Background. Africa has seen an increase in the number of health research projects being conducted on the continent, particularly clinical trials. Ideally, this should be accompanied by a commensurate improvement in research ethics review capacity to competently provide the much-required research ethics oversight. Unfortunately, this is not the case in many African countries, which are still grappling with weak research ethics oversight capacity, not only at national level but also at institutional level. Objectives. To describe the proposal by Kenya’s national (...) research ethics regulatory authority, the National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), to build the capacity of its National Scientific and Ethics Committee (NSEC), tasked with providing the required research ethics oversight in the country. Methods. This is the proposal submitted by NACOSTI to the European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership for funding of a project entitled ‘Strengthening Research Ethics and Oversight in Kenya’ (STReK). It describes the activities involved to strengthen the NSEC to provide the required research ethics in the country, and to build the research ethics capacity of research ethics committees (RECs) it has accredited, through training and mentorship programmes, to enable them to efficiently review research proposals. Results. Proposed activities of the project are presented. Implementation of the activities described is ongoing. Conclusion. Lessons learnt in this regard may be of benefit to other research ethics regulatory authorities in resource-constrained countries aiming to strengthen their research ethics oversight capacity. (shrink)

Editor's Note: Over a long period of time, the evil bourgeois reactionary line has created antagonism between two groups of students in schools—antagonism on the basis of one's family background. This antagonism became very obvious during the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution, and has lasted to this day. It has prevented further criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line and hindered further development of the Cultural Revolution.

In Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) 6A4, Gaozi 告子 states that “yi 義 (Rightness/Propriety) is external, not internal.” In 6A5, Meng Jizi 孟季子 says of yi that “... it is on the external, not from the internal.” Their defenses are met with Mengzi’s resistance. What does he perceive and resist in these statements? Focusing on several key passages in the eponymous text, I compare six promising interpretations. 6A4 and a relevant part of 2A2 can be rendered comparably sensible under each of the (...) six. However, what Gaozi says in 6A1 clearly is evidence to Mengzi that, of the six views, Gaozi holds three although he does not convey them in his statement. As for Meng Jizi’s statement, in its defense he invokes a special occasion where one is required to act one way even though one would feel a different way. Mengzi’s response has been traditionally interpreted as boiling down to a dissenting opinion about empirical psychology, that the agent on that special occasion would in fact feel the same way as they ought to act. But on a more charitable reading, the point Mengzi makes is conceptual: Though the satisfaction of yi may not require that the feeling and the act align perfectly in this case, cases where the alignment obtains are conceptually prior. This not only refutes Meng Jizi’s statement but also enables a more elegant explanation of why the Mengzi rightly has no record of Mengzi affirming that yi is internal. I conclude that 6A5 itself uniquely favors one interpretation, as far as Meng Jizi’s position is concerned: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies yi. (shrink)

This volume brings together flux essays by an eminent scholar on the origins, development, and import of Kant's philosophy, chiefly in its metaphysical aspects. Four of these were separately published between 1924 and 1926, but until now have been difficult to obtain, despite great demand. Their appearance here will be welcomed. The thesis emerging from these studies is that the critical philosophy originates in metaphysical probings concerning the nature and presuppositions of being, and issues in doctrines which, despite psychological, epistemological, (...) and ethical presentation, are intended to have definite ontological import. --L. K. B. (shrink)

Recognition that the Principle of Respect for Autonomy fails to work in family-centric societies such as Singapore has recently led to the promotion of relational autonomy as a suitable framework within which to place healthcare decision making. However, empirical data, relating to patient and family opinions and the practices of healthcare professionals in Confucian-inspired Singapore, demonstrate clear limitations on the ability of a relational autonomy framework to provide the anticipated compromise between prevailing family decision-making norms and adopted Western led atomistic (...) concepts of autonomy. Evidence suggests that despite a growing infusion of Western influence, there is still little to indicate any major shift to individual decision making, particularly in light of the way society and healthcare are structured. Similarly, the lack of employing a shared decision-making model and data that discredit the notion that the complex psychosocial and cultural factors that affect the decision making may be considered “content neutral” not only prevents the application of relational autonomy but questions the viability of the values behind the Principle of Respect for Autonomy. Taking into account local data and drawing upon a wider concept of personhood that extends beyond prevailing family-centric ideals along with the complex interests that are focused upon the preservation of the unique nature of personhood that arises from the Ring Theory of Personhood, we propose and “operationalize” the employing of an authoritative welfare-based approach, within the confines of best interest decision making, to better meet the current care needs within Singapore. (shrink)

Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s (...) virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative. (shrink)

On one view of ethical development, someone not yet virtuous can reliably progress by engaging in what meaningfully resembles virtuous conduct. However, if the well-intended conduct is psychologically demanding, one's character, precisely because one is not yet virtuous, may worsen rather than improve. This risk of degradation casts doubt on the developmental view. I counter the doubt through one interpretation and one application of the Mengzi. In passage 2A2, invoking the image of a farmer who “helped” the crop grow by (...) pulling the sprouts, MENG Ke cautions, “do not help it grow.” I defend a novel interpretation: do not advance with a naïve negligence about your psycho-physiological constitution. I also show how to advance with realistic care by pointing out an overlooked application of a much-discussed cultivation technique illustrated in Mengzi 1A7: ethical reflection can conciliate one with one’s ongoing or past advanced action, lowering the action’s risk of degradation. (shrink)

In Mengzi 6A4, Gaozi states that “yì 義 (propriety, rightness) is external, not internal.” In 6A5, Meng Jizi says of yì that “...it is on the external, not from the internal.” Their defenses are met with Mengzi’s resistance. What does he perceive and resist in these statements? Focusing on several key passages, I compare six promising interpretations. 6A4 and a relevant part of 2A2 can be rendered comparably sensible under each of the six. However, what Gaozi says in 6A1 clearly (...) is evidence to Mengzi that, of the six views, Gaozi holds three although he does not convey them in his statement. As for Meng Jiz’s defense of his statement, Meng Jizi cites a special occasion where one is required to act one way even though one would feel a different way. Mengzi’s response has been traditionally interpreted as boiling down to a dissenting opinion about empirical psychology, that the agent on that special occasion would in fact feel the same way as they ought to act. But on a more charitable reading, the point Mengzi makes is conceptual: Though the satisfaction of yì may not require that the feeling and the act align perfectly in this case, cases where the alignment obtains are conceptually prior. This not only refutes Meng Jizi’s statement but also enables a more elegant explanation of why the Mengzi rightly has no record of Mengzi affirming that yì is internal. I conclude that 6A5 itself uniquely favors one interpretation, as far as Meng Jizi’s position is concerned: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies yì. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

The needs of both metaphysics and art criticism for an understanding of creativity are approached here as a single task. The author illustrates his ontological principles in a study of D. H. Lawrence's conception of creative spontaneity. An unusual mixture of rigor, cryptic phrases, parapsychological fact-citing, and fanciful speculation.--L. K. B.

Four excellent essays which attempt, with admirable clarity and simplicity and in amazingly brief scope, to present the outline of an ethical viewpoint integrating a teleological naturalistic self-realizationism, intuitionistic ideal utilitarianism, and the ethical insights of Christianity. The semantic-epistemological issue between intuitionism and naturalism is neglected, but there are clear indications that if pressed, the nod would go to the latter. Self-realization is not taken as the end--in view of right choice; on the contrary, it is rejected as such in (...) favor of ideal utilitarianism, though it remains basic as the "ground or reason" why conduct aiming at that end is right. Designed for and understandable by the intelligent layman, these essays should interest the professional student of ethics as well.--L. K. B. (shrink)

In a refreshingly direct paper and two critical replies, these writers try to work out a practicable criterion for the ethical judgments pressed upon scientists by the far-reaching effects of their work.--L. K. B.

This book claims to state a "method of polarity" whereby philosophy can be advanced significantly. This method presupposes a conception of knowledge as rooted in value and of truth as encompassing contrary or "contrapletive" positions. Finding in experience irreducible oppositions demanding a definite method of treatment, it prescribes for this a "calculus," which is then applied to "typical philosophical problems." A vast amount of reading --somewhat over-documented by more than four hundred citations and references--are brought to bear rather externally on (...) the problems treated, which themselves are hardly more than posed in terms of the polarity concept.--L. K. B. (shrink)

By an epistemological analysis of empirical science, physical and biological, as contrasted with metaphysics, the author tries to focus on the philosophy of nature as an irreducible science intermediate between the empirical and the metaphysical. Like the former, its object is specifically mobile being; but like the latter, it aims to apprehend the intelligible essence. A clear summary of an undogmatic neoscholastic critique of natural science.--L. K. B.

This elementary introduction aims "to present a unified picture of Science"; it shows little concern for serious argument or alternative positions.--L. K. B.

A technical but lucid and relatively elementary discussion of the development of the physical concepts of space and time and the bearing of the parity hypothesis of Lee and Yang on the future course of this development.--L. K. B.

Not a philosophical analysis or explication, this compact, lyrical study remains deliberately within the "organic" categories of biblical speech--which it is part of its purpose to exemplify--and with considerable success communicates the Christian conception of ethical life as man's response to God's self-revealing activity in history, to be understood only in terms of "the living continuity between man-in-God and man-in-man."--L. K. B.

The study examines the relationship between the strength of an organizationÕs ethical climate and ethical problems involving human resource management. Data were collected through a survey of 1078 human resource managers. The results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between the strength of an organization'ss ethical climate and the seriousness of ethical violations and a statistically significant positive relationship between an organization'ss ethical climate and success in responding to ethical issues. Thus, interventions that strengthen an organization'ss ethical climate may help (...) manage ethical behavior within organizations. (shrink)

On the basis of a re-examination of the status of laws, evidence, confirmation, prediction and explanation in sciences, social as well as physical, in which the reasoning processes are not fully formalized-this informative, pioneering monograph sketches a new epistemological orientation. It emphasizes the development of specifically predictive instrumentalities, regarding which new possibilities are explored and further areas of research suggested.--L. K. B.

The chief of these five essays is the effort of a composer and conductor, deeply attached to Kant and widely read in mathematics and popularized physics, to disclose in "music's innate design" a key to the nature of "subliminal" reality, the "Ever Present." Result: both the order of music and the order of subliminal reality are elliptical. The accompanying essays, of chiefly biographical interest, present a philosophical critique of the new mathematics and geometry by a doctrinaire young Kantian. -- L. (...) K. B. (shrink)

This brief and valuable reconstruction of Mead's theory of social reality combines a carefully documented exposition of the development of Mead's thought with a philosophically critical examination of some of his major themes. Whereas most interpreters have typed Mead as a "social behaviorist," his theories are here rightly portrayed as transcending the behavioristic framework, moving "from a problematic empiricism toward an idealistic and subjectivistic account of the nature of social reality." The author finds unresolved "foundational confusions" in Mead's theories, however, (...) springing primarily from his evasion of epistemological issues. --L. K. B. (shrink)

A thoughtful inventor-businessman's statement of the simple truth about the world: All is energy, with causal order everywhere, and with such forces dominating as to justify optimistic trust in the necessary course of events.--L. K. B.

Another beginners' text, emphasizing the problem of the relation between ordinary language and formal logic. From an exceedingly simplified introduction to semiotics, it moves through an analysis of conventions of ordinary English discourse to a presentation of an elementary non-standard symbolic propositional, class and modal logic. A matrix method is used throughout, facilitating the use of the same symbols for class and propositional relations. Chapters are included on probability, Mill's inductive methods, and logic and scientific method. Abundant, typically dull exercises (...) are provided.--L. K. B. (shrink)

A characterization of the categories and theoretical orientation of Argentine "positivism" --in a broad but classical sense, amounting roughly to the identification of knowledge with the conclusions of experimental science--carried out through an historical study of the origins, development, and doctrines of indigenous philosophical and sociological theories. --L. K. B.

A metaphysical scheme which is both a philosophy and a personal religion, presented confessionally in four terse and lyrical essays. The basic concepts are authenticity, solitude, heroism, act, life and death. God is conceived as finite and multiple, engendered through history, "the fundamental meaning toward which converge the most intense fibres of the heroism which forms our history." --L. K. B.

This book professes to give a semantic analysis of the main concepts of classical and quantum physics. The author holds that the task of philosophy of science is to explicate the meanings of scientific theories, laws, and hypotheses by formal reconstruction; semantic rules are a necessary part of such a reconstruction. Beginning with an extremely, indeed fatally, simplified treatment of the required concepts of logical syntax and semantics, he proceeds to discuss in non-technical language the concepts of the chief physical (...) theories, and concludes with a description of the methodology of theory construction and confirmation. His only unusual thesis is that, contrary to what physicists tell us, models still essentially underlie all physical theories and constitute the link between theory and experiment on which must be based the semantic rules needed to supplement attempts at formal reconstruction. The strength of the book lies not in its semantic emphasis but in its stress on the hypothetico-deductive character of modern exact science, as opposed to the inductive accounts imputed to empiricists. --L. K. B. (shrink)

A collection of six unrelated articles by as many authors. First come three scholarly studies, dealing with causality in Aristotle, St. Augustine's metaphysics of created being, and St. Thomas as a commentator on Aristotle. The fourth is an exposition of Hegel's views on scepticism. Next comes a reconstruction, within the scholastic spirit, of "classical formal logic." The concluding and most interesting article is a bibliographical survey of recent works in the history of ancient philosophies. --L. K. B.