This study investigates how business leaders dynamically narrate their aspirational ethical leadership identities. In doing so, it furthers understanding of ethical leadership as a process situated in time and place. The analysis focuses on the discursive strategies used to narrate identity and ethics by ethnic Chinese business leaders in Indonesia after their conversion to Pentecostal–charismatic Christianity. By exploring the use of metaphor, our study shows how these business leaders discursively deconstruct their ‘old’ identities and construct their ‘new’ aspirational identities as (...) ethical leaders. This leads to the following contributions. First, we show that ethical leadership is constructed in identity talk as the business leaders actively narrate aspirational identities. Second, the identity narratives of the business leaders suggest that ethical leadership is a context-bound and situated claim vis-à-vis unethical practice. Third, we propose a conceptual template, identifying processes of realisation and inspiration followed by significant shifts in understanding, for the study of aspirational ethical leadership. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Anabases. Traditions et réceptions de l'Antiquité, n° 20, 2014. Nous remercions Pascal Payen, la revue Anabases et Juliette Lormier de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Cet article propose d'analyser deux entreprises de traduction en hexamètres français : celle des Travaux et des Jours d'Hésiode par Jean-Antoine de Baïf dans ses Étrénes de poézie fransoeze an vers mezurés, et celle de l'Iliade d'Homère par Philippe Brunet. Il s'agit de resituer ces (...) - Poétique et Études littéraires – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

For creatures like us, entertaining possible future scenarios of how our life might play out is often accompanied or “charged” with emotions like hope and anxiety. What will interest me in this article is whether the epistemic profile of hope and anxiety, and in particular the fact that they are directed at uncertain outcomes, might pose a threat to the stability of their valence. Hope and anxiety are not emotions which relate us to evaluative properties of actual events, they relate (...) us to evaluative properties of relevant possibilities (Gordon, 1969; Kurth, 2018; Benton, 2019). I will present and discuss two philosophical accounts according to which hope and anxiety do not have a proprietary and consistent valence. According to the first account, anxiety is an intrinsically ambivalent emotion, as a result of involving an awareness of conflicting possibilities or ways in which the future might unfold (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2015). According to the second, hope is not a strictly positive emotion, as certain specific occurrences of hope are negatively valenced (Stockdale, 2019). Finally, I argue that an evaluative theory of valence helps us clearly conceive of hope and anxiety as two polar opposite experiences of uncertainty. (shrink)

We ask, when is a property of a model a logical property? According to the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion this is the case when the property is preserved by isomorphisms. We relate this to model-theoretic characteristics of abstract logics in which the model class is definable. This results in a graded concept of logicality in the terminology of Sagi [46]. We investigate which characteristics of logics, such as variants of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, Completeness theorem, and absoluteness, are relevant from the logicality (...) point of view, continuing earlier work by Bonnay, Feferman, and Sagi. We suggest that a logic is the more logical the closer it is to first order logic. We also offer a refinement of the result of McGee that logical properties of models can be expressed in $L_{\infty \infty }$ if the expression is allowed to depend on the cardinality of the model, based on replacing $L_{\infty \infty }$ by a “tamer” logic. (shrink)

Is mathematics 'entangled' with its various formalisations? Or are the central concepts of mathematics largely insensitive to formalisation, or 'formalism free'? What is the semantic point of view and how is it implemented in foundational practice? Does a given semantic framework always have an implicit syntax? Inspired by what she calls the 'natural language moves' of Gödel and Tarski, Juliette Kennedy considers what roles the concepts of 'entanglement' and 'formalism freeness' play in a range of logical settings, from computability (...) and set theory to model theory and second order logic, to logicality, developing an entirely original philosophy of mathematics along the way. The treatment is historically, logically and set-theoretically rich, and topics such as naturalism and foundations receive their due, but now with a new twist. (shrink)

Cette conversation raconte deux expériences de mise en capacité de jeunes quant à la connaissance de leur propre alimentation. La première se dénomme Sugar Killer, c’est une expérience artistique qui s’intègre dans une recherche scientifique et pédagogique. Recherche-action d’éducation alimentaire hybridant art, alimentation et transformation du territoire, elle peut se résumer par le sous-titre « quand les collégiens enquêtent sur leurs sucres ». La seconde s’inscrit dans une recherche menée auprès d’étudiants de l’université de Poitiers une année avant le Covid (...) (2019) et durant le Covid (2020). Elle a permis de comparer les mutations de ces pratiques en fonction de la situation familiale des étudiants. Les deux expériences s’appuient sur la méthode Selfood, qui consiste à faire prendre en photo les repas d’une personne sur plusieurs jours consécutifs, pour constituer une forme d’autoportrait alimentaire. Les paysages alimentaires récoltés sont le support d’une réflexion plus large sur le fonctionnement des systèmes agro-alimentaires, sur les choix et pratiques alimentaires des participant·es, et leurs effets sur la santé et l’environnement. (shrink)

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen in Psychiatr Clin 15(4):743–758, 1992; Reed in Obsessional (...) experience and compulsive behaviour: a cognitive-structural approach, Academic Press, Cambridge, 1985; Tolin et al. in Cogn Ther Res 27(6):657–669, 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters—that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities—might depend on these affective mechanisms. (shrink)

Why do thoughts involving harm and damage trigger guilt in certain individuals and not in others? The significance of this question comes into view when considering the medical and psychological literature on patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Patients with OCD feel guilt in response to having certain recurring, negative thoughts whose content evoke scenarios of harm and damage. This, however—at least in most readings of what those thoughts consist of—is puzzling. The transition from having a thought about being the source (...) of harm popping up in one’s mind to feeling guilty is not straightforward, and it calls for explanation. Indeed, OCD appears to challenge a traditional picture of what guilt is all about... (shrink)

English summary: Taking into account the relevant and mostly contemporary ango-american debates concering collective intentionality, the author eximanes what it means to share reasons and other intentional states such as thoughts and emotions. The guiding question of the dissertation is in what way and to what extent morality and therefore self-consciousness can be understood as conditions of possibility for the sharing of mental states, especially reasons. The dissertation is a contribution mainly to fields of research in practical philosophy (normative ethics (...) and moral psychology) and in social philosophy (collective intentionality analysis) and rational choice theory. German description: Juliette Gloors Monographie fragt aus hauptsachlich analytischer Perspektive und unter spezieller Berucksichtigung der einschlagigen anglo-amerikanischen Debatten, was es bedeutet, Grunde und andere intentionale Einstellungen zu teilen. Die Leitfrage der Untersuchung lautet, inwiefern Moral und damit Selbstbewusstsein als Bedingungen der Moglichkeit solchen Teilens begriffen werden konnen. Die Dissertation ist ein Beitrag zur Forschung innerhalb des Gebiets der Praktischen Philosophie (insbesondere der normativen Ethik) und der Sozialphilosophie (speziell im Bereich der Kollektiven Intentionalitat). (shrink)

Juliette Roussin | : Cet article a pour objet d’interroger la tendance actuelle des démocraties à s’entourer d’institutions indépendantes au fort degré de compétence en vue de limiter et de corriger les défaillances éventuelles des corps démocratiques élus et représentatifs. La légitimité démocratique de ces institutions contre-majoritaires leur viendrait, selon certains théoriciens de la démocratie, de ce qu’elles offrent la possibilité de contester les décisions collectives lorsque celles-ci sont mauvaises ou injustes, contribuant ainsi à l’amélioration globale des performances du (...) régime démocratique. À partir notamment d’une lecture des travaux de Philip Pettit sur la démocratie contestataire et d’une réflexion sur l’approche épistémique défendue par David Estlund, nous questionnons au contraire le caractère démocratique de ces formes institutionnelles de contestation et montrons que, tant qu’elles ne font pas l’objet d’un contrôle démocratique plus étroit, elles peuvent être interprétées comme des modes de contestation de la démocratie plutôt que comme des instruments de son amélioration. | : This paper investigates a current tendency among democracies to appeal to highly competent independent institutions in order to constrain and amend the potential deficiencies of elected and representative democratic bodies. According to some democratic theorists, these counter-majoritarian institutions enjoy democratic legitimacy because they allow the contestation of ill-devised or unjust collective decisions, and hence contribute to the global improvement of democratic results. Based on a reading of Philip Pettit’s work on contestatory democracy and of David Estlund’s epistemic approach, the paper questions the democratic nature of these institutional forms of contestation and shows that, as long as they are not subjected to tighter democratic control, these institutions can be interpreted as ways of contesting democracy rather than as implements for its improvement. (shrink)

Feeling confused can sometimes lead us to give up on the task, frustrated. What is less emphasized is that confusion may also promote happy (epistemic) endings to our inquiries. It has recently been argued that confusion motivates effortful investigative behaviors which can help us acquire hard-to-get epistemic goods (DiLeo et al., 2019; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). While the motivational power of confusion and its benefits for learning has been uncovered in recent years, the exact nature of the phenomenon remains obscure. (...) In this paper we attempt to shed light on the nature and epistemic value of an experience we are all familiar with: the experience of being confused at an object, a statement, etc. We first review the psychological literature on confusion, where it is most often considered to be an epistemic emotion. We then propose a refined account of confusion, by drawing on the literature on metacognitive or noetic feelings, both in psychology and in the philosophy of mind. In particular, we claim that confusion centrally involves the experience of the limits of one’s cognitive capacities, because it results from a monitoring of our cognitive activities as we encounter a cognitive obstacle while processing a given content. Finally we show how our account may explain findings about the role of the experience of confusion in motivating deeper inquiry into complex problems and bringing about epistemic success in these cases. (shrink)

In this article I examine the role of anxiety in our motivation to reassess our epistemic states, by taking as a starting point a proposal put forward by Levy, according to which anxiety is responsible for the ruminations and worries about threatening possibilities that we sometimes get caught up into in our everyday life. Levy’s claim is that these irrational persistent thoughts about possible states of affairs are best explained by anxiety, rather than by beliefs, degrees of belief, or other (...) mental states. I will take Levy’s article as a starting point into my study of the role of anxiety in our inclinations to question the epistemic quality of our cognitive states. While I believe that Levy is right in directing our attention to the role of anxiety in these cases, his claim calls for further explanation into the nature of anxiety, and into the mechanisms through which anxiety generates these doubts. Although the relation between anxiety and doubt has already been highlighted, there has been little effort to elaborate on the mechanisms through which an affective state like anxiety generates a motivation to reassess our beliefs. This paper is an attempt at providing such an elaboration. Clarifying the role of anxiety in these phenomena will lead me to revise a common assumption about the interactions between anxiety and higher-level cognitive processes, such as the ones involved in representing hypothetical threatening scenarios through mental imagery. (shrink)

In this paper we isolate a notion that we call "formalism freeness" from Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture, which asks for a transfer of the Turing analysis of computability to the cases of definability and provability We suggest an implementation of Gödel's idea in the case of definability, via versions of the constructible hierarchy based on fragments of second order logic. We also trace the notion of formalism freeness in the very wide context of developments in mathematical logic in the (...) 20th century. (shrink)

1936 was a watershed year for computability. Debates among Gödel, Church and others over the correct analysis of the intuitive concept “human effectively computable”, an analysis at the heart of the Incompleteness Theorems, the Entscheidungsproblem, the question of what a finite computation is, and most urgently—for Gödel—the generality of the Incompleteness Theorems, were definitively set to rest with the appearance, in that year, of the Turing Machine. The question I explore here is, do the mathematical facts exhaust what is to (...) be said about the thinking behind the “confluence of ideas in 1936”? I will argue for a cultural role in Gödel’s, and, by extension, the larger logical community’s absorption of Turing’s 1936 model. As scaffolding I employ a conceptual framework due to the critic Leo Marx of the technological sublime; I also make use of the distinction within the technological sublime due to Caroline Jones, between its iconic and performative modes—a distinction operating within the conceptual art of the 1960s, but serving the history of computability equally well. (shrink)

Benoîte Groult n’aime pas la bande dessinée. « Le neuvième art », qu’elle associe aux albums illustrés de son enfance, évoque à ses yeux des récits conventionnels et peu féministes, dont le parangon est Bécassine. Ce « préjugé » constitue l’un des leitmotivs de la bande dessinée que Catel Muller, illustratrice et scénariste, consacre à l’essayiste et romancière féministe Benoîte Groult. Co-auteure avec José-Louis Bocquet, d’une « bio graphique » d’Edith Piaf (2005), de Kiki de Montparnasse (2...

D'où la démocratie tire-t-elle sa valeur? De ce que le plus grand nombre y exerce le pouvoir politique? Ou bien de la protection des droits et des libertés que ses institutions législatives, exécutives et judiciaires y garantissent à chaque personne? Connu en France en tant que philosophe du droit, penseur du libéralisme et des fondements de la justice sociale, Ronald Dworkin a aussi développé une conception originale de la démocratie. Pour lui, la démocratie n'est pas une procédure, mais une communauté, (...) organisée autour des principes de participation, de réciprocité et d'indépendance éthique. Ces principes politiques et moraux sous-tendent la constitution et informent les relations entre ses citoyens. C'est pourquoi l'opposition entre autogouvernement et protection des libertés relève d'une fausse alternative : les juges constitutionnels, en particulier, qui ont la charge d'interpréter le sens et l'étendue des droits, ne s'opposent pas à la réalisation de l'idéal démocratique. Au contraire : pour Dworkin, leur rôle est d'assurer que la communauté se gouverne conformément à ses principes et demeure, ainsi, une démocratie authentique. (shrink)

There has been a renewed interest in the role of hope for our ability to act rationally under uncertainty, where accounts have tended to focus on either one of two (apparently contradictory) aspects of this attitude. On the one hand, like faith, hope is viewed as an attitude which grants us resolve and determination to continue striving towards uncertain goals. On the other hand, like worry, hope is also viewed as a process in which we cognitively engage with possible futures, (...) motivated to reduce the epistemic uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of goal-relevant outcomes. I spell out how an emotional account of the psychological nature of hope is able to accommodate both of these claims, as well as classic challenges (such as cases of “recalcitrant hopes”). Within this framework, hope is both a positive emotion (it consistently evaluates its object as good) and also an “emotion of uncertainty” or epistemic emotion, through which we apprehend that a given goal-relevant outcome is possible, albeit uncertain. (shrink)

Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...) the practical factors relevant to the task at hand, by sig- naling the need for increased cognitive processing and evidence gathering in high- stakes situations. I hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxiety might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest high amounts of cognitive resources into the resolution of apparently simple and innocuous questions. As I argue, OCD might be conceived as a case in which epistemic anxiety is inappropriately elicited, represent- ing these as high-stakes questions, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. In this paper, I thus make use of the concept of (epistemic) anxiety as developed in the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to propose an account of the role of anxiety in the pathological doubt that is central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. (shrink)

The authors show. by means of a finitary version $\square_{\lambda D}^{fin}$ of the combinatorial principle $\square_\lambda^{h*}$ of [7]. the consistency of the failure, relative to the consistency of supercompact cardinals, of the following: for all regular filters D on a cardinal A. if Mi and Ni are elementarily equivalent models of a language of size $\leq \lambda$ , then the second player has a winning strategy in the Ehrenfeucht- $Fra\uml{i}ss\acute{e}$ game of length $\lambda^{+}$ on $\pi_{i} M_{i}/D$ and $\pi_{i} N_{i}/D$ . (...) If in addition $2^{\lambda} = \labda^{+}$ and i < $\lambda$ implies | $M_{i}$ | +| $N_{i}$ | $\leq$ \lambda^{+} this means that the ultrapowers are isomorphic. This settles negatively conjecture 18 in [2]. (shrink)

This article analyses a recent discourse of responsibility that accompanies states’ foreign aid provision. States adopt this discourse of National Social Responsibility to show their complian...

Is the capacity to experience hope central to our ability to entertain desirable future possibilities in thought? The ability to project oneself forward in time, or to entertain vivid positive episodic future thoughts, is impaired in patients with clinical depression. In this article, I consider the causal relation between, on the one hand, the loss of the affective experience of hope in depressed patients, and on the other hand, the reduced ability to generate and entertain positive episodic future thinking. I (...) suggest that findings in the philosophy of emotion may shed light on this causal relation. (shrink)

La nature, l'environnement sont au centre des préoccupations de tous, mais peinent à entrer dans le discours politique sous une forme cohérente. Mouvement contestataire et libertaire - particulièrement en France - l'écologie politique manque de bases théoriques, préfère les déclarations d'éthique au travail législatif, met en doute l'efficience des institutions et dénonce parfois de manière irréaliste la technique, les sciences, l'industrie. Ce livre intègre la dimension écologique à la philosophie politique moderne et particulièrement à un républicanisme rénové. La protection de (...) la nature comme "Bien commun" y est considérée comme le nouveau visage du " Bien public". En annexe, l'auteur propose quelques idées concrètes. (shrink)

I hold up my hand and I count five fingers. I take it on faith that the mapping from fingers onto numbers is recursive in the sense of the mathematician’s definition of the informal concept, “human calculability following a fixed routine.” I cannot prove the mapping is recursive—there is nothing to prove! Of course, mathematicians can prove many theorems about recursiveness, moving forward, so to speak, once the definition of the concept “recursive” has been isolated. Moving backwards is more difficult (...) and this is as it should be: for how can one possibly hope to prove that a mathematical definition captures an informal concept? This paper is about just that one word, capture, or more precisely the rela- tion “x captures y,” and the question, if y is taken to be computability, definabil- ity or provability, does there exist an adequate and unique choice of x? (shrink)

Whole Trait Theory (and other dynamic theories of personality) can illuminate the process by which motivational states become traits. Mental computational processes constitute part of the explanatory mechanisms that drive trait manifestations. Empirical work on Whole Trait Theory may inform future research directions on mental computational processes.

What is epistemically required of the rationally hopeful? In this paper, I propose that, as a subject becomes hopeful that p, she also adopts an inquiring attitude toward the question of whether p. Moreover, remaining rationally hopeful requires maintaining an inquiring attitude toward those possibilities we are hopeful about. On top of being led by a particular practical goal (that of attaining p), I suggest that the hopeful agent is also led by the epistemic goal of knowing whether p. Adding (...) the “inquiry” criteria to rational hopefulness helps explain our intuition that there is something wrong with being hopeful that p and not disposed to inquire into whether p. It also helps us further distinguish hopefulness from other positive attitudes we adopt in the face of uncertainty, such as optimism, and faith. (shrink)

We show that many singular cardinals λ above a strongly compact cardinal have regular ultrafilters D that violate the finite square principle $\square _{\lambda ,D}^{\mathit{fin}}$ introduced in [3]. For such ultrafilters D and cardinals λ there are models of size λ for which Mλ / D is not λ⁺⁺-universal and elementarily equivalent models M and N of size λ for which Mλ / D and Nλ / D are non-isomorphic. The question of the existence of such ultrafilters and models was (...) raised in [1]. (shrink)

Precise spatiotemporal control of gene expression during normal development and cell differentiation is achieved by the combined action of proximal (promoters) and distal (enhancers) cis‐regulatory elements. Recent studies have reported that a subset of promoters, termed Epromoters, works also as enhancers to regulate distal genes. This new paradigm opened novel questions regarding the complexity of our genome and raises the possibility that genetic variation within Epromoters has pleiotropic effects on various physiological and pathological traits by differentially impacting multiple proximal and (...) distal genes. Here, we discuss the different observations pointing to an important role of Epromoters in the regulatory landscape and summarize the evidence supporting a pleiotropic impact of these elements in disease. We further hypothesize that Epromoter might represent a major contributor to phenotypic variation and disease. (shrink)