The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions (...) which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. (shrink)

The nature of changes in mathematics was discussed recently in Revolutions in Mathematics. The discussion was dominated by historical and sociological arguments. An obstacle to a philosophical analysis of this question lies in a discrepancy between our approach to formulas and to pictures. While formulas are understood as constituents of mathematical theories, pictures are viewed only as heuristic tools. Our idea is to consider the pictures contained in mathematical text, as expressions of a specific language. Thus we get formulas and (...) pictures into one linguistic framework, and so we are able to analyse their interplay in the course of history. (shrink)

Over the last decade, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have elaborated an influential naturalistic account of human reasoning. Their distinctive hypothesis is that its adaptive rationale – and primary function – is to produce and assess reasons in interpersonal justification and argumentation. In this paper I argue, first, that their characterisation of reasoning as based on metarepresentations threatens to oversophisticate reasoning and faces the problem of vicious regress. Second, I argue that they owe us a coherent account of the cognitive (...) role of reasons in reasoning. (shrink)

This book offers new insights into the nature of human rational capacities by engaging inferentialism with empirical research in the cognitive sciences. Inferentialism advocates that humans' unique kind of intelligence is discursive and rooted in competencies to make, assess and justify claims. This approach provides a rich source of valuable insights into the nature of our rational capacities, but it is underdeveloped in important respects. For example, little attempt has been made to assess inferentialism considering relevant scientific research on human (...) communication, cognition or reasoning. By engaging philosophical and scientific approaches in a productive dialogue, this book shows how we can better understand human rational capacities by comparing their respective strengths and weaknesses. In this vein, the author critically revisits and constructively develops central themes from the work of Robert Brandom and other language rationalists: the nature of the assertoric practice and its connection to reasoned discourse, the linguistic constitution of the shared space of reasons, the social nature and function of reasoning, the intersubjective roots of social-normative practices and the nature of objective thought. Practices of Reason will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. (shrink)

For a decade, we have admired the incisive and broadly informed works of Ladislav Tondl on the foundations of science. Now it is indeed a pleasure to include this book among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We hope that it will help to deepen the collaborative scholar ship of scientists and philosophers in Czechoslovakia with the English reading scholars of the world. Professor Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924, and completed his higher education at the (...) Charles University iIi Prague. His doctorate was granted by the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. He was a professor and scientific research worker at the Institute for the Theory and Methodology of Science, which was a component part of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Tondl's principal fields of interest are the methodology of the empirical and experimental sciences, logical semantics, and cybernetics. For many years, he collaborated with Professor Albert Perez and others at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation in Prague, and he has undertaken fruitful collaboration with logicians in the Soviet and Polish schools, and been influenced by the Finnish logicians as well, among them Jaakko Hintikka. We list below a selection of his main publications. Perhaps the most accessible in presenting his central conception of the relationship between modem information theory and the methodology of the sciences is his 1965 paper with Perez, 'On the Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures'. (shrink)

The paper concerns semiotic functions of a conceptual framework, i.e. the system of concepts connected with a specified thematic or problem domain, or, in other words, with a specific semantic space. Conceptual framework plays and important role in specifying the structure of the domain and its specific rules.

Mathematics is traditionally considered being an apriori discipline consisting of purely analytic propositions. The aim of the present paper is to offer arguments against this entrenched view and to draw attention to the experiential dimension of mathematical knowledge. Following Husserl’s interpretation of physical knowledge as knowledge constituted by the use of instruments, I am trying to interpret mathematical knowledge also as acknowledge based on instrumental experience. This interpretation opens a new view on the role of the logicist program, both in (...) philosophy of mathematics and in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Humankind, the biological species _Homo sapiens_, lives today in a very different world from the one for which it was evolutionarily selected in the geological epoch Pleistocene (2.6 million to twelve thousand years BC). The Anthropocene, as the epoch we live now has been called, is characterized by increasing tension between human nature and technological civilization, and humans live in an atmosphere of uncertainty, insecurity, and threat. By “naturalizing” the human condition, cognitive biology offers the only painless alternative to the (...) many scenarios that depict the extinction of _Homo sapiens_ as a consequence of violent conflicts and unimaginable suffering. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse relations between China and Russia over the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the context of deepening Sino-Russian relations and the general rise of Eurasia. China and Russia are pivotal non-Western Eurasian powers in political, economic and military terms and the key motors of Eurasian multi-faceted integration. Both countries pursue their own interests and present their own projects and initiatives. Nevertheless, over the last few years, Sino-Russian cooperation has become strategic and is (...) starting to pursue a new model of globalisation and international order. In the article, I refer to this approach as the “New Eurasian Paradigm” (NEP). I follow Axel Honneth’s Hegelian-based theory of threefold-level recognition Hrubec (2011, p. 267). which I extend and employ at the interstate level to interpret the behaviour of China and Russia and their integration projects in terms of a struggle for political recognition as full, equal members of the global community determining global processes. Both countries thus aim to reform the global order and boost the integration of Eurasia in order to achieve successful development. These common interests are the main reasons behind their mutual strategic collaboration. (shrink)

Gombrich and the Problem of Relativity of Vision The essay argues that Ernst Gombrich's views are relevant to the critical examination of the notion of the relativity and historicity of vision which has been widely accepted as one of the central axioms shared by visual studies, art history and film studies.

The paper deals with M. Henry’s interpretation of Marxian philosophy in the frame of his phenomenology of life. Its aim is to show the relevance of Henry’s interpretation for the global crisis of capitalism in our times. Henry argues that economic questions in Marx’s Capital, first of all his theory of surplus value, is closely connected with the historical issues in his German ideology. Attention is also paid to Marx’s thesis about the science becoming a direct production force. In the (...) era of automatization, when most of common work is reliably done by the highly developed technological devices, such as artificial intelligence, Marx’s idea of a free development of every individual as a condition of a free development of all is not a utopian one any more. It becomes a normative claim concerning economic and political reality. Thus Marx’s idea of a classless society could be interpreted as a system of global justice, in which the extreme global inequality has been overcome. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to answer some arguments raised against mathematical structuralism developed by Michael Resnik. These arguments stress the abstractness of mathematical objects, especially their causal inertness, and conclude that mathematical objects, the structures posited by Resnik included, are inaccessible to human cognition. In the paper I introduce a distinction between abstract and ideal objects and argue that mathematical objects are primarily ideal. I reconstruct some aspects of the instrumental practice of mathematics, such as symbolic manipulations or (...) ruler-and-compass constructions, and argue that instrumental practice can secure epistemic access to ideal objects of mathematics. (shrink)