Informal logic is an attempt to develop a logic that can assess and analyze the arguments that occur in natural language discourse. Discussions in the field may address instances of scientific, legal, and other technical forms of reasoning, but the overriding aim has been a comprehensive account of argument that can explain and evaluate the arguments found in discussion, debate and disagreement as they manifest themselves in daily life — in social and political commentary; in news reports and editorials in (...) the mass media ; in advertising and corporate and governmental communications; and in personal exchange. (shrink)

The present paper elaborates a deductivist account of natural language argu-ment in the context of pragma-dialectics. It reviews earlier debates, criticizes some standard misconceptions in the literature, and argues that the identification and analysis of deductive argument schemes can be the basis of a compelling theory of argumentative discourse.

I. The function of models in the empirical sciencesII. Structure and purpose: conditions of a structural nature which models should satisfy in order to accomplish their function.III. Generalisation and specialisation of the classical definition of model, in view of the above requirements:the algebraic model conceptthe semantic model conceptthe syntactical model conceptIV. Attempt towards reunification: the concept of model on a pragmatic basis.

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “purity” concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of (...) moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind. (shrink)

The idea that Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato is simplistic and inaccurate. Much of modern and contemporary epistemology owes a debt not so much to Platonism or Aristotelianism as to their antithesis: scepticism. Recent discussions in the history of philosophy have sparked a great deal of interest in the ancient sceptics, but until now they have been misunderstood and the significance of their philosophy not fully appreciated.

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 347-371, November 2022. We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible (...) reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it. (shrink)

Apologetisch overzicht van de wijsgerige en theologisch inzichten van de middeleeuwse filosoof (1224-1274).

Linda Radzick's new book, _The Ethics of Social Punishment_, contains an important discussion of punishment outside the context of the state. By way of celebrating this fine and welcome book, I try to probe some analytical contours concerning punishment seen from the general perspective on which Radzick and I agree. I suggest altogether abandoning the idea that (non-state) punishment needs to be inflicted by an authority. Furthermore, I insist on an account of retributivism that resists the usual accusations of barbarism (...) and bloodthirstiness. (shrink)

This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for both claims, (...) and possible objections to his analysis. (shrink)

Der Geist Naturwissenschaft, von E. Schrödinger.--Über die Hypothesen, Welche der Naturwissenschaft zugrunde liegen, von G. Holton.--Die Harmonie der Welt, von H. Kayser.--Individuum ineffabile, von L. Baeck.

Though the common sense defense of affirmative action (or employment equity) appeals to principles of restitution, philosophers have tried to defend it in other ways. In contrast, I defend it by appealing to the notion of restitution, arguing (1) that alternative attempts to justify affirmative action fail; and (2) that ordinary affirmative action programs need to be supplemented and amended in keeping with the principles this suggests.

How common are corporate codes of ethics in the UK and especially among Britain's most admired companies? The author is Wicklander Professor of Professional Ethics at DePaul University, Chicago, and current President of the American Society for Business Ethics.

We argue that Hilary Putnam's pragmatism provides an epistemological perspective which can help us understand--and can positively inform--the development of informal logic.

The prodigious development of argumentation theory over the last three decades has raised many issues that challenge some of the long held assumptions that characterize the traditional study of argument. One of these issues is the role of emotion in argument and argument analysis. While rhetoric has, with its emphasis on persuasion, always recognized that emotions play some role determining which arguments we accept and reject, a long tradition sees appeals to emotion as fallacies that violate the standards of rationality (...) and objectivity reason and argument require. (shrink)

In “Image, Evidence, Argument,” Ian Dove defends an intriguing ‘middle ground’ between those who argue that there are “visual arguments” and skeptics who argue that there are not. I discuss one of Dove’s key examples, proposing a different analysis of it, arguing that there are problems with the “verbal repackaging” of the argument he suggests.

David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment. There are two reasons why David Boonin's recent book, The Problem of Punishment,1 offers me a unique oppor...

Les écoles qui, dans un passé récent, avaient la haute main dans le domaine philosophique, ont désormais perdu du terrain et, face aux nombreux problèmes auxquels nous sommes confrontés, la pensée de saint Thomas jouit d'une grande actualité. Partout dans le monde, on peut voir un intérêt croissant pour l'étude de sa pensée. Toutefois, sur plusieurs points importants, les présentations qu'on fait de sa philosophie sont divergentes. En suivant au plus près les textes eux-mêmes, l'auteur de cet ouvrage se penche (...) sur plusieurs de ces questions en débat : les rapports avec le platonisme, l'entrée en métaphysique et l'organisation de celle-ci, la doctrine de l'être, l'importance des premiers principes, l'analogie, le fondement de la morale, vérité et liberté, l'unité de l'homme... Ecrites sur une trentaine d'années, ces études pourront aider à faire connaître les enseignements fondamentaux de celui qu'on appelle le Docteur commun. (shrink)

Inspired with Jude P. Dougherty’s works in which he stresses the overruling importance of the classical, humanistic education and the central place and role of religion in the Western culture, the author presents Christopher Dawson’s analysis of the Western civilization and his demonstration of the central role of Christianity in it. The author traces the premises on which was based Dawson’s opinion that modern Western man might be absorbed by his technical inventions, to the point of losing his soul.