Decisions to override a parental request to withhold or withdraw treatment in the neonatal intensive care unit are often made based on the harm standard, with death being cast as the ultimate harm. However, often the treatment itself is not without harm, and the suffering engendered is undergone by an infant who is neither able to understand it nor express its presence. We can draw upon anticipated future quality of life to justify the present suffering, but are in a quandary (...) when that future is not guaranteed or is likely to hold little but further suffering. I propose that conflicts over continuing treatment are based both on disagreements about the desirability of possible futures, and on differing perceptions of the infant’s current level of suffering. Those of us who witness the suffering of these tiny, mute infants all bear some responsibility to insure that their suffering is not without purpose. (shrink)

The controversy over the so-called Ashley Treatment (AT), a series of medical procedures that inhibited both growth and sexual development in the body of a profoundly intellectually impaired girl, usually centers either on Ashley’s rights, including a right to an intact, unaltered body, or on Ashley’s parents’ rights to make decisions for her. The claim made by her parents, that the procedure would improve their ability to care for her, is often dismissed as inappropriate or, at best, irrelevant. We argue, (...) however, that caregiving is a central issue in the controversy, as Ashley’s need for caregiving is a defining characteristic of her life. In this article, we analyze the ethics of the Ashley Treatment within the context of family caregiving. Through the physical and emotional work of caregiving, families participate in the formation and maintenance of personal identity, a process that Hilde Lindemann recently called “holding.” We argue that, in an intellectually disabled person such as Ashley, who depends on her family for every aspect of her care, the family’s contribution to identity is an essential source of personhood. We believe that the treatment can be justified if it is indeed an instance of appropriate family “holding” for Ashley. (shrink)

Lisa Freitag and Joan Liaschenko’s thoughtful and important article goes directly to the under-examined heart of Ashley’s case, namely to what sustains her in a habitable and intelligible identity. Though quite sympathetic with their conclusion and line of argument, I try to trouble their proceedings a bit, largely by wondering how having a specific such identity, out of several that may be inprinciple available, matters to someone with Ashley’s cognitive scope. I do this not simply to be contrary, (...) but because their article also seems to me to raise issues in the ethics of bioethics—in particular, what I call the dilemma of ethical endeavor: How ought one publicly pursue deeply important and complex issues, the very raising of which may offend interlocutors who indeed have grounds for resentment. Making a habit of second guessing oneself may be part of the answer. (shrink)

I argue against traditional virtue epistemology on which knowledge is a success due to a competence to believe truly, by revealing an in-principle problem with the traditional virtue epistemologist’s explanation of Gettier cases. The argument eliminates one of the last plausible explanation of Gettier cases, and so of knowledge, in terms of non-factive mental states and non-mental conditions. I then I develop and defend a different kind of virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is an exercise of a competence to know. (...) I show how the account, while circular, is not viciously so. It explains both how knowledge is a mental state, as well as the relationship between knowledge and justification, including justified false beliefs and Gettier cases. Moreover, although direct virtue epistemology is compatible with many views on the nature of belief, it can explain how knowledge might be metaphysically more fundamental than belief as well. (shrink)

Between the years 1643 and 1649, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes exchanged fifty-eight letters—thirty-two from Descartes and twenty-six from Elisabeth. Their correspondence contains the only known extant philosophical writings by Elisabeth, revealing her mastery of metaphysics, analytic geometry, and moral philosophy, as well as her keen interest in natural philosophy. The letters are essential reading for anyone interested in Descartes’s philosophy, in particular his account of the human being as a union of mind and body, as well as (...) his ethics. They also provide a unique insight into the character of their authors and the way ideas develop through intellectual collaboration. Philosophers have long been familiar with Descartes’s side of the correspondence. Now Elisabeth’s letters—never before available in translation in their entirety—emerge this volume, adding much-needed context and depth both to Descartes’s ideas and the legacy of the princess. Lisa Shapiro’s annotated edition—which also includes Elisabeth’s correspondence with the Quakers William Penn and Robert Barclay—will be heralded by students of philosophy, feminist theorists, and historians of the early modern period. (shrink)

This paper explores two apparently-unrelated forms of authenticity. One, “restaurant authenticity,” is a subcategory of the larger category of authentic objects, focused specifically on food and especially on ethnic cuisines. “Personal authenticity” refers to a set of traits or qualities in oneself. Contrary to appearances, I argue that the two forms of authenticity intertwine in ways that merit thoughtful attentiveness. I suggest that approaching the question of the authenticity of a cuisine with an attitude of flexibility and responsiveness can, in (...) turn, constitute an activity that cultivates personal authenticity, understood as “wholehearted living.” As Diana Meyers might put it, it is itself a practice of authenticity. (shrink)

This collection charts the rise of French ideas as they have influenced British culture. It offers a guide to the history of structuralist and post-structuralist concepts in philosophy, literature, marxism, feminism, history and psychoanalysis. The book grew out of a discussion series and conference held at London's ICA following the death of Michel Foucault. The contributors assess the current state of cultural theory in France and its influence in Britain.

Accession Number: ATLA0001712286; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 821-835.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 835.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

Before we commit significant resources of time and energy to clinical ethics consultation (CEC) certification, education, and the like, one of the questions we ought to be able to answer is how to...

Face recognition is one of the most important skills in primate social cognition, enabling the formation of long-lasting, interindividual relationships. This article summarizes existing research on face processing in non-human primates with the goal of understanding the evolution of this important socio-cognitive skill. It describes different levels of configural processing and the importance of early visual expertise in face processing. By reviewing studies on the well-known face inversion effect, evidence for configural face processing in non-human primates is reviewed. The study (...) examines the social salience of faces by employing a variety of gaze tracking and visual orienting techniques. It deals with the ability to recognize individuals across various viewpoints and manipulating configural cues directly. Neuroimaging studies aid in understanding whether the neural correlates of face recognition in non-human primates involve a similar brain regions as humans. (shrink)

A core area of phonology is the study of phonotactics, or how sounds are linearly combined. Recent cross‐linguistic analyses have shown that the phonology determines not only phonotactics but also the articulatory coordination or timing of adjacent sounds. In this article, I explore how the relation between coordination and phonotactics affects speakers producing nonnative sequences. Recent experimental results (Davidson 2005, 2006) have shown that English speakers often repair unattested word‐initial sequences (e.g., /zg/, /vz/) by producing the consonants with a less (...) overlapping coordination. A theoretical account of the experimental results employs Gafos's (2002) constraint‐based grammar of coordination. In addition to Gafos's Alignment constraints establishing temporal relations between consonants, a family of Release constraints is proposed to encode phonotactic restrictions. The interaction of Alignment and Release constraints accounts for why speakers produce nonnative sequences by failing to adequately overlap the articulation of the consonants. The optimality theoretic analysis also incorporates floating constraints to explain why speakers are not equally accurate on all unattested clusters. (shrink)

While the Internet has emerged as a significant resource for women negotiating the questions and circumstances that arise during conception, pregnancy and childbirth, it remains unclear what role the Internet plays in challenging the current biomedical paradigm and empowering women to make meaningful choices. This article explores how women use the Internet to manage their pregnancies and mediate their doctor–patient relationships, particularly examining the role of social class and personal health history in shaping such Internet use. Drawing from in-depth interviews (...) with white middle-class mothers, the findings show that rather than using technology to resist the dominant biomedical paradigm, most women turned to online resources that affirmed mainstream medical authority and continued to rely on their doctors. By providing the means to confirm normalcy and take control in their reproductive experiences, the Internet enables socially privileged women to more fully perform the informed patient role in order to demonstrate their competence as mothers. (shrink)

Authorship of a scientific paper is important in recognition of one’s work, and in the academic setting, helps in professional promotion. Conflicting views of authorship have led to disputes and debates in many scientific communities. Addressing ethical issues in medical research and publishing, and conforming to the requirements of international organizations and local research ethics boards, has become an essential part of the research endeavor. Ethical issues of biomedical authorship have been a matter of debate for years. Authorship problems may (...) involve problems with integrity, including ghost authorship and guest authorship. Some scientific disciplines, such as engineering or social sciences, may not have a firm guideline for authorship criteria; however this article reviews the criteria of authorship recommended by related international organizations of biomedical field and discusses common scenarios that may lead to authorship disputes and misconducts as well as issues related to authorship in multicenter studies. The paper also discusses possible scenarios that might be legitimate to make changes in authorship lists. (shrink)

This paper starts from an observation of our practices: when people are ascribed delusional beliefs or conspiracy beliefs, they tend to be excluded from shared epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. What might motivate this exclusion? One possibility is that delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are considered as evidence of irrationality and pathology, and thus endorsing them suggests that one’s epistemic agency is compromised, at least in some contexts. One common argument for the irrational and pathological nature (...) of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs lies in their being the outputs of faulty cognition. There are some areas of overlap in the cognitive antecedents of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs as identified in the empirical literature. For instance, some biases and thinking styles have been correlated either with the adoption of delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs, or with the strength of conviction in such beliefs. The paper challenges the claim that, if delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs are the outputs of biased cognition, then it is justified to exclude people endorsing delusional beliefs and conspiracy beliefs from epistemic projects relevant to the content of their beliefs. The relevant biases and thinking styles are widespread in the non-clinical population, do not need to be part of a dysfunctional cognitive process, and can be adaptive in some contexts. (shrink)

How will we as feminists theorize these borders? How will we as beings whose very bodies are objects of globalization theorize a border which we dwell within? Ofelia Shutte asks whether it is “possible for Western feminism to disentangle itself from the historical forces of Western colonialism and from the erasure of otherness that such forces entail? (Shutte 2000, 59) I ask whether it is possible for feminism, Western or non-Western, Northern or Southern, to utilize the theoretical and political resource (...) that others, who are “othered” on both sides of the border, offer to feminist struggle. (shrink)

Because pluralism at its heart is an epistemic problem in philosophy, what is at issue in discussions of philosophical pluralism are the definitions of who counts as a knower and what counts as knowledge. In this philopoetic article, in which philosophic claims are interwoven with poetic and narrative recountings of my own experiences with racist patriarchal violence in the discipline, I argue for an epistemic approach to creating pluralism in philosophy through the satisfaction of seven conditions. These conditions require, at (...) minimum, that we consider the importance of hiring multiply-positioned persons; that we critique patriarchy and white hegemonic discourses; that we rethink assumptions about epistemic credibility; and that we dispense with “perverse dialogues.” Finally, we must encourage “true dialogue” and create a “new dialogic” in philosophy. (shrink)

I denne studien undersøkes hvilke moralske utfordringer norske politistudenter oftest møter i «praksisåret». Utfordringene identifiseres gjennom en analyse av 208 hjemmeeksamener i yrkesetikk fra avgangsstudentene ved Politihøgskolen i Oslo, hvor utfordringene beskrives gjennom kombinasjoner av hvilke verdier som står sentralt, hvilke personer som er involvert og hvilke typer oppdragene oppstår i. Funnene eksemplifiseres og settes i forhold til sentrale politivitenskapelige diskusjoner. Til slutt diskuteres hvordan studentene best kan forberedes på disse utfordringene. Nøkkelord: etikk, yrkesetikk, anvendt etikk, politi, utdanning English summary: (...) What moral challenges are Norwegian police students encountering during their practice period? This article examines what moral challenges Norwegian police students encounter during their practice period. The challenges are identified through an analysis of the experiences described in the professional ethics home exams of 208 graduates at the Norwegian Police University College in Oslo. From our analysis, paradigmatic challenges are constructed based on the combinations of values, persons and mission types typically highlighted in the exams. These challenges are then discussed in light of central topics in police science. Finally, we discuss briefly how police students can be best prepared for meeting these moral challenges. (shrink)

Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are new Gettier-type examples (...) which are grounded in “distant” epistemic luck. It is demonstrated that sensitivity and safety theories cannot handle such examples. (shrink)

From Society to System presents an overview of sociologist Michel Freitag's (1935-2009) distinctive, multifaceted and interdisciplinary work. Elaborated within the grand sociological tradition, his dialectical sociology redefines sociality as the realm of the symbolic to pinpoint its ontological frailty.

Modern cities have recently evolved as centres for material and intangible exchanges and this obliges us to rethink the urban scene. The passing from the industrial era to the new age of information has rendered obsolete the models envisaged by Max Weber, Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin. Basing her argument on the typology put forward by Saskia Sassen, Barbara Freitag sketches out the different profiles of contemporary cities. Urban centres are now defined by the level, scale and intensity of (...) the exchanges to which they give rise. On the first level is the global city, nerve centre of the globalized economy (Tokyo, New York, London...) and capable of challenging the power of the state. On the second level are the megalopoles (Mexico, São Paulo...), which are only prevented from joining the ranks of the global cities because much of their population is excluded from the global economy. Next come the metropoles, cities like Paris (‘19th-century capital’), which have retained a way of life global centres can no longer provide. However, most of the world’s population is concentrated in the peripheral boroughs of the information society’s global economy. It is for the sake of this population that attention must be paid to the transformations endured by 21st-century cities. (shrink)

The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that the contrary view (...) is based on a misunderstanding of what contextualists are claiming. (shrink)

The Guise Cooperative, a project out carried in northern Paris by Jean-Baptiste André Godin (1817-88), who was inspired by the utopian ideas of Charles Fourier (1772-1837), put into practice a model that: (a) was politico-democratic in its self-management by the workers in a foundry; (b) was socio-economic in combining for the first time international competition and social benefits; (c) anticipated ecological arguments in developing industrialization processes; (d) embodied religious tolerance; (e) outlived the genuine socialism inspired by Marx. Godin’s ‘Palais Social’ (...) in Guise, still lived in today by around 300 descendants of the workers, was proclaimed a Human Heritage monument and handed over to the European Union in 1991. (shrink)

Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality asks what happens when the sense that "I must" collides with the realization that "I can't." Bringing together philosophical and empirical work in moral psychology, Lisa Tessman here examines moral requirements that are non-negotiable and that contravene the principle that "ought implies can.".

Delusions are defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. However, in the empirical literature, delusions have been found to have some psychological benefits. One proposal is that some delusions defuse negative emotions and protect one from low self-esteem by allowing motivational influences on belief formation. In this paper I focus on delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function (motivated delusions) and argue that some of their psychological benefits can convert into epistemic ones. Notwithstanding their epistemic costs, (...) motivated delusions also have potential epistemic benefits for agents who have faced adversities, undergone physical or psychological trauma, or are subject to negative emotions and low self-esteem. To account for the epistemic status of motivated delusions, costly and beneficial at the same time, I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence. A delusion is epistemically innocent when adopting it delivers a significant epistemic benefit, and the benefit could not be attained if the delusion were not adopted. The analysis leads to a novel account of the status of delusions by inviting a reflection on the relationship between psychological and epistemic benefits. (shrink)

We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane. -/- In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the (...) concept and offers an original account of the importance of judgements of irrationality as value judgements. The book examines the standards against which we measure human behaviour, and reviews the often serious implications of judgements of irrationality for ethics and policy. Bortolotti argues that we should adopt a more critical stance towards accepted standards of rationality in the light of the often surprising outcomes of philosophical inquiry and cognitive science research into decision making. -/- Irrationality is an accessible guide to the concept and will be essential reading for students and scholars interested in the limitations of human cognition and human agency. (shrink)

It has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply (...) ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated. (shrink)