This book offers new insights into the nature of human rational capacities by engaging inferentialism with empirical research in the cognitive sciences. Inferentialism advocates that humans' unique kind of intelligence is discursive and rooted in competencies to make, assess and justify claims. This approach provides a rich source of valuable insights into the nature of our rational capacities, but it is underdeveloped in important respects. For example, little attempt has been made to assess inferentialism considering relevant scientific research on human (...) communication, cognition or reasoning. By engaging philosophical and scientific approaches in a productive dialogue, this book shows how we can better understand human rational capacities by comparing their respective strengths and weaknesses. In this vein, the author critically revisits and constructively develops central themes from the work of Robert Brandom and other language rationalists: the nature of the assertoric practice and its connection to reasoned discourse, the linguistic constitution of the shared space of reasons, the social nature and function of reasoning, the intersubjective roots of social-normative practices and the nature of objective thought. Practices of Reason will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. (shrink)

For a decade, we have admired the incisive and broadly informed works of Ladislav Tondl on the foundations of science. Now it is indeed a pleasure to include this book among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We hope that it will help to deepen the collaborative scholar ship of scientists and philosophers in Czechoslovakia with the English reading scholars of the world. Professor Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924, and completed his higher education at the (...) Charles University iIi Prague. His doctorate was granted by the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. He was a professor and scientific research worker at the Institute for the Theory and Methodology of Science, which was a component part of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Tondl's principal fields of interest are the methodology of the empirical and experimental sciences, logical semantics, and cybernetics. For many years, he collaborated with Professor Albert Perez and others at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation in Prague, and he has undertaken fruitful collaboration with logicians in the Soviet and Polish schools, and been influenced by the Finnish logicians as well, among them Jaakko Hintikka. We list below a selection of his main publications. Perhaps the most accessible in presenting his central conception of the relationship between modem information theory and the methodology of the sciences is his 1965 paper with Perez, 'On the Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures'. (shrink)

The paper emphasizes the role of knowledge dimensions of an action which could be regarded as rational. Rational action usually results of specific decision — making process including selection, evaluation and acceptance of a preferred alternative. This process should integrate not only various types of knowledge but also the interdisciplinary or interdepartmental knowledge integration. The integration of knowledge may cover various forms, especially integration of knowledge relating to different domains, of different quality, of knowledge connected with different goal-orientations. The paper (...) stresses the role of the hitherto known and recognized alternatives. The integration procedures should also include the integration of various spheres and types of knowledge with accepted and justified systems of values. (shrink)

Coming from a mathematical background, I was always puzzled by Popper’s view, according to which, after the falsification of a scientific theory its degree of corroboration becomes zero. Most of the scientific theories taught in the physics departments have already been falsified, and what is the point of teaching theories, whose degree of corroboration is zero? The first important observation to make is that not all cases of falsification are the same. In some cases, as for instance in the case (...) of the theory of phlogiston, the falsification happened in agreement with the Popperian picture. Scientists discarded the falsified theory and opted for its alternative. Therefore, nowadays nobody tries to make a scientific contribution to the theory of phlogiston. Nevertheless, there are cases, and Newtonian mechanics is surely the most important among them, when the behaviour of the scientists after the falsification of the theory is from the Popperian point of view incomprehensible. Many scientists were not ready to discard the falsified theory, and not for irrational reasons. Some of the deepest discoveries in Newtonian mechanics as for instance the famous Kolmogorov, Arnold, Moser theorem were made many years after this theory was falsified. I think that Andrej Kolmogorov, Vladimir Arnold or Jürgen Moser cannot be compared to an Aristotelian philosopher, who adheres to his pet theory after its falsification. What these three mathematicians did was a fundamental contribution to modern science. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to analyze how language affects scientific research, from planning experiments and interpreting their results, through constructing models and the testing their predictions, to building theories and justifying their principles. I try to give an overview of the potentialities of language of science. I propose to distinguish six potentialities: analytic, expressive, methodical, integrative, explanatory, and constitutive power of language. I will shortly characterize each of these potentialities and illustrate their contribution to scientific research. Although I (...) believe that the theory is valid for a wide range of scientific disciplines, all illustrations are taken from physics. (shrink)

The presented contribution stresses the role of preference ordering and of the logical culture in many spheres of human rational activities, especially in the domains connected with evaluating and decision-making tasks. Since preference relation is conceived as a relation of proposition-like-entities , any construction of preference ordering pre_- supposes the application of comparability principles. Preference expressions can be considered as a special form of propositional attitudes and the concept of preference itsself as an intensional operator.

The paper justifies the concept of “thematic structure” or “order of knowledge” over the traditional “classification of sciences” due to the uncertainty of many classification criteria. The thematic structure of science has, of course, various levels and various dimensions. Arguments against any forms of separating the humanities from sciences in the traditional sense of the term are presented and discussed. Equally unacceptable are attempts at sharp separation of technical disciplines and humanities. The thematic structure of humanities is not created by (...) some material aspects but rather through the interest — or problem-oriented aspects. In addition to the natural sciences and the humanities there exists an important sphere of sciences on artefacts or, using the term by H. Simon, the sciences of the artificial. For the contemporary research activities is typical what could be denoted as “interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary complex.” The paper traces a set of epistemological criteria for the justification of the relative independence of a scientific discipline. (shrink)

[Cartesian physics in the light of Husserl’s phenomenology].

The paper analyses the model as an artefact sui generis establishing the role of semiosis, as a homomorphic representation, as an artefact securing the function of an interface between the author and the receiver. The receiver's ability of accepting the model and its interpretation possibility and/or quality depends on the receiver's competence including the linquistic competence, his knowledge of the represented sphere and the knowledge of the applied sign system and its rules.

The nature of changes in mathematics was discussed recently in Revolutions in Mathematics. The discussion was dominated by historical and sociological arguments. An obstacle to a philosophical analysis of this question lies in a discrepancy between our approach to formulas and to pictures. While formulas are understood as constituents of mathematical theories, pictures are viewed only as heuristic tools. Our idea is to consider the pictures contained in mathematical text, as expressions of a specific language. Thus we get formulas and (...) pictures into one linguistic framework, and so we are able to analyse their interplay in the course of history. (shrink)

The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions (...) which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. (shrink)

This edited volume examines the relationship between collective intentionality and inferential theories of meaning. The book consists of three main sections. The first part contains essays demonstrating how researchers working on inferentialism and collective intentionality can learn from one another. The essays in the second part examine the dimensions along which philosophical and empirical research on human reasoning and collective intentionality can benefit from more cross-pollination. The final part consists of essays that offer a closer examination of themes from inferentialism (...) and collective intentionality that arise in the work of Wilfrid Sellars. Groups, Norms, and Practices provides a template for continuing an interdisciplinary program in philosophy and the sciences that aims to deepen our understanding of human rationality, language use, and sociality. (shrink)

In their own way, inferentialists and interactionists both trace the roots of reflective reasoning to practices and skills for making, assessing, and responding to public performances in communicative practices of giving and asking for reasons. Inferentialists have developed the idea mostly on conceptual grounds. Interactionists ask, in a more empirical spirit, why and how such practices and skills might have evolved. Thus they promise complementary “anthropological” insights of foremost interest to inferentialists. But interactionist theories advance a number of controversial claims (...) that deserve careful scrutiny. In this essay I focus on one such claim: namely that confirmation bias can be plausibly explained as a design feature that promotes postulated functions of interactive reasoning. And I argue that each of three extant proposals fails to make the claim good. (shrink)

[Galileo's Physics in the Light of the Husserl's Phenomenology].

Over the last decade, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have elaborated an influential naturalistic account of human reasoning. Their distinctive hypothesis is that its adaptive rationale – and primary function – is to produce and assess reasons in interpersonal justification and argumentation. In this paper I argue, first, that their characterisation of reasoning as based on metarepresentations threatens to oversophisticate reasoning and faces the problem of vicious regress. Second, I argue that they owe us a coherent account of the cognitive (...) role of reasons in reasoning. (shrink)

This study critically reflects and assesses a recent debate over the nature of uniquely human cognition. The two standpoints in this debate are advocated by Michael Tomasello and Henrike Moll. Both agree that _shared intentionality_ is a key difference-maker, affording qualitatively new mental processes that support new forms of cooperative sociality and cumulative culture and thoroughly _transform_ human cognition. But Moll argues that Tomasello is infirm in his commitment to the transformative impact of shared intentionality on human cognition, flirting with (...) a conflicting, _additive_ account of shared intentionality as making a key difference only in the social domain. On her own view, human-unique social development innervated by human-unique forms of shared intentionality makes a difference across the board, and all the way down. This, we are told, is a reason not only to reject additive accounts, but to accept cognitive discontinuity across the board. Having reconstructed the two standpoints, I argue that Tomasello develops a consistently transformative approach immune to most objections leveled by Moll and in key respects more modest and plausible than her own alternative proposal. And I draw from this debate some general methodological lessons for theorizing about the nature and scope of human-unique cognition. (shrink)

Gombrich and the Problem of Relativity of Vision The essay argues that Ernst Gombrich's views are relevant to the critical examination of the notion of the relativity and historicity of vision which has been widely accepted as one of the central axioms shared by visual studies, art history and film studies.

Táto kritická štúdia sa zameriava na problematiku spolupráce a pravidiel, diskutovanú Jaroslavom Peregrinom v knihe Človek a pravidla. Okrem extenzívneho exkurzu do osnovy Peregrinových hlavných myšlienok a argumentov budú systematicky analyzované niektoré kľúčové otázky patriace do tejto interdisciplinárnej teoretickej oblasti, pričom sa kriticky posúdia niektoré prvky Peregrinovho špecifického prístupu. Konkrétne, budem argumentovať, že Peregrinom preferovaná koncepcia pravidla - ako propozičného poznania, že niečo by malo nejako byť - nemôže dobre slúžiť jeho zámerom, ak chce udržať jeho evolučný prístup k pravidlám.

The aim of the paper is to clarify Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. We propose to discriminate between a scientific revolution, which is a sociological event of a change of attitude of the scientific community with respect to a particular theory, and an epistemic rupture, which is a linguistic fact consisting of a discontinuity in the linguistic framework in which this theory is formulated. We propose a classification of epistemic ruptures into four types. In the paper, each of these types (...) of epistemic ruptures is illustrated by examples from physics. The classification of epistemic ruptures can be used as a basis for a classification of scientific revolutions and thus for a refinement of our view of the progress of science. (shrink)

Akým druhom činnosti filozofia je, aký má zmysel, aké otázky si má klásť, a akým spôsobom ich má uchopiť? Mojím cieľom v článku nie je priamo odpovedať na tieto otázky, na ktoré nie je žiadna jednoduchá odpoveď. Chcem skôr kriticky preskúmať stále populárne poňatie filozofie: filozofia ako skúmanie usilujúce o pravdu či poznanie pravdy. O výroky v tomto duchu nie je vo filozofickej tradícii núdza. Otázka znie: hovoria nám tieto metafory niečo podstatné o filozofii?

There are several ontological and consequently also methodological mistakes in contemporary mainstream economics. Among them, the so-called ergodic axiom is play significant role. It is understandable that the real economy elaborated as formalized mental model looks like dynamic system on first sight. However, that is right only of dynamical systems in mathematical formalism. Economy that is in our understanding societal and/or collective economy is complex evolving organism. If we imagine such organism in the form of dynamical system that is as (...) clear mathematical formalism, we are losing their crucial authentic character. The significant irredeemable attribute of societal economy is lying in his complex evolving network process character created by large population of people with different decision-making and complex realizing among them. Going from these imaginations the two entities in a question that is dynamical system with their ergodicity and societal economic organism as complex evolving network are qualitative very different ones. That is the reason why we cannot accede with endeavours to draw on living economy straitjacket of ergodic axiom. To articulate that cause by other words ergodic dynamical systems are applicable for physical and partly for chemical entities and only scarcely are fit for living organisms. On the other hand however, as clear method the ergodic dynamical system have good applying for didactical approaches in economics where helping in better understanding some types of complexities in dynamics. The purpose of that essay is to discuss problems around usability of ergodic dynamical system theory and methods in economics in the age of advanced ICT knowledge based society. (shrink)

Globalization and a Normative Framework of Freedom The author considers the question of whether or even what normative structure of social order is able to encourage the advancement of the measure of positive liberty in the process of globalization. Related to this is the issue of the insufficiency of guarantees provided by orthodox liberalism for human self-determination. The author considers possible scenarios as to the way in which an elite cosmopolitan minority, profiting from globalization and feeling no responsibility for the (...) majority left to its own fate, would pursue its own interests. The ideas of Ralf Dahrendorf concerning the global rule of law in the name of freedom and the need for international law are referred to. Globalization is occurring just as Marx intuitively predicted: capitalism becomes the bearer of hidden immanent self-destructive mechanisms. In conclusion, the author's hypothesis is that the new era of law in the 21st century will ensure that certain civilization legal norms become natural or customary. (shrink)