Larry Moss and Rohit Parikh used subset semantics to characterize a family of logics for reasoning about knowledge. An important feature of their framework is that subsets always decrease based on the assumption that knowledge always increases. We drop this assumption and modify the semantics to account for logics of knowledge that handle arbitrary changes, that is, changes that do not necessarily result in knowledge increase, such as the update of our knowledge due to an action. We present (...) a system which is complete for subset spaces and prove its decidability. (shrink)

We study the topological models of a logic of knowledge for topological reasoning, introduced by Larry Moss and Rohit Parikh (1992). Among our results is the confirmation of a conjecture by Moss and Parikh, as well as the finite satisfiability property and decidability for the theory of topological models.

Traditional philosophical discussions of knowledge have focused on the epistemic status of full beliefs. In this book, Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. For instance, your .4 credence that it is raining outside can constitute knowledge, in just the same way that your full beliefs can. In addition, you can know that it might be raining, and that if it is raining then it is probably cloudy, where this knowledge is not knowledge of (...) propositions, but of probabilistic contents. -/- The notion of probabilistic content introduced in this book plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language as well. Just as tradition holds that you believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents. Accepting that we can believe, assert, and know probabilistic contents has significant consequences for many philosophical debates, including debates about the relationship between full belief and credence, the semantics of epistemic modals and conditionals, the contents of perceptual experience, peer disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, perceptual dogmatism, and transformative experience. In addition, accepting probabilistic knowledge can help us discredit negative evaluations of female speech, explain why merely statistical evidence is insufficient for legal proof, and identify epistemic norms violated by acts of racial profiling. Hence the central theses of this book not only help us better understand the nature of our own mental states, but also help us better understand the nature of our responsibilities to each other. (shrink)

This article reconsiders Hannah Arendt’s account of “totalitarianism” in light of the climate catastrophe and the apparent inability of our political-economic system to respond to it adequately. In the last two chapters of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt focuses on the “ideology” of totalitarian regimes: a pathological denial of reality, a privileging of the ideological system over empirical evidence, and a simultaneous feeling of total impotence and total omnipotence—an analysis that maps remarkably well onto the climate zeitgeist. Thus, while Arendt (...) used the concept of “totalitarianism” to foreclose alternatives to liberal capitalist democracy, the climate impasse suggests that the totalitarian label more properly belongs to the prevailing system itself. (shrink)

In this essay, I attempt to measure various prevailing democratic theories against an argument that Carl Schmitt advances in the first chapter of his ‘Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy’. In practice, he claims there, democratic politics is compelled to introduce a distinction between ‘the will of the people’ and the behaviour of the empirical people, thus justifying the bracketing and unlimited suspension of the latter in the name of the former, even to the point of dictatorship. I argue that no contemporary (...) approach to democracy as a fundamental value is able to mount a compelling response to this critique and that we should therefore reconsider the status of democracy as a normative commitment. I proceed by carefully and closely reading Schmitt’s chapter and then by juxtaposing various currents of democratic theory (including liberal, deliberative, epistemic and various hybrids thereof) with the trajectory of Schmitt’s argument. This essay is therefore less of a contribution to Schmitt scholarship, in the sense that it does not take a panoramic view of his corpus to determine his final stance on democracy, and more of an intervention into contemporary democratic theory using Schmitt’s argument as a kind of lever. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical discourse has deeply problematized the possibility of absolute existence. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics demonstrates that by reading Hegel’s Doctrine of the Concept in his Science of Logic as a form of Absolute Dialetheism, Hegel’s logic of the concept can account for the possibility of absolute existence. Through a close examination of Hegel’s concept of self-referential universality in his Science of Logic, Moss demonstrates how Hegel’s concept of singularity is designed to solve a host of metaphysical and epistemic (...) paradoxes central to this problematic. He illustrates how Hegel’s revolutionary account of universality, particularity, and singularity offers solutions to six problems that have plagued the history of Western philosophy: the problem of nihilism, the problem of instantiation, the problem of the missing difference, the problem of absolute empiricism, the problem of onto-theology, and the third man regress. Moss shows that Hegel’s affirmation and development of a revised ontological argument for God’s existence is designed to establish the necessity of absolute existence. By adopting a metaphysical reading of Richard Dien Winfield’s foundation free epistemology, Moss critically engages dominant readings and contemporary debates in Hegel scholarship. Hegel’s Foundation Free Metaphysics will appeal to scholars interested in Hegel, German Idealism, 19th- and 20th-century European philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and contemporary European thought. (shrink)

(1992). Cognitive Style, Gender, Attitude toward Computer‐assisted Learning and Academic Achievement. Educational Studies: Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 151-160.

Inequalities have historically been conceptualised and empirically explored with primary reference to the human. Both measurements of educational inequalities through the production of data about students, teachers and schools, and ethnographic explorations of inequalities in the spoken accounts of human actors in schools can elide affective histories and material geologies of the earth that entwine with societal inequalities, and political questions of the relation between particular human bodies and the earth. In this article, we question: What might it do to (...) rethink the concept of educational inequalities beyond human relations, from within a specific geographical territory? We seek to rethink inequalities including but exceeding these human relations; we argue that inequalities between humans, and between humans and the more-than-human, are materially generated and perpetuated. We offer three theoretical trajectories that consider the affective, spatial and material dimensions of inequality to... (shrink)

This article responds to four critics of Democracy in Spite of the Demos and reiterates its central thesis. Christopher Holman and Théophile Pénigaud attempt to maintain the critical value of democracy by invoking different elements of the deliberative tradition, while Benjamin Schupmann answers my charges by appealing to a strong liberal constitutionalism. I argue that these attempts repeat the ambivalence described and criticized in the book: democracy is taken as an end in itself, but with asterisks that introduce conditions and (...) qualifications. As long as democracy is only desirable given certain caveats, the critical weight is placed on these caveats and not on the figure of democracy. Andrew Norris takes a different approach, interrogating the book’s use of ideology critique and the concept of “socially necessary delusion.” This intervention presents difficulties to the concluding suggestion of the book, but I maintain that that these difficulties can be productive and generative rather than limiting or prohibitive. (shrink)

The temptation to look for the “purely normative essence” of argument stems from the understandable ambition to distinguish rational persuasion from mere persuasion. But in seeking a purely normative notion of argument it is easy to overlook—or actually deny—that rational persuasion is a kind of persuasion. The burden of this essay is to show that the concept of reason from which our interest in argument derives can only exist and have normative force as a kind of persuasion, that is, as (...) something causal. (shrink)

Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning, Second Edition, provides a nontechnical vocabulary and analytic apparatus that guide students in identifying and articulating the central patterns found in reasoning and in expository writing more generally. Understanding these patterns of reasoning helps students to better analyze, evaluate, and construct arguments and to more easily comprehend the full range of everyday arguments found in ordinary journalism. Critical Thinking, Second Edition, distinguishes itself from other texts in the field by emphasizing analytical (...) reading as an essential skill. It also provides detailed coverage of argument analysis, diagnostic arguments, diagnostic patterns, and fallacies. Opening with two chapters on analytical reading that help students recognize what makes reasoning explicitly different from other expository activities, the text then presents an interrogative model of argument to guide them in the analysis and evaluation of reasoning. This model allows a detailed articulation of "inference to the best explanation" and gives students a view of the pervasiveness of this form of reasoning. The author demonstrates how many common argument types--from correlations to sampling--can be analyzed using this articulated form. He then extends the model to deal with several predictive and normative arguments and to display the value of the fallacy vocabulary. Ideal for introductory courses in critical thinking, critical reasoning, informal logic, and inductive reasoning, Critical Thinking, Second Edition, features hundreds of exercises throughout and includes worked-out solutions and additional exercises at the end of each chapter. An Instructor's Manual--offering solutions to the text's unanswered exercises and featuring other pedagogical aids--is available on the book's Companion Website at www.oup.com/us/wright. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a higher-order interpretation of Leibniz's theory of consciousness according to which memory is constitutive of consciousness. I offer an account of Leibniz's theory of memory on which his theory of consciousness may be based, and I then show that Leibniz could have developed a coherent higher-order account. However, it is not clear whether Leibniz held (or should have held) such an account of consciousness; I sketch an alternative that has at least as many advantages as (...) the higher-order theory. This analysis provides an important antecedent to the contemporary discussions of higher-order theories of consciousness. (shrink)

Much has been written about the importance of narrative in teaching ethics and humanities to medical students and residents, as well as the value of narratives in clinical care. Relatively little has been said about the essential role of narrative in bioethics consultations. For most consults, the interpretation of narratives is the central moral feature, and the ethics consultant is inevitably one of the narrators. In a recent consult in which I participated, at least three narratives were in play. The (...) medical record itself was a narrative, or really, a variety of narratives. A second distinct narrative was the story of why this case had come to be categorized as an ethical concern for the medical team. A third narrative was the tentative sketch running through my mind as a consultant‐partly factual, partly anticipatory and conjectural, inevitably personal‐about what was going on here. (shrink)

Zombies recently conjured by Searle and others threaten civilized philosophy of mind and scientific psychology as we know it. Humanoid beings that behave like us and may share our functional organizations and even, perhaps, our neurophysiological makeups without qualetative conscious experiences, zombies seem to meet every materialist condition for thought on offer and yet -- the wonted intuitions go -- are still disqualefied from being thinking things. I have a plan. Other zombies -- good zombies -- can battle their evil (...) cousins to a standoff. Perhaps even defeat them. Familiar zombies and supersmart zombies resist disqualefication, making the world safe, again, for materialism. Behavioristic materialism. Alas for functionalism, good zombies still eat programs. Alas for identity theory, all zombies -- every B movie fan knows -- eat brains. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Cutting Edge Automated Reasoning, Principles and Elements Significant Successes Myths, Mechanization, and Mystique.

Despite revisions to curriculum in ethics education in business schools, there continues to be high profile examples of unethical decision making regularly spotlighted in the media. Rather than simply teaching about behaviors and how they might impact decision makers and stakeholders, we describe a suite of activities used to highlight various behaviors and biases that impact the decisions individuals might make. These activities are intertwined with course materials regarding ethics and corporate governance to remind and help students better understand how (...) decision making can be influenced and challenged by personal ethics. We provide lesson planning suggestions including adapting to remote delivery, and student handouts. This suite of activities can be incorporated into any undergraduate or graduate level course that has content dealing with ethical decision making. (shrink)

In this commentary on Evan Selinger’s book Postphenomenology: A Critical Companion to Ihde, I begin with Carl Mitcham’s claim that with respect to Don Ihde’s “postphenomenology” there are “challenges both to and from pragmatism.” I discuss four points on which postphenomenology and pragmatism seem to be in agreement, and then two points on which I believe pragmatism offers a program that socially thicker.

This paper considers the radical democratic theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau with reference to the recent rise of Right-wing populism. I argue that even as Mouffe and Laclau develop a critical political ontology that regards democracy as an end in itself, they simultaneously exclude certain elements of the demos. In other words, they appeal to formal categories but decide the political content in advance, disqualifying Right-wing movements and discourses without justification. This ambivalence between form and content reveals the (...) limits of Mouffe and Laclau’s brand of radical democracy for understanding and critiquing the present political conjuncture. (shrink)

This book is a systematic reappraisal of Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. The main argument of this book is easy to state: Leibniz offers a fully natural theory of mind. In today’s philosophical climate, in which much effort has been put into discovering a naturalized theory of mind, Leibniz’s efforts to reach a similar goal 300 years earlier will provide a critical stance from which we can assess our own theories. But while the goals might be similar, the content of Leibniz’s (...) theory significantly diverges from the majority of today’s theories. Leibniz’s philosophy of mind meets the standards of what he would regard as a fully natural theory. Perhaps surprisingly, Leibniz’s theological commitments yield a thoroughgoing naturalizing methodology: the properties of an object are explicable in term of the object’s nature. This book argues that Leibniz pursued his philosophy of mind with this methodology in hand. If we keep this commitment to a naturalizing project in mind, then we will find in Leibniz a rich and interesting philosophy of mind. -/- This book provides an account of Leibniz’s naturalizing constraints and traces them through Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. It covers issues relating to mental representation, perception, sensation, consciousness, memory, and moral identity. (shrink)

Although discussions of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice generally refer to Rawls’ two principles of justice, and although Rawls himself labels his principles “the two principles of justice”, Rawls actually sets forth three distinct principles in the following lexical order: the liberty principle, the fair equality of opportunity principle, and the difference principle. Rawls argues at some length for the priority of the liberty principle over the other two. On the other hand, Rawls offers hardly any argument at all (...) for the priority of the fair equality of opportunity principle over the difference principle. In this article I will argue that making the fair equality of opportunity principle separate from and lexically prior to the difference principle is both intuitively unattractive and inconsistent with Rawls’ method of deriving principles of justice from the choices of rational contractors in the original position. (shrink)

Self-defense and other-defense are uses of force against another person—an attacker—for the purpose of preventing the attacker from harming a victim. When such force is exercised by the victim, it is self-defense; when by a third party, other-defense. Self-defense and other-defense are preemptive uses of force because they occur before the acts they are intended to prevent occur. Thus, they operate in the realm of epistemic uncertainty. Victims and third parties can never be certain the feared acts will occur. They (...) can never be certain of what their consequences will be if the acts occur. They can never be certain what alternative exists to self-defense and other-defense for averting the feared harms. And they can never be certain what the status of the presumed attacker is—that is, whether the presumed attacker is culpable or nonculpable. Such epistemic points are addressed in this chapter. (shrink)

The problem of the transcendental has haunted philosophy for some time now. How can we think that which is external to our thought without by that token assimilating it to our thought? In other words, how can we speak of the outside without by that very gesture bringing it inside? While this conversation spun its complex tapestry over centuries, there developed alongside various attempts to dismiss or deflate the problem altogether. The most recent manifestation of this deflationary tendency is the (...) “speculative materialism” movement, represented with most clarity by Quentin Meillassoux in his 2006 work After Finitude. He attempts here to restore “the Great Outdoors” to a philosophical tradition mired in what he calls “correlationism,” which he characterizes as a kind of narcissism. So the present conjuncture seems to offer us a choice between the subjective transcendental cellar and the wilderness of speculative materialism. In this essay, we articulate an alternative to this choice rooted in readings of Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. Our intent here is not to compare or contrast their bodies of work as wholes, but to trace a distinct philosophical maneuver that is not only common to the two thinkers but reveals a link between them. Rather than annulling the transcendental question, these figures encourage us to reverse it, and ask instead “how can we think the inside without by that very token bringing it outside?” This provides us with a response to the problem of philosophy’s narcissism without recourse to Meillassoux’s “speculative” solution.Le problème du transcendantal a hanté la philosophie depuis un bon moment à présent. Comment pouvons-nous penser ce qui est externe à notre pensée sans l’assimiler par là même à notre pensée? En d’autres termes, comment parler du dehors sans l’amener par ce geste même à l’intérieur? Alors que ce débat a tissé sa toile complexe à travers les siècles, plusieurs tentatives se sont développées pour rejeter ou désamorcer le problème. La manifestation la plus récente de cette dernière tendance est le mouvement du « matérialisme spéculatif » représenté avec le plus de clarté par Quentin Meillassoux dans son oeuvre de 2006, Après la finitude. Il tente dans ce livre de restaurer le « Grand Dehors » dans une tradition philosophique enlisée dans ce qu’il appelle « corrélationnisme », qu’il caractérise comme une forme de narcissisme. Ainsi, la conjoncture actuelle semble donner le choix entre une cave transcendantale subjective et la nature sauvage du matérialisme spéculatif. Dans cet essai, nous articulons une alternative enracinée dans des lectures de Merleau-Ponty et de Deleuze. Notre intention n’est pas de comparer ou de contraster leurs oeuvres prises globalement, mais de tracer une manoeuvre philosophique distincte qui est non seulement commune aux deux penseurs, mais qui révèle un lien entre eux. Plutôt que d’annuler la question transcendantale, ces figures nous encouragent à la renverser et à poser la question à la place : comment pouvons-nous penser l’intérieur sans l’amener par là même vers le dehors? Cela nous fournit une réponse au problème du narcissisme de la philosophie sans recourir à la solution « spéculative » de Meillassoux.Il problema del trascendentale occupa la filosofia ormai da tempo. Come possiamo afferrare con il pensiero qualcosa di esterno al nostro pensiero, senza con questo assimilarlo a esso? In altri termini, come possiamo parlare dell’esterno senza per ciò stesso portarlo all’interno? Mentre questa riflessione intrecciava le proprie complesse fila lungo i secoli, prendevano forma per via collaterale diversi tentativi di sopprimere o ridimensionare il problema che l’aveva originata. La manifestazione più recente di questa tendenza coincide con il movimento del “materialismo speculativo”, rappresentato nel modo più emblematico da Quentin Meillassoux con il suo saggio Après la finitude, pubblicato nel 2006. In questo saggio, l’autore tenta di restituire “il Grande Fuori” a una tradizione filosofica invischiata in quello che egli definisce “correlazionismo” e che descrive come una sorta di narcisismo. La situazione attuale sembra così porci di fronte all’alternativa tra la chiusura angusta del trascendentale soggettivo e l’apertura incontrollata del materialismo speculativo. In questo articolo, sviluppiamo una proposta alternativa basata sulla lettura di Merleau-Ponty e di Deleuze. Il nostro intento non è quello di confrontare o contrapporre le opere dei due autori nel loro complesso, ma quello di evidenziare una precisa mossa filosofica che non solo li accomuna, ma li rivela come effettivamente connessi. Piuttosto che annullare l’interrogativo trascendentale, questi autori ci invitano a capovolgerlo, domandandosi invece: “Come possiamo afferrare con il pensiero l’interno senza per ciò stesso portarlo all’esterno?”. Questa mossa fornisce una risposta al problema del narcisismo della filosofia eludendo il ricorso alla soluzione “speculativa” di Meillassoux. (shrink)

This book interrogates the meaning and consequences of the unsettling parallel relationship between today’s critical theory and Right-wing political philosophy.

The proposal that the hippocampus is important for the encoding of episodic information, but not familiarity-based recognition, is incompatible with the available data. An alternative way to think about functional specialization within the medial temporal lobe memory system is suggested, based on neuroanatomy.

The use of performance-enhancing drugs is a significant problem in sport. It cheats clean athletes of their hard-earned rewards from perfecting their skills though dedication and hard work. It defrauds fans by substituting a distorted playing field for a true competition. Anti-doping agencies have been charged with enforcing drug policies, primarily through the use of drug testing programs. We propose that drug testing, while important, is not sufficient to achieve deterrence. Engaging the principles of perceptual deterrence and development of a (...) moral community of athletes can greatly enhance compliance with rules. (shrink)

In Prajñā and Reason Nishitani presents a powerful vision of philosophy as Absolute knowing. Nishitani’s conclusions are striking: Absolute knowing can only fulill its potential by beginning without any presuppositions and affirming the truth of contradiction. Because Hegel’s philosophy also purports to be a science of Absolute knowing, in Prajñā and Reason Nishitani develops his own account of the Absolute in conversation with Hegel’s philosophy. We reconstruct Nishitani’s reading and various critiques of Hegel, and thereafter evaluate its merits. Our inquiry (...) shows that Hegel too begins without presuppositions and affirms the truth of contradiction. As a result, we argue that Nishitani’s profound reflections on Absolute knowing draw him into close proximity with Hegel’s thinking and call us to re-think the very being of philosophy and philosophical practice today. (shrink)

Beginning from the scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi's theory of tacit knowing, and drawing upon a remarkably original model of the mind and its workings, Edward Moss develops the thesis that all consciousness is grammatically structured. Comparison is made in detail with the theories of Daniel Dennett, based on the computer analogy, and with the neurophysiological theories of Gerald Edelman. It is suggested that Moss's top-down psychological model can be integrated with Edelman's bottom-up analysis. Two final chapters explore the philosophical (...) implications of this discussion. (shrink)

Images and ideas associated with masculinity are forever in flux. In this book, Donald Moss addresses the never-ending effort of men—regardless of sexual orientation—to shape themselves in relation to the unstable notion of masculinity. Part 1 looks at the lifelong labor faced by boys and men of assessing themselves in relation to an always shifting, always receding, ideal of "masculinity." In Part 2, Moss considers a series of nested issues regarding homosexuality, homophobia and psychoanalysis. Part 3 focuses on (...) the interface between the body experienced as a private entity and the body experienced as a public entity—the body experienced as one’s own and the body subject to the judgments, regulations and punishments of the external world. The final part looks at men and violence. Men must contend with the entwined problems of regulating aggression and figuring out its proper level, aiming to avoid both excess and insufficiency. This section focuses on excessive aggression and its damaging consequences, both to its object and to its subjects. _Thirteen Ways Of Looking At A Man _will be of great interest not only to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, but also to a much wider audience of readers interested in gender studies, queer studies, and masculinity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIf representative democracy is not about elected officials responding directly to voters’ preferences, and if the voters do a poor job of voting their interests in referendums, then what is democracy about? In our view, a satisfactory theory of democracy would focus normatively on the social identities and political interests of citizens rather than on their expressed policy preferences, and empirically on the ability of organized or attentive groups to get those identities and interests effectively recognized and acted on in (...) the governmental process. A group-theoretic version of democratic theory along these lines would dispense with the most important illusions of the conventional “folk theory” of democracy. However, much hard work remains to clarify how actual democracies make policy and to construct a wise normative standard—inspirational but not innocent—against which they can be judged. (shrink)

From Locke to Kierkegaard to those annoying car ads that promise “No Boundaries”— Is our use of the word 'freedom' still coherent? Was it ever coherent? Is it significant that this fuzzy term is so often used to carry so much rhetorical force? With Larry Hatab , David Walsh , and Mark Murphy.