We argue that brains generate predictions only within the constraints of the action repertoire. This makes the computational complexity tractable and fosters a step-by-step parallel development of sensory and motor systems. Hence, it is more of a benefit than a literal constraint and may serve as a universal normative principle to understand sensorimotor coupling and interactions with the world.

Essays on atheism by Kurt Baier, John Dewey, Paul Edwards, Antony Flew, Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm, Sidney Hook, Walter Kaufmann, Corliss Lamont, Wallace I. Matson, H.J. McCloskey, Ernest Nagel, Kai Nielsen, Richard Robinson, Bertrand Russell, and Michael Scriven.

Part I: WHAT IS ETHICS? Plato: Socratic Morality: Crito. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part II: ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM. Herodotus: Custom is King. Thomas Aquinas: Objectivism: Natural Law. Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism. Louis Pojman: A Critique of Ethical Relativism. Gilbert Harman: Moral Relativism Defended. Alan Gewirth: The Objective Status of Human Rights. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part III: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES. Plato: Why Be Moral? Richard Taylor: On the Socratic Dilemma. David Gauthier: Morality and (...) Advantage. Gregory Kavka: A Reconciliation Project. Derek Parfit: Later Selves and Moral Principles. Bernard Williams: Persons, Character, and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IV: VALUE. Jeremy Bentham: Classical Hedonism. Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine. Richard Taylor: Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong. Friedrich Nietzsche: The Transvaluation of Values. Derek Parfit: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? Thomas Nagel: Value: The View from Nowhere. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part V: UTILITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Kai Nielsen: Against Moral Conservatism. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism. John Hospers: Rule-Utilitarianism. Robert Nozick: Side Constraints. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VI: KANTIAN AND DEONTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS. Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals. W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? Onora O’Neill: Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Judith Jarvis Thomson: Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VII: CONTRACTARIAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? John Rawls: Contractualism: Justice as Fairness. T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism and Utilitarianism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VIII: VIRTUE-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue. Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life. William Frankena: A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics. Walter Schaller: Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Alasdair MacIntyre: The Nature of the Virtues. Susan Wolf: Moral Saints. Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IX: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM: METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. David Hume: On Reason and the Emotions: The Fact/Value Distinction. G. E. Moore: Non-Naturalism. A. J. Ayer: Emotivism. R. M. Hare: Prescriptivism: The Structure of Ethics and Morals. Geoffrey Warnock: The Object of Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part X: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM. J.L. Mackie: The Subjectivity of Values. Jonathan Harrison: A Critique of Mackie’s Error Theory. Gilbert Harman: Moral Nihilism. Nicholas Sturgeon: Moral Explanations. Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bruce Russell: Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism. Michael Smith: A Defense of Moral Realism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XI: RELIGION AND ETHICS. Plato: Morality and Religion. Immanuel Kant: God and Immortality as Necessary Postulates of Morality. George Mavrodes: Religious and the Queerness of Morality. Kai Nielson: Ethics Without God. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XII: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY. Part A. Sociobiology and the Question of Moral Responsibility. Charles Darwin: Ethics and the Descent of Man. E.O.Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics. Michael Ruse: Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach. Elliot Sober: Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics. J.L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle, Evolution and Morality. Suggestions for Further Readingon Sociobiology. Part B. The Challenge of Determinism to Moral Responsibility and Desert. Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Louis Pojman: Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility:A Response to Galen Strawson. Richard Taylor: A Libertarian Defense of Free Will and Responsibility. Suggestions for Further Reading on Moral Responsibility. Glossary of Ethical Terms. (shrink)

John White argues that ‘egalitarianism, in education as elsewhere, is a will-o'-the-wisp’.1 He claims that recent defences of egalitarianism, among which he kindly includes my own along with those of Thomas Nagel and Kai Nielsen, have failed to answer the basic question of why a more equal society should be regarded as valuable. I shall try to show that the positive philosophical commitments contained in his argument may point the way to an answer.

Addressing the end-of-philosophy debate and the challenge it presents to contemporary philosophy, this book draws on Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Habermas and Foucault, among others. It develops the implications of Richard Rorty's arguments in particular.

Writing firmly in the Reformed tradition, Professor Shao Kai Tseng presents a reinterpretation and critical appreciation of Kant-whose complex philosophy gave rise to the secularization of modern society.

This volume considers in depth and carefully a cluster of issues central to contemporary philosophical and social scientific investigation while utilising methods and conceptualisations at the very cutting edge of philosophy.

Tri filosofskikh "opravdanii︠a︡" (teodit︠s︡ei︠a︡, antropodit︠s︡ei︠a︡, kosmodit︠s︡ei︠a︡ Serebri︠a︡nogo veka) -- Russkai︠a︡ sofiologii︠a︡ i kabbala -- S. Bulgakov : nauka sofiologii︠a︡ (ili konet︠s︡ religii) -- Tretiĭ Zavet o. Sergii︠a︡ Bulgakova -- Tretʹezavetnai︠a︡ misterii︠a︡ ("malai︠a︡" trilogii︠a︡ Bulgakova).

In this collection of original essays on metaethics, the nature of morality, and the structure of moral reasoning are characterized, the limits of justification in ethics are examined, and the underlying rationale of moral philosophy is probed. Around mid-century metaethics held centre stage in discussions of moral philosophy in Anglo-American and Scandinavian philosophical environments. During the 1970s, its "foundational" position was challenged by developments within analytic philosophy itself by a renewal of systematic substantive ethics largely, but not exclusively, of a (...) Rawlsian inspiration and by a reinvigorated interest in substantive moral problems on the part of philosophers. However, as work went on here, philosophers encountered problems concerning the methods of moral reasoning and the structure of justification of moral claims that were recognized to be metaethical. This led to a renewal of metaethics now freed from its previously narrow linguistic focus and aprioristic restrictions. The essays in this volume contribute both to this renewal and to a continued skeptical probing of the very rationale of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Many writers in various fields--philosophy, religion, literature, and psychology--believe that the question of the meaning of life is one of the most significant problems that an individual faces. In The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, E.D. Klemke collects some of the best writings on this topic, primarily works by philosophers but also selections from literary figures and religious thinkers. The twenty-seven cogent, readable essays are organized around three different perspectives on the meaning of life. In Part I, the readings assert (...) and defend the theistic view that without the existence of God--or faith in God--life has no significance or purpose. In Part II the selections deny this thesis, defending instead the humanistic alternative--that life has or can have meaning and worth without any theistic beliefs or commitment. In the final group of readings, contributors ask if the question of the meaning of life is in itself legitimate and significant. The volume also includes an introduction by the editor and a selected bibliography. This new edition adds essays by A. J. Ayer, Hazel Barnes, William Lane Craig, Owen Flanagan, Antony Flew, Thomas Nagel, Kai Nielsen, Philip L. Quinn, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Walter T. Stace.The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy and human nature. It also provides an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject for general readers. (shrink)

This book is a collection of 18 essays portraying a "humanistic" outlook on several contemporary moral problems, and includes such essayists as Kurt Baier, Carl Rogers, B. F. Skinner, Sidney Hook, Abraham Edel, John Somerville, and Corliss Lamont. Although each was requested first to give his own definition of humanism and then to work out one application of it from his particular field or interest, these directions are not always strictly adhered to. Half of the essays had in fact, already (...) been published in some form in The Humanist. The 5 topical headings of the book show the diversity of fields and interests portrayed: Ethics, Religion and the Meaning of Life; The Good Life; The Individual: Law, Morality and Social Organization; Justice and Society; and Death. Although the essays are of unequal philosophical depth and acumen, this variety may be appealing for some uses of this as a text. However, two of the essays in particular stand out for this reviewer: "Ethics Without Religion" by Kai Nielsen, which perceptively outlines the problematic for as well as against an ethics not rooted in religion, and "The Enforcement of Morals" by Ernest Nagel which aptly analyzes the problem of the relation between the spheres of morality and law taking as a focus the noted Hart-Devlin debate of this issue. The thread which Kurtz believes unites all of these essays is their portrayal of a humanistic viewpoint, a viewpoint which he attempts to summarize in his own 14-page introduction, "What is Humanism?" But defining humanism is not an easy task. One must steer between a strictly negative view which defines it only in relation to what it opposes, and a broader but rather indefinite view of it as some form of man-centered philosophy. Although Kurtz wants to be positive in his own definition, he seems unable to move away from a negative and rhetorical presentation in which theism is simply stated to be incompatible with humanism. Moreover, his outline of a humanistic ethics is somewhat superficial. For example, he seems unaware of the problems involved in holding that ethical values are man’s own "creation" and at the same time are normative and objective. Nevertheless, the book may be of some help as a supplementary text to stimulate undergraduate students in discussion and study of the topics treated therein.—B.A.M. (shrink)

There are three remarks of Norman Malcolm’s with which I should like to begin. The first is his remark that.

A primary goal of research in the semantics/pragmatics interface is to investigate the division of labor between the truth-conditional component of the meaning of an expression and other factors of a more pragmatic nature. One favorite strategy, associated foremost with Grice (1967, 1989), is to keep to a rather austere semantics and to derive the overall meaning of an utterance by predictable additional inferences, called ``implicatures,'' which are seen as based on certain principles of rational and purposeful interaction. In this (...) chapter, I will explore a di¨erent way in which the truth-conditional component is complemented in context. Imagine that we have persuasive evidence that an expression a in context c expresses a proposition p. The straightforward way of capturing this in a semantic system is to attribute to a a context-dependent meaning that maps c to p in a systematic and adequate way. (shrink)

ARGUMENT ABOUT whether in any significant sense we can derive an ought from an is has been persistent and intractable. Fifteen to twenty years ago it was orthodoxy in analytical philosophical circles to claim that for all their other differences Hume and Moore were right in agreeing that in no significant sense can we derive an ought from an is. At present there is no orthodoxy or even anything like a dominant view and, given our current understanding of how language (...) works and our understanding of moral and ideological discourse, we could not possibly reasonably remain content with old orthodoxies or take the question to be as straightforward as it was often thought to be. (shrink)

Das Denken sei das eigentliche Handeln, hat Heidegger behauptet.

It is fair enough to refer, as Father Clarke does, to the God of the Christians and the Jews as ‘the one infinite Creator of all other things’. It is reasonable to take ‘God’ as a term that has certain conditions associated with it. These conditions fix its meaning. The central conditions associated with ‘God’ are: being infinite or unlimited, eternal, self-existent, the creator of everything that exists other than himself, the being upon whom all other beings are dependent but (...) who depends on nothing himself, being personal, good, loving and holy. These conditions determine our concept of God, determine what could count as a referent for the term ‘God’. In short, God, as John Hick remarks, is conceived in Western Religions ‘as the infinite, eternal, uncreated, personal reality, who has created all that exists other than himself, and who has revealed himself to his human creatures as holy and loving’. (shrink)

Razdel 1. F. Nit︠s︡she i russkai︠a︡ myslʹ Serebri︠a︡nogo veka -- Razdel 2. Religii︠a︡ Serebri︠a︡nogo veka -- Razdel 3. Russkai︠a︡ germenevtika -- Razdel 4. Filosofii︠a︡ imeni v Rossii.

Motivation has been recognized as a vital component in successfully learning a second or foreign language. However, research on language learners’ motivation in a study abroad context requires more attention in an era in which international mobility is becoming a new normal. This study investigated 217 Chinese overseas university students’ L2 motivation during their one-year postgraduate study in the United Kingdom. by examining a range of motivational variables in relation to their motivated English language learning behaviors. Integrating results from both (...) questionnaires and interviews from nine participating students, the study revealed that international posture showed the strongest positive power, followed by the ideal L2 self, in explaining the learners’ willingness to communicate, frequency of communication, and intended learning effort. Additionally, instrumentality and parental encouragement exerted prominent promotional influence in shaping their intended learning effort. However, the ought-to L2 self-displayed a significant negative impact on their L2 learning in this study abroad context, and the role of attitudes toward L2 speakers/community and culture was not evident in this case. The findings shed light on a more comprehensive understanding of L2 motivation in a study abroad context, and offer insightful implications for English as a Foreign Language education in cultivating language learners’ motivation to prepare for study abroad. (shrink)

This essay offers an account of Rorty's version of pragmatism after the so-called linguistic turn, including his attack on epistemology and metaphysics, his metaphilosophy, his theory of morality, and his political philosophy. Woven into this account of Rorty are some of the most important criticisms made of Rorty, and considerations about how Rorty has responded or could have responded.

I am grateful to Josiane Boulad-Ayoub and Wesley Cooper for their generous treatment of my Equality and Liberty and for their probing criticisms. They make me keenly aware that I have often not expressed myself clearly enough and they have set in motion a process of self-questioning that will extend well beyond this discussion. They drive home to me, once again, the realization of how difficult it is to get anything right in philosophy.Since they, for the most part, raise different (...) sorts of issues, I shall discuss their criticisms separately starting with Cooper's account. (shrink)

IN his Reason and Goodness Blanshard has posed the following question for moral philosophers: ‘When we decide that a certain action is right or our duty, what is it that does the deciding? Our reason? Our feeling? or both’. On a superficial or slight acquaintance with either Hume or the emotivists, we are likely to respond: ‘Why, feeling only! Emotion is central in morality. Reason is but a slave or a servant of the passions; the final reasons we can give (...) for any moral claim are “exciting reasons”—our dispositions to be for or against something.’. (shrink)

Philosophers out of the idealist tradition—Kant, preeminently F. H. Bradley and H. J. Paton among our near contemporaries—have tried to set out a kind of objectivist grounding for moral principles which, I shall argue, moral principles do not and indeed could not possess. There have been many sadly defective rhetorical arguments against both absolutism and subjectivism in ethics; and rhetoric, in a quite different and indeed legitimate sense, has been employed to show that many anti-absolutist and pro-subjectivist arguments rest on (...) conceptual confusion and rhetorical exaggeration. Close attention to the logic of our language—it has been claimed—would lead us to see that all grand talk of either objectivism or subjectivism is just so much rhetoric—switching once more to the pejorative sense of “rhetoric.” Still, more recently, some philosophers have tried to specify a sense of “subjectivism” which is coherent and which does pose a rational challenge to the claims of those idealist philosophers and to the claims of others as well that there are objectively true or objectively justified categorical moral claims or whole moral accounts of how we ought to live. (shrink)