cz. 1. Podstawowe pojęcia i systemy etyczne.

It is said that transcendental phenomenology faces an unavoidable aporia, according to which it is perfectly justified to accept the claim that the transcendental ego constitutes the sense of all external being, including other subjects, as well as the claim that other subjects constitute the sense of all external objects, since they are a community of transcendental egos. The essence of the aporia is that it is impossible to accept both of these claims if one accepts the conceptual schema of (...) transcendental phenomenology. In the article, I present an interpretation of transcendental phenomenology which allows one to avoid such consequences. Firstly, the static theory of intersubjectivity presented in Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Carthesian Meditations is reconstructed and analyzed. Attention is devoted to the issues of phenomenological reduction and constitution of sense. Afterwards, it is argued that one should distinguish two kinds of constitutive processes: one understood as an activity of the sole transcendental ego (self), and the second one as an activity of the community of transcendental egos. It is claimed that both processes are mutually connected. Moreover, it seems that the second kind of constitution is metaphysically prior then the former one. This claim will allow one to overcome solipsistic interpretations of transcendental phenomenology and to overcome the aporia presented. (shrink)

THIS ESSAY will examine the connection between the subjectivity of man as a person and the structure of the human community. That relationship was tentatively explored in The Acting Person, especially in the chapter entitled "Participation." The present study is an attempt to develop insights initially introduced there.

Fenomenologia w dwudziestym wieku wiąże się z filozofią Edmunda Husserla. Punktem wyjścia jego myślenia jest założenie korelacji świata i świadomości. Podstawowe pojęcie intencjonalności świadomości ukazuje, że świadomość jest zawsze świadomością czegoś. Tak więc wszelkie bycie tego, co bytuje, istnieje o tyle, o ile ma odniesienie do doświadczającej, postrzegającej i myślącej świadomości. Swiat jest zatem korelatem świadomości. Fenomenologia nie jest początkiem drogi myślowej Martina Heideggera. Jego myślenie filozoficzne ma swoje korzenie w teologii i wczesnej fascynacji ontologią. Droga myślowa Heideggera wiedzie przez (...) fenomenologię i ontologię fundamentalną ku myśleniu bycia. Husserl położył podwaliny pod fenomenologię w swoim dziele Logische Untersuchungen. Heidegger był tym dziełem zawsze zafascynowany. Nie mógł tylko zaakceptować fenomenologii jako filozofii transcendentalnej. Natomiast w pierwotnej fenomenologicznej zasadzie „ku rzeczom samym” widział doskonałą możliwość filozofowania i myślenia metafizycznego. Przez dziesięć lat był Heidegger postacią wiodącą wśród młodych fenomenologów we Fryburgu Bryzgowijskim, uznawaną również przez samego Husserla. Później ich drogi myślowe się rozeszły. Heidegger zajmował się fenomenologią przez całe życie. Od ukazania się jego Sein und Zeit przejął, zajmowaną dotąd przez Husserla, wiodącą pozycję w ruchu fenomenologicznym. Heidegger zarzucał Husserlowi, że ten nie wyciągnął konsekwencji ontologicznych z fenomenologii. Zawsze ubolewał nad tym, że ostatecznie ich drogi się rozeszły. (shrink)

The question whether perceptual experiences justify perceptual beliefs is ambiguous. One problem is the well familiar skeptical one. How can perceptual experiences justify beliefs if those experiences may systematically deceive us? Our experiences might be just as they are and yet the world might be radically different. But there is also another problem about the justification of perceptual beliefs which arises independently of the above skeptical worry. This other problem has to do with our understanding of the very notion of (...) justification. It seems natural to think that justification can exist only in so far as what is justified is inferentially linked to the justifier. The question, then, is whether perceptual experiences can serve as an inferential basis for perceptual beliefs. The content of experiences does not seem to be the same sort of content that is possessed by beliefs. So the nature of the relation between experiences and beliefs is far from obvious. In this paper I survey various attempts of justifying the view that there is an inferential relation between experiences and beliefs so that the latter can be justified by the former and I argue that none of those attempts is satisfactory. I also suggest that the problem which those attempts address may be illusory. Even though it seems true that experiences and beliefs possess different kinds of contents, there may be no logical gap between those contents that needs to be bridged by some philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Brain bisection raises the intriguing question about how many minds the split-brain patients have. Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit, who have brought this question into consideration, come to similar conclusions in response to it. They both argue that the question has no answer, that there simply isn’t any countable number of minds that the split-brain patients have. In addition, Parfit argues that the split-brain cases can be adequately described only if we adopt a certain particular view about the metaphysical nature (...) of a person. The goal of this paper is to clarify both of those views and, in particular, to explain why Parfit’s preference for one model of personhood does not determine how many persons survive brain bisection. (shrink)

According to grounding necessitarianism if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Proponents of grounding contingentism argue against this claim, stating that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. In this article I discuss a recent argument from restricted accidental generalisations provided by contingentists that advances such possibility. I argue that grounding necessitarianism can be defended against it. To achieve this aim, I postulate a relationship between grounding (...) and essence by introducing a notion of individual essences understood as a set of essential properties that individuate its bearer. According to a proposed view grounding holds in virtue of identities of its relata, which are in turn determined by their respective individual essences. From there I claim that if grounding holds in virtue of the individual essences of its relata, then it is possible to resist the objection from restricted accidental generalisations and maintain a view that grounds necessitates what is grounded. (shrink)

The purpose of this volume is to help develop, through a variety of exploratory essays, the art and science of institutional design. The authors look at a variety of good societies as artifacts, as products—at least partly—of design, and consider how such societies can be crafted. They identify themselves with the New Constitutionalism movement, which aims to develop and promote the knowledge necessary for institutional reform and institutional creation through understanding the designer's, creator's, founder's, or reformer's perspective. The first part (...) of the volume considers some of the boundaries of what is humanly possible in politico-economic designs and the role in them of deliberation and the processes of adapting to limits. The second part considers different ways of exercising constitutionalist judgment analyzing a variety of cases, including general visions of the good society. Looking at whole societies, and at complexes of institutions, complements and informs the picture of the institutional microscale. Understanding the microscale, on the other hand, often makes the difference between empty slogans and realistic political proposals. Contributors are Karol Edward Soltan, Elinor Ostrorn, Viktor J. Vanberg, James lvi. Buchanan, John S. Dryzek, Charles 'X". Anderson, Stephen U. Elkin, Car Alperovirz, and Philip Green. (shrink)

Brian Loar argues that we can account for the conceptual independence of coextensive terms purely psychologically, by appealing to conceptual rather than semantic differences between concepts, and that this leaves room for assuming that phenomenal and physical concepts can be coextensive on a posteriori grounds despite the fact that both sorts of concepts refer directly . I argue that Loar does not remove the mystery of the coextensiveness of those concepts because he does not offer any explanation of why they (...) should be coextensive. Secondly, I argue that even if we grant that phenomenal and physical concepts can be coextensive on a posteriori grounds, we are committed to holding that there are two different and essential modes of presentation of phenomenal properties, the physical and the phenomenal, and that this precludes us from seeing phenomenal properties as essentially physical in an unrelativized sense. (shrink)

Une réjouissante leçon inaugurale prononcée au Collège de France le jeudi 25 octobre 2012. On y appréciera tout particulièrement la chasse aux poncifs, qu'ils soient ceux de l'indicible ou du nombre, du mouvement ou de la structure, ainsi que le projet d'écarter les commentaires pour en revenir aux œuvres. Cette leçon est accessible en ligne également ici. J'ai souhaité que cette leçon se présente comme une question : « Comment parler de musique ? » Une question. Car il est clair, (...) concernant la nature de (...) - Musique et Musicologie – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Formal indication is one of the central concepts of Heidegger’s hermeneutics. Formal means that something is to be fulfilled. Indication indicates the direction of fulfilling. Heidegger developed the so-called by him, „formal indication”, respectively „formally indicative concepts” as a methodological justification of the philosophical terminology. The term „formal indication” aroses in the context of the phenomenology of life, where Heidegger introduces his „hermeneutics of facticity”, which is also referred to as „formally indicative hermeneutics“. This is about something crucial for Heidegger’s (...) thinking. The epistemological and transcendental tradition of viewing finds here a turn into the existential and historical. The indication always remains at the distance of pointing, that is, someone to whom something is shown, must see for himself. Formal indication indicates the direction for seeing. What can be seen, one must learn to say, to say in the own words. The old problem of the concretization and the conceptualization, which runs through German idealism, gets here a new expression. (shrink)

David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, (...) so that a necessary statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently. (shrink)