AI-driven journalism refers to various methods and tools for gathering, verifying, producing, and distributing news information. Their potential is to extend human capabilities and create new forms of augmented journalism. Although scholars agreed on the necessity to embed journalistic values in these systems to make AI systems accountable, less attention was paid to data quality, while the results’ accuracy and efficiency depend on high-quality data in any machine learning task. Assessing data quality in the context of AI-driven journalism requires a (...) broader and interdisciplinary approach, relying on the challenges of data quality in machine learning and the ethical challenges of using machine learning in journalism. To better identify these, we propose a data quality assessment framework to support the collection and pre-processing stages in machine learning. It relies on three of the core principles of ethical journalism—accuracy, fairness, and transparency—and participates in the shift from model-centric to data-centric AI, by focusing on data quality to reduce reliance on large datasets with errors, making data labelling consistent, and better integrating journalistic knowledge. (shrink)

While the debate on values in science focuses on normative questions on the level of the individual (e.g. should researchers try to make their work as value free as possible?), comparatively little attention has been paid to the institutional and professional norms that researchers are expected to follow. To address this knowledge gap, we conduct a content analysis of leading national codes of conduct for research integrity of European countries, and structure our analysis around the question: do these documents allow (...) for researchers to be influenced by “non-epistemic” (moral, cultural, commercial, political, etc.) values or do they prohibit such influence in compliance with the value-free ideal (VFI) of science? Our results return a complex picture. On the one hand, codes of conduct consider many non-epistemic values to be a legitimate influence on the decision-making of researchers. On the other, most of these documents include what we call _VFI-like positions_: passages claiming that researchers should be free and independent from any external influence. This shows that while many research integrity documents do not fully endorse the VFI, they do not reject it and continue to be implicitly influenced by it. This results in internal tensions and underdetermined guidance on non-epistemic values that may limit some of the uses of research integrity codes, especially for purposes of ethical self-regulation. While codes of conduct cannot be expected to decide how researchers should act in every instance, we do suggest that they acknowledge the challenges of how to integrate non-epistemic values in research in a more explicit fashion. (shrink)

La planète est exténuée. L'humanité dans son ensemble traverse une mauvaise passe. A tel point que certains chercheurs professent l'effondrement, voire la fin de notre civilisation. Ces lanceurs d'alerte cosmique ne sont pas de simples illuminés. Ils comptent parmi eux des intellectuels de renom et des savants influents. Dans le même état d'esprit, des ingénieurs futuristes, anticipant une évolution qu'ils jugent inéluctable, programment le remplacement de notre espèce par des créatures hybrides d'un nouveau genre, humains augmentés ou améliorés. Demain, assurent-ils, (...) la "Singularité" assurera la relève du genre humain. L'ère du posthumanisme serait déjà entamée. Faut-il s'en féliciter? Laurence Hansen-Love expose ici les tenants et les aboutissants d'un débat qui nous concerne tous et dont les enjeux sont vertigineux. (shrink)

This volume reprints in a scholar's edition the first English-language texts on bioethics, John Gregory's (1724-1773) Observations on the Duties and Offices of a Physician and on the Method of Prosecuting Enquiries in Philosophy (London, 1770) and Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician (London, 1772). Five previously unpublished manuscripts of Gregory's lectures are also included. An introduction places Gregory's medical ethics and philosophy of medicine in their eighteenth-century contexts of Scottish Enlightenment history and culture, Baconian science and (...) philosophy of medicine, medical practice, the feminine and feminist philosophy of the Bluestocking Circle, and moral sense philosophy, particularly David Hume's concept of sympathy, and provides a bibliography of primary and secondary sources as an aid to teaching and future scholarship. The book's index provides access to Gregory's texts, by using both historical terms and current terminology of bioethics. A volume in the subseries Classics of Medical Ethics. (shrink)

John R. Searle’s 1995 publication The Construction of Social Reality is the foundation of this collection of scholarly papers examining Searle's philosophical theories. Searle’s book sets out to reconstruct the ontology of the social sciences through an analysis of linguistic practices in the context of his celebrated work on intentionality. His book provided a stimulating account of institutional facts such as money and marriage and how they are created and replicated in everyday social life. The authors in this collection provide (...) a critical appraisal of these and other ideas presented in Searle’s original publication. The editors' introduction clearly outlines the main issues in the debate and provides a useful introduction to Searle's contributions to social science. (shrink)

The influential political philosopher Leo Strauss has been credited by conservatives with the recovery of the great tradition of political philosophy stretching back to Plato. Among Strauss's most enduring legacies is a strongly negative assessment of Nietzsche as the modern philosopher most at odds with that tradition and most responsible for the sins of twentieth-century culture--relativism, godlessness, nihilism, and the breakdown of family values. In fact, this apparent denunciation has become so closely associated with Strauss that it is often seen (...) as the very core of his thought. In Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, the eminent Nietzsche scholar Laurence Lampert offers a controversial new assessment of the Strauss-Nietzsche connection. Lampert undertakes a searching examination of the key Straussian essay, "Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil." He shows that this essay, written toward the end of Strauss's life and placed at the center of his final work, reveals an affinity for and debt to Nietzsche greater than Strauss's followers allow. Lampert argues that the essay comprises the most important interpretation of Nietzsche ever published, one that clarifies Nietzsche's conception of nature and of human spiritual history and demonstrates the logical relationship between the essential themes in Nietzsche's thought--the will to power and the eternal return. (shrink)

For over four decades feminist linguists and philosophers of language have addressed the semantic, cognitive, and political factors associated with gender asymmetries in nominal and pronominal choice. The sociolinguistic spotlight has focused on the history, extent, and implications of the prescriptively sanctioned use of man and he for sex-neutral reference—he/man language in Martyna ’s term. Bare singular and simple indefinite man in exemplify this use, while the bare singulars in yield the male-specific meaning exhibited by the man or that man.

A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The ‘revenge’ problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here (...) revives the mediaeval cassatio approach, one that largely disappeared due to its incomprehending rejection by influential contemporary writers such as William Shyreswood and Thomas Bradwardine. The diagnosis readily extends to the set-theoretic paradoxes. (shrink)

The trajectory of Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought has long presented a difficulty for the study of his philosophy. How did the young Nietzsche—classicist and ardent advocate of Wagner’s cultural renewal—become the philosopher of Will to Power and the Eternal Return? With this book, Laurence Lampert answers that question. He does so through his trademark technique of close readings of key works in Nietzsche’s journey to philosophy: The Birth of Tragedy, Schopenhauer as Educator, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Human All Too Human, (...) and “Sanctus Januarius,” the final book of the 1882 Gay Science. Relying partly on how Nietzsche himself characterized his books in his many autobiographical guides to the trajectory of his thought, Lampert sets each in the context of Nietzsche’s writings as a whole, and looks at how they individually treat the question of what a philosopher is. Indispensable to his conclusions are the workbooks in which Nietzsche first recorded his advances, especially the 1881 workbook which shows him gradually gaining insights into the two foundations of his mature thinking. The result is the most complete picture we’ve had yet of the philosopher’s development, one that gives us a Promethean Nietzsche, gaining knowledge even as he was expanding his thought to create new worlds. (shrink)

Grice introduced generalized conversational implicatures with the following example: "Anyone who uses a sentence of the formX is meeting tz woman this evening would normally implicate that the person to be met was someone other than X’s wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend" (1975 : 37). Concerning this example, he suggested the following account: When someone, by using the form of expression an JQ implicates that the X does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected (...) with some identifiable person, the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific. (Grice 1975: 38.) Grice went on to sketch an explanation as to why such an implicature should arise, involving the different ways in which we behave towards things that are closely related to.. (shrink)

: In this paper, I investigate Leibniz's conception of final causation. I focus especially on the role that Leibnizian final causes play in intentional action, and I argue that for Leibniz, final causes are a species of efficient causation. It is the intentional nature of final causation that distinguishes it from mechanical efficient causation. I conclude by highlighting some of the implications of Leibniz's conception of final causation for his views on human freedom, and on the unconscious activity of substances.

Protecting confidentiality is an essential value in all human relationships, no less in medical practice and research.1 Doctor-patient and researcher-participant relationships are built on trust and on the understanding those patients' secrets will not be disclosed.2 However, this confidentiality can be breached in some situations where it is necessary to meet a strong conflicting duty.3Confidentiality, in a general sense, has received much interest in Islamic resources including the Qur'an, Sunnah and juristic writings. However, medical and research confidentiality have not been (...) explored deeply. There are few fatwas about the issue, despite an increased effort by both individuals and Islamic medical organizations to use these institutional fatwas in their research.Infringements on confidentiality make up a significant portion of institutional fatwas, yet they have never been thoroughly investigated. Moreover, the efforts of organizations and authors in this regard still require further exploration, especially on the issue of research confidentiality.In this article, we explore medical and research confidentiality and potential conflicts with this practice as a result of fatwas released by international, regional, and national Islamic Sunni juristic councils. We discuss how these fatwas affect research and publication by Muslim doctors, researchers, and Islamic medical organizations.We argue that more specialized fatwas are needed to clarify Islamic juristic views about medical and research confidentiality, especially the circumstances in which infringements on this confidentiality are justified. (shrink)

À la fois omniprésent et incernable, le temps est une dimension omniprésente de nos existences, indissociable de notre rapport au cosmos, à la vie biologique, à la conscience mais aussi à l’histoire, à la culture et à la société. Parce qu’elle est au confluent de plusieurs champs d’expérience et de réflexion, la question du temps offre une passerelle privilégiée pour croiser des approches rarement invitées à se rencontrer : celles des sciences d’un côté (physique, biologie, médecine, cosmologie), celles des arts (...) de l’autre (littérature, cinéma, arts plastiques, musique, théâtre). Au-delà des questions qui touchent à la réorganisation des partages cognitifs et disciplinaires (entre sciences et arts), l’objectif de cet ouvrage est de montrer la fécondité des transferts épistémologiques entre ces deux domaines. D’un côté, les sciences constituent un réservoir inépuisable pour les arts, auxquels elles proposent une multiplicité de modèles du temps opérant à différentes échelles : temporalités non linéaires, réversibles, cycliques ou emboîtées, qui peuvent être dynamisées par des bifurcations, des catastrophes ou des phénomènes d’émergence imprévisibles. De l’autre, les arts sont un lieu privilégié de modélisation, d’exposition et de mise à l’épreuve de modèles temporels, qui tantôt croisent la rationalité dominante (sciences, historiographie), tantôt en réactivent des dimensions occultées (mythe, rite, etc.). Frayant à la fois dans l’imaginaire et le rationnel, ces représentations du temps permettent d’exhiber la complexité d’un phénomène qui ne peut être appréhendé que dans l’entre-deux des savoirs et des arts. (shrink)

Cet article examine les choix de traduction, exposés dans deux préfaces se répondant, de deux traducteurs vers le latin de l’Ethique à Nicomaque, Joachim Périon, dont la traduction paraît en 1540, et Denis Lambin, dont le texte paraît en 1572. L’un et l’autre de ces traducteurs, à travers leur polémique, semblent en fait continuer les thèses d’un autre traducteur d’Aristote, théoricien du style de la traduction, Leonardo Bruni, dont le De interpretatione recta date de 1424-1426. Si Périon pense que le (...) seul style possible pour traduire Aristote en latin est celui des ouvrages philosophiques de Cicéron, qui a créé le seul latin philosophique, Lambin, après avoir remis en cause le principe même d’une traduction du grec vers le latin, finit par en accepter la validité, le latin restant la langue la plus riche stylistiquement, et la plus à même de rendre la richesse du grec. (shrink)

The essays in this volume explore in detail many of the ways power structures our daily personal, political and intellectual lives, and evaluate the workings of power using a variety of theoretical paradigms, from Hobbesian liberalism to Foucauldian feminist postmodernism. Taken as a whole, the book aims towards an end to unjust and destructive uses of power and the flowering of an encouraging, educated empowerment for all human beings in a pluralistic world. Section I offers a progressive chain of arguments (...) that moves from the acceptance of domination, through the rejection of domination and, finally, to a new vision of power based on equality and mutual respect. Section II explores the questions, how is the philosophical self, that is, our very understanding of who we are, implicated in the web of power and domination? Section III responds to political realism as it explores morally ideal solutions to the global problems of poverty, war and hunger. Section IV discusses ways in which our thought and practice in both public and private life are bound up in hierarchies of domination. (shrink)

This dissertation advances a solution to a problem intrinsic to understanding the dialogues of Plato. How are we to understand Plato's thought when he never speaks in his own name in any of his dialogues? Many writers assume that Plato's characters speak for him. With this assumption, they study the thought articulated by Plato's characters as if it were his own, and elaborate a so-called "doctrinal" interpretation. A variety of subjective readings follows, since what Socrates and other characters say in (...) the dialogues is often inconsistent or contradictory. To resolve these problems the dissertation constructs a method for interpreting Socratic dialogue which is true to the genre. Extending the work of Bakhtin, Clay, and Kahn, it develops a metalanguage for specifying the structure, plot, aim , and effect of a dialogue as well as the thought , character , and pathos of its participants, by applying concepts in Plato's dialogues and in Aristotle's Poetics, Ethics, Politics, Metaphysics, Physics, and other works. The dissertation shows that the Republic represents Glaucon as subject to erotic desire and desires for luxury and honor, and that the aim of Socrates' discourse is to induce a catharsis in Glaucon in order to change these states of character. ;To support this interpretation, the dissertation shows: Aristotle does not apply a doctrinal reading to Plato's dialogues; he does not attribute the remarks of the character Socrates to Plato. Irwin's claims in "Plato's Ethics" are not supported by the texts of Aristotle which he cites. Aristotle's treatment of the Republic in Politics II is consistent with a mimetic interpretation of the dialogue. His treatment of the Republic is peirastic: he refutes Socrates' proposals with premisses and arguments that Socrates himself expresses in the dialogue. The dissertation discusses Aristotle's treatment of Socrates' proposals for unity in the city of the guardians, the sharing of women and children, gender, sacrilegious acts and incest, property, and the minimum necessary elements for a city. Aristotle's concept of catharsis can be derived from Sophist 230 and Republic X. (shrink)

This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how innateness is related to such things as heritability, (...) genetic information, and theories of cognitive development; the status of arguments both for and against nativism; and how best to understand the role of genes in development and inheritance. These issues are all explored in one way or another in this book. But the book also looks to the future. Alongside state-of-the-art discussions of such established nativist concerns as language, number, spatial cognition, and social cognition, this book examines nativist work in a variety of areas where detailed nativist exploration is relatively new, including cultural learning, creativity, economic choice, culture, and morality. The expansion of nativist theorizing into all these new areas shows both the power and the promise of nativist approaches, and points the way to the future. (shrink)

Face à sa finitude, l'homme est désemparé. Il aborde l'existence par la question du " pourquoi ". " Pourquoi m'a-t-on donné la vie si c'est pour la reprendre? " Il est envahi par la colère, la révolte... puis, il cherche un sens à sa mort et pose un au-delà salvateur, un lieu où tout peut continuer autrement... ou encore il envisage une réincarnation; bref, quelque chose qui n'est plus " la fin de la fin ". Mais quand l'homme se fait (...) philosophe, comment appréhende-t-il cette idée qui sera aussi sa réalité ultime? (shrink)

This essay provide an overview of debates about the method of political philosophy that have recently gripped the field, focusing on the relationship of theory to practice. These debates can be usefully organized using two oppositions that together carve the field into three broad families of views. Call “practicalism” the view that the theory of justice exists to guide political action. Call “utopianism” the view that reflection on the idea of a just society plays an important role in the theory (...) of justice. Call the view that combines the two positions, “utopian practicalism”. On this view, reflection on the nature of a just society has an important role to play in guiding action. There would appear to be two ways to depart from this position: by rejecting the view's utopianism or its practicalism. So we find in the literature three broad camps: utopian practicalists, anti‐utopians, and anti‐practicalists. This essay provide an opinionated overview the ongoing debates between these three broad positions. It touches on the recent cases against practicalism by G.A. Cohen and David Estlund, the comparativist methodologies advocated by anti‐utopians such as Amartya Sen and Gerry Gaus, and systems failure approaches of Elizabeth Anderson and David Wiens. It also considers the recent development of novel utopian practicalist perspectives in the work of theorists including Erik Wright, Tommie Shelby, Lea Ypi, Pablo Gilabert, and Ben Laurence. (shrink)

Née des craintes, voire des frayeurs, générées par le développement de la science, la bioéthique a conduit les chercheurs, spécialisés dans l'étude du vivant, à s'interroger sur les dangers que leur discipline peut engendrer : le progrès scientifique est-il toujours souhaitable? Ne risque-t-il pas de mener à des innovations et à des avancées, intellectuellement stimulantes certes, mais éthiquement inacceptables? Tel est le sujet de cet ouvrage collectif.

À partir des résultats d’une recherche qualitative et participative ayant impliqué des personnes qui vivent avec un problème de santé mentale, des intervenants et des gestionnaires de milieux de pratique en santé mentale et visant à explorer les représentations d’une intégration sociale jugée réussie, cet article propose une analyse et une réflexion sur les conditions de possibilité d’une société suffisamment bonne et inclusive pour les personnes vivant avec un problème de santé mentale. L’élargissement du prisme de la reconnaissance sociale s’est (...) dégagé comme une condition essentielle à cet égard qui, elle-même, implique certaines conditions, avec en particulier un travail de reconnaissance de la différence en tant que telle et la mise à distance d’une logique d’utilité. (shrink)

outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.

Deontic reasoning is reasoning about permission and obligation: what one may do and what one must do, respectively. Conceivably, people could reason about deontic matters using a purely formal deontic calculus. I review evidence from a range of psychological experiments suggesting that this is not the case. Instead, I argue that deontic reasoning is supported by a collection of dissociable cognitive adaptations for solving adaptive problems that likely would have confronted ancestral humans.

Dans Cartésianisme et augustinisme au XVIIe siècle, Gouhier ne range pas Fénelon aux côtés des cartésiens « inconditionnels » et ne le considère pas comme l'auteur d'un système philosophique mais lui accorde un simple éclectisme de concepts et de notions. Ce sont ces deux assertions que nous souhaiterions examiner en montrant que Fénelon est non seulement un interprète pertinent et orthodoxe de la métaphysique des Méditations mais que, dans son entreprise herméneutique, il offre l'exemple d'une philosophie originale et achevée, accomplissant (...) ce que Descartes a laissé inachevé, à savoir un traité des attributs divins. Continuateur du projet cartésien de développer une « science parfaite » des perfections divines (AT IX, 56), Fénelon propose une apologétique cartésienne correspondant à cette « philosophie chrétienne » que Descartes lui-même entendait élaborer et à laquelle il conférait utilité et certitude (Épître aux Méditations, AT IX, 6) In Cartésianisme et augustinisme au XVIIe siècle, Gouhier does not rate Fénelon among « unconditional Cartesians » neither does he judge him as the author of a philosophical sys-tem but he does grant him mère conceptual eclecticism. We would like to challenge those two assertions in showing that Fénelon is not only a relevant and orthodox interpréter ofthe meta-physics of the Méditations but also that, in his undertaking hermeneutics, he offers example of an original and accomplished philosophy, achieving what Descartes had left uncompleted, i.e. a treatise of divine attributes. Successor of Descartes' project of a « perfect science » of divine perfections (AT IX, 56), Fénelon suggests a Cartesian apologia, which squares with this « Christian philosophy », that Descartes himself wanted to found as useful and certain (Épître, AT IX, 6). (shrink)

The paper begins by tracing the development of the understanding of truth as adjunct to the self in postmodernity. It then proceeds to ask what history is in postmodernity in the light of the reconfiguration of truth, and what kinds of response Christianity, and especially Catholic Christianity might develop to the postmodern situation. Using a critique of Habermas’ speech “Modernity – an incomplete project” it develops a notion of postmodernity as an extreme interpretation of modernity, solely through reference to the (...) self. By analysing the concept of the universal horizon in Habermas and in Hegel it shows how postmodernity both produces and deflects the notion of modernity, so that prior to the postmodern, neither modernity nor postmodernity can really be said to be thought at all.The paper suggests that postmodernity is not really ‘thought’ at all, but rather thinks for us, so that we take it for granted. It then takes a sketch of Nietzsche’s critique of the death of God as a springboard to ask what arenas a thoughtless theological response might be tempted into – especially that of conceiving the world purely and baldly as “sacramental” in structure. Finally it concludes by asking what possibilities postmodernity opens up through a thoughtful discernment of how it constitutes us at all. (shrink)

The R-Being is, by definition, that entity which possesses all qualities which, expressed in English adjectives, begin with the letter R. It is of course unknown, at the commencement of our inquiry, whether any such entity exists, but it is nevertheless possible to determine the characteristics which such a being, whether existent or not, must possess.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Laying Medicine Open: Understanding Major Turning Points in the History of Medical EthicsLaurence B. McCullough (bio)AbstractAt different times during its history medicine has been laid open to accountability for its scientific and moral quality. This phenomenon of laying medicine open has sometimes resulted in major turning points in the history medical ethics. In this paper, I examine two examples of when the laying open of medicine has generated such (...) turning points: eighteenth-century British medicine and late twentieth-century American medicine. In the eighteenth century, the Scottish physician-philosopher, John Gregory (1724–1773), concerned with the unscientific, entrepreneurial, self-interested nature of then current medical practice, laid medicine open to accountability using the tools of ethics and philosophy of medicine. In the process, Gregory wrote the first professional ethics of medicine in the English-language literature, based on the physician’s fiduciary responsibility to the patient. In the late twentieth century, the managed practice of medicine has laid medicine open to accountability for its scientific quality and economic cost. This current laying open of medicine creates the challenge of developing medical ethics and bioethics for population-based medical science and practice.Reading the Histories of Medicine, Bioethics, and Medical EthicsThere are many ways in which to read the history of medi-cine and therefore of medical ethics and bioethics. For example, the history of medicine can be usefully understood in terms of successive advances or revolutions in biomedical science and its clinical applications, with medical ethics understood as a moral response to scientific and technological change. On this reading, which has been common in the history of bioethics for the past three decades, moral response is required to address scientific and technological changes that are unprecedented and therefore threaten to outstrip society’s moral capacities [End Page 7] to understand and manage those changes well. Much recent work on the ethical, legal, and social issues raised by the genome project appeals to this reading. The history of medicine can also be read in social terms, with medicine understood as a major social institution shaped by various factors, not limited to science. In this perspective, medicine and society are understood in terms of a complex and dynamic synergy. Bioethics and medical ethics become part of this synergy and are to be explained—perhaps even explained away—by social historical factors. There are, of course, other ways to read the history of medicine and therefore of bio-ethics and medical ethics—e.g., in terms of key figures and movements that are thought to have shaped developments in crucial ways.I want to suggest another way to read these histories, namely, the successive laying open of medicine to accountability that sometimes results in key turning points in the development of medical ethics and bioethics. On this reading, ethics is understood as an intellectual and practical discipline that makes medicine as a social institution and its practitioners, physicians, morally accountable for their clinical judgment, decision making, and behavior. This differs from Robert Veatch’s (1981) reading of the history of medical ethics either as particular—informed by intellectual, moral, and experiential resources thought to be available only to physicians—or universal—informed by intellectual, moral, and experiential resources generally available in the culture (present and past). Veatch sees medical ethics as open when it is universal and closed, and unacceptable, when it is particular. I read the history of medical ethics as always universal and medicine as a social institution and practice as sometimes closed—i.e, not accountable for its scientific and moral integrity—and sometimes as open, accountable for such integrity. When medicine is “laid open,” medical ethics itself is sometimes transformed. The same may well be the case for the other health care professions. The histories of medical ethics and bioethics, therefore, can be usefully read as responses to the laying open of medicine and the health care professions generally at various times in their histories. In what follows, I examine two important examples of laying medicine open that create key turning points in the history of medical ethics—Scottish medicine from the eighteenth century and American medicine from the end of the twentieth century.The... (shrink)

The papers in this number of the Journal originated in a session sponsored by the American Philosophical Association's Committee on Philosophy and Medicine in 1999. The four papers and two commentaries identify and address philosophical challenges of how we should understand and teach bioethics in the liberal arts and health professions settings. In the course of introducing the six papers, this article explores themes these papers raise, especially the relationship among professional medical ethics, the "long history" of medical ethics, and (...) bioethics. The tendency of bioethics to deprofessionalize medical ethics is rejected, in favor of an historically informed professional medical ethics. It is suggested that bioethics should be critically reconsidered from the perspective of medical ethics as professional ethics. (shrink)

"Pain" need not be a rigid designator, but instead may pick out a state by its causal role. If it is a rigid designator, then the apparent contingency of identity comes from imagining something else filling the causal role.