Critical Legal Theory and the Challenge of Feminism provides both a thorough overview and a refinement of the ideas that underlie critical legal theory. Arguing with the rigor of analytic philosophy and the alertness to paradoxes characteristic of deconstructive philosophy, Matthew Kramer begins by exploring the tangled relations between metaphysics and politics. He then attempts to transform the discourses of the critical legal studies movement by laying out a framework of five general themes: contradictions, contingency, patterning, perspective, (...) and ideology. Kramer calls for a more sophisticated awareness of their paradoxes, explaining why the paradoxes are by no means disabling or demobilizing. Finally, Kramer explores some of feminist theory's major controversies and problems, and argues that feminist theory can profit greatly by giving due attention to inescapable paradoxes. The book is an important contribution to political philosophy, jurisprudence, feminist philosophy and metaphysics, with powerful implications for epistemology and literary theory. (shrink)

This book of readings was designed for an introductory course in the theory of modern, Western law. The materials mine the depths of history, philosophy, politics, & ethics to bring to view a certain story of the present, past & future condition of modern Western legal theory, namely that "modern" legal theory is reaching its end with the new millennium.

The papers selected for this volume offer a panorama of problems and methods at the intersection of legal theory and the humanities. The issues addressed include the role of the emotions and the imagination in legal reasoning, and the protection of the diversity of voices and perspective in the name of community. The articles balance renewed calls to humanise legal theory with those that analyse and explore the relevance of specific domains of the humanities - such as (...) literature, architecture, music, painting, drawing and film - for law. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the question of how to conceptualise the relationship between theory and practice in feminist scholarship in law. It looks in detail at the implications of different issues raised in a recent debate between Anne Bottomley and Ngaire Naffine on the existence of a “legal feminist orthodoxy”. I critique the dominance of ethics over politics and join Bottomley in her attack upon “the ethics of respect for the other”, albeit from a different position. I (...) then look at the ways in which the problem of “essentialism” is being rethought from a feminist perspective. (shrink)

This collection brings together the most important and influential papers theorising the changing relationship between law and science. The articles span historical overviews of the attempts by legal scholars to model legal science on scientific methodology, and the efforts by legal philosophers scrutinising the claims made on behalf of genetics and neuroscience as to their implications for law and legal concepts. The volume strikes a balance between those that seek to protect law's autonomy against the perceived (...) unwelcome inroads of science, and those that seek to shape and change law by incorporating the latest scientific developments. (shrink)

Review of Frederic R. Kellogg, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., _Legal Theory And Judicial Restraint_ (Cambridge University Press 2007).

Challenges to Legal Theory offers the reader a fascinating journey though a variety of multi-disciplinary topics, ranging from law and literature, and law and religion, to legal philosophy and constitutional law. The collection reflects some of the challenges that the field of legal theory currently faces. It is compiled by a selection of international and Spanish scholars, whose essays are made available in English translation for the first time. The volume is based on a collection of essays, (...) published in Spanish, in honour of Professor José Iturmendi Morales, of Complutense University, Madrid, and brings the rich scholarship of pre-eminent Spanish scholars of law and legal theory to an international audience. (shrink)

The Epistle on Legal Theory: Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī. Edited and translated by Joseph E. Lowry. Library of Arabic Literature. New York: New York University Press, 2013. Pp. xl + 501. $40.

Action-based legal theory is a discrete branch of praxeology and the basis of an emerging school of jurisprudence related to, but distinct from, natural law. Legal theory and economic theory share content that is part of praxeology itself: the action axiom, the a priori of argumentation, universalizable property theory, and counterfactual-deductive methodology. Praxeological property-norm justification is separate from the strictly ethical “ought” question of selecting ends in an action context. Examples of action-based jurisprudence are found in existing “Austro-libertarian” (...) literature. Legal theory and legal practice must remain distinct and work closely together if justice is to be found in real cases. Legal theorizing was shaped in religious ethical contexts, which contributed to confused field boundaries between law and ethics. The carrot and stick influence of rulers on theorists has distorted conventional economics and jurisprudence in particular directions over the course of centuries. An action-based approach is relatively immune to such sources of distortion in its methods and conclusions, but has tended historically to be marginalized from conventional institutions for this same reason. (shrink)

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of (...) principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable. (shrink)

Modern legal theory contains a wide range of approaches and topics: from economic analysis of law to feminist legal theory to traditional analytical legal philosophy to a range of theories about justice. This healthy variety of jurisprudential work has created a problem: students and theorists working in one tradition may have difficulty understanding the concepts and terminology of a different tradition. This book works to make terminology and ways of thinking accessible. This dictionary covers topics from (...) 'the autonomy of law' to the 'will theory of rights', from 'autopoiesis' to 'wealth maximization', and from 'John Austin' to 'Ludwig Wittgenstein'. The most important concepts and ideas are presented in a simple dictionary format. There are also many longer entries, where the initial definition gives an accessible explanation, but the entry goes on to give more detailed information about the history of an idea and the debates currently surrounding it. (shrink)

This book provides an accessible introduction to jurisprudence and legal theory. It sets out a course of study that offers a highly effective series of introductions into a wide variety of theories and theoretical perspectives, from traditional approaches such as Natural Law to modern ones such as Feminist Theory, Economic Analysis of Law and Foucault and Law, The book is designed for students of jurisprudence and legal theory, but it will also assist those studying law and (...) class='Hi'>legal systems within courses on Political Science, Philosophy and Sociology. (shrink)

The author attempted to present the development of legal theories through early & medieval philosophical history.

The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose (...) a systematic agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address. (shrink)

Written by leading experts in the area, this volume investigates the ways in which emerging masculinities theory in law could inform feminist legal theory in particular and law in general. As many of the chapters in this collection illustrate, law is constantly in a dynamic interaction with masculinities: it has both influenced existing masculinities and has been influenced by those masculinities. The contributions focus feminist and critical theoretical attention on masculinities and consider the implications of masculinities theory for law (...) and legal theory. (shrink)

The essay briefly review the intellectual bonds between Alchourrón and Bulygin and Italian legal thought. Alchourrón and Bulygin’s seminal work is widely read in Italy; and by now is considered essential groundwork by a growing generation of young legal scholars.

The Legal Theory Lexicon series usually explicates some concept in legal theory, jurisprudence, or philosophy of law. But what are those fields and how do they relate to each other? Is "jurisprudence" a synonym for "philosophy of law" or are these two overlapping but distinct fields? Is "legal theory" broader or narrower than jurisprudence? And why should we care about this terminology? As always, this entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon series is aimed at law students, (...) especially first-year law students with an interest in legal theory. (shrink)

This book grew out of the conviction that the original concepts of the Poznań School of Legal Theory are still perfectly suited for application today, in the era of moral pluralism and multicentric legal systems. Moreover, since we are in the midst of a period of heated disputes over the grounds of the normativity of law, and are confronting controversies about the basis for the legitimacy of court decisions, over the results of legal interpretation, and concerning the (...) coherence of legal systems, it would seem that the legal-theoretical proposals put forward by the circle of Poznań legal theorists, supported as they are by firm methodological foundations, have not by any means lost their value. (shrink)

This paper argues for the adoption of pluralist pragmatism about concepts of law. The first part of the paper introduces the argument by reference to the debate over conceptual prescriptivism in the contemporary literature on the methodology of legal theory. The second part of the paper offers a method for recognising pluralism in traditions of jurisprudential inquiry: it does so on the basis of the use of modes of objectification that can be said to underwrite the construction of concepts (...) of law. A number of examples of such modes are offered, with the focus thereafter being on two such modes: on the one hand, the explanatory paradigm of reason; and on the other hand, the explanatory paradigm of cause. A map of traditions of jurisprudential inquiry is sketched on the basis of these two modes. The third part of the paper goes on to show how combining the prescriptive resources that follow from the two traditions of jurisprudential inquiry classified in such a manner makes our response to certain practical context more robust. The four practical contexts are: the exercise of judicial behaviour; the structure of international law; legal education; and, legal scholarship. It is only by adopting the pluralist pragmatism espoused by the ethics of legal theory that we can avoid theoretical insularity (the belief that any one theoretical picture is capable of corresponding truthfully to the world) and theoretical imperialism (the belief that any one theoretical picture can be used as a foundation for a prescriptive agenda). (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Historical Background An Overview The Indeterminacy Thesis Critical Legal Theory and Social Theory The Critique of the Public/Private Distinction Policy “Implications” The Critique of Rights Critical Feminist Theory and Critical Race Theory The Legacy References.

Introduction -- Defamation Criteria: Fact or Value? -- The Elusive Distinction between Fact and Opinion -- Defamation and Freedom of Expression -- Conclusion -- 10 Conclusion: A Unifying Prescription -- Introduction -- Socialist Positivism -- Critical Legal Positivism -- Feminist Positivism -- Alternative Dispute Resolution -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

I argue that disputes within constitutional theory about whether recent supreme court decisions exceed the scope of legitimate judicial review and disputes within legal theory about the nature and determinacy of law are best seen and assessed as disputes over the nature of legal interpretation. I criticize the interpretive assumptions on which these disputes generally depend and defend a theory of interpretation which tends to vindicate the determinacy of law even in hard cases and the style of recent (...) court decisions which many critics find troublesome. (shrink)

There is a common understanding among logicians today that nonmonotonic types of reasoning, such as defeasible or presumptive, can clearly warrant a rational acceptance of its conclusion. Recognition of the significance and legitimacy of these forms of arguments, which were considered for long as fallacious, is believed to be very recent and many logicians tended to reject any discussions around it within the tradition of logic after Aristotle. In contrast, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), since medieval age, has recognised the validity and (...) importance of non-deductive forms of reasoning, analysed the structures of such arguments and demonstrated how the conventionally understood fallacies are not essentially fallacies. Qiyās – generally represents analogical reasoning – is taken here as a case of defeasible reasoning in Islamic argumentation. This paper will show through works of two emblematic medieval Muslim jurist-logicians, al-Juwainī and al-Ghazzālī, that understanding the legitimacy and the structure of non-deductive forms of arguments is at the core of Islamic legal theories (usūl al-fiqh), and that they recognised its legitimacy and proposed a dialectical method (jadal) of approaching it. Les logiciens comprennent généralement que les types de raisonnement non monotones peuvent justifier l’acceptation rationnelle des conclusions. L’importance et la légitimité de ces formes d’arguments, qui ont longtemps été considérées comme fallacieuses, ont été controversées parmi les logiciens de la tradition logique aristotélicienne. En revanche, la jurisprudence islamique (fiqh) a depuis longtemps reconnu l’importance des formes de raisonnement non déductives et a démontré que les sophismes conventionnellement compris ne sont pas essentiellement des sophismes. Le qiyās – qui représente généralement le raisonnement analogique – est un exemple de raisonnement réfutable dans l’argumentation islamique. Je montre à travers les travaux de deux juristes-logiciens musulmans médiévaux emblématiques, al-Juwainī et al-Ghazzālī, que la compréhension de la légitimité des formes d’arguments non déductives est au cœur des théories juridiques islamiques (usūl al-fiqh), qui ont proposé une méthode d’approche dialectique (jadal). (shrink)

The bumpy road to institutionalism : Schmitt's way-out of decisionism -- Exploring Schmitt's institutionalism : institutions and normality -- Institutionalist decisionism : law as the shelter of society -- Institution and identity : reassessing Schmitt's political theory -- Schmitt vs. Kelsen : the social ontology of legal life -- Schmitt vs. Hauriou : the politicization of institutionalism -- Schmitt vs. Romano : institutionalism without pluralism? -- Schmitt vs. Mortati : the concretization of the concrete order -- The impossibility of (...) legal indeterminacy -- The inconceivability of legal pluralism. (shrink)