditions and lived adoptee experiences give new shape, meaning, and importance to philosophical thinking about adoption. Showcasing a diversity of styles and standpoints, and organized into three core themes—situating adoption, knowing adoption, and telling adoption—this book grapples with the adoption experience, historical and recent developments in adoption practice, and emerging directions in philosophical scholarship. (shrink)

The author attempted to present the development of legal theories through early & medieval philosophical history.

Freedom interpreted as absence of restraints, as such, is a vacuous ideal. It requires reference to some setting and course of action in order to distinguish those restraints that block human effort from those, say, that support it. More broadly, this notion of freedom has little meaning and less value without some external criterion for evaluating human action and its conditions. Many thinkers have argued that the. criterion must be the absolute Truth ? truth that is unconditioned, indubitable, and imperative. (...) They have often argued that there is no freedom of error, and that the many persons who do not know such Truth are free only in obeying the few who do. This concept of freedom is often regarded as intolerable. A third possibility is to interpret freedom as a name for a range of significant alternatives for thought and action. Freedom, here, is compatible with truth interpreted in terms of the process of inquiry, rather than as substantive possession. It is a necessary condition for judging which restraints are real obstacles and which courses of action may be harmless, legitimate or good. The third meaning, especially, is illustrated with reference to the freedoms of utterance (expression) and speech (communication). (shrink)

It would be misleading to make any reference to Marx's “theory” of truth-for nowhere in the corpus of Marx's writings will one find an essay dealing with truth in a thematic way. Marx's scattered remarks on truth occur within the context of discussions of social questions. What one can pull together on the topic of truth amounts at most to the sketch of a concept which applies to social knowledge and not knowledge in general. My aim will be to reconstruct (...) Marx's concept of social truth on the basis of his writings on society and social theory.Those who want a systematic essay developing a general Marxist theory of knowledge have, of course, Lenin's classical formulation of Marxist epistemology in Materialism and Empiriocriticism. We also have Leszek Kolakowski's bold and heretical attack on Lenin's interpretation in “Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth” where we find the astounding claim that Marx's view of truth is closer to that of William James than to that of Lenin.Kolakowski's essay has been the subject of numerous attacks both by predictably indignant true believers and by independent, creative Marxists. (shrink)