There are times when a curiously odd relic of language presents us with a thread, which when pulled, reveals deep and general facts about human language. This paper unspools such a case. Prior to 1930, English speakers uniformly preferred male-before-female word order in conjoined nouns such asuncles and aunts; nephews and nieces; men and women. Since then, at least a half dozen items have systematically reversed their preferred order (e.g.,aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews) while others have not (men and (...) women). We review evidence that the unusual reversals began withmother and dad(dy)and spread to semantically and morphologically related binomials over a period of decades. The present work proposes that three aspects ofcognitive accessibilitycombine to quantify the probability of A&B order: (1) the relative accessibility of the A&B terms individually, (2) competition from B&A order, and critically, (3) cluster strength (i.e., similarity to related A'&B' cases). The emergent cluster of female-first binomials highlights the influence of semantic neighborhoods in memory retrieval. We suggest that cognitive accessibility can be used to predict the word order of both familiar and novel binomials generally, as well as the diachronic change focused on here. (shrink)

This volume addresses the intriguing issue of indirect reports from an interdisciplinary perspective. The contributors include philosophers, theoretical linguists, socio-pragmaticians, and cognitive scientists. The book is divided into four sections following the provenance of the authors. Combining the voices from leading and emerging authors in the field, it offers a detailed picture of indirect reports in the world’s languages and their significance for theoretical linguistics. Building on the previous book on indirect reports in this series, this volume adds an empirical (...) and cross-linguistic approach that covers an impressive range of languages, such as Cantonese, Japanese, Hebrew, Persian, Dutch, Spanish, Catalan, Armenian, Italian, English, Hungarian, German, Rumanian, and Basque. (shrink)

Within the Judeo-Christian tradition, Sodom and Gomorrah represent locales in which threats to national formation are couched in sexual terms. The biblical narrative insists on a particular social invisibility for those sexual activities not blessed by the bonds of matrimony. Reclaiming Sodom surveys a number of institutions that have had an interest in perpetuating these views: the police, the state, the church and the law. The collection ranges through biblical scholarship, an investigation of the Founding Fathers' beliefs, the legal mobilization (...) towards the category of sodomy in 18th and 19th century England, and the US Supreme Court's 1986 Bowers vs. Hardwick decision. Analysis is provided of the ways in which the Judeo-Christian tradition has shaped anthropological accounts of the same-sex practices of non-Western people, as well as essays on how colonial gestures have marked lesbian identity in the Carribean, and derformed narratives about the racial geography of AIDS. Reclaiming Sodom explores alternatives to the force of the Sodomitic biblical narrative in Islamic, non-western, and western traditions, and discusses the ways in which sodomy calls into question normative definitions of sexuality and gender. The collection pursues the "pleasures and dangers" of these alternatives, and takes on Proust's refusal to imagine a social movement founded on the "stigma" of Sodom. The collection examines the relations between sex/gender identities and sexual acts in important and provocative ways, and argues for the political use and usefulness of both Sodom and sodomy. Reclaiming Sodom makes an important and controversial contribution to the literature on sexuality and gender, as well as the nature of sex in our culture. Contributors: Dorothy Allison, Robert Alter, Neil Bartlett, Leo Bersani, Gerald Creed, Marc Daniel, Lee Edelman, Janet E. Halley, Jonathan Ned Katz, Pierre Klossowski, Rocky O'Donovan, Guy Hocquenghem, Cindy Patton, Marquis de Sade, David Shannon, Makeda Silver, Jonathan Goldberg. (shrink)

Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. (...) The Equivalence Schema–a well-known alethic principle–says that it is true that $p$ if and only if $p$ . We take epistemic coverage to underwrite a suitably qualified evidential analogue of the Equivalence Schema: for a high proportion of values of $p$ , subject $S$ has evidence that $p$ due to her reliance on source $S^{*}$ if and only if $p$ . We show how this evidential version of the Equivalence Schema suffices for the reliability of certain absence-based inferences. Section 4 is dedicated to exploring consequences of the Evidential Equivalence Schema. The slogan ‘absence of evidence is evidence of absence’ has received a lot of bad press. More elaborately, what has received a lot of bad press is something like the following idea: absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $p$ is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . A striking consequence of the Evidential Equivalence Schema is that absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in p is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . We establish this claim in Section 4 and show how this supports the reliability of an additional type of absence-based inference. Section 4 immediately raises the following question: how can we make philosophically good sense of the idea that absence of evidence is evidence of absence? We address this question in Section 5. Section 6 contains some summary remarks. (shrink)

Part I Philosophic Traditions Introduction to Part I 3 1 Philosophy and the Afro-American Experience 7 CORNEL WEST 2 African-American Existential Philosophy 33 LEWIS R. GORDON 3 African-American Philosophy: A Caribbean Perspective 48 PAGET HENRY 4 Modernisms in Black 67 FRANK M. KIRKLAND 5 The Crisis of the Black Intellectual 87 HORTENSE J. SPILLERS Part II The Moral and Political Legacy of Slavery Introduction to Part II 107 6 Kant and Knowledge of Disappearing Expression 110 RONALD A. T. JUDY 7 (...) Social Contract Theory, Slavery, and the Antebellum Courts 125 ANITA L. ALLEN AND THADDEUS POPE 8 The Morality of Reparations II 134 BERNARD R. BOXILL Part III Africa and Diaspora Thought Introduction to Part III 151 9 “Afrocentricity‘: Critical Considerations 155 LUCIUS T. OUTLAW, JR. 10 African Retentions 168 TOMMY L. LOTT 11 African Philosophy at the Turn of the Century 190 ALBERT G. MOSLEY Part IV Gender, Race, and Racism Introduction to Part IV 199 12 Some Group Matters: Intersectionality, Situated Standpoints, and Black Feminist Thought 205 PATRICIA HILL COLLINS 13 Radicalizing Feminisms from “The Movement Era‘ 230 JOY A. JAMES 14 Philosophy and Racial Paradigms 239 NAOMI ZACK 15 Racial Classification and Public Policy 255 DAVID THEO GOLDBERG 16 White Supremacy 269 CHARLES W. MILLS Part V Legal and Social Philosophy Introduction to Part V 285 17 Self-Respect, Fairness, and Living Morally 293 LAURENCE M. THOMAS 18 The Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson 306 MICHELE MOODY-ADAMS 19 Some Reflections on the Brown Decision and Its Aftermath 313 HOWARD McGARY 20 Contesting the Ambivalence and Hostility to Affirmative Action within the Black Community 324 LUKE C. HARRIS 21 Subsistence Welfare Benefits as Property Interests: Legal Theories and Moral Considerations 333 RUDOLPH V. VANTERPOOL 22 Racism and Health Care: A Medical Ethics Issue 349 ANNETTE DULA 23 Racialized Punishment and Prison Abolition 360 ANGELA Y. DAVIS Part VI Aesthetic and Cultural Values Introduction to Part VI 373 24 The Harlem Renaissance and Philosophy 381 LEONARD HARRIS 25 Critical Theory, Aesthetics, and Black Modernity 386 LORENZO C. SIMPSON 26 Black Cinema and Aesthetics 399 CLYDE R. TAYLOR 27 Thanatic Pornography, Interracial Rape, and the Ku Klux Klan 407 T. DENEAN SHARPLEY-WHITING 28 Lynching and Burning Rituals in African-American Literature 413 TRUDIER HARRIS-LOPEZ 29 Rap as Art and Philosophy 419 RICHARD SHUSTERMAN 30 Microphone Commandos: Rap Music and Political Ideology 429 BILL E. LAWSON 31 Sports, Political Philosophy, and the African American 436 GERALD EARLY. (shrink)

With rapidly spreading extractive practices on a global scale, the amount of residue generated raises the question of waste management and economic externalities. Are humans, and most crucially the Earth, equipped to welcome such an exponentially increasing quantity of restants? Artworks, as inexhaustible in their readings, are congenial to this idea of irreducible remains. In this paper, I argue Derrida’s treatment of remains might provide a waste-based approach to ecocriticism which, in turns, can be leveraged to articulate an insightful reading (...) of some artworks in times of extractive overconsumption and environmental destabilisation. Lee Bae’s Issu du feu (2000) and House of Moon (2014), Emerson Pontes’s Mil Quase Mortos: Boiúna, and Rochelle Goldberg’s Cannibal Actif (2018) are three contemporary artworks that directly challenge those externalities by explicitly engaging with remains ranging from charcoal, human-made waste and oil. Through a formal analysis of these artworks and a close reading of Derrida’s Feu la cendre, ‘Biodegradables Seven Diary Fragments,’ and the seminars Manger l’autre and Rhétorique du cannibalisme, it appears that eco-deconstruction is perhaps above all a matter of engaging with the structure of remains. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger are two of the most important--and two of the most difficult--philosophers of the twentieth century, indelibly influencing the course of continental and analytic philosophy, respectively. In _ Groundless Grounds_, Lee Braver argues that the views of both thinkers emerge from a fundamental attempt to create a philosophy that has dispensed with everything transcendent so that we may be satisfied with the human. Examining the central topics of their thought in detail, Braver finds that Wittgenstein and (...) Heidegger construct a philosophy based on _original_ _finitude_--finitude without the contrast of the infinite. In Braver's elegant analysis, these two difficult bodies of work offer mutual illumination rather than compounded obscurity. Moreover, bringing the most influential thinkers in continental and analytic philosophy into dialogue with each other may enable broader conversations between these two divergent branches of philosophy. Braver's meticulously researched and strongly argued account shows that both Wittgenstein and Heidegger strive to construct a new conception of reason, free of the illusions of the past and appropriate to the kind of beings that we are. Readers interested in either philosopher, or concerned more generally with the history of twentieth-century philosophy as well as questions of the nature of reason, will find _Groundless Grounds _of interest. (shrink)

There are a wide variety of potential applications of artificial intelligence (AI) in Defence settings, ranging from the use of autonomous drones to logistical support. However, limited research exists exploring how the public view these, especially in view of the value of public attitudes for influencing policy-making. An accurate understanding of the public’s perceptions is essential for crafting informed policy, developing responsible governance, and building responsive assurance relating to the development and use of AI in military settings. This study is (...) the first to explore public perceptions of and attitudes towards AI in Defence. A series of four focus groups were conducted with 20 members of the UK public, aged between 18 and 70, to explore their perceptions and attitudes towards AI use in general contexts and, more specifically, applications of AI in Defence settings. Thematic analysis revealed four themes and eleven sub-themes, spanning the role of humans in the system, the ethics of AI use in Defence, trust in AI versus trust in the organisation, and gathering information about AI in Defence. Participants demonstrated a variety of misconceptions about the applications of AI in Defence, with many assuming that a variety of different technologies involving AI are already being used. This highlighted a confluence between information from reputable sources combined with narratives from the mass media and conspiracy theories. The study demonstrates gaps in knowledge and misunderstandings that need to be addressed, and offers practical insights for keeping the public reliably, accurately, and adequately informed about the capabilities, limitations, benefits, and risks of AI in Defence. (shrink)

In this essay, Soyoung Lee explores the theme of mourning as a way of attending to a fundamental aspect of human experience that is bound to negativity. The essay helps readers to see that experience in a different light by drawing on what is shown to be an internal connection between mourning and having language. The dominant culture of contemporary education is preoccupied with management and control, and this renders hollow the understanding of the negative experience children go through. Such (...) experience, if it is acknowledged at all, is regarded as requiring intervention and perhaps correction. Yet negative experience, as Lee tries to show, is the very source of personal growth. This is to take human experience as wounded, and the wound as the very place for the creation of our own words. A hasty approach toward an individual's suffering, whether in the name of “healing” or “knowledge,” becomes a suppression of voice. In its denial of the otherness within the self, it neglects the possibilities of self-transformation. The essay pursues these ideas through a reading of contrasting works of art: some poetry by Paul Celan (in conjunction with Jacques Derrida's response to it) and Still Walking, a film directed by Hirokazu Kore-eda. Both artworks deal with their own wounds and words in ways that are instructive. (shrink)

A number of philosophers argue that the moral value of national identity is sufficient to justify at least a prima facie right of a national community to create its own independent, sovereign state. In the literature, this argument is commonly referred to as the identity argument. In this paper, I consider whether the identity argument successfully proves that a national group is entitled to a state of its own. To do so, I first explain three important steps in the argument (...) and then consider whether they lead to the desired conclusion. My examination reveals that the identity argument relies on the Optimal Protection Principle; however, this principle does not apply to the case of a national community. As a result, the identity argument fails to justify even a prima facie right of a national community to establish its own state. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS A REVALENT VIEW of St. Thomas Aquinas's position on the logic of propositions has been that according to him propositions of the :form, x is, hold a privileged place, that they are in a special sense " existential," and that such propositions straight.forwardly attribute the act of exi,stence to an individual or to a class of individuals.1 Some texts seem (...) to support such an interpretation. For example, in his commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias, Aquinas says: " To clarify this we must note that the verb 'is ' itself is sometimes predicated in an enunciation, as in ' Socrates is.' By this we intend to signify that Socrates really is." 2 This passage seems to treat the predicate " exists " or " is " as unproblematical, as though it had a straightforward meaning needing little clarification, at least in the context of a logical treatise. On the basis of such a text, one may be tempted to infer that for Aquinas " Socrates exists " has the same logical form as " Socrates sits," and that " Men exist " is of the same form as " Men are mortal.'' Peter Geach has shown, however, that Aquinas's doctrine here is not as simple as it may first appear. For Aquin,as some of the propositions which have the grammatical form of x is have 'a different logical form.3 Geach points out that for Aquinas the sentence, "Blindness exists," for example, actual1 E.g., Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 190-215. 2 Super Peri, Bk. II, lect. 2, # 212. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 37 at "FJ11J hoc..•." a Peter Geach, in P. T. Geach and G. E. M. Anscombe, Three Philosophers (New York: Cornell University, 1961), 88 ff; Peter Geach, "Form and Existence," in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. Kenny (New York: Notre Dame U., 1969), pp. 41-47. 605 606 PATRICK LEE ly means, Something or other is blind. That is, blind is the real predicate rather than exists. Mo11eover, Geach argues, the logical peculiarity of this sentence is equally found in any sentence of the form, "an F exists." Such a proposition, " does not,attribute actuality (existence) to an F, but F-ness to something or other..." 4 And yet Geach will not apply rthis interpretation to all sentences of the form, " x is." He al'lgues that sentences in which " is " or " exists " is. joined to a logically pl'oper name are in a different category. Unlike in general propositions such as "an F exists," in such singular propositions, those using logically proper names, Geach,argues, actual existence is attributed to or predicated of an individual. "We have here a sense of 'is ' or 'exists ' that seems to me to be certainly a genuine predicate of individuals: the sense of ' exists ' in which one says that an individual came to exist, still exists, no longer exists, etc...."5 I believe that, while Geach's position is more accurate than the first interpretation, mentioned above, it is nevertheless still inaccurate on certain key points. While it is misleading to say that for Aquinas exists is never a genuine predicate; nevertheless, I will argue that it is his position that exists or existence is not a genuine predicate in any proposition which does not refer back to a previous proposition (or to what is known in or by previous propositional knowledge). Let us crull a proposition which refers to something known in a previous proposition a " second-order p11oposition," and one that does not thus refer a " first-order proposition." Then, I shall argue that for Aquinas exists is not a genuine predicate in any first-order proposition. Moreover, I believe that these points are crucial to understanding Aquinas's position on existence as well as his position on how knowledge is related,to reality, i.e., his realism. In this article I would like to examine Aquinas's thought on the logic of existential propositions and discuss its significance for epistemology. 4 Geach, " Form and Existence," Zoo. int., p. 45. 5 Ibid., p. 46. EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN AQUINAS 607 In sections... (shrink)

Allen Buchanan proposes a methodological framework with which theorists may evaluate different theories of secession, including the National Self-Determination theory. An important claim he makes is, because the right to secede is inherently institutional, any adequate theory of secession must include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality. Because the National Self-Determination theory blatantly lacks such an analysis, Buchanan concludes that this theory is inherently flawed. In this paper, I consider Buchanan’s framework and the responses from supporters of (...) national self-determination theory. I try to clarify the confusion shared by both parties. I conclude that, although Buchanan’s theory of institutional morality is sound, his critiques of the national self-determination theory fails. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ANALOGIES OF BEING IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS RICHARD LEE New School for Social Research New York, New York IN HIS Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Aquinas offers three modes of analogy.1 The three modes offered there are referred to, though not by the names given them, throughout his works. It remains a curious fact, however, that Aquinas varies his opinion as to whether analogy of attribution (...) or analogy of proportionality (sometimes referred to as analogy of proper proportionality as attribution is referred to in the literature as analogy of proportion) is the proper mode of analogical predication. In fact, as we shall see, Aquinas himself imports elements of the analogy of attribution into the analogy of proportionality. What needs to be investigated, then, is what characterizes these two modes of analogy; what makes them both analogy; why do they differ. Before understanding the specific nature of each form of analogy, however, one should understand why Aquinas appealed to analogy in the first place. Finally, one should attempt to grasp what the implications of each form of analogy are for Aquinas's metaphysical system and why he seems to favor the analogy of attribution over that of proportionality at crucial points in his thought. Why analogy? In general, one can say that Aquinas uses the concept of analogy (and that of proportionality) to solve two problems. On the one hand, the concept of analogy is used to argue that God does, 1 In I sent., 19. 5. 2, ad 1. 471 472 RICHARD LEE in fact, have knowledge of his creatures. The issue here is that the intellect knows in proportion to the thing known. However, God is infinite and if he knows anything finite he would know that thing in proportion to the created, finite thing. Since there is no proportion between finite and infinite, God cannot have any knowledge of his creatures.2 The element of knowledge, however, is not merely a preface to the discussion of the types of analogy. Aquinas argues that we can name a thing insofar as it is known.3 Since we have no concept of God (in his essence), we cannot name God, at least in the same way we name other things. On the other hand, Aquinas uses analogy to fill a metaphysical gap in his system. For he agrees with Pseudo-Dionysius and Maimonides that we cannot know God in his essence. Therefore, any names that we apply to God are not names which tell us anything about God. Aquinas is well aware that the God of revelation is not a God about whom one ought to speak. To say anything at all about God is already to say too much; it is already doomed to failure because of God one should not speak. However, this situation leaves Aquinas in a peculiar position. For he takes seriously the Aristotelian dictum that a thing is known only when its principles are known.4 If God is the principle, something must be known of him if anything is to be known at all. There must be some way to speak of God. Aquinas sees in analogy a middle ground between these two positions. For what he seeks is a mode of predication that lies between univocity and equivocity. In other words, he seeks a mode of predication that predicates the same thing in a different way of two (or more) things. In univocal predication the same term is applied according to the same ratio.5 Thus, the community 2 This is the issue, for example, in De Veritate, q. 8, a. 1, ad 6; De Veritate, q. 2, a.3, ad 4. 3 Cf. Summa Theologiae I, 13, 1, c. 4 For example, cf. Physics I, 1. 5 One is tempted to render ratio as " definition." However, it is not clear that definition is enough. Clearly, in univocal predication the definition must be the same (e.g., predicating animal of man and ox). But is it enough that only the definition is the same? Is there not some metaphysical element lack- THE ANALOGIF'.$ OF BEING 473 that applies to univocal predication is one of identity. The concept of animal... (shrink)

Yi Hwang is Korean giant Bo of Neo-Confucianism, Zhu Xi as their study to cases. He was the author severely criticized Wang Yangming. Lee Hwang and odd peak on the "four-terminal impassioned" debate, both sides quoted Zhu's literature as an argument, and from that perspective loyal to Zhu. However, in essence is, Yi Hwang on Mencius' four-terminal, "said Zhu interpretation presupposes a set of different teachings of Confucianism system architecture, though Mencius in line with the text, but out of Zhu (...) Xi's basic position. This is one of the most crucial question is: "truth" can activities? In Zhu's of Science, the reason why is gas, there are not only activities. Based on the literature that: Yi Hwang in the interpretation of Zhu Xi's theory of qi, intentionally or unintentionally give reasons when an activity, while escaping the structure of Zhu Xi of Science. As a leading representative of Korean Confucianism, Yi T'oegye generally adhered to Zhu Xi's philosophical viewpoint, also writing several essays criticizing Wang Yang-ming's differences with Zhu Xi. In the debate between Yi T'oegye and his contemporary, Ki Kobong on the "Four Buddings" and the "Seven Emotions," both sides appealed to Zhu Xi's texts in the belief that they were being faithful to Zhu Xi's standpoint. But in fact, Yi's interpretation of "Four Buddings" presupposes a philosophical framework that differs from that of Zhu Xi. In this Yi deviates from Zhu Xi's standpoint, although he remains faithful to Mencius' texts. The key point of this debate lies in the question of whether "li" can be active. In Zhu Xi's philosophical framework, "li" as the ontological ground for "qi" has mere being but not activity. In this paper I demonstrate that in his interpretation of Zhu Xi's doctrine of "li" and "qi," Yi unconsciously ascribes a kind of activity to "li "and hence deviates from Zhu Xi's original philosophical position. (shrink)

During the Dark Ages, the progress of Western civilization virtually stopped. The knowledge gained by the scholars of the classical age was lost; for nearly 600 years, life was governed by superstitions and fears fueled by ignorance. In this outspoken and forthright book, Lee McIntyre argues that today we are in a new Dark Age--that we are as ignorant of the causes of human behavior as people centuries ago were of the causes of such natural phenomena as disease, famine, and (...) eclipses. We are no further along in our understanding of what causes war, crime, and poverty--and how to end them--than our ancestors. We need, McIntyre says, another scientific revolution; we need the courage to apply a more rigorous methodology to human behavior, to go where the empirical evidence leads us--even if it threatens our cherished religious or political beliefs about human autonomy, race, class, and gender.Resistance to knowledge has always arisen against scientific advance. Today's academics--economists, psychologists, philosophers, and others in the social sciences--stand in the way of a science of human behavior just as clerics attempted to block the Copernican revolution in the 1600s. A scientific approach to social science would test hypotheses against the evidence rather than find and use evidence only to affirm a particular theory, as is often the practice in today's social sciences. Drawing lessons from Galileo's conflict with the Catholic church and current debates over the teaching of "creation science," McIntyre argues that what we need most to establish a science of human behavior is the scientific attitude--the willingness to hear what the evidence tells us even if it clashes with religious or political pieties--and the resolve to apply our findings to the creation of a better society. (shrink)

The principle of national self-determination holds that a national community, simply by virtue of being a national community, has a prima facie right to create its own sovereign state. While many support this principle, not as many agree that it should be formally recognized by political institutions. One of the main concerns is that implementing this principle may lead to certain types of inequalities—between nations with and without their own states, members inside and outside the border, and members and nonmembers (...) inside the same nation state. While these inequalities may arise, I shall argue that they are not unjust. These worries are partly the results of confusing two types of interests that a national group may have—in cultural affairs and in political affairs. While a national community should enjoy rights over their cultural affairs, this does not grant them authority over other non-cultural, political affairs. Once the distinction is drawn, we can see that there are constraints on the implementation of this principle. Consequently, these inequalities justify setting limits to a group’s right of self-government, although they do not conclusively refute the right itself. (shrink)

Steven Lee critiques an essay by Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane on the preventive use of military force.

Recently, due to various geopolitical events, a movement for 'decolonisation' has taken shape. In essence, this movements seeks to right the wrongs of Western colonialism. This desire has been expressed in many diverse ways depending on the context. Within academia, it has found expression in the idea of 'decolonising the curriculum' - redesigning university courses to include more authors, texts, perspectives and more - from those outside of the Western world and/or cultural sphere. Due to its prominence within academia, philosophy (...) is one of the disciplines being scrutinised through the eyes of this current zeitgiest, and for good reason. Many philosophers have begun to take note and adapt accordingly, including those who specialise in non-Western philosophical traditions already. There are growing realisations, not only about the pressing need to learn about other traditions of philosophy, given the geopolitical rise of such Eastern nations as India and China, but also that non-Western philosophy has been unjustly 'othered' by Western academia. The issue of decolonisation is not going away and will only intensify with time. As such, this paper aims to make a contribution to these ongoing debates. It is a comparison of the Indian Buddhist philosopher, Śāntideva and the Greco-Roman Stoic tradition. The paper hopes to demonstrate conclusively that diverse traditions of world philosophy, despite geographical, conceptual and cultural distances, are able to converse fruitfully—and contain much more that unites them than differentiates them. It is also hoped that this paper will encourage non-specialists in non-Western traditions to become aware of the complexity, sophistication and philosophical worth of non-Western, in this case Asian, forms of thought. Lastly, it is desired, if nothing else, that this paper increases and contributes towards, inter-cultural dialogue and understanding. (shrink)

Although the positive outcomes achieved in home‐visiting interventions targeting young, disadvantaged mothers are partly credited to therapeutic relationships, researchers rarely offer philosophical or theoretical explanations for these relationships. This omission is a conspicuous oversight as nurse–family relationships have figured prominently in public health nursing practice since its inception. In this study, I suggest that the contribution of therapeutic relationships to positive outcomes will remain theoretically undeveloped as long as clinical trials and nursing practice models follow the logic of techne. After (...) describing how a scientific–clinical gaze misrepresents teen mothers and contributes to a rational–technical model of clinical practice, I draw on contemporary hermeneutics to describe how dialog and understanding are indispensable for clinical judgment and the judicious use of scientific knowledge. This hermeneutic corrective calls attention to the dialogical nature of truth and the relational skills that disclose meaning, preserve personhood, and support possibilities available in the life‐world. Dialogical understanding also disrupts the scientific–clinical gaze by disclosing the social disparities that are implicated in early childbearing and teen mothers’ long‐term prospects. The implications of this thought for legitimating and supporting the flexibility and clinical know‐how that ‘strays’ from protocol‐driven care is addressed. (shrink)

In _The Prisonhouse of Psychoanalysis_, Arnold Goldberg trains a searching, critical eye on his own profession. His subject matter is the system of interlocking constraints - theoretical, institutional, educational - that imprisons psychoanalysis and the psychoanalyst. His agenda is to sketch the shape analysis might take in the absence of these constraints. What emerges from these twin endeavors is a penetrating critique of psychoanalysis from the inside - from the vantage point of a senior analyst who has labored for (...) many years within the prisonhouse that he now criticizes. In proffering an alternative vision of psychoanalysis, Goldberg ventures into recent literature in epistemology, philosophy of science, cognitive psychology, and the neurosciences, so that one valuable byproduct of his work is a brilliant application of insights culled from these fields to the question of what analysis is, and what it may yet become. His examination of "psychoanalysis without foundations" challenges the ability of infancy research data and neurological findings, respectively, to provide an empirical rock bottom from which psychoanalytic theory-building can proceed. His chapter on "psychoanalysis without representations" reviews the analytic literature on the latter concept, only to show how recent theories of brain processing, including connectionism, provides a basis for understanding mental phenomena without any intermediary representations. Finally, his vision of "psychoanalysis without a subject" assesses recent findings about the nature of memory, insights of contemporary philosophy, and Kohut's notion of the selfobject as converging tributaries that make possible an analysis that dispenses with the conventional dichotomy of subject and object. (shrink)

Pencak Silat is a martial art, performance practice and system of body cultivation prevalent throughout much of Indonesia and the Malay-speaking world. This article compares different modalities of the practice and pedagogy of Sundanese Pencak Silat in West Java with more recent attempts to standardize practice at a national level under the auspices of the Indonesian Pencak Silat Association. Drawing on David Sudnow’s seminal account of learning how to play jazz piano, it is suggested that learning how to improvise is (...) a highly structured process that proceeds from the mastery of certain generic principles from which are generated potentially unbounded repertoires of habitual response. In the institutionalized instruction that is propagated by IPSI generative potential is subjugated to the desire to achieve homogeneity in practice. Aspects of Pencak Silat as it is taught nationally under the auspices of IPSI are examined in relation to the notion of spectacle. In conclusion, it is argued that the limits of the Nationalist project become self-evident as the dynamic potential of the body in Sundanese Pencak Silat is subsumed in an attempt to achieve fixity of the symbolic order. (shrink)

This essay calls for consideration of a “new” professional journalistic virtue: militant tolerance. The historic and philosophical foundations of tolerance is reviewed, and the concept of militant tolerance linked to Gandhi’s construction of “truth force” as a form of political action. Journalistic militant tolerance suggests that virtuous journalists will be those who recognize hate and systemic discrimination, particularly at the institutional level, and who work to counteract it in a professional role. This understanding of role emphasizes not just individual choice, (...) but the stance that journalistic institutions (media corporations, professional groups) take to counteract intolerance reified in both individual and institutional acts. Philosophically, it places justice on a more equal footing with truth as a central professional value. The concept is examined through two case studies, one involving political rhetoric and the second journalistic use of whistleblowers. (shrink)

In recent decades in Korea, many significant changes in political, social and cultural dimensions have been held by the citizen’s initiative, where the revitalization of citizenship and strong civic unity have played a role. Yet, in regard to the characteristic of Korean citizenship, it seems that the aspect of individual subject has not been fully matured or issued; that is, there is a dissymmetry between the strong civic unity and a weak individual subject. This paper attempts to explore a possible (...) historical account of why this has been the case by examining the historical development of the concept of enlightenment in modern Korea and Japan. ‘Enlightenment’, as a modern concept in Korea, was imported via Japan in the period from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century as in many other new concepts such as ‘democracy’ or ‘nation’. However, by comparison to the Western idea of the Enlightenment, its modern concept, Korean or Japanese, developed a different meaning in each own context, while lacking its original meaning essential to the creation of the ‘modern individual subject’ as a ‘citizen’. Hence, in modern Korea and Japan, the word ‘enlightenment’ is regarded as a historical concept with no contemporary relevance. (shrink)

Natalie Stoljar posits that purely procedural theories of autonomy are unable to explain the ‘feminist intuition’, which is the idea that the internalization of false and oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. She claims instead that an account based on ‘normative competence’ – which requires true beliefs and critical reflection – can explain why oppressive norms should be excluded as legitimate decision-making inputs. On my view, however, the normative competence approach is subject to a worrying problem. While Stoljar's view successfully (...) problematizes the internalization of oppression, her view misattributes non-autonomy also to those who perpetrate the oppression. I suggest that this is implausible, arguing instead that we can establish an asymmetry of autonomy between those who oppress others and those who are made target of oppression. (shrink)