Delusions are one of the most classical symptoms described in schizophrenia. However, despite delusions are often emotionally charged, they have been investigated using tasks involving non-affective material, such as the Beads task. In this study we compared 30 patients with schizophrenia experiencing delusions with 32 matched controls in their pattern of responses to two versions of the Beads task within a Bayesian framework. The two versions of the Beads task consisted of one emotional and one neutral, both with ratios of (...) beads of 60:40 and 80:20, considered, respectively, as the “difficult” and “easy” variants of the task. Results indicate that patients showed a greater deviation from the normative model, especially in the 60:40 ratio, suggesting that more inaccurate probability estimations are more likely to occur under uncertainty conditions. Additionally, both patients and controls showed a greater deviation in the emotional version of the task, providing evidence of a reasoning bias modulated by the content of the stimuli. Finally, a positive correlation between patients’ deviation and delusional symptomatology was found. Impairments in the 60:40 ratio with emotional content was related to the amount of disruption in life caused by delusions. These results contribute to the understanding of how cognitive mechanisms interact with characteristics of the task in the context of delusional thinking. These findings might be used to inform improved intervention programs in the domain of inferential reasoning. (shrink)

Is Aristotle right when he says that Plato believed in a class ofentities which are "intermediate" between physical objects and Forms? It may seem unrewarding to ask this question again. Scholars divide into two groups over the answer, and it may well seem impossible by now for either side to make any point that will convince the other. If the issues are well understood, and the lines of the controversy drawn already, can it be worthwhile to reconsider the problem? In (...) this paper I shall try to reconsider this issue from a somewhat different angle. It may be that, while the traditional question cannot be conclusively answered as so stated, the problem can nevertheless be fruitfully investigated by first considering a related question,the answer to which has implications for the way in which the traditional question should be answered. (shrink)

When Mill's The Subjection of Women was published in 1869 it was ahead of its time in boldly championing feminism. It failed to inaugurate a respectable intellectual debate. Feminist writers have tended to refer to it with respect but without any serious attempt to come to grips with Mill's actual arguments. Kate Millett's chapter in Sexual Politics is the only sustained discussion of Mill in the feminist literature that I am aware of, but it is not from a philosophical viewpoint, (...) and deals with Mill only in the service of an extended comparison with Ruskin. Philosophical books on Mill give the essay short measure. Alan Ryan in J. S. Mill heads one chapter ‘Liberty and The Subjection of Women’, but the former work gets twenty-six pages and the latter only four. Ryan says that ‘it is almost entirely concerned with the legal disabilities of women in Victorian England’. H. J. McCloskey, injfohn Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, gives the essay one and a half pages, commenting that it reads ‘like a series of truisms’ and seems so unimportant today because equality of the sexes has been achieved! (shrink)

In the Republic, Socrates undertakes to defend justice as being in itself a benefit to its possessor. Does he do this, or does he change the subject? In a well-known article, David Sachs pointed out that there seems to be a shift in what Plato is defending. The challenge to Socrates is put by Thrasymachus, who admires the successful unjust man, and by Glaucon and Adeimantus, who do not, but are worried that justice has no adequate defence against Thrasymachus. In (...) all these passages justice is discussed in terms of the non-performance of actions which are regarded as unjust according to common morality; Sachs calls this common concept of ordinary justice ‘vulgar justice’. (shrink)

Kaum ein anderes semantisches Feld durchzieht Platons Werk von den ersten Dialogen an bis zum Spätwerk so prägend und zugleich so spannungsreich wie das der Mimesis. Von der Sprachphilosophie über die Ästhetik und Moralpsychologie bis hin zur Metaphysik, Kosmologie und Theologie: in erstaunlich vielen Themenbereichen gewinnt die Semantik der Mimesis bei Platon hohe Relevanz. Der Tagungsband „Platonic Mimesis Revisited“ bietet eine umfassende und kontextsensible Neubetrachtung der Mimesis in allen einschlägigen Dialogen. Anders als frühere monographische Behandlungen des Themas vereint er eine (...) bedeutende Auswahl wissenschaftlicher Perspektiven aus Philosophie und Philologie und gibt so einen breiten Einblick in moderne Forschungsansätze.Mit Beiträgen vonMichele Abbate, Alexandra V. Alván Leon, Laura Candiotto, Andrea Capra, Elenio Cicchini, Michael Erler, Francesco Fronterotta, José Antonio Giménez Salinas, Stephen Halliwell, Irmgard Männlein-Robert, Lidia Palumbo, Anna Pavani, Julia Pfefferkorn, Antonino Spinelli, Benedikt Strobel und Justin Vlasits. (shrink)

In [3], two different effective versions of Borel embedding are defined. The first, called computable embedding, is based on uniform enumeration reducibility, while the second, called Turing computable embedding, is based on uniform Turing reducibility. While [3] focused mainly on computable embeddings, the present paper considers Turing computable embeddings. Although the two notions are not equivalent, we can show that they behave alike on the mathematically interesting classes chosen for investigation in [3]. We give a “Pull-back Theorem”, saying that if (...) Φ is a Turing computable embedding of K into K’, then for any computable infinitary sentence φ in the language of K’, we can find a computable infinitary sentence φ* in the language of K such that for all. (shrink)

Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some circumstances where it is justifiable to use animals as experimental test subjects (where the individual animals are benefited by the experiments).

This paper begins with the idea that we can learn a good deal about promising by examining the conditions and norms that govern promise- breaking. Sometimes promises are broken as a deliberate plan, other times they are broken because they are simply incompatible with other, more signifi cant moral norms, or because it becomes clear that they are impossible to keep. There are cases where people make promises that are actually incompatible with each other. Politicians, for example, often give such (...) incompatible promises, either intentionally, or by making too many commitments, some of which turn out to be incompatible. In making such promises, agents guarantee that at least one promise be broken. Is the agent who makes incompatible promises under any obli- gation? If ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ and promises entail obligations, then it seems that one cannot, in fact, make promises one cannot keep. This paper explores the problem by drawing analogies between incompatible promises and other promises that cannot be kept. It suggests that we can deny ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ strictly speaking, but recognize that there is a practical limit on what the agent can be called on to do. On this view, even promises to do the impossible commit the agent. Similarly, politi- cians who promise too much are still obligated to do as promised. (shrink)

O teórico Michael Löwy afirmou que o campo científico é social e politicamente condicionado, não sendo viável estabelecer um distanciamento entre ciência e ideologia. No atual momento, é possível visualizar a clareza dessa afirmação, na medida em que o campo científico se demonstra obstruído diante do cenário político vivenciado. O pensamento crítico e problematizador é tido como um perigo eminente perante a conjuntura conservadora e antidemocrática que se acentua. Com isso, a produção de pensamento crítico e o posicionamento de resistência, (...) diante da formação conservadora, assume a denominação de doutrinação, e o debate gerador de reflexão tende a ser calado, sobretudo se não confirmar a lógica dominante. Ao compreendermos a necessidade de reafirmar o teor questionador da produção de conhecimento, como elemento central na formação social, entende-se sua relevância na construção de um caminho democrático do pensamento social. Neste trabalho, buscamos levantar reflexões a partir de uma revisão bibliográfica, procurando entender produção de conhecimento em um período de anti-intelectualismo. Em contraposição ao conceito positivista de neutralidade do conhecimento, pretende-se investigar a relação dialética entre representação política e formação intelectual. Nossa concepção de pesquisa científica situa-se em um campo que não é neutro, mas permeado de diferentes concepções de mundo, de ser humano e de conhecimento, bem como engendrada por relações que ocorrem entre sujeitos, que propendem a produzir conhecimentos científicos a partir do seu lugar social, um lugar suficientemente privilegiado. Este trabalho se propõe examinar essas questões, ao referenciar a formação social como aspecto determinante na produção de conhecimento. Aponta-se à figura do intelectual orgânico como elemento essencial para pensar essa questão, ao salientar a contraposição ao retrocesso científico imposto no último período e a valorização do pensamento crítico, mais do que nunca como pensamento que resiste no campo da pesquisa e diante do sistema produtivista que o concebe. (shrink)

German theologian F. D. E. Schleiermacher's doctrine of God-the first to be developed in the post-Kantian era-fundamentally changed the course of Christian theology. The degree to which his doctrine of God was influenced by the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza remains in dispute, however. This study examines the ways in which Schleiermacher actively adopted elements of Spinoza's thought in the development of his own theological doctrine of God. Julia Lamm's analysis of little-known but seminal essays by Schleiermacher reveals his (...) young creative genius in daring to go beyond the neo-Spinozism of Herder and the post-Kantianism of Fichte by developing his own post-Kantian Spinozism. Schleiermacher's unique simultaneous appropriation of Kant and Spinoza is characterized by four themes: an organic monism, an ethical determinism, a critical realism, and a nonanthropomorphic view of God, which Lamm traces through his two major theological works, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers and The Christian Faith. Ultimately, Lamm finds that Schleiermacher departs from Spinoza in significant ways. Most notably, he talks about "the living God" who is best expressed through the divine attributes of love and wisdom. This living God is what Schleiermacher refers to as the "third alternative" to, on the one hand, the anthropomorphized God of orthodox Protestantism and, on the other hand, Spinoza's natura naturans. (shrink)

In the Stoics we find a combination of two perspectives which are commonly thought to conflict: the embedded perspective from within one's social context, and the universal perspective of the member of the moral community of rational beings. I argue that the Stoics do have a unified theory, one which avoids problems that trouble some modern theories which try to unite these perspectives.

‘The matter will hinge on this point: what will be established is the ideal wise and virtuous person either of the Stoics or of the Old Academy [Platonists and Aristotelians]. You can’t have both; the dispute between them is not about boundaries but about complete ownership, since all rationale for living is involved in one’s definition of the final good, and dispute about that is dispute about all rationale for living. So it can’t be both, since they disagree so deeply; (...) it must be one or the other.…I am dragged in different directions—at one time one view seems more convincing to me, at other times the other. Still, unless one or other of them is the case, I firmly believe that virtue is defeated. But—just on this issue they disagree.’. (shrink)

The evaluation of character has taken on new significance in moral theory, and, indeed, some advocate a shift in focus away from evaluating action to evaluating character. This has been taken to pose special challenges for utilitarian and consequentialist moral theory. Utilitarianism's commitment to impartiality and its seeming failure to accommodate virtue evaluation have led to problems, some of which are developed in the essays in this volume.

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the contrast in views between traditional mainstream Chinese philosophy and Western liberal individualism on the importance of the concept of individual rights in social and political thought. The contrast is striking because, whereas individual and political rights have long featured in public discourse in the West, in China, mainstream social and political thought has developed without a notion of individual rights. In search of the significance of this major difference, the paper traces ideas of (...) the self in China through Confucian ethics, and compares the Confucian conception of the self with the deontological liberal conception of the subject as a bearer of rights in the West. Having established that the Chinese way of thinking about the self and about moral agency is in stark contrast to the image of the self as a bearer of rights in the deontological conception, the paper goes on to discuss the inadequacy of the moral individualism of a rights‐based morality and argues for an alternative view of morality which places importance on the intrinsic value of collective goods and on membership in a society. (shrink)

Warum sind unsere Daten und das Private schützenswert? Diese Frage stellt sich insbesondere in Zeiten der vierten Industriellen Revolution, des Internets der Dinge und des politischen Wandels. Julia Maria Mönig zeigt, dass Hannah Arendts Anliegen, das Private unbedingt zu bewahren, von ihrem Verständnis des antiken Haushalts bis hin zur Verletzung der informationellen Privatheit im Totalitarismus aufschlussreiche Einsichten in aktuelle Debatten - etwa über Cybermobbing - liefert. Das Buch richtet sich an Philosoph_innen ebenso wie an Datenschützer_innen und Privatheitsforscher_innen verschiedener Disziplinen (...) sowie an alle, die sich über die Zukunft und Gegenwart der Demokratie Gedanken machen. (shrink)

The naturalistic fallacy is a source of much confusion. In what follows I will explain what G. E. Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy, give modern day examples of it then mention some of the different types of views it has spawned. Finally, I will consider a few criticisms of it.

On his way to convey Jupiter's rebuke to Aeneas, Mercury passes by his maternal grandfather Atlas, a mountain vividly personified as an old man with snowy beard/frozen rivers running down his chin . Here he pauses, then flings himself into the waves.

ABSTRACT: Biological prospecting is being undertaken in the Antarctic and, as novel material starts to yield significantly higher commercial rewards, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties might decide to regulate it through the Antarctic Treaty System. This will be problematic since activities are already being undertaken, patents have been filed and products developed. Furthermore, there are differing perceptions of the status of the Antarctic, with some considering it global commons and others considering it the common heritage of mankind. These 2 doctrines (...) can be inferred from the rhetoric of the Treaty and its subsequent legal instruments through which human activities, including the use of resources, are managed. However, the Antarctic Treaty System does not support either in practice because activities such as fishing and bioprospecting already return an exclusive reward for effort, with no benefit-sharing arrangements. Under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the Parties determine allowable catches for a fishery based on scientific assessment, and this may discharge them from providing access and benefit-sharing arrangements to the international community potentially available through other international law (e.g. the Law of the Sea Convention or the Convention on Biological Diversity). The major turning point in Antarctica came when the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities—which acknowledged the rights of the international community—failed to enter into force. Today the international community is rewarded with a relatively healthy Antarctic environment and free access to some scientific information, which are benefiting all mankind. But the international community does not get direct financial reward from Antarctic activities because access is constrained by law and by a lack of capacity. There is no mechanism for disbursing compensation to all mankind in any case, although the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties could certainly rectify this if they had the will to do so. So far they have not. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Sounds and Silences:Acknowledging Political EngagementJulia Eklund KozaThis symposium grapples with such questions as "Should music educators participate in political understandings?" The term "politics" often brings to mind "Big P" political matters, including citizenship, governance of the state, the election of officials, and the formation of public policy. Another way of thinking about politics is to associate it with power relations in social interactions of any kind. If one (...) thinks about it in the second way, then wherever there are two or more people, there are politics. Questions such as "Should we participate in politics?" and "How engaged should we be?" become meaningless. Michel Foucault's discussions of the pastoral forms of governance employed by the modern state, specifically the uses of technologies of the self, challenged long-held views about relationships between the individual and the state. In particular, his claim that major dominations are the effects, not the causes, of myriad local and particular mobilizations of power provides a rationale for examining these local mobilizations.1 If major dominations and "Big P" politics are the effects of local mobilizations, then everyone participating in social interactions participates in "Big P" politics, as well.This more global conception of political engagement stands in sharp contrast to a narrower one, which can be described using a "swimmer-on the-shore" metaphor. The swimmer stands on a beach looking out at the sea and decides whether this is a day for a toe dip, wading to the knees, total immersion, or staying out of the water altogether. The swimmer can choose to stay dry (unless inundated by the tide or a tidal wave). This conception is evident in a comment reportedly made by a music education professor in response to two back-to-back annual meetings of the music education researchers at Committee on Institutional Cooperation (CIC) institutions. Both meetings had been devoted to critique of MENC's policies and practices, and the disgruntled professor reportedly remarked, "That's enough about politics; let's get back to talking about music." In his view, which is shaped by the "swimmer" conception, some discussions are political, others are not; while some curricular areas, such as civics and sex education, are political, music is not, nor should it be. If, however, we assume that there is power in all social relations, then the "swimmer" conception has no salience because everyone is immersed; music, because it is a social activity, is political. Its engagement in politics is neither good nor bad, in and of itself; rather, it is inevitable. [End Page 168]Some may concede that although it is not possible to be disengaged, it is necessary and good for scholars and teachers to be politically "neutral." Conceptions of neutrality rely on a one-dimensional linear integers model of political engagement. On the line representing the integers, there is a plus side, a minus side, and zero, the zero presumably being the point of neutrality. People and views associated with the far ends of the line are extreme, while those closer to the zero point are moderate. In addition, positions on the line are assigned a moral value; depending upon the issue and the perspective from which the line is being viewed, plus can be good but minus is bad, plus can be bad but minus is good, neutral can be good, or neutral can be bad. If every issue and every social relation is political, however, and if we assume that people and relationships change, then the linear integers model is inadequate because it fails to embody the dynamic, multi-dimensional character of the complex social relations in which all of us engage. Another problem with the linear integers model is that it fails to interrogate the power vested in whomever or whatever decides what will constitute extreme, moderate, or neutral—what will be deemed reasonable and what outrageous. Sometimes this responsibility has been assigned to a fictitious "reasonable" person without much thought having been given to the political dimensions of the construction of reasoning. What is deemed outrageous in one system of reasoning may be perfectly reasonable in another.Belief that education can and should be objective and neutral comes from... (shrink)

This essay examines control discourse in and out of educational settings, arguing that illusions of control are among the means by which governance is accomplished in domains far from schools. The tactical productivity of such illusions in non-school settings "necessitates" and explicates their prevalence in education. The first installment of this essay identifies some assumptions undergirding dominant control and management discourse; analyzes discussions of control in fields other education; and briefly examines the role that social location plays in fostering specific (...) understandings of control. A later installment will focus more narrowly on education, music education specifically. The author maintains that recognizing the limits of governmentality, bankrupting illusions of control, and uncoupling associations between uncertainty and terror, are powerful political disruptions. Acknowledging that classroom control may be neither achievable nor desirable may open the door to different understandings of classroom power relations and to re-articulations of the purposes of schooling. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit dem “Fall Thompson” – einem kaum erforschten Streitfall innerhalb der Anglikanischen Kirche und der wissenschaftlichen Theologie über die Zulässigkeit der Kritik an zentralen Bekenntnisinhalten vom Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts. Die Verfasserin rekonstruiert sowohl die akademisch-theologische Diskussion über Thompsons umstrittene Veröffentlichung als auch die komplexen rechtlich-formalen Vorgänge innerhalb des Magdalen Colleges in Oxford. Der Fall illustriert exemplarisch den Konflikt zwischen liberalen und konservativen Theologen über die Grundlagen des christlichen Glaubens, der den westeuropäischen Protestantismus im 19. und (...) 20. Jahrhundert spaltete. (shrink)

[David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...) possible by naturalist views of truth, that is, views which do not presuppose normativity in explaining truth. /// [Julia Tanney] This paper attempts to describe why it is not possible to account for normative phenomena in non-normative terms. It argues that Papineau's attempt to locate norms of judgement 'outside' content, grounded in an individual's desires or reasons, mislocates the normativity that is thought to resist appropriation within a 'world that conceives nature as the realm of law'. It agrees, however, that a theory of content that locates norms 'inside' content will not be forthcoming-at least if this is to require fashioning the norms that in some sense govern judgment or thought into individually necessary conditions for contentful states. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende mostrar un proyecto innovador en la enseñanza de asignaturas jurídicas, en su vertiente procesal o de carácter formal, para que el alumno pueda realizar, una vez que conoce el derecho sustantivo, un completo diagnóstico de un caso concreto, y ser capaz de dar la orientación jurídica adecuada a la práctica jurídica. El objetivo es que interrelacionen los conocimientos teóricos que van adquiriendo en el aula con su aplicación efectiva a la realidad práctica, persiguiéndose la convergencia con el (...) Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior. Contribuye a la promoción del trabajo autónomo y autoaprendizaje del alumno, fortaleciendo además la necesaria innovación y actualización en metodologías de enseñanza-aprendizaje, utilizando las nuevas tecnologías de la información y la comunicación aplicadas a la docencia, consistentes en grabaciones reales de materias en relación a la asignatura a la que lo hemos empezado a aplicar, el Proceso Laboral. (shrink)

[David Papineau] This paper disputes the common assumption that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses a problem for naturalism. My overall strategy is to argue that norms of judgement derive from moral or personal values, particularly when such values are attached to the end of truth. While there are philosophical problems associated with both moral and personal values, they are not special to the realm of judgement, nor peculiar to naturalist philosophies. This approach to the normativity of judgement is made (...) possible by naturalist views of truth, that is, views which do not presuppose normativity in explaining truth. /// [Julia Tanney] This paper attempts to describe why it is not possible to account for normative phenomena in non-normative terms. It argues that Papineau's attempt to locate norms of judgement 'outside' content, grounded in an individual's desires or reasons, mislocates the normativity that is thought to resist appropriation within a 'world that conceives nature as the realm of law'. It agrees, however, that a theory of content that locates norms 'inside' content will not be forthcoming-at least if this is to require fashioning the norms that in some sense govern judgment or thought into individually necessary conditions for contentful states. (shrink)

This famous Catalan mystic is presented here with selections from his writings.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 127 from Adam, and inheriting "real sins" with real "guilt." From his De libero arbitrio onward, Augustine sees that if Adam's is the sin of someone "other" than ourselves, then it is alienum to us, is simply not "our" sin, and we cannot be held "guilty" of it. On the other hand, he is willing to accept that God might fittingly decree that Adam's descendants "inherit" the (...) debt, obligation, weakness, sickness, or mortality (choose the Augustinian metaphor you prefer) that is appropriate punishment for the sin which Adam (personally) committed. But, at bottom, Rigby and Sage have the same difficulty: both assume that Augustine was a "creationist," when he was not. For he saw that creationism must necessarily view our individual souls as metaphysically "other" than Adam's, so that God could never judge us guilty of that "other's" sin. Rigby would have been wiser to combine and extend the insights he himself quotes from Huftier (59 n. 14), Bonner (78-79: omnes fuimus ille unus), TeSelle (86), Confessions 4.31 ("by our own act": nos inde ruimus), and Rondet (121 n. 6). Augustine thought that we sinned the original sin (nos inde ruimus) precisely because we were metaphysically identical with our father Adam: fuimus iUe unus. I submit that the very same theory, making our souls identical with Adam's, subtends both the Confessions and Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings. ROBERT J. O'CONNELL Fordham University Mark D. Johnston. The Spiritual Logic of Ramon LluU. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. x + 336. $65.oo. In the last twenty-five years a considerable number of scholars have turned their attention to the sort of formal logic found in the writings of the Catalan polymath, Ramon Lull (d. x316). This attention has run parallel to the current interest in medieval logic and linguistic theory, although Lull was less concerned with the theory of the properties of terms than with formulating a realistic theory of the predicables and categories and a new theory of demonstration. In the work under review Mark Johnston provides us with a study of Lulrs logic which is systematic in character. His work represents a first attempt to go beyond the studies of individual points of doctrine and to situate the development of Lulrs logic within the context of the evolution of the Ars lulliana. The work is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the early writings to the year 13o3, the second the later ones composed between 13o3 and 1316. Johnston takes the very early Compendium logicae Algazelis as his point of departure for the first part and the Logica nova of 13o3 as that for the second part. He describes Lull's thought following the sequence of the different tracts of the Aristotelian logic and relates its development to the biography of the Majorcan philosopher. Throughout his study Johnston emphasizes three special characteristics in Lull's approach: its popular nature, its extreme realism, and its moralizing intention. Lull's works were composed both in Latin and in Catalan and aimed at an audience quite different than that of the clerical universities of the Middle Ages. His approach as- 128 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 199o sumed a natural ontology, realist and "essentialist," which was of Avicennian derivation. His argumentation presupposed the idea that individual beings are concrete realizations of abstract essences situated in a scala creaturarum which leads in degrees to the divinity. The idea of basing philosophical discourse on the hierarchical structure of creation appealed to Lull because in it he found something common to the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. This fact made his logic necessarily an extremely realist one, consciously opposed to the logic of the Scholastics. From the extreme realism of Lulrs logic to his moralizing intent, it is but a step. To explain the status of things as real, Lull formulated a tropological exegesis of creation by way of the scala creaturamtm. Johnston accordingly directs our attention to the importance of analogy in Lull's logic. The analogical character of Lulrs logic had indeed been emphasized by the brothers Carreras y Artau in their history of Spanish philosophy... (shrink)

The insight a patient shares into their own psychosis is fundamental to their condition - it goes to the heart of what we understand 'madness' to be. Can a person be expected to accept treatment for a condition that they deny they have? Can a person be held responsible for their actions if those actions are inspired by their own unique perceptions and beliefs - beliefs that no-one else shares? The topic of insight in schizophrenia and related disorders has become (...) a major focus of research in psychiatry and psychology. It has important clinical implications in terms of outcome, treatment adherence, competence, and forensic issues. In order to study 'insight' a broad perspective is required. This involves applying knowledge from the cognitive and brain sciences, as well as from philosophy and the social sciences. Insight and Psychosis comprises a series of in-depth, well-referenced, scholarly overviews from each of these perspectives with a strong empirical foundation - including in some cases the presentation of new data and meta-analysis of the published literature. These are integrated and synthesised by the editors, both acknowledged experts in the field. The scope is truly international and spans theoretical perspectives, clinical practice, and consumer views. The book will act as a source for students and researchers interested in pursuing any number of questions and controversies around lack of insight and awareness, and will guide clinical psychologists and psychiatrists who seek a broader view of the many facets of insight that might arise during their day-to-day work. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v52-vega.

This essay defends moral expertise against the skeptical considerations raised by Gilbert Ryle and others. The core of the essay articulates an account of moral expertise that draws on work on expertise in empirical moral psychology, and develops an analogy between moral expertise and linguistic expertise. The account holds that expertise is contrastive, so that a person is an expert relative to a particular contrast. Further, expertise is domain specific and characterized by “automatic” behavior and judgment. Some disagreements in the (...) literature regarding moral expertise are diagnosed as being due to failures to adequately distinguish different ways in which someone can be a moral expert. For example, expertise in action does not imply expertise in judgment or analysis. (shrink)

This book argues for a new reading of the political and ethical through the literatures of Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay from 1970-2000. Carlos Amador reads a series of examples from the last dictatorship and the current post-dictatorship period in the Southern Cone, including works by Augusto Roa Bastos, Roberto Bolaño, Ceferino Reato, Horacio Verbitsky, Nelly Richard, Diamela Eltit, and Willy Thayer, with the goal of uncovering the logic behind their conceptions of belonging and rejection. Focusing on theoretical concepts that (...) make possible the formation of any and all communities, this study works towards a vision of literature as essential to the structure of ethics. (shrink)

Julia Markovits develops a desire-based, internalist account of what normative reasons are--an account which is compatible with the idea that moral reasons can apply to all of us, regardless of our desires. She builds on Kant's formula of humanity to defend universal moral reasons, and addresses the age-old question of why we should be moral.