Can we ever experimentally disentangle phenomenal consciousness from the cognitive accessibility inherent to conscious reports? In this commentary, we suggest that (1) Block's notion of phenomenal consciousness remains intractably entangled with the need to obtain subjective reports about it; and (2) many experimental paradigms suggest that the intuitive notion of a rich but non-reportable phenomenal world is, to a large extent illusory – in a sense that requires clarification.

Chacun d'entre nous fait partie du monde, certes. Mais, au-delà de son évidence, quelle est la signification d'une telle formule? Comment faisons-nous partie du monde? Comment sommes-nous reliés à tout ce qui n'est pas nous : les autres, le reste de la nature, le cosmos? Lionel Naccache répond à cette énigme intemporelle à partir d'une approche mathématique fondée sur la distinction entre ensembles discrets et ensembles continus : alors qu'un élément, qui fait partie d'un ensemble discret, reste séparé des (...) autres éléments par des frontières tranchées, ces frontières disparaissent dans un ensemble continu. La question devient alors : sommes-nous reliés au reste du monde par des liens continus ou par des liens discrets? Muni de cette boussole, Lionel Naccache nous propose une odyssée passionnante et pleine de gai savoir éclectique qui nous entraîne de la psychologie de la subjectivité vers les sciences du cerveau et de la conscience, les origines et l'évolution des idées mathématiques et la philosophie politique. Au bout du voyage, Lionel Naccache formule une nouvelle éthique pour le XXIe siècle"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...) behavior. We then propose a theoretical framework that synthesizes those facts: the hypothesis of a global neuronal workspace. This framework postulates that, at any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long-distance connectivity of these `workspace neurons' can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workspace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state. A complete theory of consciousness should explain why some cognitive and cerebral representations can be permanently or temporarily inaccessible to consciousness, what is the range of possible conscious contents, how they map onto specific cerebral circuits, and whether a generic neuronal mechanism underlies all of them. We confront the workspace model with those issues and identify novel experimental predictions. Neurophysiological, anatomical, and brain-imaging data strongly argue for a major role of prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and the areas that connect to them, in creating the postulated brain-scale workspace. (shrink)

Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...) taxonomy which distinguishes between vigilance and access to conscious report, as well as between subliminal, preconscious and conscious processing. We suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms, and that conscious perception is systematically associated with a sudden surge of parieto-frontal activity causing top-down amplification. (shrink)

Ce texte n’est rien d’autre qu’une note de lecture en marge du livre du neuroscientifique Lionel Naccache, Le cinéma intérieur. Projection privée au cœur de la conscience (Odile Jacob, 2020). Tout en reconnaissant l’intérêt de cet ouvrage et plus généralement des recherches en neurosciences cognitives pour l’étude de la fiction, je mets en évidence le panfictionnalisme qui anime Naccache. Ce panfictionnalisme découle de l’absence d’une définition claire de la fiction et de la non-distinction qui en résulte entre fiction et (...) récit. (shrink)

Les publications récentes permettent de mettre en relief des questions de détail ou d’ensemble qui n’avaient pas jusqu’ici attiré l’attention.Une note à un texte classique paru dans le tome VI de la traduction française des œuvres de Freud conduit à s’interroger sur l’origine, ainsi que sur la signification psychologique, philosophique et théologique de l’expression inter urinas et faeces nascimur.La publication, attendue depuis plus de vingt ans, de la traduction en français des lettres complètes de Freud à Fliess fait apparaître que, (...) contrairement à ce que prétendaient les éditeurs de 1950, Freud a collaboré scientifiquement avec Fliess. On y voit également la lente genèse de la « théorie sexuelle » jusqu’en 1905.La publication de la correspondance de Freud et d’Eitingon montre en ce dernier un ami fidèle qui fournit à Freud des matériaux littéraires et cliniques et lui assura un lien avec les organisations juives.Dans une tout autre perspective, le livre récent de Lionel Naccache, Le nouvel inconscient, met très clairement en lumière les processus cérébraux correspondant à ce qui, chez Freud, est l’inconscient en tant que « représentation non représentée ». En revanche, il critique d’une manière intéressante mais discutable d’autres aspects de l’inconscient freudien : son intemporalité, son origine infantile, son rapport au refoulement.Recent publications enable to stress detail or overall topics that had not up to now attracted attention.A footnote in a classical text to be found in the 6th volume of the French translation of Freud’s works leads to question the origin, together with the psychological, philosophical and theological meanings, of the expression inter urinas et faeces nascimur.The publication, longed for for more than twenty years, of a French translation of the Complete Letters of Freud to Fliess stresses that, contrary to what the editors of the 1950 translation had pretended, Freud did indeed work hand in hand scientifically with Fliess. One also witnesses here the slow genesis of the « sexual theory » until 1905.The publication of Freud’s and Eitingon’s letters shows how the latter was a faithful friend of Freud ; giving both literary and clinical references, and also granting him a link with the Jewish organizations.In quite a different perspective, Lionel Naccache’s recent book, entitled Le nouvel inconscient, highlights very vividly the cerebral processes corresponding to the unconscious as « non represented representation ». Conversely, he criticizes quite interestingly but in a questionable way other aspects of the Freudian unconscious : i.e. its timelessness, its infantile origin, its relationship with repression. (shrink)

According to commitment accounts of assertion, asserting is committing oneself to something’s being the case, where such commitment is understood in terms of norms governing a social practice. I elaborate and compare two version of such accounts, liability accounts (associated with C.S. Peirce) and dialectical norm accounts (associated with Robert Brandom), concluding that the latter are more defensible. I argue that both versions of commitment account possess a potential advantage over rival normative accounts of assertion in that they needn’t presuppose (...) any notion of an assertion’s correctness. Additionally, I show how dialectical norm accounts can explain relations between assertion and truth. After setting forth objections that have been raised against commitment accounts, I argue that responses are available on behalf of dialectical norm accounts. Finally, I propose that a liberalized dialectical norm account can illuminate phenomena sometimes seen as supporting truth relativism. (shrink)

This book, collecting his most important papers in the form in which they were originally published, can be seen as a companion to that one.

Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then (...) argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth. (shrink)

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)

Rejecting structural contraction has been proposed as a strategy for escaping semantic paradoxes. The challenge for its advocates has been to make intuitive sense of how contraction might fail. I offer a way of doing so, based on a “naive” interpretation of the relation between structure and logical vocabulary in a sequent proof system. The naive interpretation of structure motivates the most common way of blaming Curry-style paradoxes on illicit contraction. By contrast, the naive interpretation will not as easily motivate (...) one recent noncontractive approach to the Liar paradox. (shrink)

A decade in the making, the _Handbook i_s the definitive contemporary exposition of interpersonal psychoanalysis. It provides an authoritative overview of development, psychopathology, and treatment as conceptualized from the interpersonal viewpoint.

ABSTRACT:‘Race’ has long searched for a stable, suitable idea, with no consensus on a master meaning in sight. What I call deflationary pluralism about the existence of race recognizes that various meanings may be true as far as they go but avoids murky disputes over whether there are races in some sense. Once we have rejected the notion that racial essences yield innate cognitive differences, there is little point to arguing over the race idea. In its place, I propose the (...) idea of socioancestry, which jettisons racial thinking yet recognizes the social dynamics of color. For example, Black Americans, many of whom have traceable non-African ancestry, constitute an Africa-identified, socioancestrally black subgroup. ‘Race’ talk is not needed to sustain legitimate color-conscious approaches to social identity and social justice. Long-standing fixation on the race idea has obscured the simple truth that visible continental ancestry is the root of the social reality of color consciousness. (shrink)

This paper compares two ways of holding that logic is special among the sciences in that it has no restricted class of entities as its subject matter, but instead concerns all entities alike. One way is Williamson’s explanation of how inquiry into logical consequence and logical truth only superficially concerns the linguistic or conceptual entities that bear these properties. Williamson draws on ideas familiar from deflationism about truth, and his account has been called “deflationary.” I argue that the analogy is (...) misleading. While there’s a broad sense in which Williamson offers a deflationary account of logical inquiry, his view differs from deflationism about truth in being best understood as a form of instrumentalism. By contrast, I elaborate a deflationism about logical properties modeled on deflationism about truth. I defend this expressive device deflationism as an explanation of our use of logical predicates. (shrink)

In this classic work, L.D. Barnett delves into the ancient Indian science of Brahma-knowledge. Drawing from sources that predate the Vedas, Barnett presents a detailed study of the cosmology and spirituality of the Brahma tradition, exploring the nature of the universe, the workings of the human mind, and the path to enlightenment. This insightful and beautifully written book is a must-read for anyone interested in the spiritual traditions of India. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, (...) and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de reprendre et d’approfondir l’épineuse question des rapports entre technologies (principalement digitales, les NTIC) et mondialisation. Généralement considérés sous l’angle d’un parallélisme (les deux vont de pair) agrémenté d’une réciprocité (et s’influençant mutuellement), ces rapports sont plus souvent postulés que décrits en détail et plus encore, questionnés. L’objectif est ici moins de qualifier de manière définitive la nature de ces liens, que de souligner la richesse du champ de réflexion, et d’en tracer les contours à grands (...) traits et de présenter quelques pistes de réflexion récentes et fécondes, autour de concepts clefs, comme la « mondialisation technologique » ou « digitale ». (shrink)

This paper contrasts two versions of a pragmatist critique of deflationism about truth. According to the critique, understanding the practice of factual discourse requires understanding a role played in that practice by speakers’ use of the concept of truth. Huw Price takes this role to lie in the expression of attitudes of approval and disapproval toward other speakers’ assertions. Proceeding from Robert Brandom’s analysis of assertion, I defend an alternative account of truth’s role in terms of the acknowledgement and disacknowledgement (...) of communicative authority. I explain why this account fails to yield Price’s key anti-deflationary conclusion, namely that engaging in factual discourse requires holding that false assertions are ipso facto normatively incorrect. (shrink)

Based on specific documentary evidence, historian Lionel Jensen reveals how 16th- and 17th-century Western missionaries used translations of the ancient RU ...

This paper aims to call into question the customary division of logically revisionary responses to the truth-theoretic paradoxes into those that are “substructural” and those that are “ structural.” I proceed by examining, as a case study, Beall’s recent proposal based on the paraconsistent logic LP. Beall formulates his response to paradox in terms of a consequence relation that obeys all standard structural rules, though at the price of the language’s lacking a detaching conditional. I argue that the same response (...) to paradox can be given using a consequence relation that preserves detachment rules for a conditional, though at the price of restricting structural rules. The question “Is paradox being blocked by invoking a substructural consequence relation?” is thus ill-posed. The lesson of this example, I conclude, is that there is no useful explication of the idea of a substructural approach to paradox. (shrink)

Surveys Western literature and thought to reveal the evolution of the ideals of sincerity and authenticity.

Building on recent work, I present sequent systems for the non-classical logics LP, K3, and FDE with two main virtues. First, derivations closely resemble those in standard Gentzen-style systems. Second, the systems can be obtained by reformulating a classical system using nonstandard sequent structure and simply removing certain structural rules (relatives of exchange and contraction). I clarify two senses in which these logics count as “substructural.”.

This paper examines two explanations Sellars gives, at successive stages of his career, of how semantic vocabulary lets us relate linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic reality. Despite their differences, both explanations reveal a distinctive pragmatist approach. According to Sellars, we do not use semantic vocabulary to describe language-world relations. Rather, our taking language to relate to the world is implicit in the moves licensed by our semantic assertions. I argue that Sellars's discussions of the function of semantic vocabulary point to an (...) overlooked position regarding the relation between the concepts of meaning and truth. According to him, the function of meaning ascriptions cannot be explained independently of the function of truth ascriptions. That is because the function of meaning ascriptions essentially involves licensing claims about the world when combined with truth ascriptions. If he is right, this poses a challenge to deflationary accounts of the function of truth talk. (shrink)

Although a great deal of attention has been paid to the history of intellectual property in Great Britain, very little has been said about the history of intellectual property law in the British colonies. This Article attempts an overview, focusing on the nineteenth century. The author argues that there was no apparent imperial strategy as to the development of colonial intellectual property laws, and that, as a consequence wide variations existed between the laws operative in Britain and the colonies. One (...) exception to this picture existed in relation to literary copyright, where, for reasons that were never clearly articulated, British law had been extended to its colonies from 1814. The overall picture was otherwise one of "legal fecundity," with capacity for variation and experiment by the colonial legislatures constrained more by internalized notions of what was appropriate than by formal, external, limitations imposed from Britain. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there appeared a growing desire both in Great Britain, and amongst many of the colonies and self-governing dominions, for a greater level of uniformity. (shrink)

Two general features of metameric patterning in Drosophilaare considered: (1) maintenance of a constant number of metameres (segments or parasegments) in the face of variation in length of the embryo; (2) expression of pattern by on‐off switchings of particular genes, with only three or four rows of cells to each element of pattern. For each of these features, the general strategic question is raised: could reaction‐diffusion theory account for this? In both cases, it is answered affirmatively. For the second feature, (...) this review contains some hitherto unpublished computer simulations by one of us (K. Y. T.), illustrating that a reaction‐diffusion mechanism can be transformed into a patterned switching mechanism by nothing more than compartmenting of the diffusion region. For the scale of three compartments to one pattern repeat unit (representing three rows of cells to a segment) the switching pattern predicted by computation is two‐off to one‐on. This resembles the pattern of expression of the engrailed gene, posteriorly localized in each segment. (shrink)

Laborie and Hessayon bring rare prophetic and millenarian texts to an international audience by presenting sources from all over Europe (broadly defined), and across the early modern period in English for the first time.

. The brain evolved not to think but to act, and ideology is an act of social affiliation which can be compared to kin affiliation, both satisfyingly emotional and expressing a perception about the nature of the real world central to the nature of being human. Males may affiliate to macrosocial ideologies more enthusiastically than females because of their relative lack of certainty of kin relationships. Exogamy was the necessary solution to kin‐related strife in prehistory. Perhaps what the world needs (...) is not only a moral equivalent to war but an ideological equivalent to exogamy to resolve social differences on a much larger scale. (shrink)

According to dialectical disposition expressivism about conjunction, disjunction, and negation, the function of these connectives is to convey dispositions speakers have with respect to challenging and meeting challenges to assertions. This paper investigates the view’s implications for logic. An interpretation in terms of dialectical dispositions is proposed for the proof rules of a bilateral sequent system. Rules that are sound with respect to this interpretation can be seen as generating an intrinsic logic of dialectical dispo- sition expressivism. It is argued (...) that such a logic will be very weak —weaker than the intersection of minimal logic and FDE. (shrink)