This commentary on the argument by Jablonka & Ginsburg ( 2022 ) that unlimited associative learning (UAL) provides an evolutionary marker for the transition to consciousness raises the question, “Transition to what?” The proposal that a level of consciousness required for UAL would embody eight specific criteria is credible, but can a limited degree of sentience still exist in animals that lack some of the criteria? The article makes a compelling case that UAL could serve as a marker for the (...) transition to an evolutionarily sustainable level of consciousness, but this may be different from _minimal_ consciousness. Nonetheless, the insight of these authors provides an exemplary roadmap for research on the evolutionary emergence of subjective experience in early animal evolution. (shrink)

Both Plato and Aristotle have something to say about admiration. But in order to know where to look, and in order to appreciate the force of their remarks, we need to sketch a little of the ethical background that they presuppose. I begin, therefore, with ancient Greek ethics in the wider sense, and discuss the treatment of admiration and related attitudes by Homer, Herodotus, and other pre-Platonic sources. Then I turn to the views of Plato, Adam Smith, Aristotle and Cicero. (...) This order of discussion allows us to see why admiration is both morally significant and, in some respects, morally unreliable. (shrink)

Authorial and artistic declarations would seem to be a boon to interpreters who favor actual intentionalism. However, because they believe there are limits on the power of authors and artists to embody their intentions in their works, moderate actual intentionalists hold that some intentions are irrelevant. Looking closely at authorial declaration about the sexuality of Albus Dumbledore in the Harry Potter novels, I argue in favor of the extreme actual intentionalist position that genuine authorial declarations should not be ignored because (...) authorial intention always determines meaning. The answer to the question in the subtitle is that we do not know with certainty, even though there is a definite right answer. We can argue for the answer we think is most likely, however. And aided by the distinction between meaning and significance, extreme actual intentionalism provides a clear and consistent way of making such arguments while avoiding the problem of being stuck with an interpretation we find aesthetically displeasing. (shrink)

Kant takes autonomy to be recognizably valuable. In claiming that non-Kantian views of morality treat the morally good will as heteronomous, he intends to present an objection to these views. He expects proponents of these views to recognize that the implication of heteronomy is a serious objection; his task is not to convince them that heteronomy is bad, but to convince them that their views imply heteronomy.

: Julia Kristeva coined the term intertextuality in 1966, and since that time intertextuality has come to have almost as many meanings as users. No small task, I clarify what intertextuality means for Kristeva and her mentor/colleague, Roland Barthes before criticizing their concept of intertextuality and its application in interpretation. Because no rational and coherent concept of intertextuality is offered by Kristeva, Barthes, or their Epigoni, I conclude that intertextuality should be stricken from the lexicon of sincere and intelligent humanists.

v. 1. Philosophy before Socrates -- v. 2. Socrates and his contemporaries -- v. 3. Plato's ethics -- v. 4. Plato's metaphysics and epistemology -- v. 5. Aristotle's ethics -- v. 6. Aristotle: substance, form, and matter -- v. 7. Aristotle: metaphysics, epistemology, natural philosophy -- v. 8. Hellenistic philosophy.

Bayle est souvent considéré comme sceptique, mais sa conception de la raison n’est pas toujours claire ; ce qui en revanche est clair, c’est qu’il manifeste une profonde méfiance à l’égard des capacités de la raison de livrer une connaissance certaine. Cependant, une nouvelle interprétation de Bayle comme rationaliste « stratonicien » a été développée par Gianluca Mori, qui donne une description détaillée de Bayle comme philosophe critique désireux de rendre compte de toutes positions possibles dans leur complexité et de (...) tirer toutes les conséquences des arguments invoqués au service des principes dits « stratoniciens ». Cette conception de Bayle comme rationaliste critique stratonicien rend possible une interprétation de Bayle moins comme un « supersceptique » à la Richard Popkin, que celui qui permet à la raison d’opérer avec une portée et une autorité plus grandes que ne le permettrait le scepticisme. Mori affirme que la conception de la raison chez Bayle est assez forte ; selon lui, la raison peut aller jusqu’au bout, avec une autorité absolue, et tirer des conclusions. Je soutiens que la conception de la nature et de la fonction de la raison chez Bayle se situe en fait entre le rationalisme stratonicien de Mori et l’interprétation « supersceptique » de Popkin. Comme Mori, je pense qu’il s’agit d’un rationalisme « critique » ; mais contre lui, je pense que la raison elle-même définit et recommande ses propres limites. J’appelle cette conception de la raison « sceptico-rationaliste » et, en suivant Bayle, je suggère comment le « bon sens » (qui fait partie de la raison) aide à définir ces limites. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is, perhaps, the most controversial philosopher of the twentieth-century. Little has been written on him or about his work and its significance for educational thought. This unique collection by a group of international scholars reexamines Heidegger's work and its legacy for educational thought.

First Published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This chapter begins by considering the relationship between Christian ethics and moral philosophy. The analysis then turns to the period between the Reformation and the death of St Alphonsus Liguori. It discusses arguments for and against voluntarism; fundamental morality as genuine morality; pagan virtue; what Christian morality adds to morality; moral and positive obligations; and divine love and divine justice.

This paper is a philosophical analysis ofHeidegger and Nietzsche's approach tometaphysics and the associated problem ofnihilism. Heidegger sums up the history ofWestern metaphysics in a way which challengescommon sense approaches to values education.Through close attention to language, Heideggerargues that Nietzsche inverts thePlatonic-Christian tradition but retains theanthropocentric imposition of ‘values’. Ihave used Nietzsche's theory to suggest aslightly different definition of metaphysicsand nihilism which draws attention to theontological parameters of human truths as astruggle between competing sets of conflictingor contradictory values (perspectives) thatopens (...) space for rethinking and re-educatinghuman possibilities. How this openness willshow up in educational theory and practice isonly beginning to be evoked. The twophilosophers indicate an approach to issues ofmorality, decision making and knowledgeproduction which may surprise and disconcerttraditional views. As the forefathers ofpost-structuralist thinking, Nietzsche andHeidegger offer a critique of Humanism whileretaining the Renaissance tradition ofpositioning education as the well spring ofvalues in society. It is through the generationof new knowledges, the development of critiqueand the nurturing of character that societyreformulates itself in relation to the earth.The ethical evaluation of these new forms ofknowledge is crucial to the creative and caringregeneration of the human environment, asopposed to the corrosive adoption ofconsumerism and usury. (shrink)

Exosomatic memory is a crucial phase in the evolution of humanity because it enables learning to take place across groups and generations rather than exclusively through lived experience or one on one transmission. Exosomatic memory is the attribution of knowledge to objects, such as art or writing, which allows epistemology to be transmitted beyond the individual to subsequent generations of people. Exosomatic memory is the key to the transmission of culture and knowledge, beyond the individual who learns exclusively from personal (...) experience. This places technologies such as writing and art in a key position for the education of culture and knowledge. Stiegler develops these ideas, following Martin Heidegger, Leroi-Gourhan and Derrida from the Palaeolithic to the contemporary.Maori use of natural objects as exosomatic transmission of intergenerational learning exceeds the technological enframing of modernity outlined by Heidegger. For indigenous peoples, exosomatic memory is cultural, technological and ecological.Stiegler argues that the impact of cybernetics on knowledge production is accelerating the technological enframing of knowledge (2018). Consequently, information technologies are leaving the human mind behind, in passive receptivity rather than dynamic creativity. The prefrontal cortex is slower than the internet, exacerbating a widening lag in active understanding, in favour of passive absorption. Alienation and epistemological entropy are trapping us in climate change and the anthropocentric Capitalocene. Maori insight may cut the Gordian knot and sidestep the alienation and determinism of technological modernity. (shrink)

This paper challenges historically preconceived notions surrounding a minor’s ability to make medical decisions, arguing that federal health law should be reformed to allow minors with capacity as young as age 12 to consent to their own Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC)-approved COVID-19 vaccinations. This proposal aligns with and expands upon current exceptions to limitations on adolescent decision-making. This analysis reviews the historic and current anti-vaccination sentiment, examines legal precedence and rationale, outlines supporting ethical arguments regarding adolescent decision-making, (...) and offers rebuttals to anticipated ethical counterarguments. (shrink)

Resumo Visto por uma lente existencial, o filme Fight Club impele-nos a criar um autêntico self. Porém, também nos adverte que a criação de um autêntico self é algo que só podemos fazer por nós mesmos. A definitiva ironia no filme Fight Club é que, num esforço por rejeitar a sociedade e cultivar a individualidade, as pessoas acabam por se conformar a um culto e aos seus ditames. A lição é que a autenticidade é frágil, facilmente esmagada e facilmente rendida. (...) No final do filme, o protagonista, oferece-nos esperança, ainda que seja para nos tornarmos auto-conscientes e lutar contra as forças que nos procuram subjugar. Palavras-chave : autenticidade, consumismo, existencialismo, Fight Club, Nietzsche, vícioViewed through an existential lens, Fight Club urges us to create an authentic self, but it also cautions us that the creation of an authentic self is something we can only do for ourselves. The ultimate irony in Fight Club is that in an effort to reject society and cultivate individuality, people end up conforming to a cult and its dictates. The clear lesson is that authenticity is fragile, easily crushed and easily surrendered. By the end of the movie, the protagonist at least offers us hope, though, that we can become self-aware and fight back against the forces that seek to subjugate us. Keywords : addiction, authenticity, consumerism, existentialism, Fight Club, Nietzsche. (shrink)

_The first unauthorized look at the philosophy behind _Heroes_, one of TV's most popular shows_ When ordinary individuals from around the world inexplicably develop superhuman abilities, they question who they are, struggle to cope with new responsibilities, and decide whether to use their new power for good or for evil. Every episode of Tim Kring's hit TV show _Heroes_ is a philosophical quandary. _Heroes and Philosophy_ is the first book to analyze how philosophy makes this show so compelling. It lets (...) you examine questions crucial to our existence as thinking, rational beings. Is the Company evil, or good? Does Hiro really have a destiny? Do we? Is it okay to lie in order to hide your powers or save the world? _Heroes and Philosophy_ offers answers to these and other intriguing questions. Brings the insight of history's philosophical heavyweights such as Plato and Nietzche to _Heroes_ characters and settings Adds a fun and fascinating dimension to your understanding of the show Expands your thinking about _Heroes_ as the series expands from graphic and text novels to action figures and a video game Whether you're new to _Heroes_ or have been a fan since day one, this book will take your enjoyment of the show to the next level. (shrink)

What can _South Park_ tell us about Socrates and the nature of evil? How does _The Office_ help us to understand Sartre and existentialist ethics? Can _Battlestar Galactica_ shed light on the existence of God? _Introducing Philosophy Through Pop Culture_ uses popular culture to illustrate important philosophical concepts and the work of the major philosophers With examples from film, television, and music including _South Park_, _The Matrix_, _X-Men_, _Batman_, _Harry Potter, Metallica_ and _Lost,_ even the most abstract and complex philosophical (...) ideas become easier to grasp Features key essays from across the Blackwell _Philosophy and Pop Culture_ series, as well as helpful editorial material and a glossary of philosophical terms From metaphysics to epistemology; from ethics to the meaning of life, this unique introduction makes philosophy as engaging as popular culture itself Supplementary website available with teaching guides, sample materials and links to further resources at _www.pop-philosophy.org_. (shrink)

Many of the original Saturday Night Live (SNL) cast and writers believed that cocaine was non‐addictive and that it was a logical drug to use to sustain the long hours of intense preparation necessary for a weekly live show. It's no secret that drugs and alcohol have been fuel for some SNL cast members. In the early days, the culture and writing of SNL were fueled by drugs, particularly cocaine and marijuana. So John Belushi's drug use was not at all (...) unique, and it justified his belief that people in the entertainment business needed to do drugs to cope with pressure and stress. Sadly, though, John and Chris Farley both lost their lives to overdoses at the young age of 33. Although Stuart Smalley pokes fun at the Pollyanna tone of recovery gurus, Al Franken himself has been a great advocate for the kind of twelve‐step programs that Chris Farley succeeded with for a time. (shrink)

Aristotle claims that the soul in animals is defined by two faculties: the discriminative belonging to sense and thought, and the faculty of initiating movement. He insists that the part which initiates movement, the desiring part, is not separable from the other parts and faculties of the soul; to think of this as a separable part is to conceal its essential connexions with other psychic states in a teleological explanation of behaviour. His reasons for insisting on this indicate his guiding (...) assumptions about the nature of psychic states. (shrink)

One of the many illuminating aspects of Bart Schultz's book is the recurrent theme of Sidgwick's Socratic inspiration. Some of Sidgwick's contemporaries at Cambridge were among those who gave new life to the study of Socrates and Plato in England. The Cambridge Apostles were self-consciously devoted both to Socratic ideals of friendship and to the Socratic aim of impartial free inquiry on fundamental questions.

Moses Amyraut’s 1640 work On the Elevation of Faith and the Humbling of Reason is often misread as advocating the position suggested by its title. In fact, Amyraut constructs a tripartite classification of religious beliefs according to their relation to reason, such that he can affirm truths that are incomprehensible to reason, while maintaining that reason is the ultimate ground of their truth. He divides religious truths into those delivered by reason, those consistent with reason, and those incomprehensible to reason, (...) as against religious beliefs contrary to reason, which cannot be true; the rationality of each class of truths depends on the rationality of those in the previous class. This classification helps to make sense of the seventeenth-century debate between those (such as Leibniz) who argue that incomprehensible religious beliefs are simply above reason, and those (such as Bayle) who argue that incomprehensible religious beliefs are actually contrary to reason. (shrink)

Your philosophy consists of your beliefs and your reasons for your beliefs. Beliefs form a garden; we need to learn to weed out the dandelions and water the flowers. The readiness to weed out a previously held belief takes courage and is the sign of a true philosopher. In particular we need to avoid committing the aesthetic fallacy, the mistaken idea that what is true is necessarily pleasant, good, or beautiful.

Relevance with regard to the social sciences can be presented as a new imposition from external stakeholders and an obligation imposed upon the individual researcher. As an alternative approach, we place relevance in a larger institutional but also historical perspective. Taking the case of two non-traditional locations for the social sciences, we suggest that ‘relevance’ has been actively constitutive of both institutions from the beginning—even if the definition and practice of relevance have been matters of discussion, change and contestation. In (...) what we describe as a process of multi-layering, relevance has over time accumulated new meanings which can co-exist with older concerns. It follows that, even when universities express a commitment to relevance, the enactment of that commitment will be open to competing interpretations. Our account identifies an element of circularity as old issues return in new form. We also note that both the institutional past and organizational complexity can be overlooked within contemporary discussions. Relevance is not a static concept around which critical debate then circulates. Its contextuality, case-specificity and multi-dimensionality make it difficult to impose from above. Nevertheless, the shifting construction of its meaning and enactment provokes questions about the identity and purpose of both the social sciences and the universities. (shrink)

The Posterior Analytics describes the structure of a science and of the content of scientific propositions. Aristotle sees the weaknesses observed in his methods, and his views on justification support and explain some of his demands on scientific knowledge. However, these same views seem to imply demands that he cannot meet within any plausible conception of justification.

Abstract Six apparent features of Kant's conception of autonomy appear to differentiate it sharply from anything that we can find in an Aristotelian conception of will and practical reason. (1) Autonomy requires a role for practical reason independent of its instrumental role in relation to non-rational desires. (2) This role belongs to the rational will. (3) This role consists in the rational will's being guided by its own law. (4) This guidance by the law of the will itself requires acts (...) of legislation?the making of laws?for oneself. (5) These acts of legislation constitute the law as one's own law, as moral constructivists hold. (6) Kant marks this character of the rational will by using ?autonomy? and cognates. These six apparent features, however, do not mark any discontinuity between Kant and an Aristotelian conception. The first three apparent features are genuinely Kantian, but are not aspects of discontinuity, whereas the last three mark aspects of discontinuity, but are not genuinely Kantian. (shrink)