Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally affected by environmental (...) factors such as commonly perceived evidence. In a general theorem, we identify causal conditions guaranteeing each kind of opinion independence. These results have implications for whether and how ‘wisdom of crowds’ arguments are possible, and how truth-conducive institutions can be designed. (shrink)

The case studies compiled in _Another Way: Decentralization, Democratization and the Global Politics of Community-Based Schooling_ offer a comparative look at how the global politics of educational decentralization have influenced the democratic aspirations of diverse community-based schooling initiatives in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas.

Social enterprises, as typical hybrid organisations, are embedded in a plural institutional environment in which some stakeholders regard achieving social goals as fundamental, while others see economic profit as the priority. A great challenge for social enterprises is dealing with the conflicts resulting from the diverse expectations of stakeholders. Based on the existing works on organisational legitimacy and the social business model, we propose a legitimacy-based social enterprise model composed of three main phases, namely, legitimacy proposition, legitimacy strategy planning, and (...) legitimacy strategy implementation. Our model is meant to serve as an effective legitimacy-building tool for social enterprises of various kinds. (shrink)

BackgroundRecent advancements in neuroscientific techniques have allowed us to make huge progress in our understanding of memories, and in turn has paved the way for new memory modification technologies that can modulate memories with a degree of precision, which was not previously possible. With advancements in such techniques, new and critical ethical questions have emerged. Understanding and framing these ethical questions within the current philosophical theories is crucial in order to systematically examine them as we translate these techniques to the (...) clinic.Main bodyIn this paper, we discuss the ethical implications of modern neuroscience techniques that aim to disrupt or enhance memories. We attempt to frame the MMTs in the context of existing ethical philosophical theories to provide a cohesive analysis of the myriad of ethical quagmires that might emerge from such technologies. We argue the application of Aristotle’s Golden Mean and multiple accounts of authenticity are useful in approaching the ethical questions surrounding MMTs. We then propose a framework in which ethical considerations can be systematically examined. Lastly, we provide caveats and considerations for the use of this framework. Overall, we provide a practical approach for the ethical use of MMTs depending on the situation.ConclusionWhile at face value, our model appears to put severe limitations on the application of MMTs, we are not completely opposed to their use, but rather our framework guides the agent to consider the implications before making any decisions. Most importantly, we argue that the use of MMTs does not reduce the responsibility of the initial decision, and the agent must accept the post-MMT self as the new “true self” regardless of the outcome. As the developmental trajectory of MMTs suggests we are getting closer to practical clinical applications, ethical concerns across a wide range of disciplines need to be addressed to develop best strategies and policies when dealing with MMTs. If this can be achieved, we believe the ethical use of MMTs is not only possible but would also be of tremendous benefit to many people suffering from memory-related mental disorders. (shrink)

This paper engages with the longstanding debate over whether being exposed to a risk of harm amounts to harm itself (what I call ‘risk-harm’). The dominant view has been that those exposed to risks of harm do not suffer harm. In this paper, I defend the widely unpopular subjectivist account of risk-harm – according to which those exposed to unwanted risks of harm can suffer harm – against prominent objections that have been levied against it. The first section sets out (...) to renew and strengthen the appeal of the account in light of recent developments in the surrounding literature. The second section defends the account against arguably its most formidable objection, namely the claim that there is no such thing as risk-harm. The third section wraps up by parrying some prominent general objections, which highlight potentially undesirable upshots to accepting the existence of risk-harm. (shrink)

It has been proved that total generalized variation can better preserve edges while suppressing staircase effect. In this paper, we propose an effective hybrid regularization model based on second-order TGV and wavelet frame. The proposed model inherits the advantages of TGV regularization and wavelet frame regularization, can eliminate staircase effect while protecting the sharp edge, and simultaneously has good capability of sparsely estimating the piecewise smooth functions. The alternative direction method of multiplier is employed to solve the new model. Numerical (...) results show that our proposed model can preserve more details and get higher image visual quality than some current state-of-the-art methods. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a growing jurisprudential and philosophical literature on the concept of harm, in particular, what it means to suffer harm. This paper defends the most unpopular acc...

* This work has been evolving for a while now. Some parts trace back to the few pages on the context-dependency of quantifiers in my dissertation. Reading Recanati’s paper on domains of discourse made me rethink some of my earlier conclusions without in the end actually changing them much. Other parts formed the material for several discussions in my seminar on context-dependency at MIT in the fall of 1995, which included several sessions exploring the issues raised in an early version (...) of Kratzer. Connecting the choice function approach to indefinites with a general analysis of contextual domain restriction was an idea that I considered then without however working out any details. Conversations with Lisa Matthewson and studying her paper inspired me to tackle the problem again. Connections to questions about the context-dependency of conditional sentences also tickled my fancy, since I have been working on conditionals for a while now. Having the opportunity to present this material at the Vilem Mathesius Series provided the impetus to flesh out some of my vague thoughts. Major influences come from the work done in recent years at MIT by Lisa Matthewson, Philippe Schlenker, Julie Legate, and Uli Sauerland. I thank Irene Heim, Lisa Matthewson, Orin Percus, Philippe Schlenker, and Jason Stanley for illuminating discussions about this material. At this point, I see this talk as a report on the state of the art, exploring an intriguing possible connection, but I do not claim substantial intellectual property rights. Mistakes are certainly mine, achievements are probably not. (shrink)

Every member of the club was convinced that if a (particular) friend of his from Texas had died in the fire, he would have inherited a fortune.

This paper presents two general results of decidability concerning logics based on an indeterministic metric tense logic, which can be applied to, among others, logics combining knowledge, time and agency. We provide a general Kripke semantics based on a variation of the notion of synchronized Ockhamist frames. Our proof of the decidability is by way of the finite frame property, applying subframe transformations and a variant of the filtration technique.

Deliberative systems theorists have not explained what a deliberative system is. There are two problems here for deliberative systems theory: an empirical problem of boundaries (how to delineate the content of a deliberative system) and a normative problem of evaluation (how to evaluate the deliberation within a deliberative system). We argue that an adequate response to these problems requires a clear ontology. The existing literature suggests two coherent but mutually exclusive ontologies. A functionalist ontology postulates self-sustaining deliberative systems with their (...) own functional goals and logics independent of human intentionality. In contrast, an interpretive ontology conceives of deliberative systems as the products of the beliefs and actions of the actors in the relevant practices—deliberative systems derive from human intentionality. We conclude by showing how these conflicting ontologies lead to different empirical and normative agendas. (shrink)

Motivation has been recognized as a vital component in successfully learning a second or foreign language. However, research on language learners’ motivation in a study abroad context requires more attention in an era in which international mobility is becoming a new normal. This study investigated 217 Chinese overseas university students’ L2 motivation during their one-year postgraduate study in the United Kingdom. by examining a range of motivational variables in relation to their motivated English language learning behaviors. Integrating results from both (...) questionnaires and interviews from nine participating students, the study revealed that international posture showed the strongest positive power, followed by the ideal L2 self, in explaining the learners’ willingness to communicate, frequency of communication, and intended learning effort. Additionally, instrumentality and parental encouragement exerted prominent promotional influence in shaping their intended learning effort. However, the ought-to L2 self-displayed a significant negative impact on their L2 learning in this study abroad context, and the role of attitudes toward L2 speakers/community and culture was not evident in this case. The findings shed light on a more comprehensive understanding of L2 motivation in a study abroad context, and offer insightful implications for English as a Foreign Language education in cultivating language learners’ motivation to prepare for study abroad. (shrink)

Review of: Rudolph A. Makkreel, Kant’s Worldview. How Judgment Shapes Human Comprehension, Chicago, Northwestern University Press, 2021, 288 p. ISBN: 9780810144316.

Tri filosofskikh "opravdanii︠a︡" (teodit︠s︡ei︠a︡, antropodit︠s︡ei︠a︡, kosmodit︠s︡ei︠a︡ Serebri︠a︡nogo veka) -- Russkai︠a︡ sofiologii︠a︡ i kabbala -- S. Bulgakov : nauka sofiologii︠a︡ (ili konet︠s︡ religii) -- Tretiĭ Zavet o. Sergii︠a︡ Bulgakova -- Tretʹezavetnai︠a︡ misterii︠a︡ ("malai︠a︡" trilogii︠a︡ Bulgakova).

A fundamental postulate of statistical mechanics is that all microstates in an isolated system are equally probable. This postulate, which goes back to Boltzmann, has often been criticized for not having a clear physical foundation. In this note, we provide a derivation of the canonical distribution that avoids this postulate. In its place, we impose two axioms with physical interpretations. The first axiom ensures that, as our system of interest comes into contact with different heat baths, the ranking of states (...) of the system by probability is unchanged. Physically, this axiom is a statement that in thermal equilibrium, population inversions do not arise. The second axiom requires that, for any heat bath and any probability distribution on states, there is a universe consisting of a system and heat bath that can achieve this distribution. Physically, this axiom is a statement that energy flows between system and heat bath are unrestricted. We show that our two axioms identify the Boltzmann distribution. (shrink)

Ch. 1: Inadequate approaches to the question of God -- 1.1. Initial clarifications -- 1.2 Wholly unsystematic direct approaches -- 1.3. Semi-systematic indirect approaches -- 1.4. A wholly anti-systematic, anti-theoretical, and direct approach: Ludwig Wittgenstein -- 1.5. A characteristic example of a failed critique: Thomas Nagel's objections to God as "last point" -- Ch. 2. Heidegger's thinking of Being: the flawed development of a significant approach -- 2.1. Heidegger's failed and distorting interpretation and critique of the Christian metaphysics of Being (...) -- 2.2. Heidegger's four approaches to "retrieving" the "question of being" -- 2.3. What is unthought in Heidegger's thinking of Being I: Being-as-Ereignis -- 2.4. What is unthought in Heidegger's "thinking of Being" II: Being and being(s)- Ereignis and Ereignete(s) -- 2.5. The "overcoming [Überwinding] of metaphysics" as "transformational recovering [Verwindung]" of metaphysics and "the end of the history of Being" -- 2.6. The status of Heideggerian thinking I: thinking of Being as thinking within Ereignis, thinking that reaches its destination with Ereignis (Denken, das in das Ereignis einkehrt) -- 2.7. The status of Heideggerian thinking II: absolute claim, provisionality, the poverty of language, the language of thinking, the finitude of thinking -- 2.8. Heidegger's thinking and the topic "God" -- 2.9. Heidegger's "thinking": a fundamentally deficient and confused form of thinking -- Ch. 3:The structural-systematic approach to a theory of Being and God -- 3.1. The systematic context: the theoretical framework of the structural-systematic philosophy -- 3.2. The unrestricted universe of discourse as the universal dimension of primordial Being -- 3.3. Explication of the dimension of Being I: theory of Being as such -- 3.4. Explication of the dimension of Being II: theory of Being as a whole -- 3.5. Explication of the relation between absolutely necessary Being and the contingent dimension of Being as key to a conception of absolutely necessary Being as minded (as personal) -- 3.6. Absolutely necessary minded (personal) Being as creator of the world (as absolute creating) -- 3.7. The clarified relation between Being and God and the task of developing an integral theory about God -- Ch. 4: Critical examination of two counterpositions: Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion -- 4.1. Levinas's misguided conception of transcendence "beyond B/being" -- 4.2. Jean-Luc Marion's failed conception of "radical and non-metaphysical transcendence" and of "God without Being". (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Grundlagen einer Theorie der Wahrheit" verfügbar.

I have frequently mentioned objective problems and topics in the preceding sections. But what exactly is the force of ‘objective’ here? As my remarks should have made clear I have been using ‘objective’ to contrast with ‘purely historical’. A ‘purely historical’ approach never gets beyond reproduction, commentary, and interpretation. I call an approach ‘objective’ when it involves a philosopher who advances his own theses and claims. This minimal understanding of ‘objectivity’ (in the context of my remarks in this paper) by (...) no means implies that there are problems and topics, systems of concepts, methods, and similar factors that are ‘eternal’, completely independent of the contingencies of history (of philosophy, of the sciences), that are not relative to a language, to a logic, to a model, etc. Indeed whether there are problems, etc., in just this absolute, atemporal sense is itself a question for systematic philosophy. It seems clear that the formulation of a problem can only take place against a cognitive background of some sort and within some ‘conceptual scheme’. 34 Such an assumption is made by most if not all analytic philosophers. But the fact that a philosophical tradition recognizes ‘conceptual schemes’ does not make it a ‘purely historical’, non-objective philosophy, in the sense already introduced and described. A philosopher who explicitly accepts a certain ‘conceptual scheme’ proceeds in an entirely objective and systematic (and not purely historical) manner when, within this framework, he formulates his own theses. (shrink)

"Presents, and in part develops, a systematic philosophy as the universal science, or the theorization of the unrestricted universe of discourse, explicitly including being as such and as a whole. Argues that complete exploration of the theoretical domain requires such a science"--Provided by publisher.

Mit dem vorliegenden Werk schliesst Lorenz B. Puntel seine Seinstrilogie ab; die beiden vorherigen Bande sind unter dem Titel Struktur und Sein (2006) und Sein und Gott (2010) erschienen. Der neue Band fuhrt das in den anderen Banden nur inchoativ formulierte gesamtsystematische philosophische Programm aus. Lorenz B. Puntel betrachtet das Thema Sein und Nichts als das ursprungliche Thema der Philosophie und stellt daruber eine umfassende Theorie auf. Diese Theorie nennt er Seinstheorie; sie besteht aus den beiden Subtheorien: Ontologie (...) als Theorie (des Seins) der Seienden und Einailogie als Theorie des Seins selbst oder als solchen. Ausgangspunkt ist die von Heidegger eingefuhrte ontologische Differenz, die Unterscheidung von Sein und Seienden. In eingehenden, auf den einschlagigen Originaltexten der wichtigsten Philosophen basierenden Ausfuhrungen wird der Nachweis gefuhrt, dass der in der Philosophiegeschichte feststellbare Grundmangel in der haufigen totalen und in sehr wenigen Fallen partiellen Ignorierung der grossen Seinsfrage besteht; nirgends wird diese in adaquater Weise thematisiert. In Teil II arbeitet der Autor die Grundzuge sowohl der allgemeinen Ontologie als auch der Einailogie heraus. Zwei grundlegende Thesen werden bewiesen: die Moglichkeit des relativen Nichts, d. h. des Verschwindens aller Seienden auf der Basis ihrer Kontingenz, und die Unmoglichkeit des absoluten Nichts, d. h. des Verschwindens des Seins selbst auf der Basis seines notwendigen Status. Gezeigt wird schliesslich, dass dem Sein selbst eine geistige Verfasstheit innewohnt, die aus Intelligenz/Denken, Wille und Freiheit besteht, womit die Moglichkeit eroffnet wird, dass das notwendige geistig verfasste und damit freie Sein sich weiter offenbaren kann. Dem nachzugehen, setzt aber eine grundlegende methodische und thematische Zasur voraus. (shrink)

The necessary task for philosophy is the development of a metaphysical ontology, i.e., a philosophical theory of everything. The urgency of this task is apparentin, for example, the weakness of proofs for the existence of God. When such “proofs” are not rooted in a comprehensive metaphysical ontology, the principlesapplied, as well as the “God” whose existence has supposedly been proven, are unintelligible. Thus, the explication of Being, from within an adequately articulated framework, should be the central focus of philosophy. The (...) basic conceptual structures required for this task are the three fundamental modalities: necessity, possibility, and contingency. With these tools, we can refute the thesis that everything is contingent and nothing is necessary or absolute. The all-is-contingent thesis has as an implication the assumption of the possibility of absolute nothingness. But this concept both is itself contradictory and has an impossible consequence. Finally, the relation between the absolute dimension of being and persons like us (contingent beings) can be understood by conceiving of the absolute dimension as a personal absolute. From here, we can attempt to interpret the history of the free acts of the personal absolute by studying the history of revealed religions. (shrink)

Kai Nielsen is one of Canada's most distinguished political philosophers. In a career spanning over 40 years, he has published more than 400 papers in political philosophy, ethics, meta-philosophy, and philosophy of religion. Pessimism of the Intellect presents a thoughtful collection of Nielsen's essays complemented by an extended reflective interview with Nielsen. This collection allows the reader to grasp the systematic scope of his thought and methodology.

The present article purports to answer the old question of whether the concept (and the method) of Hegelian dialectic can be clarified. Three arguments are advanced in defence of the claim that Hegel's conception is not in fact intelligible. The first argument shows that dialectical negation leads to an infinite regress. The second argument analyses Hegel's claim that the dialectical method yields a positive result and demonstrates that this claim remains completely unsubstantiated and unsubstantiable. The third argument comes to the (...) conclusion that Hegelian dialectic cannot pretend to be an acceptable explication of the “intuitive” understanding of negation. An APPENDIX examines critically a new attempt by D. Wandschneider of reconstructing the first steps of Hegelian dialectical logic by displaying “antinomic structures” and by employing (at least to a limited extent) the techniques of formal logic. (shrink)

O tema da pluralidade de correntes filosóficas sempre ocupou a filosofia desde seu início. Hoje ele tem uma atualidade extraordinária devido ao fato inegável de que a filosofia está presente em todos os países dotados de uma cultura e língua com caráter suprarregional. Com exceção de alguns exímios filósofos como Hegel e Heidegger, o tópico foi em geral ignorado e/ou é apenas parcial e inadequadamente abordado. O presente ensaio propõe-se elaborar as grandes linhas de uma tematização sistemática deste complexo fenômeno. (...) Na seção 1 é apresentada uma breve caracterização das mais importantes posturas na filosofia atual a respeito da pluralidade de correntes filosóficas. As três posturas, às quais todos os posicionamentos vigentes podem ser reduzidos, são as indicadas no título do ensaio. O resultado de uma consideração crítica destas posturas consiste na tese de que somente a terceira postura, segundo a qual a unidade da filosofia em meio à pluralidade de correntes filosóficas representa um problema solúvel ou insolúvel, pode ser considerada uma concepção coerente e bem fundada. Tal posicionameno, porém, não exclui a aceitação de certos elementos da primeira e da segunda pos­turas. Na seção 2 são delineados os fundamentos para uma solução positiva do problema. Estes se centralizam no conceito de quadro referencial teórico com a tese subsequente de que existe uma pluralidade de quadros referenciais teóricos. Na seção 3 vem exposto o esboço de uma solução positiva, resultado da tematização das relações entre os diferentes quadros referenciais teóricos. São apresentadas e fundamentadas três teses. A primeira recorre ao conceito de verdade elaborado na filosofia estrutural sistemática e, nesta base, adquire a seguinte formulação: a cada quadro teórico bem formado e constituído corresponde um determinado grau de verdade. A segunda tese reza: quadros referenciais teóricos bem forma­dos e constituídos formam uma hierarquia a partir dos critérios de teoricidade, inteligibilidade, coerência, abertura temática ilimitada e rigor expositivo. Por fim, a terceira tese articula uma consequência metódica e programática de longo alcan­ce: uma tarefa preliminar e essencial da filosofia consiste em elaborar o quadro teórico de maior rigor teórico, mais inteligível, mais coerente e de maior abertura temática possível. O resultado não consiste na pretensão ingênua de elaborar um quadro teórico supremo e absoluto, nem mesmo o de atingir uma verdade cabal e definitiva. Este não é o ideal da filosofia. Na conclusão, resume-se brevemente o corolário geral das considerações feitas no ensaio: a unidade da filosofia não é uma grandeza fixa, estática e abstrata; ao contrário, constitui uma grandeza dinâ­mica e processual; além disso, o caráter real da filosofia dá-se somente como um processo de autodeterminação através das suas fases históricas concretizadas nas figuras chamadas de correntes filosóficas. (shrink)

The article aims to show that current understandings and developments of “metaphysics,” in both analytic and continental philosophy, fail to do justice both to the metaphysical tradition as a whole and to the potentialities inherent in that tradition’s mode and aim of thinking. The root failure is the failure to recognize that Thomas Aquinas, by distinguishing between ens and esse, reveals that metaphysics must thematize Being (esse) as well as being(s) (ens/entia). To be sure, Aquinas’s understanding of Being solely as (...) actus essendi is fundamentally inadequate, but Being is not even a topic for analytic philosophy, for which metaphysical questions concern only being(s). The article takes seriously Heidegger’s (only partially correct) charge that an “oblivion of Being” pervades metaphysics and, against Heidegger, shows how to conceive of and develop an adequate theory of Being. (shrink)

I thought the paper by Kai-yee Wong and Chris Fraser was fascinating and insightful. Two things I especially appreciated are the clarity with which they summarize my views. I think they are quite fair and accurate. Second, I appreciate their suggestion that the way to deal with the practical problem of weakness of will has much to do with the role of the Background in shaping our actions. I think they are especially on the right track when they say that (...) the improvement of Background skills may actually narrow the range of real options for action, (p. 21) nonetheless, they do not decrease freedom. As they say, “It is a process of strengthening the self, and the agent is likely to experience the concomitant restriction of ‘live’ options not as a limitation but as strength of character.” (p. 21). That seems to me very much on the right track. What they are suggesting, and it is a powerful addition to my own writings, is that we should not just think of the Background as facilitating languages, games and social practices generally, but for morality as well (p. 23). (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Preliminaries 1 The Highly Problematic Status of the Category of Substance 2 A New Approach: Prime State of Affairs (“Pristate”) as the Only Ontological Category at the Fundamental Level 3 Concluding Remarks.

Die "Gottesfrage" ist anerkanntermaßen eine äußerst komplexe, vieldeutige und obskure Frage. In ausführlicher Auseinandersetzung mit Heidegger, in dessen Schriften eine sehr einflussreiche einseitige und entstellende Interpretation und Kritik der großen metaphysischen Tradition immer wieder präsentiert wird, zeigt Lorenz B. Puntel, dass die Gottesfrage klar, rational und argumentativ, kurz: mit theoretischer Rigorosität, behandelt werden kann. Dies aber setzt einen umfassenden philosophischen Theorierahmen voraus, der die Entfaltung einer systematischen Konzeption des Seins als solchen und im Ganzen ermöglicht und in nuce enthält. (...) Anschließend wird eine solche Konzeption im Grundriss zur Darstellung gebracht. In einem ausführlichen Kapitel werden die Positionen von É. Lévinas und J.-L. Marion, den zwei wohl radikalsten postmodernen Kritikern und Gegnern jeder Form eines positiven Verhältnisses zwischen dem "Sein" und "Gott", eingehend analysiert und deren radikale Unhaltbarkeit demonstriert. (shrink)

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither “deflationary” nor “substantive”.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In (...) particular, it is shown that generally an “objectual” ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting “objects” (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of “primary states of affairs”. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible. (shrink)

Propósito deste ensaio é apresentar uma nova abordagem ao velho problema que é o acesso filosófico ao Deus cristão. Isto acontece dentro do esquema de uma nova metafísica cujo ponto de partida é a capacidade que a mente tem de percepcionar a totalidade do ser, facto este que o artigo apresenta como sendo justamente uma estrutura central do intelecto. Dado que as distinções entre intelecto e mundo, conceitos e realidade, sujeito e objecto, etc., já pressupõem a totalidade do ser dada (...) perceptivamente e nela está baseada, esta totalidade, assim concebida, torna-se mais fundamental que todas aquelas famosas distinções. A tarefa dessa nova metafísica aqui em questão consiste em explicitar uma explicação desta totalidade. No presente artigo, esta explicação é desenvolvida apenas numa direcção, a saber, a explicação no sentido de como proceder da totalidade do ser para o Deus cristão. Neste sentido, uma distinção fundamental é feita entre "o Absoluto" e "Deus ". A filosofia tradicional acreditou frequentemente que a filosofia só poderia explicitar a "determinação" do absoluto como criador do universo finito. O autor do artigo visa justamente demonstrar que outras determinações do Absoluto podem ser filosoficamente alcançadas; mas isto pressupõe que a história da liberdade do Absoluto seja radicalmente tomada em consideração. Ora isto, por sua vez, significa que a história e interpretação da religião - especialmente da religião segundo a tradição judaico-cristã - tem de ser vista como um tópico filosófico verdadeiramente central. Assim compreendido, o Absoluto é apropriadamente designado por "Deus ". Segue-se que uma das consequências desta abordagem é a de que uma vincada distinção entre filosofia tradicional e teologia tradicional cristã deve ser abandonada. /// The purpose of this essay is to present a new approach to the old problem of philosophical access to the Christian God. This is done within the frame of a new metaphysics whose starting point is the mind's perception of the totality of being which is shown to be a central structural feature of the mind as such. Since the distinctions between mind and world, concepts and reality, subject and object, and the like, already presuppose the perceptually given totality of being and are based on it, this totality, so concei-ved, is more fundamental than all those famous distinctions. The task of the envisaged new metaphysics consists in working out an explication of this totality. In this paper this explication is developed only in one direction: the explication in the sense of how to proceed from the totality of being to the Christian God. To this effect, a fundamental distinction is made between "the Absolute" and " God". Traditional philosophy had constantly believed that philosophy could only work out the "determination "of the Absolute as the creator of the finite universe. The paper endeavours to demonstrate that further determinations of the Absolute can be philosophically reached; but this presupposes that the history of the freedom of the Absolute is radically taken into account. And this, in turn, amounts to the claim that the history and interpretation of religion - most especially according to the Judaic-Christian tradition -must be seen as a central philosophical topic. Thus understood, the Absolute is appropriately called " God". One of the consequences of this approach is that the sharp distinction between traditional philosophy and traditional Christian theology should be abandoned. (shrink)

Evangelization in the present contemporary context, transmission of faith, and the new architecture of communication are this article’s central axes. Just as interconnected cogwheels, they need to function together to hand on faith appropriately in today’s world. Our society, marked by unprecedented experiences in the field of digital culture, gave rise to a “new person”, who lives and relates within a new architecture of communication altogether. In the communicative process of digital culture, the modality of communication has changed from a (...) unilinear mode of transmission to networked, interactive, collaborative forms of interaction. Based on the teachings of the Second Vatican Council, and in an effort to rethink the present modalities of faith transmission, this study concerns both the convergence and continuity of the Magisterium of the Church on evangelization and the urgency for her to engage in a dialogue between faith and culture. This requires an attitude of courage to consider more deeply the relation between faith, Church life, and the current transformations as experienced today. For in the digital culture, a new perception and understanding of faith has grown and developed. New languages have challenged conventional paradigms and prompted us into a change of mentality and pastoral practice. (shrink)

The first section states two general theses: the claim that semeantic features are not expressible in language is indefensible; and, the role semantic expressions play in language consists in making language fully determinate. The second section elaborates on the main thesis of the paper; that is, ‘... is true’ expresses neither a predicate nor a PROsentence-forming operator (R. Brandom), but a PERsentence- (and PERproposition-) forming operator (‘PER’ from ‘PERfect’ or ‘PERform’). Contrary to the ‘anaphoric’ conception, it is argued that the (...) truth operator functions ‘cataphorically’ in the following sense: it applies to semantically indeterminate (or underdetermined) sentences (and propositions) and yields fully determinate sentences (and propositions), i.e., PERsentences (and PERpropositions). This leads to a surprisingly new understanding of (Tarski’s) Tbiconditionals. The final section shows how to conceive of the fully determinate semantical and ontological status of sentences and propositions. (shrink)

There is probably no conceptualization of rights more famous than Ronald Dworkin’s claim that they are “trumps.” This seems to stand in stark contrast to the dominant, proportionality-based strand of rights discourse, according to which rights, instead of trumping competing interests, ultimately have to be balanced against them. The goal of this article is to reconcile Dworkin’s work and proportionality and thereby make a contribution to our understanding of both. It offers a critical reconstruction of Dworkin’s theory of rights which (...) does away with the misleading label of rights as “trumps” and shows that, far from being in conflict with proportionality, properly understood Dworkin’s work supports and supplements that doctrine and provides a much-needed account of its moral foundation as being about human dignity, freedom, and equality. (shrink)

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and Greg Restall’s (...) bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. (shrink)

This festschrift includes a dozen essays on issues that have been at the focus of Kai Nielsen's research, mainly issues in ethics and political philosophy. Among these are four essays on socialism and Marxism. There are also essays on philosophy of religion, epistemology, and meta-philosophy.