It is now standard to distinguish between two kinds of rationality: substantive rationality, which consists in holding attitudes that are substantively reasonable or justified, and structural rationality, which consists in holding attitudes that fit together in the right ways. What, if anything, unifies these two kinds of rationality? In this paper, I propose that norms of rationality arise because we are epistemically limited beings who cannot directly ensure the correctness of our attitudes. Substantive and structural rationality represent two different ways (...) of manifesting a fundamental commitment to getting things correct, given our epistemic limitations. Correspondingly, substantive and structural irrationality are distinct rational failures. Substantively irrational attitudes involve a failure to live up to the commitments that constitute those attitudes. Structurally irrational combinations of attitudes are constituted by inconsistent commitments, which guarantees that we will fail to live up to at least some of our commitments in holding these attitudes. (shrink)

In this essay, I develop an account of belief as commitment to the truth of a proposition. On my account, to believe p is to represent p as true by way of committing to the truth of p. To commit to the truth of p, in the sense I am interested in, is to exercise the normative power to subject one’s representation of p as true to the normative standard of truth. As I argue, my account of belief as commitment (...) of the truth explains a variety of features of belief that separate it from attitudes like acceptance, supposition, and imagination. Most importantly, it explains the distinctive connection between belief and evidence. Moreover, my account helps solve three further puzzles about belief, regarding doxastic voluntarism, the aim of belief, and Moore’s paradox. (shrink)

This paper defends an account of moral worth. Moral worth is a status that some, but not all, morally right actions have. Unlike with merely right actions, when an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is necessarily creditworthy for doing the right thing. First, I argue that two dominant views of moral worth have been unable to fully capture this necessary connection. On one view, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent is motivated by the (...) features of the action that make it right. On the other, an action is morally worthy if and only if its agent is motivated by the action’s rightness itself. Neither of these views captures the connection between moral worth and creditworthiness, because each view leaves room for cases of accidentally doing the right thing. Next, I develop a new account, which I call the Guise of Moral Reasons Account. On my account, morally worthy actions are right actions that are motivated by moral reasons as such. This account rules out cases of accidentally doing the right thing, thus capturing the necessary connection between moral worth and creditworthiness for doing the right thing. (shrink)

This chapter discusses some of Anscombe’s contributions to the philosophy of practical reason. It focuses particularly on Anscombe’s view of what it is to act for reasons. I begin by discussing the relationship between acting intentionally and acting for reasons in Anscombe's theory of action. I then further explicate her view by discussing her rejection of two related views about acting for reasons: causalism (the view that reasons are a kind of cause of actions) and psychologism (the view that reasons (...) are mental states like desires and beliefs). In the process, I try to show that Anscombe’s rejection of these theses does not leave us with mystery, but rather sheds light on an interesting and serious heterodox view of acting for reasons. I conclude by suggesting that though Anscombe's views have been taken sufficiently seriously by philosophers of action, they should be taken more seriously by philosophers of practical reason. (shrink)

In this commentary, I raise a few questions about Schmidt’s argument against (R-E): whether facts about incoherence are directly reasons for suspension on particular propositions, as opposed to reasons against sets of attitudes; whether (R-E) should really be formulated in terms of a broad category of “doxastic attitudes” that includes transitional attitudes like suspension; and whether incoherence-based reasons really must fit into the category of “epistemic reasons,” as opposed to be a more general category of right-kind reasons. Though my questions (...) reflect some skepticism about the specifics of Schmidt’s argument, I conclude that it succeeds in what I take to be its broader aim. (shrink)

In Greek Late Antiquity philosophy defined itself above all through the interpretation of authoritative texts such as Plato's dialogues or the treatises of Aristotle. This work looks at the last Late Antique commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, the pagan Simplicius and the Christian Philoponus. Golitsis demonstrates how differently the two contemporaries interpreted the philosophical tradition and how this led them to deducedifferent routes to finding the truth.

Our concern in this paper lies with a common argument from racial discrimination to realism about races: some people are discriminated against for being members of a particular race (i.e., racial discrimination exists), so some people must be members of that race (i.e., races exist). Error theorists have long responded that we can explain racial discrimination in terms of racial attitudes alone, so we need not explain it in terms of race itself. But to date there has been little detailed (...) discussion of whether it is better to explain racial discrimination in terms of race or in terms of racial attitudes alone. Our goal is to offer a novel and detailed argument in defense of explaining racial discrimination in terms of racial attitudes alone, by attending to the neglected phenomenon of misperception discrimination, which involves differential treatment due to misperceived race. We argue that the discriminatory action in misperception cases must be explained in the same way as cases where (according to the realist) the victim’s race is accurately perceived. Thus, the victim’s actual race cannot provide the best explanation. The main upshot of our argument is that explanatory arguments from racial discrimination to realism about race fail. (shrink)

Both actions and beliefs are subject to normative evaluation as rational or irrational. As such, we might expect there to be some general, unified story about what makes them rational. However, orthodox approaches suggest that the rationality of action is determined by practical considerations, while the rationality of belief is determined by properly epistemic considerations. This apparent disunity leads some, like Rinard (2019), to reject orthodox theories of the rationality of belief in favor of pragmatism. In this paper, I argue (...) we should reject pragmatist approaches to unifying the rationality of action and belief. Instead, I argue, we should embrace a correctness‐based view of rationality, on which rationality is fundamentally about getting things correct as best we can, given our epistemic limitations. On such a view, the facts about rational action and belief are a function of the facts about correct action and belief. I contend that the apparent disunity of orthodox theories is created by the fact that action and belief have different correctness conditions. Nevertheless, on the correctness‐based view, this disunity is merely apparent. This renders pragmatism's revisionary implications for the rationality of belief unnecessary to take on in order unify it with the rationality of action. (shrink)

Verse work on quintessence of Dvaita Vedanta and philosophy of Vishnu faith.

In this paper I wish to discuss some relationships between philosophy and science, or rather, between the philosophy of science and the natural sciences, as well as the role of research programmes in these relationships. My interest in the topic rises out of the problems involved in teaching philosophy, and especially epistemology, to science, engineering and technology students. My “field experience” in the last five years has led me to the conclusion that the purpose is better served through a programme (...) of courses of different levels carried out by the joined forces and complementary efforts of philosophers and scientists. However, I do not intend to discuss either this conclusion or my own teaching experiences concerning a particular educational system at a particular period — in fact, one of reformation. If I mention this, it is in order to draw attention to two implicit distinctions, made by teachers and students, philosophers and scientists, but not always in the same manner, which may become the source of dispute when one attempts to make them explicit. The two distinctions are (a) the one between philosophy (of science) and (the natural) science(s), and (b) the one between the view of science presented in the philosophy of science and the view of science created by the scientists and science teachers. (shrink)

Whether an individual doctoral study or a large-scale multidisciplinary project, researchers working across cultures face particular challenges around power, identity, and voice, as they encounter ethical dilemmas which extend beyond the micro-level of the researcher-researched relationship. In using a cross-cultural perspective on how to conceptualise research problems, collect data, and disseminate findings in an ethical manner, they also engage with the geopolitics of academic writing, language inequalities, and knowledge construction within a globalised economy. It is increasingly recognised that existing ethical (...) codes and paradigms either do not sufficiently address such issues or tend to be rather restrictive and insensitive to multiple and complex cultural and contextual differences. This book extends our understanding of the ethical issues and dilemmas faced by researchers in comparative and international education. It asks what the relevance of postcolonial theory is for understanding research ethics in comparative and international education; whether Western ethical practices in qualitative social research are incompatible with cultures outside the West; how a ‘situated’ approach can be developed for exploring research ethics across cultures and institutions; and how ‘informed consent’ can be negotiated when the process appears to contradict community values and practices. In sharing experiences from a wide range of cultural and institutional contexts, the authors offer both theoretical resources and practical guidance for conducting research ethically across cultures. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education. _. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of the reasons for which we act, believe, and so on for any Ф such that there can be reasons for which we Ф. Such reasons are standardly called motivating reasons. I argue that three dominant views of motivating reasons (psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism) all fail to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. I show this by drawing out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and demonstrating how each view (...) fails to satisfy at least one of these constraints. I then propose and defend my own account of motivating reasons, which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason for which someone Ф‐s when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to Ф, and (b) her representation explains, in the right way, her Ф‐ing. As I argue, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three constraints on what motivating reasons must be, and weathers several objections that might be leveled against propositionalist views. (shrink)

Susanna Rinard has recently offered a new argument for pragmatism and against evidentialism. According to Rinard, evidentialists must hold that the rationality of belief is determined in a way that is different from how the rationality of other states is determined. She argues that we should instead endorse a view she calls Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of all states is determined in the same way. In this paper, I show that Rinard’s claims are mistaken, and that evidentialism (...) is more theoretically virtuous than its opponents sometimes give it credit for. Not only does evidentialism not make an exception for belief, but it fits naturally into a unified, explanatorily powerful account of the rationality of intentional mental states. According to such an account, the rationality of all intentional mental states, including belief, is determined by the right kind of reasons for those states. Since the right kind of reasons for belief just are evidential considerations, this unified account entails evidentialism. I conclude, contra Rinard, that evidentialism can be situated within a general account of rationality that is at least as theoretically virtuous as pragmatism, if not more so. (shrink)

Damascius of Damascus, last ‘Platonic successor’ in Athens, is rarely compared to one of his masters, namely Ammonius, the philosopher of Alexandria. When scholars do compare the two Neoplatonist philosophers, they usually focus on the negative picture of Ammonius, which is drawn by Damascius in his Philosophical History. In this paper, I argue that Damascius admired Ammonius’ intellectual endeavours and espoused a basic feature of the philosophical exegesis of his master, namely his concordism regarding the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, (...) as is evident in Damascius’ surviving work on Plato and his (fragmentarily preserved) treatise On Time. Damascius’ downgrading of Ammonius came about rather as a disappointment, which is however by no means fully justified. (shrink)

Metaethical constitutivists seek to ground normativity in facts about what is constitutive of agency. One strand of constitutivism locates the foundations of normativity in constitutive aims, which are standardly conceived of in teleological terms. I present three challenges that show that the teleological conception of constitutive aims is inadequate for the constitutivist project. I then sketch an alternative conception of constitutive aims in the form of a commitment-based conception. On the commitment-based conception, actions and attitudes constitutively represent their objects as (...) having certain properties, and their constitutive aims are fixed by the accuracy-conditions of these representations. Because such representations constitutively involve a commitment on the part of the agent to the object’s having the relevant property, they generate authoritative norms for the agent. I conclude that, unlike the teleological conception, the commitment-based conception promises to yield a unified constitutivism that delivers authoritative normative standards for both actions and attitudes. (shrink)

We prove that in an arbitrary o-minimal structure, every interpretable group is definably isomorphic to a definable one. We also prove that every definable group lives in a cartesian product of one-dimensional definable group-intervals. We discuss the general open question of elimination of imaginaries in an o-minimal structure.

Introducing a largely neglected area of existing interactions between Greco-Roman antiquity and media theory, this volume brings together a range of interdisciplinary studies to address the question of why interactions in this area matter and how they might be developed further.

Hesperides Press are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in analytic philosophy that engages with non-Western philosophical traditions, including South Asian religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. However, thus far, there has been no engagement with Sikhism, despite its status as a major world religion with a rich philosophical tradition. This paper is an attempt to get a start at analytic philosophical engagement with Sikh philosophy. My focus is on Sikh ethics, and in particular on the theory of vice and (...) virtue that can be gleaned from Sikh scripture. According to this theory, the five major vices have a unified source in the vice of haumai. Haumai is a kind of false conception of oneself as singularly important, and correspondingly, a false conception of the world as revolving around oneself, as a world of objects there for one’s use. Vice, then, comes down to the failure to recognize the importance of others. The corresponding picture of virtue is that virtue consists in a recognition of the importance of others, through the recognition of an ultimate reality on which all are One. After reconstructing the Sikh theory of vice and virtue, I conclude with some comparative remarks on Sikh and Western ethics. (shrink)

McTaggart’s thesis about the unreality of time has puzzled and still puzzles philosophers of the metaphysics of time, who defend the existence of either McTaggart’s A series or McTaggart’s B series. McTaggart himself, however, was led through his analysis to view as real what he called the “C series,” which, unlike the temporal A and B series, is atemporal. The author argues that the ancient conception of time, especially of the Neoplatonist Damascius, reveals an important gap in McTaggart’s thought, namely, (...) his overlooking the idea of an integral present (that is, a present that does not form a series), which allows to account for the B series as being generated from the C series without the involvement of the A series, which has been shown by McTaggart to have a contradictory nature. This comparative account enables us to see not only that Damascius was the first presentist in the history of the metaphysics of time, but also that McTaggart’s analysis rests upon the unreflected assumption that time, if it is real, progresses linearly. (shrink)

Humans regularly pursue activities characterized by dramatic success or failure outcomes where, critically, the chances of success depend on the time invested working toward it. How should people allocate time between suchmake‐or‐breakchallenges and safe alternatives, where rewards are more predictable (e.g., linear) functions of performance? We present a formal framework for studying time allocation between these two types of activities, and we explore optimal behavior in both one‐shot and dynamic versions of the problem. In the one‐shot version, we illustrate striking (...) discontinuities in the optimal time allocation policy as we gradually change the parameters of the decision‐making problem. In the dynamic version, we formulate the optimal strategy—defined by agiving‐upthreshold—which adaptively dictates when people should stop pursuing the make‐or‐break goal. We then show that this strategy is computationally inaccessible for humans, and we explore boundedly rational alternatives. We compare the performance of the optimal model against (a) a myopic giving‐up threshold that is easier to compute, and even simpler heuristic strategies that either (b) only decide whether or not to start pursuing the goal and never give up or (c) consider giving up at a fixed number of control points. Comparing strategies across environments, we investigate the cost and behavioral implications of sidestepping the computational burden of full rationality. (shrink)

Let M = 〈M, +, <, 0, {λ}λ∈D〉 be an ordered vector space over an ordered division ring D, and G = 〈G, ⊕, eG〉 an n-dimensional group definable in M. We show that if G is definably compact and definably connected with respect to the t-topology, then it is definably isomorphic to a 'definable quotient group' U/L, for some convex V-definable subgroup U of 〈Mⁿ, +〉 and a lattice L of rank n. As two consequences, we derive Pillay's conjecture (...) for a saturated M as above and we show that the o-minimal fundamental group of G is isomorphic to L. (shrink)

In this short note we provide an example of a semi-linear group G which does not admit a semi-linear affine embedding; in other words, there is no semi-linear isomorphism between topological groups f:G→G′Mm, such that the group topology on G′ coincides with the subspace topology induced by Mm.

This research examines a series of case studies from the agricultural sector to illustrate how various models of innovation embrace value proposition. A conscious value contestation at the interface of science, policy and civil society requires transformations in the triple-helix model of university-government-industry collaboration, because reiterations in the triple-helix model of innovation, such as quadruple, quintuple and higher helices, do not necessarily address civil society concerns for human values and science ethics. This research develops and tests a matrix model of (...) university-government-industry-civil society collaboration, which involves the co-creation of inclusive and transformational spaces for value proposition. Findings suggest that the matrix model of innovation institutionalises citizen science as it serves as a moral heuristic to make seemingly apolitical science responsive to essentially contested societal values. (shrink)

This is the first of a two-volume edition of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The new edition, which includes a philosophical and philological introduction, as well as notes to textcritical issues, is based on a critical evaluation of the entire manuscript tradition of the commentary. It also takes into account its indirect tradition and the Latin translation of Juan Ginès Sepúlveda.

Zwischen 1258 und 1264 verfaßte Nikephoros Blemmydes eine Einführung in die Philosophie. Diese εἰσαγωγιϰὴ ἐπιτομὴ ist eine als Doppelhandbuch verfaßte Abhandlung, bestehend aus der ἐπιτομὴ λογιϰης und ἐπιτομὴ фυσιϰης. Während ersteres Werk mit einem Prooimion beginnt, verfügt der zweite Teil über keines. Dies bestätigt, in Verbindung mit weiteren Argumenten, die anderswo dargelegt werden, die These vom Doppelhandbuch, denn das Physiklehrbuch sollte gar nicht als selbständig gelten, sondern eine Fortsetzung der Logik sein. In historischen oder rhetorischen Werken sollte das Prooimion über (...) die Ziele des Werkes belehren, Spannung erzeugen, das Wohlwollen für den Verfasser erwecken (captatio benevolentiae) sowie als Ort für eine direkte oder indirekte Widmung dienen. (shrink)

We prove the Compact Domination Conjecture for groups definable in linear o-minimal structures. Namely, we show that every definably compact group G definable in a saturated linear o-minimal expansion of an ordered group is compactly dominated by (G/G 00, m, π), where m is the Haar measure on G/G 00 and π : G → G/G 00 is the canonical group homomorphism.

In this paper, we discuss the ethical responsibility of the Information Technology (IT) industry towards its female workforce. Although the growing IT industry experiences skills shortages, there is a declining trend in the representation of women. The paper presents evidence that the IT industry is not gender-neutral and that it does little to promote or retain its female workforce. We urge that professional codes of ethics in IT should be revised to take into account the diverse needs of its staff.

Let $\mathcal{M}$ be an o-minimal expansion of a real closed field $R$. We define the notion of a lattice in a locally definable group and then prove that every connected, definably generated subgroup of $\langle R^{n},+\rangle$ contains a definable generic set and therefore admits a lattice.

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 4 Seiten: 458-473.