Les médiations de la parole publique par les dispositifs numériques questionnent le renouvellement possible des formes de délibérations collectives au sein des groupes associatifs. Nous examinerons comment, dans un contexte d'émergence de nouveaux collectifs technophiles orientés vers des pratiques d'usage et de politisation des technologies de communication, le mouvement « communautaire » québécois redéfinit son identité, ses aspirations et ses pratiques dans la sphère publique, au prix de vives tensions. Plusieurs éléments semblent structurer les différences et controverses: l'enracinement local du (...) mouvement communautaire, sa structure hiérarchique, son mode de financement et les représentations de la technique.Mediations of public speaking by digital devices can question the renewal of collective forms of deliberation within voluntary groups. We will examine how, in the context of the emergence of new collective-oriented technophiles use practices and politicization of communication technologies, the movement "community" Quebec redefines its identity, its aspirations and practices in the public sphere, the price tensions. Several factors seem to structure differences and controversies: local roots community movement, its hierarchical structure, its funding and representations of the art. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...) that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries. (shrink)

Ne serait-ce que par son titre, dont l’oxymore est d’emblée assumée (p.11) et dont les protagonistes sont associés d’une manière qui ne laisse de surprendre, l’ouvrage de Julien Boudon publié dans la collection « Les sens du droit » des éditions Dalloz, mériterait de retenir l’attention.Dans ce court opus, l’auteur entend, à travers un examen qui puise tout à la fois aux sources de l’histoire, de la philosophie, du droit, de la science politique, et qui emprunte à la fois (...) au style de la monog.. (shrink)

En français, le mot 'langue' indique à la fois l'organe logé au creux de la bouche et la faculté de parole. On fait le pari que le rapport de l'un à l'autre n'a rien d'accidentel : tout comme la langue est le seul organe qui puisse sortir du corps, la langue que nous parlons est à la fois dedans et dehors. Une philosophie de l'expression se déduit de cette interrogation, ainsi qu'une poétique. Elles ne sont pas sans relation aveu ; (...) ce qui permet la liberté d'expression. Ces grandes questions sont affrontées sans jamais quitter la langue des yeux. Dans cette quête, on croise Aristote, des philosophes, des linguistes, des romanciers et de poètes, mais aussi un beat-boxer, quelques embrasseurs et Philomèle dont la langue coupée dit la résistance multiple et opiniâtre. Avec elle, on va au bout de la langue."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...) -/- The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: -/- the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. -/- Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences. (shrink)

Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.

Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account (...) of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance. -/- This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public polic. (shrink)

Widespread preservation of fossilized biomolecules in many fossil animals has recently been reported in six studies, based on Raman microspectroscopy. Here, we show that the putative Raman signatures of organic compounds in these fossils are actually instrumental artefacts resulting from intense background luminescence. Raman spectroscopy is based on the detection of photons scattered inelastically by matter upon its interaction with a laser beam. For many natural materials, this interaction also generates a luminescence signal that is often orders of magnitude more (...) intense than the light produced by Raman scattering. Such luminescence, coupled with the transmission properties of the spectrometer, induced quasi‐periodic ripples in the measured spectra that have been incorrectly interpreted as Raman signatures of organic molecules. Although several analytical strategies have been developed to overcome this common issue, Raman microspectroscopy as used in the studies questioned here cannot be used to identify fossil biomolecules. (shrink)

RNA polymerase II (RNAP II) non‐coding transcription is now known to cover almost the entire eukaryotic genome, a phenomenon referred to as pervasive transcription. As a consequence, regions previously thought to be non‐transcribed are subject to the passage of RNAP II and its associated proteins for histone modification. This is the case for the nucleosome‐depleted regions (NDRs), which provide key sites of entry into the chromatin for proteins required for the initiation of coding gene transcription and DNA replication. In this (...) review, recent data on the effects of pervasive transcription through NDRs are summarized and a model is proposed to explain how RNAP II‐driven transcription is able to modify the nucleosomes flanking the NDRs, leading to nucleosome repositioning and NDR closure. Even though much of the mechanistic detail underlying these events remains to be elucidated, such a model provides a basis to explain how non‐coding transcription through NDRs can regulate the initiation of coding gene expression and DNA replication. (shrink)

The relationship between politics and the digital has largely been characterized as one of epochal change. The respective theories understand the digital as external to politics and society, as an autonomous driver for global, unilateral transformation. Rather than supporting such singular accounts of the relationship between politics and the digital, this article argues for its specificity: the digital is best examined in terms of folds within existing socio-technical configurations, and as an artefact with a set of affordances that are shaped (...) and filled with meaning by social practice. In conceptualizing the digital as numeric, countable, computable, material, storable, searchable, transferable, networkable and traceable, fabricated and interpreted, it becomes clear that the digital cannot be divorced from the social. These affordances of the digital are discussed in relation to specific political, digital practices that are further developed in the different contributions in this special issue, such as predictive policing (Aradau and Blanke, this issue), data protection (Bellanova, this issue), extremist recruitment videos (Leander, this issue), political acclamation (Dean, this issue), and pandemic simulations (Opitz, this issue). (shrink)

Cet ouvrage interroge l'expérience de pensée, rapportée aux textes de philosophie et d'histoire naturelle du xviiie siècle. À travers un corpus étendu mais représentatif, il s'agit de questionner les procédés qui légitiment ou non le recours à ce procédé, en spécifiant les textes par une typologie nouvelle.

Julien Tricard tackles the abductive solution to the problem of induction. In order to best explain the regularities that can be observed in nature, should one assume that they necessarily result from natural laws, without which they would be improbable cosmic coincidences? By examining David Armstrong's and John Foster's versions of this inference, Julien Tricard shows that it is based on the confusion of two incompatible concepts of “regularity”. From this he derives a conception of induction that is (...) neither the empiricists’ factual generalization, nor the abduction of nomic necessities from observed regularities, but the operation of constituting particular facts as regular instances of laws. (shrink)

Analyse de l'herméneutique du mouvement, ainsi que de son imprégnation dans la philosophie occidentale moderne, notamment en utilisant les figures centrales de Bachelard et de Merleau-Ponty. Les contributions tentent de mettre au jour les rapports qu'entretiennent imagination et mouvement, images dynamiques et schèmes moteurs.

Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...) it is argued, holds between one's emotions and what they are about. It is to this worry – that the construal of the emotions as perceptions inevitably raises – that this paper tries to respond. In this paper, I suggest that when it is realized that one dimension of perception itself is directly dependent on the perceiver's perspective on her environment, then emotion, which is also essentially perspectival in this sense, bears the comparison with perception very well. After having clarified the nature and the role that perspective plays in perception, I argue that, in the case of emotions, the same perspectival role can be played by agents’ long-standing evaluative tendencies and character traits. The resulting conception of emotion as perception is then tested against possible objections. (shrink)

Les auteurs posent la question des retentissements du deuil d’une figure parentale dans l’enfance sur les remaniements liés à la construction psychique de la paternité. Elles formulent cette problématique théorique en s’étayant sur l’analyse du cas de Marc, futur primipère ayant vécu le deuil de son propre père dans son enfance. Les auteurs soulignent que devenir père nécessite, pour le sujet, de parvenir à s’identifier à ses imagos parentales et de s’étayer sur ses représentations de la fonction parentale, et discutent (...) du destin de l’objet interne lorsque le parent réel est décédé. En particulier, la nouvelle paternité implique le renoncement aux objets parentaux idéalisés, question à mettre en lien avec l’idéalisation du défunt qui intervient toujours dans le deuil, au moins dans les premiers temps. En outre, l’accession à la paternité réactive des angoisses de mort et de castration, processus entrant en synergie avec le réveil de ces mêmes angoisses dans le deuil. Cette étude clinique ouvre aux questions de la parentification du garçon orphelin et de l’impact de cette dernière sur la construction ultérieure de la paternité. (shrink)

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...) has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism. (shrink)

Objective Our study sought to (1) describe the practices and preferences of Colombian adolescents in accessing sexual and reproductive health services: accompanied versus alone; (2) compare actual practices with stated preferences; and (3) determine age and gender differences regarding the practice and these stated preferences. -/- Methods 812 participants aged 11–24 years old answered a survey in two Profamilia clinics in the cities of Medellin and Cali in Colombia. A cross-sectional analysis was performed to compare participants’ answers based on the (...) variables of gender and age. -/- Results A quarter of participants visited the clinic alone (25.4%). Females were more likely to go alone in comparison to males (26.3% vs 14.1%; p = 0.031), and older participants went alone more often than younger participants (p < 0.001). Most participants – 72.7% (95 %CI: 69.3–75.9) – expressed a preference in being accompanied to the clinic, and more than 90% had their preferences met. The preferences of older participants were, however, less likely to be met than those of younger participants (p < 0.001), notably, because they predominantly wanted to be accompanied. -/- Conclusion Contemporary public health and bioethics literature advocates in favor of developing health services that better meet the preferences of adolescents. The present research highlights an apparent blind spot related to the role that others (e.g., parents, friends, partners) can or should play in accompanying adolescent patients when they access sexual and reproductive health services. Respecting adolescents’ preferences, and hence their autonomy, is not simply a matter of ensuring freedom from constraints (e.g., their right and ability to go alone). Rather, it should also consider the liberty to choose whether to be accompanied when accessing SHRS and by whom. (shrink)

Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non-actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets.

Argumentation has been an important topic in knowledge representation, reasoning and multi-agent systems during the last twenty years. In this paper, we propose a new abstract framework where arguments are associated with a strength, namely a quantitative information which is used to determine whether an attack between arguments succeeds or not. Our Strength-based Argumentation Framework combines ideas of Preference-based and Weighted Argumentation Frameworks in an original way, which permits to define acceptability semantics sensitive to the existence of accruals between arguments. (...) The question of accruals arises in situations where several arguments defending the same position against another argument are unable to individually defeat this argument, but could do it collectively if they combine their strengths. We investigate some of the theoretical and computational properties of our new framework and semantics, and present a reasoning algorithm that is based on a translation of the problem into pseudo-boolean constraint satisfaction. This paper proposes an intuitive framework which allows strength compensations in an argumentation context where attacks may not succeed, completed by an approach which detects accruals throughout the reasoning process without requiring the elicitation of all compensatory combinations of arguments as an input. (shrink)

In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim that these attitudes generate the wished-for evaluative correctness conditions. Our argument (...) rests on the idea that emotional attitudes manifest a sensitivity to evaluative evidence and that this sensitivity secures the kind of normativity we expect of the emotions. We bring our discussion to a close by assessing whether the psychological underpinnings of this sensitivity to evaluative evidence are such as to threaten the foundation of attitudinalism: the idea that emotions do not represent values. Given the available models of how we might access values prior to emotional experience, we conclude that the attitudinalist is still in the game. (shrink)

La série d’articles écrits par Michel Foucault sur le soulèvement iranien de 1978 a été l’objet de vives polémiques. L’analyse sérieuse et attentive d’un tel corpus montre pourtant l’intérêt qui est le sien tant sur le plan historique que conceptuel. C’est sur la notion de « spiritualité politique », certainement la plus importante des articles, que nous nous arrêterons tout particulièrement ici. Nous tenterons d’abord de comprendre pourquoi, comment et contre quoi une telle notion a émergé dans l’entreprise de description (...) de l’événement. Nous verrons ensuite les pistes et hypothèses qu’elle ouvre aujourd’hui, tant pour la recherche proprement foucaldienne que pour les recherches d’ordre théologico-politique. (shrink)

When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...) certainty. With such a guide in hand infallibilism can be evaluated on its own merits. The most controversial parts are the first and fourth. The idea that knowledge requires infallible belief is thought to be excessively sceptical. The idea that knowledge warrants certainty is thought to be excessively dogmatic. The present paper addresses the first. It argues that knowledge requires infallible belief. (shrink)

Si la tradition phénoménologique tend à fonder toute norme éthique et politique sur la manifestation fondamentale de l’alter ego, à la fois en rupture et en identité avec le moi, peut-on à partir d’une telle manifestation originaire rendre raison d’un principe pratique comme celui de la tolérance? L’ouverture à autrui ainsi décrite peut-elle même servir de structure de justification à un universel éthique et politique quel qu’il soit? Après avoir examiné les avantages mais surtout les apories d’une telle voie de (...) justification à partir de l’alter ego, l’article tente de montrer qu’une phénoménologie devant rendre raison de la tolérance n’a pas davantage les moyens de s’établir du côté d’une histoire ou d’une anthropologie de la relation aux étrangers : en effet, le rapport immédiat à l’autre n’est que rarement dans l’histoire un rapport à un frère humain égal à soi, et l’intérêt télévisuel récent et frappant pour ce qui se passe partout sur la planète a nécessairement quelque chose de factice à cause de la phénoménalité même des images reçues par les écrans. L’article formule puis examine finalement une hypothèse à même de valider partiellement la justification de l’universalisme pratique par l’expérience d’autrui : l’universalisation de l’expérience de l’alter ego à tout autre n’est pas tant permise par des conditions perceptuelles particulières que par la possibilité ouverte de se trouver dans un même champ de parole, dont la tolérance apparaît précisément comme la condition nécessaire. (shrink)

Selon Rousseau le langage n’est pas né pour dire le monde, mais pour dire l’amour. Au 18ème siècle, cette thèse originale déplace les lignes car elle met l’expression des affects au coeur de la communication : ce n’est pas pour assurer la référence que nous parlons mais pour instituer le monde de nos passions. C’est à suivre ce fil rouge qu’est consacrée cette étude. Il ne s’agit pas seulement de montrer qu’un tel fil permet de lire ensemble l’Essai sur l’origine (...) des langues et le reste de l’oeuvre, ou qu’il traverse et unit les écrits du philosophe et ceux de l’écrivain. Il y a plus et plus important - là où Rousseau noue anthropologie des passions et doctrine de l’expression, un mystère quotidien nous attend. C’est celui par lequel ce que nous disons de ce que nous sentons ne se distingue plus en droit de ce que nous sentons. Un amour est comme un feu : s’il se déclare, il existe autrement. Il est plus vif, plus intense. Plus dangereux aussi. (shrink)

At head of title: The Johns Hopkins University. Institute for the Study of Law.

Le 15 septembre 2016, Carlo Ginzburg était invité par le Groupe Genevois de Philosophie à tenir une conférence dans le cadre d’un colloque consacré à « La philosophie et son histoire : un débat actuel ». En étudiant les deux cas de Garcilaso de la Vega et de John David Rhys, Ginzburg apportait une contribution de poids à l’ethnophilologie – si la philologie est la discipline académique qui permet d’établir la lettre des textes, l’ethnophilologie devient sous sa plume l’entreprise qui (...) invite à employer la rigueur des méthodes philologiques pour faire entendre la vérité des voix soumises. La leçon pour la traductologie contemporaine est importante – la traduction n’est pas une simple opération pacifique. Elle implique des relations de force. (shrink)

How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...) defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them. -/- . (shrink)

If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might (...) come to be concomitantly instantiated in a subject. I dismiss what I call the parallel and oscillation models for not satisfying the transparency condition, i.e. for failing to capture that, if Sam empathizes with Maria, then Sam's own emotional experience towards the object of Maria's emotion has to be mediated by Maria's own emotional experience. I conclude in favour the fusion model as the only model capable of satisfying the transparency condition, and I argue that the suggested proposal illuminates the difference between it and other ways in which we understand the emotions of others. Finally, I expand and clarify the conception of empathy as transparency through responses to obvious objections that the view raises. Key Words: empathy • emotion • philosophy • psychology • simulation. (shrink)

One puzzle concerning highly idealized models is whether they explain. Some suggest they provide so-called ‘how-possibly explanations’. However, this raises an important question about the nature of how-possibly explanations, namely what distinguishes them from ‘normal’, or how-actually, explanations? I provide an account of how-possibly explanations that clarifies their nature in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. I argue that the modal notions of actuality and possibility provide the relevant dividing lines between how-possibly and how-actually explanations. Whereas how-possibly (...) explanations establish claims of possible explanations, how-actually explanations establish claims of actual ones. Models, in turn, simply provide evidence for these claims. (shrink)