Este artigo objetiva descrever e analisar as legislações urbanísticas brasileiras ao longo dos séculos XX e XXI, com foco nas leis que regulamentam o parcelamento e o uso do solo. Reconhecemos a origem dessas leis que têm orientado e normatizado o espaço urbano nas últimas décadas, principalmente no que diz respeito aos parâmetros urbanísticos estabelecidos para o desenvolvimento das cidades. Assim, o artigo é apoiado em uma abordagem dialética e qualitativa, este estudo busca realizar uma análise dos referenciais teóricos, além (...) de dados obtidos por meio de pesquisa documental. Ao final, oferecemos um panorama abrangente das principais leis que têm sido aprovadas no contexto urbano brasileiro contemporâneo, as quais têm direcionado e normatizado o espaço urbano. (shrink)

I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognising pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because (...) I seem to be looking from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot be reduced to egocentric visual-spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin sufficient to explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere. Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness using methods which can be replicated at any time. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the phenomenology of awakening in Chinese Zen Buddhism. In this tradition, to awaken is to ‘see your true nature’. In particular, the two aspects of awakening are: (1) seeing that the nature of one’s self or mind is empty or void and (2) an erasing of the usual (though merely apparent) boundary between subject and object. In the early Zen tradition, there are many references to awakening as chopping off your head, not having eyes, nose (...) and tongue, and seeing your ‘Original Face’. These references bear a remarkable resemblance to an approach to awakening developed by Douglas Harding. I will guide the reader through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments which investigate the gap where you cannot see your own head. I will endeavour to show that these methods, although radically different from traditional meditation techniques, result in an experience with striking similarities to Zen accounts of awakening, in particular, as experiencing oneself as empty or void and yet totally united with the given world. The repeatability and apparent reliability of these first-person methods opens up a class of awakening experience to empirical investigation and has the potential to provide new insights into nondual traditions. (shrink)

Eric Schwitzgebel (2011) argues that phenomenal judgments are in general less reliable than perceptual judgments. This paper distinguishes two versions of this unreliability thesis. The process unreliability thesis says that unreliability in phenomenal judgments is due to faulty domain-specific mechanisms involved in producing these judgments, whereas the statistical unreliability thesis says that it is simply a matter of higher numbers of errors. Against the process unreliability thesis, I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgments can be (...) accounted for by domain-general factors: attention, working memory limits and conceptualization. As these factors are shared with the production of perceptual judgments, errors in phenomenal judgments are not due to faulty domain-specific processes. Furthermore, this account defends phenomenal judgments against general scepticism by providing criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgments. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a version of panpsychist idealism on first-person experiential grounds. As things always appear in my field of consciousness, there is prima facie empirical support for idealism. Furthermore, by assuming that all things correspond to a conscious perspective or perspectives (i.e., panpsychism), realism about the world is arguably safeguarded without the need to appeal to God (as per Berkeley’s idealism). Panpsychist idealism also has a phenomenological advantage over traditional panpsychist views as it does not commit (...) perceptual experience to massive error by denying that perceived colours are properties of things. Finally, I argue that the subject combination problem for panpsychism has been motivated by the problematic assumption that consciousness is in things. Thinking about subject combination from the first-person perspective is fruitful for reframing the subject combination problem and for seeing how subjects could potentially combine for the idealist. (shrink)

Hume famously denied that he could experience the self. Most subsequent philosophers have concurred with this finding. I argue that if the subject is to function as a bearer of experience it must (1) lack sensory qualities in itself to be compatible with bearing sensory qualities and (2) be single so that it can unify experience. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where one cannot see one’s own head. I argue that this open space conforms (...) to the above criteria and hence is consistent with being the subject. I respond to the objection that this location is merely a lack of visual experience. I argue that this space also encompasses sound and touch properties and hence functions as a bearer for other sensory modalities. These first-person findings provide prima facie support for the view that the subject is a thin bearer of experience. (shrink)

While first-person methods are essential for a science of consciousness, it is controversial what form these methods should take and whether any such methods are reliable. I propose that first-person experiments are a reliable method for investigating conscious experience. I outline the history of these methods and describe their characteristics. In particular, a first-person experiment is an intervention on a subject's experience in which independent variables are manipulated, extraneous variables are held fixed, and in which the subject makes a phenomenal (...) judgement about the target experience of the investigation. I examine historical and contemporary examples of first-person experiments: Mariotte’s demonstration of the visual blind spot, Kanizsa’s subjective contours, the Tse Illusion, and investigations of the non-uniform resolution of the visual field. I discuss the role that phenomenal contrast plays in these methods, and how they overcome typical introspective errors. I argue that their intersubjective repeatability is an important factor in their scientific status, however, it is not the only factor. That they control for extraneous factors and confounds is another factor which sets them apart from pseudoscience (e.g., the perception of auras), and hence another reason for classifying them as genuine experiments. Furthermore, by systematically mapping out the structure of visual experience, these methods make scientific progress. Praises of such first-person experimental approaches may not always be sung by philosophers and psychologists, but they continue to flourish as respectable scientific methods nevertheless. (shrink)

Erwin Schrödinger holds a prominent place in the history of science primarily due to his crucial role in the development of quantum physics. What is perhaps lesser known are his insights into subject-object duality, consciousness and mind. He documented himself that these were influenced by the Upanishads, a collection of ancient Hindu spiritual texts. Central to his thoughts in this area is that Mind is only One and there is no separation between subject and object. This chapter aims to bridge (...) Schrödinger’s view on One Mind with the teachings of Dōgen, a twelfth century Zen master. This bridge is formed by addressing the question of how time relates to One Mind, and subject-object duality. Schrödinger describes the experience of One Mind to be like a timeless now, whereas subject-object duality involves a linear continuum of time. We show how these differing positions are unified in the notion of ‘absolute present’, which was put forward in the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1871–1945). In addition, we argue that it is in this notion of absolute present that the views of Schrödinger, Dōgen and Nishida meet. (shrink)

I am aware of the tree and its leaves, but am I aware of my awareness of these things? When I try to introspect my awareness, I just find myself attending to objects and their properties. This observation is known as the ‘transparency of experience’. On the other hand, I seem to directly know that I am aware. Given the first observation, it is not clear how I know that I am aware. Fred Dretske thought that the problem was so (...) acute that he issued the challenge of answering ‘How do you know that you are not a zombie?’ I propose that a view found in the Advaita Vedanta, that awareness is self luminous, reconciles these two observations. I understand self-luminosity as the thesis that: (1) I am implicitly aware of my awareness and (2) I am phenomenally aware of a distinct phenomenal character of my awareness. In support of the first claim, that I apparently only attend to objects in the world when introspecting perceptual experience, suggests that I do not know my awareness explicitly, but rather that I must know it implicitly. In support of the second claim, I argue that the mere fact that I am perceptually conscious is not sufficient to allow me to know that I am perceptually conscious. In particular, the qualities I am perceptually aware of do not tell me that I aware of them, rather they just seem to be properties of objects. I also assess whether strategies for responding to Cartesian sceptical scenarios can be employed against Dretske’s consciousness scepticism. I argue that these strategies either fail to distinguish me from a zombie or they do not adequately describe my epistemic situation. By contrast to other accounts, if awareness has its own distinct phenomenal character, then it cannot be considered to be a prima facie property of the world, hence the self-luminosity of awareness provides a plausible account of how I know that I’m not a zombie. (shrink)

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does my (...) somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa. (shrink)

Objectives Practitioners in contemplative traditions commonly report experiencing an awareness that is distinct from sensory objects, thoughts, and emotions (“awareness itself”). They also report experiences of a void or underlying silence that is closely associated with this awareness. Subjects who carry out the Headless Way exercises frequently report an experience of emptiness or void at the same time as other contents (void-like experiences). The goals of this study were to (1) assess the reliability of these methods in eliciting the recognition (...) of awareness and void-like experiences in participants who had no prior exposure to these techniques, (2) investigate the prevalence of these experiences in these tasks, and (3) to differentiate these experiences from closely related and potential precursor experiences. -/- Method Twenty adults participated in in-depth individual interviews in which they were guided through the Headless Way exercises. A thematic analysis was conducted on the interview transcripts. -/- Results Twelve of the participants reported a void-like experience, and five participants reported an experience of awareness itself. These experiences were respectively categorized as subsets of the more general categories of perceptual absences and the sense of not being person-like. Another novel finding was the real-time reports of awareness and void-like experiences during the exercises. -/- Conclusions Our findings provide preliminary evidence that the Headless Way exercises can effectively induce experiences of emptiness and awareness in participants without prior experience. The findings suggest that such experiences can be elicited outside of a traditional meditation context, including in non-meditators. Furthermore, the experience of not being person-like and of perceptual absences may be precursors and more general forms of recognizing awareness itself and the void-like nature of the mind. (shrink)

Background: This study developed a photo and video database of 4-to-6-year-olds expressing the seven induced and posed universal emotions and a neutral expression. Children participated in photo and video sessions designed to elicit the emotions, and the resulting images were further assessed by independent judges in two rounds. Methods: In the first round, two independent judges, experts in the Facial Action Coding System, firstly analysed 3,668 emotions facial expressions stimuli from 132 children. Both judges reached 100% agreement regarding 1,985 stimuli, (...) which were then selected for a second round of analysis between judges 3 and 4. Results: The result was 1,985 stimuli were produced from 124 participants. A Kappa index of 0.70 and an accuracy of 73% between experts were observed. Lower accuracy was found for emotional expression by 4-year-olds than 6-year-olds. Happiness, disgust and contempt had the highest agreement. After a sub-analysis evaluation of all four judges, 100% agreement was reached for 1,381 stimuli which compound the ChildEFES database with 124 participants and 51% induced photographs. The number of stimuli of each emotion were: 87 for neutrality, 363 for happiness, 170 for disgust, 104 for surprise, 152 for fear, 144 for sadness, 157 for anger 157, and 183 for contempt. Conclusions: The findings show that this photo and video database can facilitate research on the mechanisms involved in early childhood recognition of facial emotions in children, contributing to the understanding of facial emotion recognition deficits which characterise several neurodevelopmental and psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

A partir de las reflexiones arendtianas acerca del pensar sócratico y la caída de las nociones tradicionales de la moralidad tras los trágicos acontecimiento de la Alemania nazi, se pretende responder a la pregunta por cómo la actividad del pensar en sí misma puede ser, en efecto, de tal naturaleza que permita distinguir entre el bien y el mal. Para ello, se hace uso de las anotaciones de la autora en torno a la capacidad del juicio y de su relación (...) con el pensar. (shrink)

This article focuses on performative articulations of critiques of psychiatry, with two forms of demonstration in particular: First, the Mad Pride Parades, which have been held in various German cities since 2013, and second actions by the “Blaue Karawane” in Bremen, a movement that emerged in the 1980s in the wake of the dissolution of a psychiatric clinic. Although they are situated in different temporal and local contexts, both rely on forms of street protest to question the demarcation between ‘normal’ (...) and ‘mad’ and to promote the equal recognition of mental alterity. A detailed examination of the forms of action highlights the importance of carnivalesque celebration, provocation and spectacle for both forms of psychiatric critique. We argue that these forms allow experiencing this critique and, at the same time, make drafts of a different—better—society tangible. To elaborate on these aspects, we draw on queer and gender theoretical considerations as well as on approaches from performance studies. Looking at Mad Pride parades and the Blaue Karawane in their respective contexts reveals similarities in the way in which critique of the exclusion of mental alterity is articulated, but also highlights differences in terms of affectedness, participation and argumentation. (shrink)

Cramer et al.'s network approach reconceptualizes mental comorbidity on the basis of symptom space originating from psychometric signatures. We argue that the advantages of this approach need to be regarded in the context of the multi-level functional organization of the neural substrate, ranging from neurogenetic to psychometric. Neuroelectric oscillations are proposed as a level-integrating principle.

In this paper I identify two different lockean concepts of justice - "proprietary justice" and "justice as fairness" - and examine the relationship between each of them and charity in John Locke´s theory of property. As I try to show, in both cases Locke considers that charity may have priority over justice. This undermines the classical interpretation of Locke as a defender of unlimited capitalistic appropriation and provides additional evidence supporting Locke´s acceptation of a minimal redistributive system which should guarantee (...) the material welfare of non-appropriators. (shrink)

Phenomenal objectivism explains perceptual phenomenal character by reducing it to an awareness of mind-independent objects, properties, and relations. A challenge for this view is that there is a sense in which a distant tree looks smaller than a closer tree even when they are the same objective size (perceptual size variation). The dual content view is a popular objectivist account in which such experiences are explained by my objective spatial relation to the tree, in particular visual angle (perspectival size). I (...) describe a series of first-person experiments for investigating size experience. I use a ruler as a first-person method for operationalising perspectival size (Experiment 1). I use the corridor illusion (Experiment 2), outlining one’s head in the mirror (Experiment 3), and outlining the size of objects on glass (Experiment 4) to show a phenomenal difference in size for items in different depth contexts, despite being identical in visual angle. These finding demonstrate that visual angle cannot account for these spatial experiences. Psychological evidence provides further support for the thesis that subjects do not experience visual angle when depth information is present. Together this evidence supports the hypothesis that perceptual size variation cannot be accounted for by visual angle, hence undermining a plausible version of the dual content theory. This outcome, combined with problems raised by alternative objectivist accounts of size variation, provides support for a subjectivist account of size experience. (shrink)

This article brings together two debates in contemporary political philosophy: on the one hand, the dispute between the distributive and relational approaches to equality and, on the other hand, the field of intergenerational equality. I offer an original contribution to the second domain and by doing so, I inform the first. The aim of this article is thus twofold: (1) shedding some light on an under-researched and yet crucial question – ‘which inequalities between generations matter?’ and (2) contributing to a (...) far-reaching debate that touches upon the nature of egalitarianism. After showing that there are two key problems that fall within the scope of intergenerational equality – questions of justice between age groups and questions of equality between birth cohorts – I argue that, contrary to what the default distributive view (complete lives egalitarianism) states, some inequalities between age groups matter independently of their diachronic impact, and so partly for relational reasons. I argue that, even if we are distributive egalitarians, we must endorse the relational egalitarian conception to successfully make sense of some inequalities between age groups. I infer from this both that the putative view that the ‘relational’ conception of equality can be redescribed as distributive must be rejected and that the distributive view requires supplementation (but not necessarily displacement) by the relational view. (shrink)

Zoning laws determine what types of land uses and densities can occur on each property lot in a municipality, and therefore also govern the range of potential environmental and health impacts resulting from the land use. Zoning regulations are the most ubiquitous of the land use laws in the United States, as well as in many other countries. As such, they have far-reaching effects on the location of noxious uses, and any concomitant environmental or human health impacts.Zoning has enormous implications, (...) in general, for shaping our environment, and because changes to zoning are made through a political process, it has possibilities for abuse. One zoning expert stated:I suppose what really disturbs me is that because zoning is the most universal of the legal tools for shaping the character of the municipality, any unwise use of the process has a far greater impact upon our national character than does the abuse of a less widely employed device. (shrink)

The notion of hope occupies a central position in Paulo Freire’s work. Since he understands hope to be a motor for change, an ontological necessity and a political act, Freire concludes that it is important to educate hope so that it is not converted into infertile hopelessness or tragic despair. Imbued with Freirean spirit, my purpose in this paper is to construct a dialogue between this great educator’s thoughts and those of Spinoza. This impossible encounter between these two men who (...) rebelled in thought and action against the oppressions of their times will occur through the investigation of the following themes: 1) the role of hope in the Freirean conception of history; 2) relationships between freedom and necessity; 3) hope’s social functions and 4) Freire’s proposal of an ‘education of hope’. Two notions of hope will be discussed: naïve hope and critical hope. The spinozist provocation consists in suggesting an ethical and political attitude which is primarily moved by our power to think and act and is, therefore, not based on hope. (shrink)

En las siguientes páginas me propongo exponer de modo sucinto dos de los problemas filosóficos más significativos de la Edad Media: el de los universales y el de la individuación. El primero se pregunta por el estatus ontológico de las nociones universales; el segundo por el principio de individuación de las diferentes substancias. A pesar de ser problemas distintos, estas cuestiones están estrechamente unidas. El problema de los universales albergó desde sus inició la pregunta por el estatus ontológico de los (...) individuos, cuestión de la que derivó posteriormente la pregunta por la individuación. Por su parte, al no haber sido un problema tratado independientemente desde su origen, el problema de la individuación se ha entendido como un hacerse individuo del universal. Dada esta cercanía, parece necesario establecer cómo se conectan las nociones de ‘universal’, ‘individuo’ e ‘individuación’ con el fin de entender con mayor claridad dichas cuestiones. (shrink)

Purpose: The main aim of this study was to examine the influence of organizational culture on strategy implementation in Kenya Government Tourism Agencies. Materials and Methods: The study used a positivist approach research philosophy. The research designs employed in this study were explanatory and descriptive research designs. The study population comprised of the tourism industry. The study included the ministry of tourism itself since it is the parent ministry that regulates and oversees the operations of the tourism agencies to give (...) a total of 10 areas of study. A sample of 327 was achieved based on the following formula. This study used primary data. The study used questionnaires and interview guides to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitative data was analyzed through scientific methods using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS version 22) while qualitative data was analyzed thematically. The descriptive statistics was first used to analyze the demographic factors of the respondents using frequencies and charts. Inferential statistics such as correlation and multiple linear regression analysis were used to test the relationship among the variables as per the study hypothesis. Findings: The culture of an organization was found to play a critical role in implementation of strategies and consequently realizations of set objectives and profits in organizations. Organizational norms, ethics, employee training and organizational climate are very key in achieving success while implementing strategies. Implications to Theory, Practice and Policy: It is recommended that organizations (tourism industry) create strategy implementation promoting culture, culture of timeliness, innovative culture, ethics and one which promotes team spirit. These aspects of culture need to be reinforced and strengthened to ensure implementation of strategies is smooth and quick enough. This study thus bridges the gap between theory and practice, offering a nuanced understanding of the interplay between organizational culture and strategy implementation in a critical sector for Kenya's economy. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal (...) judgements are due to domain-general factors, which are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal judgements may still be statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism. Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors, minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability. In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides support for a subjectivist account of variance in size experience. In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience that I seem to be looking from here. Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself. I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend. (shrink)

O objetivo geral deste artigo é fomentar reflexões filosóficas acerca da presença e dos sentidos da virilidade na sociedade capitalista, especialmente no momento atual em que figuras autoritárias revelam-se fortemente presentes no cenário político do Brasil. Para tanto, este trabalho toma como pano de fundo a filosofia existencialista de Simone de Beauvoir e sua proposta de uma moral da ambiguidade fundamentada na ação pela qual o indivíduo assume-se como sujeito e objeto em seu desvelamento do mundo e na relação com (...) o outro. Os tipos identificados por Beauvoir em atitudes inautênticas que derivam do medo de assumir essa ambiguidade bem como a própria liberdade, e as noções de reciprocidade e generosidade são elementos fundamentais para o desenvolvimento deste trabalho. No que concerne à virilidade, a proposta de fomento da reflexão é desdobrada também com a sugestão de diálogo entre Beauvoir e os autores Max Horkheimer e Herbert Marcuse e a autora Claudine Haroche. Desenhada a noção de virilidade e sua relação com a lógica agressiva do sistema capitalista e com a construção das categorias de Homem e Mulher respectivamente enquanto Um e Outro, por fim, apontamos, pela discussão acadêmica no campo da filosofia e também por uma construção poética da letra de música, que foge ao nosso rigor da pesquisa, imagens que, pelo erotismo e por aspectos positivos de um contrauniverso, oposto ao masculino, revelem possibilidades de abalarmos as engrenagens da virilidade e as estruturas que esta sustenta. (shrink)

Histories of psychoanalysis largely respect the boundaries drawn by the psychoanalytic profession, suggesting that the development of psychoanalytic theories and techniques has been the exclusive remit of professionally trained analysts. In this article, I offer an historical example that poses a challenge to this orthodoxy. Based on extensive archival material, I show how British psychiatric social workers, a little-studied group of specialist mental hygiene workers, advanced key organisational, observational, and theoretical insights that shaped mid-century British psychoanalysis. In their daily work (...) compiling patient histories, conducting home visits, and interviewing the parents of ‘maladjusted’ children, psychiatric social workers were uniquely positioned to expose the importance of family relationships in the development of childhood neuroses. As this article details, their analytic attention to these dynamics not only influenced, but fundamentally constituted the innovative research on maternal-child relationships and family therapy pioneered by eminent psychoanalyst John Bowlby. In addition, psychiatric social workers produced and published independent psychoanalytic research, and fiercely debated the limitations of analytic concepts such as transference. In presenting the relationship between British psychiatric social work and psychoanalysis, this article suggests a new way of telling the history of both. (shrink)

In 1956, as a young art critic, the Mexican philosopher Juliana González first encountered the paintings of the Spanish surrealist Remedios Varo at the artist’s breakthrough solo exhibition in Mexico City’s Galería Diana. González, greatly impressed, soon befriended the much older Varo and became a regular visitor to her studio, where they talked about her paintings and their shared intellectual interests in literature, psychoanalysis, and philosophy, a conversation that ended with Varo’s untimely death in 1963 at age 54. A (...) few years later, González contributed this essay-homage to the 1966 catalog Remedios Varo. She opens with an evocation of Varo’s masterpiece, the triptych To the Tower, Embroidering the Earth’s Mantle and The Escape —a magnet for viewers at the recent “Surrealism Beyond Borders” exhibition in New York and London—and finds in it keys to the artist’s life and to her attempts through art “to flee this inexorable order toward another reality.” González’s close examination of the contradictions and ambiguities in Varo’s artistry, of “her wise, poetic humor,” and of her quest “to comprehend the universe” remains an essential read almost 60 years later. The catalog in which it first appeared is long out of print, and, to the best of my knowledge, González’s essay has never been republished in Spanish, making the text that follows as much an act of recovery as it is a translation. (shrink)

Despite the various perceptual-motor deficits documented in strabismus, there is a paucity of studies evaluating visual illusions in patients with strabismus. The aim of this study was to examine how the illusionary perception occurs in children/adolescents with strabismus with referral for surgery to correct ocular deviations. A controlled cross-sectional study was carried out in which 45 participants with strabismus and 62 healthy volunteers aged 10–15 years were evaluated. The behavioral response to three geometric illusions [Vertical-Horizontal illusion, Müller-Lyer illusion and Ponzo (...) illusion] and respective neutral stimuli regarding the estimation of image size and response time were measured using the Method of Adjustment. To analyze the influence of secondary factors: type of ocular deviation ; amount of eye deviation; presence of amblyopia and stereopsis, a one-way ANOVA was performed. Among the tested illusions, children with strabismus showed greater susceptibility and response time to Ponzo’s illusory images. Children with strabismus and preserved stereopsis, on the other hand, showed similar susceptibility and response time to control group patients to the Ponzo illusion. Patients with amblyopia showed overcorrection in the estimate of non-illusory Ponzo images. Children with horizontal ocular deviation associated with vertical deviation showed higher susceptibility to vertical adjustment images for the Müller-Lyer illusion. Individuals with strabismus tended to overcorrect the length of the straight-line segment adjusted for non-illusory images when testing non-illusory images in the Müller-Lyer test, as well as for the neutral images in the Vertical-Horizontal test. The findings indicated impairment in the perception of geometric illusions and neutral figures, especially for the Ponzo illusion test by children with strabismus. As the behavioral response to illusory images may indirectly reflect the visual and morphofunctional alterations present in these individuals, we suggest that the investigation of visual illusory perception can be used as a new research strategy in the field of investigating the visual function in strabismus. (shrink)

In this article; I put forward an instrumental justification for the introduction of youth quotas in parliaments on grounds of justice between coexisting generations. I provide a two-fold argument drawing on the distinction between “substantive representation” and “symbolic representation”. I argue that these jointly provide a good basis for a “politics of youth presence” in parliaments. In the first section; I evaluate the impact that youth quotas can have on enhancing the chances of fair youth policies. In the second section; (...) I show that youth quotas can play an important symbolic role in the promotion of a community of political equals; with potential implications for youth political participation. (shrink)