Sociobiology has ignored the results of psychology, which is the discipline between biology and society. Campbell's target article fills some of the gaps beautifully, but the fact that women's direct and physical aggression has increased during the past 20 years, undermines Campbell's evolutionary explanation of female aggression. The two classical types of theoretical explanations of aggression are that (1) aggression is a drive and (2) aggression is instrumental behavior. Expressive aggression, assumed to be typical of women, is no (...) more drive aggression than is men's aggression. (shrink)

To 'consequentialise' is to take a putatively non-consequentialist moral theory and show that it is actually just another form of consequentialism. Some have speculated that every moral theory can be consequentialised. If this were so, then consequentialism would be empty; it would have no substantive content. As I argue here, however, this is not so. Beginning with the core consequentialist commitment to 'maximising the good', I formulate a precise definition of consequentialism and demonstrate that, given this definition, several sorts of (...) moral theory resist consequentialisation. My strategy is to decompose consequentialism into three conditions, which I call 'agent neutrality', 'no moral dilemmas', and 'dominance', and then to exhibit some moral theories which violate each of these. (shrink)

Should we allow grave harm to befall one individual so as to prevent minor harms befalling sufficiently many other individuals? This is a question of aggregation. Can many small harms ‘add up’, so that, collectively, they morally outweigh a greater harm? The ‘Close Enough View’ supports a moderate position: aggregation is permissible when, and only when, the conflicting harms are sufficiently similar, or ‘close enough’, to each other. This paper surveys a range of formally precise interpretations of this view, and (...) reveals some of the problems they face. It also proposes a novel interpretation which avoids these problems. (shrink)

In Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that existence is always a harm. His argument, in brief, is that this follows from a theory of personal good which we ought to accept because it best explains several ‘asymmetries’. I shall argue here that Benatar's theory suffers from a defect which was already widely known to afflict similar theories, and that the main asymmetry he discusses is better explained in a way which allows that existence is often not a (...) harm. (shrink)

I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's 'organic unities', and Jonathan Dancy's 'value holism'. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism (...) ought to be retained because (a) it eliminates the needless multiplication of values inherent in variable evaluations, and (b) it preserves a certain necessary connection between values and reasons, which Dancy himself endorses. (shrink)

How do reasons combine? How is it that several reasons taken together can have a combined weight which exceeds the weight of any one alone? I propose an answer in mereological terms: reasons combine by composing a further, complex reason of which they are parts. Their combined weight is the weight of their combination. I develop a mereological framework, and use this to investigate some structural views about reasons, the main two being "Atomism" and "Holism". Atomism is the view that (...) atomic reasons are fundamental: all reasons reduce to atomic reasons. Holism is the view that whole reasons are fundamental. I argue for Holism, and against Atomism. I also consider whether reasons might be "context-sensitive". (shrink)

Should harms to different individuals be aggregated? Moderate views answer yes and no. Aggregation is appropriate in some but not all cases. Such views need to determine a threshold at which aggregation switches from appropriate to inappropriate. Alex Voorhoeve proposes a method for determining this threshold which links other-regarding and self-regarding ethics. This proposal, however, implies a spurious correlation between favoring aggregation and egoism.

Moral conclusions cannot validly be inferred from nonmoral premises – this principle, commonly called “Hume’s law,” presents a conundrum. On one hand, it seems obviously true, and its truth is often simply taken for granted. On the other hand, an ingenious argument by A. N. Prior seems to refute it. My aim here is a resolution. I shall argue, first, that Hume’s law is ambiguous, admitting both a strong and a weak interpretation; second, that the strong interpretation is false, as (...) shown by Prior’s argument; and, third, that the weak interpretation is true. (shrink)

I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeed in showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given the structure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim that qualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tension is that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they have causal efficacy, while his argument for the epiphenomenal (...) character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they are non-physical. Since these two arguments cannot be combined coherently, the most Jackson's argument can establish is that qualia are non-physical. (shrink)

Campbell came to the Klamath marshes, a wetland in southern Oregon formed by three ancient, shallow lakes, a vast emptiness that is paradoxically home to an amazing diversity of life, of untold thousands of birds both migratory and resident, of all the interconnected life forms that make up one of North America's richest natural environments.".

This paper considers the impact which developments in neuroscience seem likely to have on our inherited, intuitive psychology ? the system of beliefs called ?folk psychology? by enthusiasts for its elimination. The paper argues that while closer relations between a developing genuinely scientific cognitive psychology and a burgeoning neurological understanding are to be welcomed, physiology will not reduce psychology, and the concepts belonging to intuitive psychology will be transformed and enriched, but not discredited or discarded, when psychology, in its cognitive (...) form, emerges as a science with genuine explanatory power. The analogy between belief and desire, on one hand, and witches and phlogiston, on the other, is rejected. So is the parallel between folk psychology and folk physics. We face the choice, on Churchland's principles, between the rejection of historical, literary, and moral culture, and accepting a dualism in human thought which despairs of a comprehensively naturalistic vision of ourselves. (shrink)

Following the socialist revolution, a colossal shift in everyday realities began in the 1920s and '30s in the former Russian empire. Faced with the Siberian North, a vast territory considered culturally and technologically backward by the revolutionary government, the Soviets confidently undertook the project of reshaping the ordinary lives of the indigenous peoples in order to fold them into the Soviet state. In Agitating Images, Craig Campbell draws a rich and unsettling cultural portrait of the encounter between indigenous Siberians (...) and Russian communists and reveals how photographs from this period complicate our understanding of this history. Agitating Images provides a glimpse into the first moments of cultural engineering in remote areas of Soviet Siberia. The territories were perceived by outsiders to be on the margins of civilization, replete with shamanic rituals and inhabited by exiles, criminals, and "primitive" indigenous peoples. The Soviets hoped to permanently transform the mythologized landscape by establishing socialist utopian developments designed to incorporate minority cultures into the communist state. This book delves deep into photographic archives from these Soviet programs, but rather than using the photographs to complement an official history, Campbell presents them as anti-illustrations, or intrusions, that confound simple narratives of Soviet bureaucracy and power. Meant to agitate, these images offer critiques that cannot be explained in text alone and, in turn, put into question the nature of photographs as historical artifacts. An innovative approach to challenging historical interpretation, Agitating Images demonstrates how photographs go against accepted premises of Soviet Siberia. All photographs, Campbell argues, communicate in unique ways that present new and even contrary possibilities to the text they illustrate. Ultimately, Agitating Images dissects our very understanding of the production of historical knowledge. (shrink)

It is often acknowledged that public policies can constrain people's procreative opportunities, in some cases even infringing their procreative rights. However, a topic that is not often discussed is how the procreative choices of one generation can affect the procreative opportunities of later generations. In this article, we argue that the demographic fact that childbearing above the replacement fertility level is eventually unsustainable supports two constraints on universal procreation rights: a compossibility constraint and an egalitarian constraint. We explore the implications (...) of these two constraints and suggest that there are reasons to think of procreative opportunity as a finite resource that can be distributed more or less equally across generations. We also briefly discuss possible ways of meeting demands of intergenerational justice with respect to procreative opportunity. (shrink)

Using exploratory factor analysis on a unique dataset of global executives, we find that their perceptions of their national government’s risk management effectiveness are largely driven by two latent factors: leadership virtue, and governance. We show that the leadership virtue signal is potentially a stronger signal. We hypothesize that this may be because making decisions and taking actions to manage risk is a continuous process requiring inter alia foresight and moral discipline in looking to the interests of others and acting (...) in service to those interests above self-interest. This suggests at least two propositions for further testing, for which, we offer rhetorical argument and anecdotal evidence at the end of this paper and suggest methodologies for further testing. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to uncover this connection empirically between national risk management and leadership virtue. (shrink)

The so-called “Levelling Down Objection” is commonly believed to occupy a central role in the debate between egalitarians and prioritarians. Egalitarians think that equality is good in itself, and so they are committed to finding value even in such equality as may only be achieved by “levelling down”–i.e., by merely reducing the better off to the level of the worse off. Although egalitarians might deny that levelling down could ever make for an all-things-considered improvement, they cannot deny that it may (...) make things better in at least one respect. Prioritarians, on the other hand, do deny this; according to them, levelling down cannot make things better in any respect. In this paper I argue that the Levelling Down Objection leans far too heavily on a heretofore unanalysed notion: namely, the notion of “being better in this or that respect.” I propose what I take to be a plausible analysis of that notion, and show that, given the proposed analysis, the prioritarian is no less vulnerable to the Levelling Down Objection than is the egalitarian. I conclude that proponents of the Levelling Down Objection need either to suggest a better analysis or abandon the Levelling Down Objection altogether. (shrink)

How We Know is intended as a summary (and a modest extension) of Objectivist epistemology. Binswanger's treatment of a wide range of epistemological issues is examined. Because his theory of propositions is inadequate and his philosophy of mind is an extreme form of dualism, Binswanger has added little to previous efforts by “official” Objectivists. As a work of epistemology in the broad sense, Binswanger's effort is fatally impaired. It is undone by his bifurcation between consciousness and the physics of the (...) brain, which, if accepted, would largely deprive psychology and even computer science of their subject matter. (shrink)

Hübner and White argue that we should not administer DBS to psychopathic prisoners. While we are sympathetic to their conclusion, we argue that the authors’ two central arguments for this conclusion are problematic. Their first argument appeals to an overly restrictive conception of individual medical benefit: namely, that an individual medical benefit must alleviate subjective suffering. We highlight cases that clearly constitute individual medical benefits although there is no relief of subjective suffering. The second argument depends on an overly restrictive (...) conception of the sort of motivation needed to ground consent to a medical procedure. It is also too quick to treat it as unproblematic to consider psychopaths as fully competent. We argue that this view overlooks certain kinds of internal motivation. It also overlooks the possibility that after successful activation of underactive brain-regions, a former psychopath might become a better representative of his or her “true self.” -/- . (shrink)

This paper reports the key findings from two student surveys undertaken at our institution in the academic years 2020-21 and 2021-22. The research was based on the Bretag et al. (2018) student survey undertaken in various Australian universities. After discussions with both Bretag and Harper, we adapted the questions to our context – a Russell Group university in the UK – but included similar questions to enable a comparison, and to find out if there were common themes. The main aim (...) of the surveys was to understand our students’ awareness of what is meant by the term ‘academic integrity’, defined as ‘being honest in your work, acknowledging the work of others and giving credit where you have used other people’s ideas/data’ https://secretariat.leeds.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/109/2022/12/academic_integrity.pdf. The responses provided an important insight into student attitudes to academic integrity, their understanding of academic malpractice, and their awareness of the penalties if found to have plagiarised, and if found guilty of contract cheating (Medway et al., 2018; Morris, 2018; Harper et al., 2019). The surveys also identified what students would find useful in developing their understanding of academic integrity, and this underlines the importance of consulting our students. Key findings include gaps in the information provided to students, the need for regular and timely reminders of the principles of academic integrity, and the need for guidance to be written using student-friendly language. The findings informed our recommendations in terms of teaching and learning at School/Faculty level and to policy at University level, to further support student success. In the context of the key issues raised by the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) Academic Integrity Charter (2020), we discuss examples of best practice currently undertaken at the University of Leeds, on-going discussions regarding developments, and our recommendations for further embedding a culture of academic integrity. We argue that all students should have the same baseline experience and therefore promoting this ethos is the responsibility of all staff who teach and support students. (shrink)

in Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, in press).

Striking similarities across ape gestural repertoires suggest shared phylogenetic origins that likely provided a foundation for the emergence of language. We pilot a novel approach for exploring possible semantic universals across human and nonhuman ape species. In a forced‐choice task, n = 300 participants watched 10 chimpanzee gesture forms performed by a human and chose from responses that paralleled inferred meanings for chimpanzee gestures. Participants agreed on a single meaning for nine gesture forms; in six of these the agreed form‐meaning (...) pair response(s) matched those established for chimpanzees. Such shared understanding suggests apes' (including humans') gesturing shares deep evolutionary origins. (shrink)

Cassandra speaking.The first of these lines is not in dispute; the three which follow are notorious; they are subjoined as in the manuscripts, with punctuation to mark the ostensible construction:ε δ ἔπαρχος Ίλίοʊ τ άναστάτηςούκ οἶδεν οἶδ уλσσα μισητς κʊѵòςλέξασα καì κτείνασα ϕαιδρόνοʊς, δίκηνἄτης λαθραίοʋ τεύξεται κακῇ τύχῃ.