O objetivo geral deste artigo é fomentar reflexões filosóficas acerca da presença e dos sentidos da virilidade na sociedade capitalista, especialmente no momento atual em que figuras autoritárias revelam-se fortemente presentes no cenário político do Brasil. Para tanto, este trabalho toma como pano de fundo a filosofia existencialista de Simone de Beauvoir e sua proposta de uma moral da ambiguidade fundamentada na ação pela qual o indivíduo assume-se como sujeito e objeto em seu desvelamento do mundo e na relação com (...) o outro. Os tipos identificados por Beauvoir em atitudes inautênticas que derivam do medo de assumir essa ambiguidade bem como a própria liberdade, e as noções de reciprocidade e generosidade são elementos fundamentais para o desenvolvimento deste trabalho. No que concerne à virilidade, a proposta de fomento da reflexão é desdobrada também com a sugestão de diálogo entre Beauvoir e os autores Max Horkheimer e Herbert Marcuse e a autora Claudine Haroche. Desenhada a noção de virilidade e sua relação com a lógica agressiva do sistema capitalista e com a construção das categorias de Homem e Mulher respectivamente enquanto Um e Outro, por fim, apontamos, pela discussão acadêmica no campo da filosofia e também por uma construção poética da letra de música, que foge ao nosso rigor da pesquisa, imagens que, pelo erotismo e por aspectos positivos de um contrauniverso, oposto ao masculino, revelem possibilidades de abalarmos as engrenagens da virilidade e as estruturas que esta sustenta. (shrink)

The Perfection of the Universe gives an account of the idea of the universe and its perfection in Aquinas's philosophy, but at the same time it provides an example of how a cosmology can be developed in a teleological framework. Although this is the cosmology of one who was first and foremost a theologian, the book tries to show how it was articulated philosophically and in relation to a particular model of the universe. As a contribution to the history of (...) philosophy, and Thomistic studies in particular, it seeks to draw more attention to Aquinas's view of the world, which has been relatively neglected in favor of emphasis on his theory of knowledge and theory of being, and at the same time to show how it is integral to his very understanding of being. The book thereby brings out a dimension of rationality in Aquinas's philosophy that is often ignored, especially as it concerns creation as a whole and what Aquinas refers to as convenientia in this whole. The systematic nature of Aquinas's conception of the universe is highlighted by the author's attempt to reconstruct the movement of his thought. Thus Oliva Blanchette focuses not just on the universe or on perfection but on the perfection of the universe as a unified idea that recurs frequently in both the philosophy and the theology of Aquinas and that has its own philosophical dynamic both as a logic and as an actuality. In doing so, he endeavors to correct misconceptions about Aquinas's idea of the universe, such as that found in Lovejoy's Great Chain of Being, and to show how the idea stands up philosophically even while being connected with a scientific model of the universe now viewed as obsolete. (shrink)

Background: This study developed a photo and video database of 4-to-6-year-olds expressing the seven induced and posed universal emotions and a neutral expression. Children participated in photo and video sessions designed to elicit the emotions, and the resulting images were further assessed by independent judges in two rounds. Methods: In the first round, two independent judges, experts in the Facial Action Coding System, firstly analysed 3,668 emotions facial expressions stimuli from 132 children. Both judges reached 100% agreement regarding 1,985 stimuli, (...) which were then selected for a second round of analysis between judges 3 and 4. Results: The result was 1,985 stimuli were produced from 124 participants. A Kappa index of 0.70 and an accuracy of 73% between experts were observed. Lower accuracy was found for emotional expression by 4-year-olds than 6-year-olds. Happiness, disgust and contempt had the highest agreement. After a sub-analysis evaluation of all four judges, 100% agreement was reached for 1,381 stimuli which compound the ChildEFES database with 124 participants and 51% induced photographs. The number of stimuli of each emotion were: 87 for neutrality, 363 for happiness, 170 for disgust, 104 for surprise, 152 for fear, 144 for sadness, 157 for anger 157, and 183 for contempt. Conclusions: The findings show that this photo and video database can facilitate research on the mechanisms involved in early childhood recognition of facial emotions in children, contributing to the understanding of facial emotion recognition deficits which characterise several neurodevelopmental and psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

Purpose: The main aim of this study was to examine the influence of organizational culture on strategy implementation in Kenya Government Tourism Agencies. Materials and Methods: The study used a positivist approach research philosophy. The research designs employed in this study were explanatory and descriptive research designs. The study population comprised of the tourism industry. The study included the ministry of tourism itself since it is the parent ministry that regulates and oversees the operations of the tourism agencies to give (...) a total of 10 areas of study. A sample of 327 was achieved based on the following formula. This study used primary data. The study used questionnaires and interview guides to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitative data was analyzed through scientific methods using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS version 22) while qualitative data was analyzed thematically. The descriptive statistics was first used to analyze the demographic factors of the respondents using frequencies and charts. Inferential statistics such as correlation and multiple linear regression analysis were used to test the relationship among the variables as per the study hypothesis. Findings: The culture of an organization was found to play a critical role in implementation of strategies and consequently realizations of set objectives and profits in organizations. Organizational norms, ethics, employee training and organizational climate are very key in achieving success while implementing strategies. Implications to Theory, Practice and Policy: It is recommended that organizations (tourism industry) create strategy implementation promoting culture, culture of timeliness, innovative culture, ethics and one which promotes team spirit. These aspects of culture need to be reinforced and strengthened to ensure implementation of strategies is smooth and quick enough. This study thus bridges the gap between theory and practice, offering a nuanced understanding of the interplay between organizational culture and strategy implementation in a critical sector for Kenya's economy. (shrink)

A partir de las reflexiones arendtianas acerca del pensar sócratico y la caída de las nociones tradicionales de la moralidad tras los trágicos acontecimiento de la Alemania nazi, se pretende responder a la pregunta por cómo la actividad del pensar en sí misma puede ser, en efecto, de tal naturaleza que permita distinguir entre el bien y el mal. Para ello, se hace uso de las anotaciones de la autora en torno a la capacidad del juicio y de su relación (...) con el pensar. (shrink)

Francis Bacon foi considerado por alguns pensadores o pai do método experimental. Outros filósofos o acusaram de advogar um empi-rismo naif. Em nosso artigo pretendemos identificar as peculiaridades do tipo de empirismo abraçado por Bacon. Os mais duros críticos de Bacon têm destacado sua retórica fatualista e têm dispensado pouca atenção à complexidade de um sistema metodológico que atribui papel crucial à evidência negativa. Negligenciam principalmente o real significado epis-temológico de sua proposta de uma indução eliminatória. Associando Bacon rigidamente a (...) uma espécie de empirismo justificacionista deixam de detectar importantes ingredientes falibilistas em sua obra. Por aspirar a identificar o que pode haver de falibilismo na obra de Bacon este artigo questionará a avaliação que Popper faz de Bacon ao apresentá-lo como o grande representante do empirismo ingênuo e dogmático. Por mais que sejam procedentes algumas das críticas que Popper dirige a Bacon, mos-traremos que sua leitura repete velhos clichês sobre o autor do Novum Organum.Some philosophers regard Francis Bacon as the father of ex-perimental method. Others accuse Bacon of defending a naïf empiricist theory of knowledge. In this article I try to identify the peculiarities of the empiricism supported by Bacon. Bacon’s most severe critics emphasize his factualist rhetoric, paying no sufficient attention to the complexity of a methodological system that attributes a crucial role to negative evidence. They neglect the real epistemological meaning of Bacon’s proposal of an eliminative induction. As a rule, such critics are unable to detect the important fallibilist features present in Bacon’s work because they tend to, uncritically, identify him with a kind of em-piricist justificationism. The purpose of this article is to investigate the possible fallibilist elements in Bacon’s writings. By so doing, I shall challenge Popper’s evaluation of Bacon’s philosophy of science. I dis-agree with Popper when he describes Bacon as a dogmatic and naïf empiricist. Although some of the criticisms Popper addresses to Bacon are well-founded, I will argue that the general reconstruction of Ba-con’s inductivism carried out by Popper is not fully defensible. (shrink)

Cramer et al.'s network approach reconceptualizes mental comorbidity on the basis of symptom space originating from psychometric signatures. We argue that the advantages of this approach need to be regarded in the context of the multi-level functional organization of the neural substrate, ranging from neurogenetic to psychometric. Neuroelectric oscillations are proposed as a level-integrating principle.

This article brings together two debates in contemporary political philosophy: on the one hand, the dispute between the distributive and relational approaches to equality and, on the other hand, the field of intergenerational equality. I offer an original contribution to the second domain and by doing so, I inform the first. The aim of this article is thus twofold: (1) shedding some light on an under-researched and yet crucial question – ‘which inequalities between generations matter?’ and (2) contributing to a (...) far-reaching debate that touches upon the nature of egalitarianism. After showing that there are two key problems that fall within the scope of intergenerational equality – questions of justice between age groups and questions of equality between birth cohorts – I argue that, contrary to what the default distributive view (complete lives egalitarianism) states, some inequalities between age groups matter independently of their diachronic impact, and so partly for relational reasons. I argue that, even if we are distributive egalitarians, we must endorse the relational egalitarian conception to successfully make sense of some inequalities between age groups. I infer from this both that the putative view that the ‘relational’ conception of equality can be redescribed as distributive must be rejected and that the distributive view requires supplementation (but not necessarily displacement) by the relational view. (shrink)

In this paper I identify two different lockean concepts of justice - "proprietary justice" and "justice as fairness" - and examine the relationship between each of them and charity in John Locke´s theory of property. As I try to show, in both cases Locke considers that charity may have priority over justice. This undermines the classical interpretation of Locke as a defender of unlimited capitalistic appropriation and provides additional evidence supporting Locke´s acceptation of a minimal redistributive system which should guarantee (...) the material welfare of non-appropriators. (shrink)

This article presents a parametrized functional interpretation. Depending on the choice of two parameters one obtains well-known functional interpretations such as Gödel's Dialectica interpretation, Diller-Nahm's variant of the Dialectica interpretation, Kohlenbach's monotone interpretations, Kreisel's modified realizability, and Stein's family of functional interpretations. A functional interpretation consists of a formula interpretation and a soundness proof. I show that all these interpretations differ only on two design choices: first, on the number of counterexamples for A which became witnesses for ¬A when defining (...) the formula interpretation and, second, the inductive information about the witnesses of A which is considered in the proof of soundness. Sufficient conditions on the parameters are also given which ensure the soundness of the resulting functional interpretation. The relation between the parametrized interpretation and the recent bounded functional interpretation is also discussed. (shrink)

Zoning laws determine what types of land uses and densities can occur on each property lot in a municipality, and therefore also govern the range of potential environmental and health impacts resulting from the land use. Zoning regulations are the most ubiquitous of the land use laws in the United States, as well as in many other countries. As such, they have far-reaching effects on the location of noxious uses, and any concomitant environmental or human health impacts.Zoning has enormous implications, (...) in general, for shaping our environment, and because changes to zoning are made through a political process, it has possibilities for abuse. One zoning expert stated:I suppose what really disturbs me is that because zoning is the most universal of the legal tools for shaping the character of the municipality, any unwise use of the process has a far greater impact upon our national character than does the abuse of a less widely employed device. (shrink)

Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only yet still has significant merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, (...) is more convincingly dealt with by subjectivism than by its rivals: In contrast to realism or even relativism (with which subjectivism is often confused), subjectivism can help to explain the peculiarities of obligation without forcing us to disregard the parallel problem in the field of religion. This finding calls into question the rationale for, as well as the success of, central assumptions in ontology and semantics which the realist so freely hands out in order to make his point: If religious facts and the truth-aptness of religious judgements will not explain religious obligation, moral facts and the truth-aptness of moral judgements will not help the moral realist either. So unless we do not wish to simply cast the problem of moral obligation aside, in future, moral subjectivism must be seriously considered as a worthwhile position in its own right. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ********** Moralischer Subjektivismus ist ein Oberbegriff für Theorien wie Alfred Ayers „Emotivismus“ und John Mackies „Irrtumstheorie“, die heute kaum noch Vertreter finden. In diesem Aufsatz beleuchte ich das Feld vom Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion her. Ich lege so die Möglichkeit eines anderen moralischen Subjektivismus dar, der mit Ayers oder Mackies Theorie nur das Rubrum gemein hätte und doch gewichtige Vorzüge aufweist. Die handlungstheoretische Betrachtung von Moral und Religion mit Hilfe der Philosophie des Geistes legt nahe, dass dieser moralische Subjektivismus mit dem für die Moralphilosophie zentralen Problem des moralischen Sollens besser umgehen kann als seine Rivalen: Anders als der Realismus oder gar der Relativismus (mit dem der Subjektivismus oft verwechselt wird), kann der hier ausgeleuchtete Subjektivismus mit der besonderen Verbindlichkeit moralischer Forderungen umgehen, ohne die Parallele zur besonderen Verbindlichkeit religiöser Forderungen in Abrede stellen zu müssen. Die Rolle und Durchschlagkraft der vom Realisten so freigiebig gespendeten ontologischen oder semantischen Zusatzannahmen er- scheint vor diesem Hintergrund fragwürdig. Dem religiösen Realisten wird man vergleichbare Annahmen nicht zugeben wollen und muss es auch nicht. Dann aber können wir die Erklärung besonderer Verbindlichkeit generell nicht auf Ontologie oder Semantik gründen. Der verbreitete Appell an sogenannte moralische Tatsachen oder die behauptete Wahrheitsfähigkeit moralischer Sätze erweist sich so als wirkungslos. Sofern wir das Problem des moralischen Sollens überhaupt weiter ernst nehmen wollen, muss der moralische Subjektivismus als Position künftig ernsthaft erwogen werden. (shrink)

Este artículo se adentra en los temas y tópicos vitales de la obra literaria de Eliacer Cansino, escritor dedicado a la literatura juvenil, e invita a reflexionar sobre cómo su lectura puede desarrollar el pensamiento crítico de los jóvenes lectores del siglo XXI. Para abordar esta investigación, se ha recurrido a una metodología de corte cualitativo, con especial atención a la narrativa biográfica. De esta manera, dado que literatura y realidad constituyen dos caras de una moneda al forjar lectores, se (...) analizó el perimundo literario de Eliacer Cansino. Los resultados justifican que la lectura de la obra de este autor es un referente literario para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico desde la experiencia lectora de los adolescentes. (shrink)

This is a study of Blondel's philosophy of the supernatural as it appeared only in the dissertation on Action of 1893. First, it reviews how Blondel brought philosophy to focus concretely on human action and what he focuses on in this action as the principle for its dialectical unfolding. Second, it shows how this focus brings him to a radical critique of superstition and any idea of natural religion, since even the latter is viewed as a kind of superstition. Third, (...) it examines how he proceeds to the affirmation of God as the necessary being of action and how this affirmation places the human being in a position of having to choose between saying yes or no to God at the core of his action. Fourth, it shows how Blondel argues from this existential exigency that the thought of the supernatural necessarily arises with regard to the question of human destiny and that such a thought, if it actualized in human action through a gratuitous initiative on the part of God, necessarily entails a revelation, a mediation, and a religious practice on the part of man. In conclusion it reflects on how this science of practice remains a philosophy, as distinct from theology, even though it has to do with religious practice in the most supernatural sense. /// O presente artigo constitui urn estudo sobre o problema do sobrenatural, tal como Blondel comeca por o tratar em sua tese de doutoramento sobre a Ácção, publicada em 1893. Em primeiro lugar, passa-se em revista não só o modo concreto como Blondel fez do problema da acção assunto para a filosofia, mas também se procura discernir aquilo que, segundo ele, na acção mesma constitui o princípio do seu desdobramento dialéctico. Em segundo lugar, mostra-se como a partir deste ponto de focagem Blondel procede a uma critica radical da superstição bem como de toda e qualquer ideia de religião natural, por ele igualmente vista como uma espécie de superstição. Em terceiro lugar, examina-se o modo como Blondel avança em direcção a uma afirmação de Deus como o ser necessário da acção e como esta mesma afirmação coloca o ser humano numa posicjio de, no fulcro do seu agir, ter de optar entre o dizer sim ou não a Deus. Em quarto lugar, mostra-se o modo como Blondel, partindo desta exigência existencial, argumenta no sentido de que o pensamento do sobrenatural necessariamente se dá em conexão com a questão do destino humano e de como tal pensamento, actualizado na acção humana graças a uma iniciativa gratuita da parte de Deus, necessariamente implica a ideia de revelação, mediação, e prática religiosa da parte do homem. Finalmente, em conclusão, reflecte-se sobre o modo como esta ciência da prática permanece filosofia, distinta da teologia, mesmo quando, enquanto tal, ela tern a ver com uma prática religiosa no sentido mais sobrenatural do termo /// Ceci est une étude de la philosophie du surnaturel de Blondel telle qu'elle parut uniquement dans la thèse sur L'Action de 1893. Premièrement, elle revoit comment Blondel a amené la philosophie à réfléchir concrétement sur l'action humaine et ce sur quoi cette réflexion s'appuie comme principe du déploiement dialectique de cette action. Deuxièmement, elle montre comment ce déploiement amène Blondel à une critique radicale de la superstition et de toute idée de religion naturelle, puisque cette dernière est vue comme une sorte de superstition. Troisièmement, elle examine comment Blondel avance vers une affirmation de Dieu comme Fetre necessaire de l'action et comment cette affirmation amène l'être humain à devoir choisir entre dire oui ou non face à Dieu au plus profond de son action. Quatrièmement, elle montre comment Blondel, à partir de cette exigence existentielle, arrive à poser que la pensée du surnaturel surgit nécessairement par rapport à la question du destin de l'être humain et comment une telle pensée, si elle devient réalite dans l'action humaine par une initiative gratuite du côté de Dieu. entraine du côté de l'homme la nécessité d'une révélation, une médiation et une pratique religieuse. En conclusion, l'étude se demande comment cette science de la pratique reste une philosophie, distincte de toute théologie, même si elle traite de la pratique religieuse dans son sens le plus surnaturel. (shrink)

In the late 1930's Blondel precipitated a debate over the question of a Christian philosophy in a series of articles on St. Augustine insisting on the philosophical nature of the saint's thought. Rationalist historian of philosophy Bréhier objected to the very idea of a Christian philosophy. Other historians like Gilson allowed that a philosophy could be characterized loosely as Christian when it was associated with Christian thought, as in the Middle Ages. But Blondel argued against both of these positions as (...) presupposing a separation between philosophy and religion that allowed only for a false hybridization between the two when they were juxtaposed. His own approach to philosophy had been to show a necessary intersection between the two in the question about the ultimate meaning of human action as it relates to God in his infinite transcendence, as this had long been understood in the Catholic tradition, that is, as relating to something supernatural in the strictest sense, something bound to appear as scandalous and paradoxical to reason alone. The present article examines how he first came to his philosophical method for dealing with this question in the 1890's and how he later used this method in defending the idea of a philosophy that was integrally rational and Catholic in the strict sense of both terms. /// Na década de 1930, Maurice Blondel desencadeou um importante debate acerca da questão da chamada Filosofia Cristã mediante uma série de artigos sobre Santo Agostinho, os quais insistiam em particular sobre a natureza filosófica do pensamento do grande santo. Bréhier, um historiador da Filosofia de tendência racionalista, objectou à própria ideia de uma Filosofia Cristã. Outros historiadores, tais como E. Gilson, concediam que uma Filosofia poderia ser vagamente caracterizada como Cristã quando a mesma esteja associada com o pensamento cristão, como era o caso na Idade Média. Mas Blondel argumentava contra estas duas posições na medida em que achava que as mesmas pressuponham a separação entre Filosofia e Religião, separação esta que permitia apenas uma falsa hibridização entre as duas quando as mesmas eram justapostas. A sua posição pessoal em relação à Filosofia defendia que entre esta e a Religião existia uma intersecçdo necessária acerca da questão relativa ao sentido ultimo da acçdo humana na medida em que esta remete para Deus na sua infinita transcendência, tal como esta era desde há muito compreendida na tradição Católica, ou seja, enquanto que remetendo para algo sobrenatural no sentido mais estrito, algo destinado a aparecer como escandaloso e paradoxal à razão enquanto que entregue a si mesma. O presente artigo examina de que modo Blondel primeiro chegou ao seu método filosófico no tratamento desta questão na década de 1890 e de como ele mais tarde usou este método para defender a ideia de uma Filosofia que é integralmente racional e católica no sentido mais estrito de ambos os termos. (shrink)

The notion of hope occupies a central position in Paulo Freire’s work. Since he understands hope to be a motor for change, an ontological necessity and a political act, Freire concludes that it is important to educate hope so that it is not converted into infertile hopelessness or tragic despair. Imbued with Freirean spirit, my purpose in this paper is to construct a dialogue between this great educator’s thoughts and those of Spinoza. This impossible encounter between these two men who (...) rebelled in thought and action against the oppressions of their times will occur through the investigation of the following themes: 1) the role of hope in the Freirean conception of history; 2) relationships between freedom and necessity; 3) hope’s social functions and 4) Freire’s proposal of an ‘education of hope’. Two notions of hope will be discussed: naïve hope and critical hope. The spinozist provocation consists in suggesting an ethical and political attitude which is primarily moved by our power to think and act and is, therefore, not based on hope. (shrink)

En las siguientes páginas me propongo exponer de modo sucinto dos de los problemas filosóficos más significativos de la Edad Media: el de los universales y el de la individuación. El primero se pregunta por el estatus ontológico de las nociones universales; el segundo por el principio de individuación de las diferentes substancias. A pesar de ser problemas distintos, estas cuestiones están estrechamente unidas. El problema de los universales albergó desde sus inició la pregunta por el estatus ontológico de los (...) individuos, cuestión de la que derivó posteriormente la pregunta por la individuación. Por su parte, al no haber sido un problema tratado independientemente desde su origen, el problema de la individuación se ha entendido como un hacerse individuo del universal. Dada esta cercanía, parece necesario establecer cómo se conectan las nociones de ‘universal’, ‘individuo’ e ‘individuación’ con el fin de entender con mayor claridad dichas cuestiones. (shrink)

What is discrimination and what makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Even after an ever-rising tide of research over the course of the past twenty-five or so years these questions still remain hard to answer. Exercising candid and self-critical hindsight, Larry Alexander, who contributed his fair share to this tide, thus remarked: “All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.” If this is true it (...) raises serious doubts as to how wrongful discrimination can be a moral wrong in itself. Also, the question comes up as to who it is who breaches a promise or a fiduciary duty. This paper defends the view that the substance of these remarks is better understood by couching them in a political approach towards discrimination. Against this background, they give rise to real and pressing concerns. Once we conceptualise the realm political along Hobbesian lines as the battleground comprising both the private sphere of the individual and the public sphere of the commonwealth it emerges that discrimination has different significance with regard to these respective spheres. In order to illustrate this, I adopt Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s descriptive account of discrimination as „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ and the common view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because it is harmful, disrespectful, or both. In the private sphere the case can be made for morally permissible cases of discrimination. Sexual discrimination due to sexual self-determination with consequently freely choosing your sexual or romantic partner is the central case in point. Where somebody feels unfairly rejected and consequently hurt neither the charge of harm inflicted nor that of disrespect endured need be justified. No “breach of promises or fiduciary duties” is involved. The case is different, however, when it comes to the fiduciary of power. In discriminating, he who exercises the power of the commonwealth necessarily breaches a promise and a fiduciary duty. Discrimination thus appears to be more of a problem of political philosophy than one of applied ethics. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ******************** Was ist Diskriminierung und warum ist Diskriminierung verwerflich, wenn sie es denn ist? Dies bleibt ungeachtet der seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren anschwellenden Forschungsliteratur unverändert eine harte Nuss. Larry Alexander, der selbst maßgeblich zu dieser Forschungsliteratur beigetragen hat, merkt daher selbstkritisch an: „All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.“ Wenn dies der Fall ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie moralisch verwerfliche Diskriminierung dann noch an sich verwerflich sein kann. Es stellt sich dann auch die Frage, wer hier ein Versprechen bricht und seine Treuepflichten verletzt. Die leitende Annahme dieses Aufsatzes ist es, dass man dem sachlichen Kern dieser Bedenken Rechnung tragen kann, indem man eine politische Perspektive auf das Phänomen der Diskriminierung einnimmt. Die Bedenken erweisen sich dann als substanziell und zutreffend. Konzeptualisieren wir den Bereich des Politischen mit Thomas Hobbes als das Spannungsfeld, das die private Sphäre des Individuums und die öffentliche Sphäre des Gemeinwesens gegeneinander abgrenzt, wird sichtbar, dass Diskriminierung in diesen Sphären jeweils unterschiedlich zu bewerten ist. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, lege ich Kasper Lippert-Rasmussens deskriptives Verständnis von Diskriminierung als „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ zugrunde und mache von der in der Diskussion verbreiteten Ansicht Gebrauch, dass das Zufügen von Schaden oder die Verweigerung von Respekt Diskriminierung verwerflich macht. In der privaten Sphäre kann es nun Fälle moralisch zulässiger Diskriminierung geben. Zentral ist die sexuelle Diskriminierung aufgrund der Ausübung einer freien Wahl des eigenen Sexual- oder Liebespartners. Auch wenn sich der Abgewiesene womöglich geschädigt sieht, wird unbilliger Schaden nicht zugefügt und geschul- deter Respekt nicht verweigert. Den Grund finden wir in Alexanders Formel: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt nicht vor. Anders im Fall staatlicher Diskriminierung: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt hier stets vor, da Fälle staatlicher Diskriminierung regelmäßig Machtmissbrauch darstellen: Der Inhaber staatlicher Gewalt verletzt die Treuepflicht, das Mandat unparteilich auszuüben, das getreulich auszuführen er gelobt hat. Diskriminierung erscheint also weniger als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik denn als eines der politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Despite the various perceptual-motor deficits documented in strabismus, there is a paucity of studies evaluating visual illusions in patients with strabismus. The aim of this study was to examine how the illusionary perception occurs in children/adolescents with strabismus with referral for surgery to correct ocular deviations. A controlled cross-sectional study was carried out in which 45 participants with strabismus and 62 healthy volunteers aged 10–15 years were evaluated. The behavioral response to three geometric illusions [Vertical-Horizontal illusion, Müller-Lyer illusion and Ponzo (...) illusion] and respective neutral stimuli regarding the estimation of image size and response time were measured using the Method of Adjustment. To analyze the influence of secondary factors: type of ocular deviation ; amount of eye deviation; presence of amblyopia and stereopsis, a one-way ANOVA was performed. Among the tested illusions, children with strabismus showed greater susceptibility and response time to Ponzo’s illusory images. Children with strabismus and preserved stereopsis, on the other hand, showed similar susceptibility and response time to control group patients to the Ponzo illusion. Patients with amblyopia showed overcorrection in the estimate of non-illusory Ponzo images. Children with horizontal ocular deviation associated with vertical deviation showed higher susceptibility to vertical adjustment images for the Müller-Lyer illusion. Individuals with strabismus tended to overcorrect the length of the straight-line segment adjusted for non-illusory images when testing non-illusory images in the Müller-Lyer test, as well as for the neutral images in the Vertical-Horizontal test. The findings indicated impairment in the perception of geometric illusions and neutral figures, especially for the Ponzo illusion test by children with strabismus. As the behavioral response to illusory images may indirectly reflect the visual and morphofunctional alterations present in these individuals, we suggest that the investigation of visual illusory perception can be used as a new research strategy in the field of investigating the visual function in strabismus. (shrink)

In this article; I put forward an instrumental justification for the introduction of youth quotas in parliaments on grounds of justice between coexisting generations. I provide a two-fold argument drawing on the distinction between “substantive representation” and “symbolic representation”. I argue that these jointly provide a good basis for a “politics of youth presence” in parliaments. In the first section; I evaluate the impact that youth quotas can have on enhancing the chances of fair youth policies. In the second section; (...) I show that youth quotas can play an important symbolic role in the promotion of a community of political equals; with potential implications for youth political participation. (shrink)

The late 18th century is characterized by two crucial events: the rise of Goethe as a dominating literary figure and the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy and its productive reception not only in the philosophical but also literary discourse of the time. While the Tübingen School concreatively adopted Kant’s philosophy as a system of ideas, they also critically responded to its intellectualising impulse by positing the equiprimordiality of world and Self, of art and reason. Adhering to the self-critical impulse of (...) Kant’s philosophy by positing the equiprimordiality of both the empirical world and the intelligible subject, and trying to overcome the “chorismos” between them through the classicist model of aesthetic Bildung, they argued for the co-extensiveness of the reality of both philosophy and literature. The authors investigate how the latent antagonism between these divergent traditions of the so-called Goethezeit creates the thrust behind the intellectual firework of divergent literary and philosophical discourses from around 1800, throughout the 19th and into the 20th century. (shrink)