IntroductionAllocation of research funds relies on peer review to support funding decisions, and these processes can be susceptible to biases and inefficiencies. The aim of this work was to determine which past interventions to peer review and decision-making have worked to improve research funding practices, how they worked, and for whom.MethodsRealist synthesis of peer-review publications and grey literature reporting interventions in peer review for research funding.ResultsWe analysed 96 publications and 36 website sources. Sixty publications enabled us to extract stakeholder-specific context-mechanism-outcomes (...) configurations for 50 interventions, which formed the basis of our synthesis. Shorter applications, reviewer and applicant training, virtual funding panels, enhanced decision models, institutional submission quotas, applicant training in peer review and grant-writing reduced interrater variability, increased relevance of funded research, reduced time taken to write and review applications, promoted increased investment into innovation, and lowered cost of panels.ConclusionsReports of 50 interventions in different areas of peer review provide useful guidance on ways of solving common issues with the peer review process. Evidence of the broader impact of these interventions on the research ecosystem is still needed, and future research should aim to identify processes that consistently work to improve peer review across funders and research contexts. (shrink)

The aim of this research paper is to examine Latin in the context of legal translation between the Polish, English and French languages. Latin ap- pears in contemporary legal discourse in the form of maxims, short phrases and terms. Even though it constitutes an integral element of legal drafting, Latin often attracts little attention from legal translators. It is falsely assumed that Latin elements of the text do not require translation due to several miscon- ceptions related to the Latin language. (...) Firstly, Latin is generally perceived as a global language with no local variations in form. Secondly, Latin is believed to be the universal point of reference in international communication. Thirdly, Latin legal phrases or maxims are thought to originate solely from Roman law, thus they express only Roman legal thought. In the first part of the paper we will address the above issues. To this end, we will briefly discuss the historical presence of Latin in the European lin- guistic context. We will then present the results of our research into the use of Latinisms in the Polish, French and English legal systems. The subject of our research was a set of twenty Latin maxims and phrases that frequently appear in the decisions of the Polish courts. During the first stage of the analysis, the items in question were verified in Legalis. The second stage of the research involved the consultation of monolingual dictionaries of French and English legal language to verify the universal charac- ter of the analyzed Latinisms. During the third stage of the analysis, we looked at the practical use of Latinisms in online databases of legal texts. The paper concludes with some comments on Latinisms in lexicographical publications and online sources. (shrink)

The paper discusses the use of term ‘advocacy science’ which is communication of science which goes beyond simple reporting of scientific findings, using the case study of biotechnology. It argues that advocacy science should be used to distinguish the engagement of modern civil society organizations to interpret scientific knowledge for their lobbying. It illustrates how this new communicative process has changed political discourse in science and general perception of the role of science in contemporary society.

The paper discusses conflicts in perceptions of GM crops illustrating the complexities of GM debates and applications of the concept of sustainable development. The concept consists of three discourses that both opponents and supporters of GM crops refer to in their analyses: environmentalism, social and economic development and the two sub-issues of sustainable development—biodiversity loss and food security. This creates a unique situation when both proponents and opponents of GM food use the same framework of sustainable development to support their (...) arguments and do not reach a common ground. This will be illustrated by a review of the arguments brought by these two groups. (shrink)

The focus of this article is the influence of Lev Shestov’s ideas on European intellectuals, especially French philosophers and poets. The author shows that the Russian thinker had a significant impact on shaping the intellectual atmosphere in France at the first half of the twentieth century, contributing to the rise of existentialist philosophy. Among Shestov’s direct philosophical followers are literary critic, writer, and musicologist Boris de Schloezer; essayist and philosopher Georges Bataille; and poet Benjamin Fondane.

Introduction. F.M. Dostoevsky called the under- ground type the most important thing that he brought out in his work. “The Underground Man,” in his opinion, is the main Russian person. In the “un - derground” type F.M. Dostoevsky revealed the idea of the duality of a person who cannot be pleased with any progress or reason, because he only needs, as the character of “Notes from Underground” noted, to declare his will. Thus we can talk about a person with a (...) reverse perspective, i.e. about the one who is determined by internal causation, acts on himself, dreams and does not live among things. The purpose of the study is to demonstrate an un - derstanding of the dual nature of man in F.M. Dosto - evsky’s philosophy. Traditionally, starting with Plato, the duality of man in philosophy was understood as a division into soul and body. However, in our opinion, F.M. Dostoevsky’s “dual man”, who is called the underground type, thanks to the presence of consciousness, creates a second plane in the world, doubles reality to his dreams, belonging to subjec- tivity. Thus, we can say that the duality of human nature is a division within one human consciousness. What then can we say about consciousness? This is the presence of a person who exists in the world not according to the laws of the world, in relation to himself. Consciousness is what glues existence and the objects of our dreams together. Trying to keep his own dreams in reality, a person endows reality with meaning, overcoming the meaninglessness of the world. Methods. One of the main methods is literary analy - sis of the works of F. M. Dostoevsky and the interpre - tations of his ideas in the space of thought of L. I. Shestov and S. A. Nikolsky. The study also involves a targeted reference to the works of V.V. Zenkovsky, V.V. Rozanov, K.V. Mochulsky, L.P. Grossman and M.M. Bakhtin. These types of analysis are aimed at identifying connotations and discrepancies in the philosophical systems of the thinkers under study, both at the level of textual analysis of their works and at the level of studying their concepts. Textual analysis is used as an auxiliary method. Scientific novelty of the research. The article traces the development of the “underground man” type in the creative space of F. M. Dostoevsky. The first attempt to conceptualize it comes from the story “The Double.” The continuation of the type is found the work “Notes from Underground”. The sci - entific novelty of the study lies in the fact that, refut - ing the already existing interpretations of this type by Russian philosophers, the author proposes an alternative one, the essence of which is as follows: the “underground man” is a dual person, who is characterized not by the classical split in philosophy into soul and body, but by the split within one’s own consciousness. In addition, the article, for the first time in scientific literature, proves the idea that the main character of the novel “Teenager” also belongs to the type of “underground man.” Results. The author explores the anthropological configurations of the philosophy of F. M. Dostoevsky and identifies the “underground man” as a special anthropological type, conceptualized in F. M. Dostoevsky’s works. The latter it is under - stood as a person with a split self, who lives not in the world, but in a picture of the world, to which he doubles reality through imagination. Such a person is characterized by a priority of the internal level over the external one and a desire for a radical reduction of the present world. Conclusions. The philosophy of F. M. Dostoevsky, whose task was to try to comprehend, defend and justify man, is characterized by a special understand - ing of the latter as one who lives only by internal causation and refuses to obey the deterministic connections thanks to which everything exists in the world of the present. (shrink)

Elements of Mind provides a unique introduction to the main problems and debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. Author Tim Crane opposes those currently popular conceptions of the mind that divide mental phenomena into two very different kinds (the intentional and the qualitative) and proposes instead a challenging and unified theory of all the phenomena of mind. In light of this theory, Crane engages students with the central problems of the philosophy of mind--the mind-body problem, the problem of (...) intentionality (or mental representation), the problem of consciousness, and the problem of perception--and attempts to find solutions to these problems. A fresh and engaging exploration of the main issues in the philosophy of mind, Elements of Mind is easily accessible to students with no background in the subject. (shrink)

BackgroundThe success of biobanking is directly linked to the willingness of people to donate their biological materials for research and storage. Ethical issues related to patient consent are an essential component of the current biobanking agenda. The majority of data available are focused on population-based biobanks in USA, Canada and Western Europe. The donation decision process and its ethical applications in clinical populations and populations in countries with other cultural contexts are very limited. This study aimed to evaluate the decision-making (...) experience of the clinical biobank donors, as well as psychological and social motivators and deterrents of this decision and associated ethical risks.MethodsSemi-structured interviews were conducted in two medical institutions, in St Petersburg (Russia), in 2016–2017, among 13 donors of a clinical biobank (pregnant women, cardiac patients, and patients with multiple sclerosis) and three donation organisers—medical specialists involved in recruiting donors for a clinical biobank. Analysis of interview data was based on qualitative content analysis.ResultsDonors of a clinical biobank express beliefs in the absence of risks associated with the donation. The primary motivators for donating to the biobank were: prosocial, indirect reciprocity (response to or anticipation of an act in kind by a third party), intrinsic motivation (to enhance their self-esteem and satisfying their curiosity about the donation process), and comparability with personal values. A high level of trust in biomedical research and the particular physician can contribute to a favourable decision. The overall decision-making process regarding the biobank donation could be described as quick and not based on a careful reading of informed consent documents. The integration of biobank donation decision-making in the process of medical care might prompt patient to donate to biobank without proper consideration. The specific type of therapeutic misconception—the presence of unrealistic hope that donation could provide a direct benefit for a third person in need was discovered.ConclusionsPatients recruited to a clinical biobank in Russia have virtually no concerns as to the storage of their biomaterials. The donation decision is mainly motivated by prosocial attitudes and other factors that are similar to the motivating factors of blood donation. The fact of going through inpatient treatment and poor differentiation between donation for other people's benefit and for research purposes can make the process of obtaining consent more ethically problematic. (shrink)

In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable ways’ (...) (1929: 52). So although any attempt to describe the given will inevitably be an interpretation of it, this should not give us reason to deny its existence: ‘no-one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this immediate presence in consciousness of that which no activity of thought can create or alter’ (1929: 53). Whatever those outside philosophy might think, Lewis was certainly right about what philosophers were prepared to deny. His conception of the ‘given’ is without question one of the targets of Wilfrid Sellars’s influential critique of the notion of the ‘whole framework of givenness’ (1957).1 One of the things Sellars was attacking was the idea that something that was merely given by the senses could put one in a position to be justified in making a judgement about the empirical world. The.. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the (...) problem of non-existence, despite what some philosophers say. (shrink)

The article considers the influence of the scientific world picture on the forms and modes of the existence of art. The author reveals the epistemological function of art in various historical periods of changing scientific paradigms, outlines the role of art in the Middle Ages (pre-scientific knowledge), the Renaissance, the New Age (classical scientific paradigm), and the period of the late 19th – first half of the 20th centuries (non-classical scientific paradigm). Particular attention is paid to modernism, in the art (...) of which the epistemological function is largely realized, and artists embody the achievements of the contemporary scientific world picture in new forms, reflecting the complexity of new scientific theories that an ordinary person must take for granted. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I (...) end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content. (shrink)

Prior negative performance and wrongdoing are difficult for applicants to overcome during their job search. The result has often been that they resort to lies and deception in order to obtain employment. The present study examines “stealing thunder” as a trust repair tactic that might be useful for overcoming prior indiscretions when it is used by applicants during the selection interview process. Stealing thunder refers to the self-disclosure of negative information that preempts allegations of wrongdoing by third parties such as (...) hiring managers. Data were collected using a scenario-based 2 X 2 experimental design in which perceptions of integrity, trust, and employability were measured. Results indicated that a stealing thunder strategy that involved accepting responsibility under a low likelihood of transgression discovery led to higher ratings of trust than blaming others when discovery of wrongdoing was imminent. The stealing thunder strategy was somewhat more effective than when a traditional, post-allegation apology was used. But stealing thunder did not lead to higher levels of an overall willingness to hire the applicant. (shrink)

The first edition was awarded the '2005 Textbook Award of the Association of University Professors of Management (Verband der Hochschullehrer fur ...

The currently standard philosophical conception of existence makes a connection between three things: certain ways of talking about existence and being in natural language; certain natural language idioms of quantification; and the formal representation of these in logical languages. Thus a claim like ‘Prime numbers exist’ is treated as equivalent to ‘There is at least one prime number’ and this is in turn equivalent to ‘Some thing is a prime number’. The verb ‘exist’, the verb phrase ‘there is’ and the (...) quantifier ‘some’ are treated as all playing similar roles, and these roles are made explicit in the standard common formalization of all three sentences by a single formula of first-order logic: ‘(∃ x )[P( x ) & N( x )]’, where ‘P( x )’ abbreviates ‘ x is prime’ and ‘N( x )’ abbreviates ‘ x is a number’. The logical quantifier ‘∃’ accordingly symbolizes in context the role played by the English words ‘exists’, ‘some’ and ‘there is’. (shrink)

This paper presents and defends an account of the coincidence of biological organisms with mereological sums of their material components. That is, an organism and the sum of its material components are distinct material objects existing in the same place at the same time. Instead of relying on historical or modal differences to show how such coincident entities are distinct, this paper argues that there is a class of physiological properties of biological organisms that their coincident mereological sums do not (...) have. The account answers some of the most pressing objections to coincidence, for example the so-called grounding problem , that material coincidence seems to require that coinciding objects have modal differences that do not supervene on any other properties. (shrink)

This paper seeks to explore the empirical agenda of business ethics research from a methodological perspective. It is argued that the quality of empirical research in the field remains relatively poor and unconvincing. Drawing on the distinctions between the two main philosophical positions from which methodologies in the social sciences are derived – positivism and interpretism – it is argued that it is business ethics' tradition of positivist, and highly quantitative approaches which may be at the root of these epistemological (...) problems. Six distinct aspects of business ethics research are identified and assessed according to their methodological impact. Accordingly, it is argued that more interpretive approaches may offer substantial liberating potential in the development of a stronger and more theory-rich empirical base. The author concludes by arguing for greater plurality and diversity in empirical research methodologies in the business ethics field. (shrink)

Brentano’s account of what he called intentionale Inexistenz — what we now call intentionality — is without question one of the most important parts of his philosophy, and one of the most influential ideas in late 19th-century philosophy. Here I will explain how this idea figures in Brentano’s central text, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1995a). I will then briefly explain how Brentano’s ideas about intentionality evolved after the first publication of this work in 1874, and how they were (...) then misinterpreted by some influential analytic philosophers. (shrink)

Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences. They may not all agree with the spirit of Rutherford's quoted remark that 'there is physics; and there is stamp-collecting',' but they all grant physical science (...) a unique ontological authority: the authority to tell us what there is. Physicalism is now almost orthodox in much philosophy, notably in much recent philosophy of mind. But although often invoked, it is rarely explicitly defined. It should be. The claim that everything is physical is not as clear as it seems. In this paper, we examine a number of proposed definitions of physicalism and reasons for being a physicalist. We will argue both that physicalism lacks a clear and credible definition, and that in no non-vacuous interpretation is it true. We are concerned here only with physicalism as a doctrine about the empirical world. In particular, it should not be confused with nominalism, the doctrine that there are no universals.2 Nominalism and physicalism are quite independent doctrines. Believers in universals may as consistently assert as deny that the only properties and relations are those studied by physical science. And nominalists may with equal consistency assert or deny that physical science could provide enough predicates to describe the world. That is the question which concerns physicalists, not whether physical predicates name real universals. (We will for brevity write as if they do, but we do not need that assumption.). (shrink)

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship (...) to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”. (shrink)

This paper reviews and analyses the implications of citizenship thinking for building ethical institutional arrangements for business. The paper looks at various stakeholder groups whose relation with the company changes quite significantly when one starts to conceptualize it in terms of citizenship. Rather than being simply stakeholders, we could see those groups either as citizens, or as other constituencies participating in the administration of citizenship for others, or in societal governance more broadly. This raises crucial questions about accountability and democracy (...) in stakeholder relations with the corporation. We sketch out the main currents informing and emerging from the citizenship perspective on firm-stakeholder relations; analyze specific stakeholder groups and their particular relevance in the context of a citizenship perspective; and conclude with a discussion of the broader implications in terms of building ethical institutions. (shrink)

This book is concerned with the alleged capacity of the human mind to arrive at beliefs and knowledge about the world on the basis of pure reason without any dependence on sensory experience. Most recent philosophers reject the view and argue that all substantive knowledge must be sensory in origin. Laurence BonJour provocatively reopens the debate by presenting the most comprehensive exposition and defence of the rationalist view that a priori insight is a genuine basis for knowledge. This important book (...) will be at the centre of debate about the theory of knowledge for many years to come. (shrink)

Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...) claim is not, of course, that the child’s experience is ‘empty’; but that, unlike the scientist, it does not see the tube as a cathode ray tube. One way of supporting this claim is to say that one cannot see something as an F unless one has the concept F. Since the child plainly lacks the concept of a cathode ray tube, it cannot see it as a cathode ray tube. Although Perceptual Relativism is hard to believe, this supporting suggestion is not so implausible. After all, when we see (and more generally, perceive) the world, the world is presented to us in a particular way; so how can we see it as being that way unless we have some idea or conception of the way it is presented? We need not be committed to a representative theory of perception to think that perceptions in some sense represent the world. We can express this by saying that perceptions have content. Now it is a commonplace that the contents of beliefs and the other propositional attitudes involve concepts. The belief that this thing is a cathode ray tube involves, in some sense, the concept cathode ray tube. So the line of thought behind Perceptual Relativism may be expressed thus: seeing an F as an F is a state with content. (shrink)

The celebrated "Twin Earth" arguments of Hilary Putnam (1975) and Tyler Burge (1979) aim to establish that some intentional states logically depend on facts external to the subjects of those states. Ascriptions of states of these kinds to a thinker entail that the thinker's environment is a certain way. It is not possible that the thinker could be in those very intentional states unless the environment is that way...

Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind’s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind–body problem. I treat these themes separately: chapters 1, and 3–5 are concerned with intentionality, while chapter 2 is about the mind–body problem. In this summary I will first describe my view of the mind–body problem, and then describe the book’s main theme. Like many philosophers, I see the mind–body problem as containing two (...) sub–problems: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. I see these problems forming the two horns of a dilemma. Just as the problem of mental causation pushes us towards physicalism, so the problem of consciousness pushes us away from it. Each problem reveals the inadequacy of the solution to the other. Essentially the problem of mental causation is the conflict between (i) the apparent fact that mental states and events have effects in the physical world and (ii) a general principle about the causal nature of the physical world, which is sometimes called the ‘causal closure’ or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical world. This principle says that all physical effects have physical causes which are enough to bring them about. The problem then is simple: how can a mental cause have a physical effect if that effect also has a physical cause which is enough to bring it about? Barring massive overdetermination of our actions by independent causes, it seems that the best answer is to identify the mental and the physical causes. And this is traditionally how physicalists have argued for their identity theory of mind and body. However, many physicalists reject the identity theory, and therefore they have to solve the mental causation problem in some other way. At present, there is no consensus among physicalists on which of the currently proposed solutions is correct. In chapter 2 of EM I propose an alternative, which I call ‘emergentism’. Inspired by the rejection of the identity theory, Emergentism is the idea that mental properties are genu.. (shrink)

‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...) derives from scholastic discussions of concepts or intentiones.2 Rather, his originality consists in his claim that the concept of intentionality marks out the subject matter of psychology: the mental. His view was that intentionality ‘is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything like it’.3 This is Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental. Despite the centrality of the concept of intentionality in contemporary philosophy of mind, and despite the customary homage paid to Brentano as the one who revived the terminology and placed the concept at the centre of philosophy, Brentano’s thesis is widely rejected by contemporary philosophers of mind. What is more, its rejection is not something which is thought to require substantial philosophical argument. Rather, the falsity of the thesis is taken as a starting-point in many contemporary discussions of intentionality, something so obvious that it only needs to be stated to be recognised as true. Consider, for instance, these remarks from the opening pages of Searle’s Intentionality: Some, not all, mental states and events have Intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional.... My beliefs and desires must always be about something. But my nervousness and undirected anxiety need not in that way be about anything.4 Searle takes this as obvious, so obvious that it is not in need of further argument or elucidation. (shrink)

Social media is fueling the increasing individualization of impact metrics. While democratizing for some, for others, the move reinforces privilege and exacerbates inequality.

What is the relation of philosophy and teaching? Do we start from philosophy and then work to close the gap through a process of application? Do we start from teaching, and work to create a space for philosophical reflection? Is it enough to include philosophical texts and activities in teacher education? Or perhaps we need to include teachers from the start as collaborators in the production of philosophical work. Of, in, for, with: it seems that every preposition has been proposed (...) to join teaching and philosophy–a perennial dilemma that philosophers of education are far too familiar with. These anxious efforts to close the gap only reinforce our narrow, lopsided images of each endeavor. The teacher turns outward; the philosopher inward. Teaching is mired in the quotidian; philosophy prone to pointless abstraction. Called to act, the teacher works within the constraints of institutions; called to question, the philosopher practices principled withdrawal. While there is a grain of truth here, such contrasts obscure a key fact: philosophy and teaching are deeply kindred practices. The contemporary tragedies unfolding in Gaza and Israel serve as an urgent reminder of the costs of cleaving contemplation from action. Indeed, we will argue that the alienation of teaching (a practical endeavor if ever there was one) and philosophy (the contemplative discipline par excellence) damages the integrity of each. In what follows, we explore three conceptual sites—the posing of questions, the act of walking together, and the effort to discover what is at stake—which demonstrate a welcome return, or reunion, between philosophy and teaching. (shrink)

Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.

NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED IN ANY FORM WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE PUBLISHER.

Acknowledging the increasing attention in the literature devoted to the incorporation of ethical considerations into consumers' purchase decisions, this paper explores the notion of an ethical product. It is argued that ethical issues have long been involved in consumers' product evaluations, but that there has been little academic investigation of ethics in terms of product concepts and theories. Ethics are thus examined in the context of the augmented product concept, and two dimensions of ethical augmentation are identified: direction and content. (...) These dimensions are set out and discussed at some length, and then they are used to construct an ethical product matrix. It is shown how this could be used to provide structure and coherence to examinations of the perceived ethics of any given product offering. The implications of the analysis offered in the paper are discussed, and a number of limitations of the ethical product notion are identified. Finally some conclusions and directions for future research are suggested. (shrink)

This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species (...) names are rigid designators and show how this provides additional motivation for SAI. (shrink)

Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...) first is not. And we also occasionally distinguish mental pain (which is normally understood as some kind of emotional distress) from the ‘physical pain’ one feels in one’s body. So what can be meant by saying that pain is a mental state? Of course, it only takes a little reflection shows that this naive view is mistaken. Pain is a state of consciousness, or an event in consciousness, and whether or not all states of mind are conscious, it is indisputable that only minds, or states of mind, are conscious.2 But does the naive view tell us anything about the concept of pain, or the concept of mind? I think it does. In this paper, I shall give reasons for thinking that consciousness is a form of intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’. I shall claim that the consciousness involved in bodily sensations like pain is constituted by the mind’s direction upon the part or region of the body where the sensation feels to be. Given this, it is less surprising that the naive view of pain says what it does: the apparent ‘physicality’ of pain is a consequence of confusing the object of the intentional state—the part of the body in which the pain is felt—with the state of being in pain. (shrink)