‘Intersectionality’ has taken on a complex position in the field of feminist scholarship over the last decade. Debate on the concept has swung back and forth, from buzzword to harsh critique. Amid these discussions, many feminist scholars have thought about Audre Lorde and the role of her writings in the debates over intersectionality. Lorde’s radical literary feminism has often been seen both as reflecting a politics of identity, on the one hand, and as shifting and situational, on the other. Intersectionality (...) has also been claimed either to be recycling the ideas of identity politics or to be forging new ways to grasp decentered identity positions and power structures. This article aims to tell a story about the roots of intersectionality through – and alongside – the legacy of Lorde’s feminism, by revisiting certain identity-political ideas. The radical nature of Lorde’s thinking is in many ways connected to politicized writing styles and rebellious literary forms. The main focus in this article is therefore extended to cover the role and implications of radical writing styles for intersectionality. The article argues that the oeuvre of telling the story of intersectionality through Lorde’s feminism opens up a new perspective on the genealogy of intersectionality. (shrink)

In bioethics vaccine refusal is often discussed as an instance of free riding on the herd immunity of an infectious disease. However, the social science of vaccine refusal suggests that the reasoning behind refusal to vaccinate more often stems from previous negative experiences in healthcare practice as well as deeply felt distrust of healthcare institutions. Moreover, vaccine refusal often acts like an exit mechanism. Whilst free riding is often met with sanctions, exit, according to Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit and (...) voice is most efficiently met by addressing concerns and increasing the quality and number of feedback channels. If the legitimate grievances responsible for vaccine refusal are not heard or addressed by healthcare policy, further polarization of attitudes to vaccines is likely to ensue. Thus, there is a need in the bioethics of vaccine refusal to understand the diverse ethical questions of this inflammable issue in addition to those of individual responsibility to vaccinate. (shrink)

Determining the human activity that social processes consist in is a central task for the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper asks: which conception of agency arising from contemporary action theory is the most suitable for social science explanation? It is argued that a movement-centered, Davidsonian picture of agency is not suitable for explaining certain social processes such as strikes and boycotts because, instead of intentional bodily movements, they are explained by the intentional omissions of agents. I propose that (...) instead of intentional bodily movements, social processes are better explained by phenomena in which an agent is taking an active relation both to her mental or bodily processes as well as to what is happening around her. Thus, to fully explain social processes, a comprehensive theory of agency that can account for intentional actions and intentional omissions and a conception of agency that includes both materialist and volitionalist aspects is needed. (shrink)

What precisely does a distraction threaten? An agent who spends an inordinate amount of time attending to her smartphone – what precisely is she lacking? I argue that whereas agency of attention is the agent’s non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to, autonomy of attention is the agent, through her second-order desires, effectively interfering with her non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to. Freedom of attention is the agent’s possibility to hold or switch her focus of (...) attention without fixating on any specific focus against her will or without distraction from chosen foci. This conceptual work provides resources to track manipulations that diminish a person’s freedom of attention. (shrink)

It has been debated whether the so-called attention economy, in which the attention of agents is measured and sold, jeopardizes something of value. One strand of this discussion has focused on so-called attention rights, asking: should attention be legally protected, either by introducing novel rights or by extending the scope of pre-existing rights? In this paper, however, in order to further this discussion, we ask: How is attention already protected legally? In what situations does a person have the right to (...) attention under current law? -/- Unlike (Chomanski, Neuroethics 16:1–11, 2023), who discusses an overall right to attention, or (Puri, Rutgers Law Record 48:206–221, 2021), who discusses an overall right to attentional privacy, in this paper we focus on two types of situations in which a person’s attention is already protected by legal regulation. Sustained attention-requiring tasks can be jeopardized by distractions whereas attentiveness to certain kind of stimuli can be jeopardized by immersive stimuli. That is why distractions are regulated in situations where an agent has what we call a concentration right and immersive stimuli are regulated in situations where an agent has what we call a duty to be attentive. The further analysis of these situations provides an understanding of the legal means by which attention is already regulated, which can be helpful when thinking about how it should be regulated in the future. (shrink)

Review of Anne Heith's Laestadius and Laestadianism in the Contested Field of Cultural Heritage: A Study of Contemporary Sámi and Tornedalian Texts.

Man and earth : on the geography of Eric Dardel.

In the popular and academic literature on the problems of the so-called attention economy, the cost of attention grabbing, sustaining, and immersing digital medias has been addressed as if it touched all people equally. In this paper I ask whether everyone has the same resources to respond to the recent changes in their stimulus environments caused by the attention economy. I argue that there are not only differences but disparities between people in their responses to the recent, significant increase in (...) the degree and persuasiveness of digital distraction. I point toward individual variance in an agent’s top-down and bottom-up attention regulation, and to further inequality-exacerbating variance in active participation on the internet and in regulating reward-seeking behaviors on the internet. Individual differences in these areas amount to disparities because they have been found to be connected to socioeconomic background factors. I argue that disparities in responding to digital distraction threaten fair equality of opportunity when it comes to digital distraction in the classroom and that they may lead to an unequal contribution of achievements that require complex cognition by people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. (shrink)

What does it mean to intentionally not perform an action? Is it possible to not perform an action out of resistant intention? Is there sufficient language for talking about this kind of behavior in the social sciences? In this article, a nonnormative vocabulary of not doings including resistant intentional omissions is developed. Unlike concepts that describe official, overt, and public resistance, James Scott’s everyday resistance and Albert Hirschman’s exit have made it possible to talk about the resistant inactions of agents (...) in the social sciences. But in order to grasp the ordinariness of this kind of oppositional behavior, philosophy of intentional omissions is used. (shrink)

How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action not done, the agent cannot further process the possibility (...) of her own action; she cannot intentionally try to not do something, resist performing an action, or decide or choose to not perform an action. The literature on people with frontal lobe damage suggests that without metacognitive control of action, a person automatically follows what the environment affords or what others are doing. Through at least procedural metacognitive control of action, agents are able to intentionally omit. This view has explanatory power over a variety of intentional omissions and over a variety of agents. It answers central questions in the philosophy of intentional omissions: who is capable of intentionally omitting, when and where intentional omissions unfold, and what are the relevant guiding mental states on which the control of intentional omissions is based? The answers to these questions contribute in part to naturalizing agency, at least when it comes to negative agency, our ability to guide the non-performance of our actions. (shrink)

This article describes how ethical guidelines have been applied while interviewing psychiatric patients who were recovering from mental illness, especially from psychosis, to allow nurses to understand these patients’ experiences. Because psychiatric patients are vulnerable, their participation in research involves ethical dilemmas, such as voluntary consent, legal capacity to consent, freedom of choice, and sufficient knowledge and comprehension. The first part of this article describes the most important ethical guidelines concerning human research. These have been published by different organizations, departments, (...) committees and commissions for the purpose of protecting human rights and dignity whenever research participants are vulnerable persons or their capacity to consent is limited. At present, however, no special regulations govern research involving adults who have been diagnosed with a condition characterized by mental impairment. Furthermore, a relatively small body of research has documented the effects of various disorders (e.g. psychiatric conditions) on decision-making capacity per se. One basic moral and policy question is whether these individuals should ever be involved in research. The second part of this article concentrates on how the investigator made sure that participating patients had understood their role in this particular piece of nursing research. During the interviews the investigator noticed that some ethical dilemmas required further study and debate because of the lack of consensus on the proposed regulatory provisions on research involving institutionalized persons and their ability to make an informed and voluntary decision. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the main features of rational choice theory and evaluates it with respect to the conceptions of Lakatos' research program and Laudan's research tradition. The analysis reveals that the thin rationality assumption, the axiomatic method and the reduction to the micro level are the only features shared by all rational choice models. On these grounds, it is argued that rational choice theory cannot be characterized as a research program. This is due to the fact that the thin rationality (...) assumption cannot be understood as a hard core in Lakatos' terms. It is argued that Laudan's conception of a research tradition better characterizes rational choice theory. On the basis of this conclusion, certain important criticisms of rational choice theory are answered. First, the criticisms concerning the core assumptions of rational choice theory are countered. It is argued that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of rational choice theory as a unified set of models, such as Lakatos' research program. Second, Green and Shapiro's rational choice 'pathologies' - inconsistent predictions, post hoc theory development and arbitrary domain restrictions - are evaluated. Contrary to Green and Shapiro, it is argued that post hoc theory development is a more preferable strategy for developing RCT than domain restrictions based on ex ante rules. (shrink)

How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action not done, the agent cannot further process the possibility (...) of her own action; she cannot intentionally try to not do something, resist performing an action, or decide or choose to not perform an action. The literature on people with frontal lobe damage suggests that without metacognitive control of action, a person automatically follows what the environment affords or what others are doing. Through at least procedural metacognitive control of action, agents are able to intentionally omit. This view has explanatory power over a variety of intentional omissions and over a variety of agents. It answers central questions in the philosophy of intentional omissions: who is capable of intentionally omitting, when and where intentional omissions unfold, and what are the relevant guiding mental states on which the control of intentional omissions is based? The answers to these questions contribute in part to naturalizing agency, at least when it comes to negative agency, our ability to guide the non-performance of our actions. (shrink)

Vaalijärjestelmä on yksi keskeisimmistä demokraattisen järjestelmän instituutioista, joka vaikuttaa merkittävästi siihen, kuka vaalit voittaa ja kuka häviää. Eerik Lagerspetz analysoi kirjassaan Social Choice and Democratic Values laajasti äänestyssääntöjen vaikutusta demokraattisiin päätöksiin. Lagerspetzin teos on tärkeä monestakin syystä, mutta erityisesti siksi, että se yhdistää harvoin keskenään keskustelevia normatiivisen demokratiateorian ja sosiaalisen valinnan teorian perinteitä. Pohdin artikkelissani äänestysmenettelyjen valintaa. Keskityn siihen, millä säännöillä äänestysmenettely valitaan, en niinkään sitä, ketkä valinnan tekevät. Tarkastelen aluksi sitä, miten äänestyssäännön valinta poikkeaa muista poliittisista valinnoista. Tämän jälkeen (...) pohdin, millä menettelyillä valinta voidaan tehdä ja lopuksi tarkastelen kahta empiiristä tutkimusta siitä, miten äänestysmenettelyjä valitaan. (shrink)

Theories of deliberative democracy maintain that outcomes of democratic deliberation are fairer than outcomes of mere aggregation of preferences. Theorists of impartial justice, especially Rawls and Sen, emphasize the role of deliberative processes for making just decisions. Democratic deliberation seems therefore to provide a model of impartial decision-making applicable in the real world. However, various types of cognitive and affective biases limit individual capacity to see things from others’ perspectives. In this paper, two strategies of enhancing impartiality in real world (...) decision-making are discussed. The first involves decision-making processes which detach decision-makers from their particular interests, whereas the second aims to enhance the quality of democratic deliberation and empathetic reasoning. We conclude that new forms of democratic deliberation may be necessary if we hold on to the aspiration of making decisions which are both democratic and impartial. (shrink)

We examine recent evolution in corporate responsibility in the forest industry, an important natural-resource-based industry which is under rapid internationalisation and structural change under challenging financial pressures. We address two recent trends in corporate communication: corporate disclosure, that is the adoption of consistent external reporting standards [namely the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) ], and the growing awareness of engagement with and impact on local communities through philanthropy, generation of prosperity, communication and the social impact of core activities. This study uses (...) a comparative qualitative case approach to forest industry multinational enterprises (MNEs) based on a combination of secondary (reporting, company newsletters and other documentation) and interview data. Three large-scale multinational forest industry firms, all pursuing different strategies in terms of internationalisation and geographical and product diversification, were chosen for the study: Stora Enso, SCA and Sappi Ltd. Our results show that the overall quality of sustainability reporting has improved in these companies from 2005 to 2009 with the adoption of GRI. However, based on our fourfold categorisation of social impact, the core social impact indicator in GRI (SO1) has been interpreted very differently in these MNEs, and the adoption of GRI has not actually much improved the comparability of the reports or transparency of practices. (shrink)

Accountability is present in many types of social relations; for example, the accountability of elected representatives to voters is the key characteristic of representative democracy. We distinguish between two institutional mechanisms of accountability, i.e., opportunity to punish and requirement of a justification, and examine the separate and combined effects of these mechanisms on individual behavior. For this purpose, we designed a decision-making experiment where subjects engage in a three-player trust game with two senders and one responder. We ask whether holding (...) the responder accountable increases senders’ and responders’ contributions in a trust game. When restricting the analysis to the first round, the requirement of justification seems to have a positive impact on senders’ contributions. When the game is played repeatedly, the experience of previous rounds dominates the results and significant treatment effects are no longer seen. We also find that responders tend to justify their choices in terms of reciprocity, which is in line with observed behavior. Moreover, the treatment combining punishment and justification hinders justifications that appeal to pure self-interest. (shrink)

This study develops conceptual means in philosophy of agency to better and more systematically address intentional omissions of agents, including those that are about resisting the action not done. I argue that even though philosophy of agency has largely concentrated on the actions of agents, when applying philosophy of action to the social sciences, a full-blown theoretical account of what agents do not do and a non-normative conceptual language of the phenomena in question is needed. Chapter 2 aims to find (...) out what kind of things intentional omissions are. I argue that although intentional omissions are part of our intentional behavior, they are not actions in the sense that the standard account of action assumes. Instead, because intentional omissions are homogenous, continuous, unbounded, indefinite and directly uncountable, they should be thought of as activities instead of performances. This view links the ontology of intentional omissions to the ontology of processes instead of to that of events, and I argue that this kind of ontology accounts for the fluid nature of the agency of alive agents not only instigating but controlling and sustaining their intentional omissions as well. Chapter 3 aims to find out on what conditions is an omission intentional. The aim is to find a naturalized explanation of them that would make it possible to combine psychological perspectives with philosophical ones so that intentional omissions could be treated as something that exist in the world, not just in our philosophical intuitions. I argue that intentional omissions necessarily require the agent’s procedural metacognition concerning the action not done. Based on this metacognition view, a non-normative conceptual typology of not doings is presented. Chapter 4 aims to find out on what conditions is an intentional omissions resistance toward something. The necessary elements of resistance are clarified and I argue that resistant intentional omissions in which the agent does not perform an action out of resistance toward something are a normal part of our everyday agency. The implications of the findings are considered for theories of action, especially when it comes to the belief-desire model that may not be able to fully account for resistant intentional omissions. Chapter 5 aims to find out what conceptual means do we have for talking about not doing something as a form of resistance. I argue that in the social sciences, bioethics and military ethics to not do something out of resistance is taken as something that exists, and as something that has causes and effects. However, concepts such as civil disobedience, conscientious refusing, exit and everyday resistance do not account for the ordinariness of this kind of not doings. Thus, I argue that such concepts are not able to fully cover resistant inaction and philosophy of intentional omissions can be of use not just in the social sciences. Finally, Chapter 6 considers the implications of these findings. The main implication of this study is that our view of social and ethical agency would need to better include intentional not doings, not just the sum of the intentional actions of agents. Another major implication is that agents themselves should be heard when analyzing their intentional omissions in society, because intentional omissions are phenomena that can easily be mixed with the passivities of agents from the perspective of an outside observer. (shrink)

Tarkoitukselliset tekemättä jättämiset ovat osa toimijuutta siinä missä tarkoitukselliset teotkin. Tarkoitukselliset tekemättä jättämiset ovat kuitenkin piileviä toimijuuden ilmentymiä siinä mielessä, että on vaikea ulkopuolisen tarkkailijan näkökulmasta sanoa, jättääkö joku jotakin tekemättä tarkoituksella vai vahingossa. Teon filosofista lähestymistapaa tarvitaan siksi sen selvittämiseen, mitä tapahtuu, kun ihminen tarkoituksella jättää teon tekemättä. -/- Filosofinen työ pystyy erottelemaan tekemättä jättämisiä toisistaan, etsimään niiden välttämättömiä ja riittäviä ehtoja ja sijoittamaan ne osaksi toimijuutemme kokonaisuutta. Käsitteellinen työ auttaa tekemään piilevistä ilmiöistä todellisia antamalla niille nimen. Ontologinen työ (...) asettaa ilmiön osaksi todellisuuden perusrakennetta. Naturalistinen tutkimusote teon filosofiassa löytää vastaavuuksia kognitiivisen psykologian ja teon filosofian kategorioiden välille. Monimenetelmäinen tutkimusote on hyödyllinen silloin kun jokin ilmiö on jäänyt vähälle huomiolle. Koherentin filosofisen työn puutteessa tarkoitukselliset tekemättä jättämiset ovatkin olleet alttiita yksinkertaistavilla myyteillä ja sanonnoilla selittämiseen. -/- Kokonaisvaltainen toimijuuden filosofia pyrkii selvittämään, mistä toimijuudessa on kyse ottamalla huomioon myös sen piilevät ilmentymät. Tällainen toimijuuden teoria soveltuu paremmin myös yhteiskuntatieteiden käyttöön. Sillä miten ymmärrämme ja pystymme käsitteellistämään tarkoituksellisia tekemättä jättämisiä, on väliä esimerkiksi siksi, että ihmisen toimintaa koskevia teorioita käytetään yhteiskuntatieteissä. Yhteiskuntatieteitä taas käytetään informoimaan poliittista päätöksentekoa. Sillä miten teoria tavoittaa piilevää toimijuutta on siis merkitystä, kun vaikkapa pyritään puuttumaan osallistumattomuuteen tai äänestämättömyyteen. (shrink)

In this article I examine the architecture and architectural thinking of Finnish Academician Reima Pietilä in relation to his design methodology. Pietilä was an architect with an original, creative, artistic personality, who set out early in his career to develop the form language, and theory of modern architecture, moving it towards an organic expressionism. Finnish nature mysticism was a source of inspiration for him, and ‘nature architecture’ one of his key concepts.

We investigated the longitudinal links between parental teaching of reading and spelling and children’s word reading and spelling skills. Data of 244 Lithuanian parent–child dyads were analyzed, who were followed across three time points: end of kindergarten (T1;Mage= 6.88; 116 girls), beginning of Grade 1 (T2), and end of Grade 1 (T3). The children’s word reading and spelling skills were tested, and the parents answered questionnaires on the frequency with which they taught their children reading and spelling. Overall, the results (...) showed that the parents were responsive to their children’s skill levels across the domains of reading and spelling and across time (i.e., the transition from kindergarten to Grade 1 and across Grade 1). However, differences between the domains of reading and spelling were also observed. In particular, in the domain of reading and across the transition from kindergarten to Grade 1, the parents responded to their children’s skill levels by increasing the time spent teaching children with poor word reading skills, and decreasing the teaching time for the children with good word reading skills. In contrast, as spelling skills may require more time to develop, parents maintained similar frequencies of teaching spelling across the transition to Grade 1 for all children, and only parents of good spellers taught less spelling at the end of Grade 1 than parents of children with poor and average word spelling skills. (shrink)

Biodiversity loss is an immense ecological crisis of our time. But while “biodiversity” has become a buzzword in media and policy, conservationists have found it difficult to build a common understanding on the nature and severity of biodiversity loss and the means to tackle it. Perhaps surprisingly, many biologists and philosophers have proposed that biodiversity might be best defended with reference to its aesthetic value. This article explores whether aesthetic values could provide strong support for biodiversity conservation. By exploring the (...) question from the viewpoints of species diversity, ecosystem diversity, and genetic diversity, we argue that there is a mismatch between apparent and real biodiversity and that aesthetics can, at best, give only limited support for biodiversity conservation. (shrink)

Let be a universal class with categorical in a regular with arbitrarily large models, and let be the class of all for which there is such that. We prove that is totally categorical (i.e., ξ‐categorical for all ) and for. This result is partially stronger and partially weaker than a related result due to Vasey. In addition to small differences in our categoricity transfer results, we provide a shorter and simpler proof. In the end we prove the main theorem of (...) this paper: the models of are essentially vector spaces (or trivial, i.e., disintegrated). (shrink)

We are currently experiencing a planetary crisis that will lead, if worst comes to worst, to the end of the entire world as we know it. Several feminist scholars have suggested that if the Earth is to stay livable for humans and nonhumans alike, the ways in which many human beings – particularly in the wealthy parts of the world, infested with Eurocentrism, colonialism, neoliberalism, and capitalism – inhabit this planet requires radical, ethical, and political transformation. In this article, we (...) propose that feminist theory, particularly feminist posthumanities, and Black feminist and decolonial thought, together with creative practices such as writing, have much to contribute to transformative planetary activism that imagines different and other kinds of worlds and futures based on an ethical consideration of nonhuman others and collective caring for the planet. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce an AEC framework for studying fields with commuting automorphisms. Fields with commuting automorphisms are closely related to difference fields. Some authors define a difference ring (or field) as a ring (or field) together with several commuting endomorphisms, while others only study one endomorphism. Z. Chatzidakis and E. Hrushovski have studied in depth the model theory of ACFA, the model companion of difference fields with one automorphism. Our fields with commuting automorphisms generalize this setting. We have (...) several automorphisms and they are required to commute. Hrushovski has proved that in the case of fields with two or more commuting automorphisms, the existentially closed models do not necessarily form a first order model class. In the present paper, we introduce FCA-classes, an AEC framework for studying the existentially closed models of the theory of fields with commuting automorphisms. We prove that an FCA-class has AP and JEP and thus a monster model, that Galois types coincide with existential types in existentially closed models, that the class is homogeneous, and that there is a version of type amalgamation theorem that allows to combine three types under certain conditions. Finally, we use these results to show that our monster model is a simple homogeneous structure in the sense of S. Buechler and O. Lessman (this is a non-elementary analogue for the classification theoretic notion of a simple first order theory). (shrink)

Background Shared responsibility is an essential part of family-centred care and it characterizes the relationship between parents and healthcare professionals. Despite this, little is known about their shared responsibility for decision-making in neonatal intensive care units. Aim The aim of this scoping review was to identify previous studies on the subject and to summarize the knowledge that has been published so far. Method The review was conducted using electronic searches in the CINAHL, PubMed, Scopus and PsycINFO databases and manual searches (...) of the reference lists of the selected papers. The searches were limited to peer-reviewed papers that had been published in English from 2010 to September 2021. The data were selected based on inclusion and exclusion criteria and the findings were inductively summarized. We identified eight papers that met the inclusion criteria. Ethical considerations: The scoping review was conducted according to good scientific practice by respecting authorship and reporting the study processes accurately, honestly and transparently. Results The results showed that shared responsibility for decision-making was based on the parents’ intentions, but the degree to which they were willing to take responsibility varied. The facilitating and inhibiting factors for shared responsibility for decision-making were related to the communication between parents and professionals. The impact was related to the parents’ emotions. Conclusion It is essential that parents and professionals negotiate how both parties will contribute to their shared responsibility for decision-making. This will enable them to reach a mutual understanding of what is in the infants’ best interests and to mitigate the emotional burden of decisions in neonatal intensive care units. More research is needed to clarify the concept of shared responsibility for decision-making in this intensive care context. (shrink)

La philosophie européenne est souvent critiquée comme une manière dépassée de penser et est taxée d’individualiste, d’anthropocentrique et d’euro-centrique. Plusieurs de ces approches critiques partagent la notion que la source majeure des problèmes gît dans la pensée cartésienne héritée de l’ego. Je confronte cette notion anti-cartésienne de la philosophie européenne en argumentant que la phénoménologie husserlienne offre une réinterprétation robuste et viable de l’ego cartésien, une réinterprétation qui échappe aux impasses kantiennes du formalisme et de l’intellectualisme. Suivant l’analyse de Husserl (...) et de Merleau-Ponty, je montre que le moi qui constitue le sens du monde n’est ni seulement une forme de représentations ni un solus ipse. Plutôt que d’être une forme statique ou un agent solitaire, le moi formateur du sens est une formation dynamique doté d’une structure interne et de relations génératives avec autres ego similaires. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 2, Page 305-317, April 2022.