This book examines the Socratic method of elenchus, or refutation.

This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but realism regarding (...) physical objects. Westphal attends to neglected topics - Kant's analyses of the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold, the 'lifelessness of matter', fallibilism, the semantics of cognitive reference, four externalist aspects of Kant's views, and the importance of Kant's Metaphysical Foundations for the Critique of Pure Reason - that illuminate Kant's enterprise in new and valuable ways. His book will appeal to all who are interested in Kant's theoretical philosophy. (shrink)

"This volume is a scholarly collection of massive biographical detail, much of which is being revealed for the first time." —Isis A selection of Fisch’s most important articles on these topics is presented here in a convenient format, including revisions and updating and a complete bibliography of Fisch’s published writings.

This paper correlates community service goals from 82 business firms with various organizational characteristics, including goals, niches, structure, context, and performance. The results demonstrate that community-service goals are positively correlated with prestige goals, assets goals, superior-design niche, net assets size, and performance on income to net assets. Community-service goals, however, were not significantly correlated with profit goals, low-price niche, multiplicity of outputs, workflow continuity, qualifications, or centralization, as expected.

Gödel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met.1 This I attempt to do.

One might have thought that if something has two or more distinct realizations, then that thing is multiply realized. Nevertheless, some philosophers have claimed that two or more distinct realizations do not amount to multiple realization, unless those distinct realizations amount to multiple “ways” of realizing the thing. Corey Maley, Gualtiero Piccinini, Thomas Polger, and Lawrence Shapiro are among these philosophers. Unfortunately, they do not explain why multiple realization requires multiple “ways” of realizing. More significantly, their efforts to articulate multiple (...) “ways” of realizing turn out to be problematic. (shrink)

In this article, I develop the idea of the “institutional insight” as a pathway to two foundational values for applied ethics: human dignity and the common good. I explore—but do not offer a definitive analysis of—these two values that I believe are critical to the progress of business ethics. In several previous articles, I have alluded to this theme, but here I hope to show that human dignity and the common good underlie both management's fiduciary duty to shareholders, and management's (...) obligations to “stakeholders.” Indeed, it may be that the frequently observed tension between the latter two normative paradigms can be resolved only by engaging in the comprehensive moral thinking afforded by the institutional insight. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's move is admirably motivated and directed, but it suffers from basic flaws which involve it in as many problems as it has warded off. This paper will attempt to trace out some of these flaws, and also to suggest how they might have been avoided. In the process, it will invoke the aid of the ancient aphorist who seems in some ways to have been a kindred spirit of Wittgenstein, and who shares with him a stress upon the public (...) or the "common" as the key to overcoming philosophy's perplexities: Heraclitus of Ephesus. The sage who, wearied by the abstruseness of vain speculation and by the chatter of the marketplace, went off to play with the children in the temple of Artemis, may have some useful hints for the gardener in the Irish monastery, wearied by the hum of the idling engine forever "gunned" by the professional philosophers. (shrink)

In this essay, I would like to do three things. First, I would like to provide a broad and brief overview of the effects of absolute poverty in creating an information gap and a digital divide and the effects of these gaps in perpetuating absolute poverty. Second, I would like to show that ordinary case intuitions, normative ethical theories, and theological considerations converge in entailing a moral obligation to help those in poverty. Third, I would like to argue, all too (...) briefly, that although this surely involves making donations of both cash and food - free of the sorts of conditions that are frequently imposed by organizations like the IMF and World Bank - it also involves donations of a sort that are specifically targeted to close the information and digital divides. (shrink)

This text predicts that the 21st century will see great steps forward in biotechnology, producing controversial ethical debates relating to the use of this technology. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, it addresses key issues in bioethics, such as medicine, nursing, law and administration.

METAPHYSICS is the most controversial and controverted of the philosophical disciplines. I want to argue, nevertheless, that if it did not already exist in some form, then it would be necessary to invent it. For the need to think fundamentally is not incidental to the inquiring energy of the human mind. That energy has taken form as myth, meditation, and reflection among a variety of peoples of diverse cultures. In our rather abstract and articulate culture, however, fundamental thinking has taken (...) the rational, argumentative and conceptual form of discourse. (shrink)

Directed reasons are reasons that rely for their normative significance on the authority one individual has with respect to another. Acts such as promising seem to generate such reasons. These reasons seem paradigmatically agent relative: they do not hold for all agents. This paper provides a defense of the claim that theform of agent relativism seemingly required by directed reasons is innocuous, and poses no general problem for a practice dependent account of directed reasons, and, therefore, for consequentialism. While the (...) position I present does not constitute a complete teleological account of value, it points toward a way of integrating directed reasons into a practice-based account of value. The position presented also remains consistent with the so called Compelling Idea that often motivates consequentialism: it is always permissible for an agent to do what will lead to the outcome that is best. (shrink)

pt. 1. The need for a philosophy of pain and suffering. The circle of life on the earth. The misuse of fear. Pain. The problems of old age. Rejuvenation. Death and dying. The hereafter. The circle of recurrence.--pt. 2. Doctors and doctoring. Surgery. Psycho-therapy. The two worlds.

This paper extends my prior analysis of Hegel’s solution to the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion to moral philosophy. So doing provides a uniform account of rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains, i.e. empirical knowledge and morals. It argues that the Pyrrhonian Dilemma refutes both foundationalist and coherentist models of justification, and raises serious issues about the justificatory adequacy of contemporary forms of moral constructivism. It explicates and defends Kant’s account of the autonomy of reason as the self-critical regulation of (...) one’s own thought and judgment in view of relevant principles, standards, evidence and alternative analyses. It argues that Kant’s account of autonomy is defensible independently of transcendental idealism and of natural causality. Due to our fallibility and incomplete knowledge and understanding, our individual critical self-assessment requires the constructive mutual criticism of others. Hence maximally rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains is in part, ineliminably, a social and historical phenomenon. These aspects of rational justification are consistent with, and ultimately support, realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about basic moral principles. One’s own maximally rational justification of non-formal, substantive claims or views accordingly requires recognition of one’s justificatory dependence upon the constructive criticism of others. This requires recognizing their capacities for critical assessment and rational justification. This is the most fundamental form of mutual recognition in Hegel’s analysis. It provides direct and powerful justification for Kant’s thesis that we ought and must respect all others as autonomous rational agents, as agents who can think and act on the basis of justifying reasons. This justification is independent of Kant’s account of ‘dignity’ or the incommensurable value of rational agency. (shrink)

This is the first book to focus on the ethic that Dietrich Bonhoeffer constructed during the 1930s—an ethic he crafted while playing a key role in Christian resistance to Nazism and an ethic still inspiring politically active Christians. The ethic of discipleship, this study argues, represents a reworking of the Christian faith so that it becomes actively opposed to totalitarianism. This book therefore adds a significant dimension to the published record concerning the German theologian and pastor executed in 1945 for (...) conspiring to assassinate Hitler and overthrow the Third Reich. Since an ethic reflects more than a cognitive assent and has emotional and experiential dimensions, the author's approach is socio-psychological, drawing on the large documentary record of Bonhoeffer's family relations. Reductionism, however, is rejected in this book, which gives social psychology parity but not superiority—in understanding Bonhoeffer's religious quest and political dialogue. (shrink)

An invaluable companion to Green’s comprehensive collection of Strauss’s writings on Maimonides, this volume shows how Strauss confronted the commonly accepted approaches to the medieval philosopher, resulting in both a new ...