The multiplicity of demands and claims in ultra-pluralistic societies complicates the search for justice. Furthermore, the normative force of competing ideals gives rise to an aporia at the heart of the idea of justice’s federating force. In this article, I argue that exemplary moral and political acts evince these ideals by reason of their fittingness with respect to the demands of the situations to which they respond. As such, these acts lay claim to their normative value by exemplifying the “rule” (...) that each act summons. Drawing upon aesthetic experience’s lateral transposition onto the planes of ethics and politics, I show how imagination is operative in practical judgments. Accordingly, I relate the search for justice to an eschatology of non-violence, which for Paul Ricœur takes the place of the critique of ideology in its opposition to an ontology of lingual understanding. (shrink)

Pendant plusieurs années, Geoffroy de Lagasnerie s’est rendu à la cour d’assises de Paris. Il a vu être jugés et condamnés des individus accusés de braquage, d’attentat, d’assassinat, de coups mortels, de viol. A partir de cette expérience, il propose une réflexion sur l’Etat pénal, le pouvoir et la violence. Nos manières de rendre la Justice s’inscrivent dans un système général et a priori paradoxal : pour juger, les procès construisent une narration individualisante des acteurs et des causes de (...) leurs actes ; mais, pour réprimer, ils transforment chaque action interindividuelle en agression contre la «société» ou contre l’Etat. Comment comprendre ce système du jugement et de la répression et ce jeu des catégories pénales? La Loi est souvent présentée comme instaurant le règne de la raison contre les réactions passionnelles. Ne produit-elle pas en réalité des effets de dépossession et du traumatisme? A quelles conditions une sociologie critique pourrait-elle nous donner les moyens d’imaginer un droit moins violent, un Etat moins souverain et une justice plus démocratique? En mêlant récits et analyses théoriques, Geoffroy de Lagasnerie montre que l’institution judiciaire ne forme pas seulement une réponse à la délinquance. La scène du tribunal, où un individu est forcé de comparaître devant des juges, est un miroir grossissant de notre appartenance à l’Etat. Si bien que, au bout du compte, cet ouvrage offre une exploration de notre condition de sujet politique. Geoffroy de Lagasnerie, philosophe et sociologue, est professeur à l’Ecole nationale supérieure d’arts de Paris-Cergy. Il est l’auteur notamment de L’Art de la révolte. Snowden, Assange, Manning (Fayard, 2015), La Dernière Leçon de Michel Foucault (Fayard, 2012), Logique de la création (Fayard, 2011). (shrink)

Dans Upheavals of Thought, Martha Nussbaum considère « notre manière concrète d’imaginer » l’objet d’une émotion, par exemple la personne que je chéris, ou pour laquelle j’éprouve de la compassion, comme un élément « cognitif » additionnel au sein des émotions, elles-mêmes définies en termes de jugements. Dans Love’s Knowledge, elle montre que l’imagination, qu’elle réfère à la phantasia aristotélicienne, et les émotions, sont essentielles au jugement pratique et à la délibération morale. Tout en présentant la manière dont elle articule (...) ainsi imagination, jugements et émotions, je défends l’idée qu’une autre prise en compte du rôle de l’imagination en lien avec les émotions peut permettre d’étayer une conception « non cognitive » des émotions, que l’on peut rapporter à Hume. (shrink)

Selon Léonard de Vinci, le peintre doit « se mettre à la place de l’esprit même de la nature », entendue comme genèse perpétuelle, force vitale et métamorphique. Dans sa démesure, un tel projet fascine autant qu’il terrifie. Pour répondre à ce défi, Léonard renouvelle profondément l’art de la peinture jusqu’à en faire, en théorie comme en pratique, un exercice sans cesse recommencé. Les notes et préceptes du Traité de peinture comme les techniques qu’il invente en témoignent – chiaroscuro, sfumato, (...) perspective aérienne, componimento inculto [esquisse informe ou sauvage], etc. À la jonction de la main et de l’esprit, l’exercice de peindre sollicite une ascèse perceptive et imaginative, à travers le jugement, le regard, porté sur le monde et ses formes mouvantes. Ascèse, au sens fort d’un désapprentissage permettant de détisser les rets de l’habitude et les tropismes subjectifs. Cet exercice opère non seulement le crayon à la main, par le déploiement de l’esquisse et la fécondité du repentir [pentimento], mais, dans un plus grand dénuement encore, en regardant « des murs souillés de beaucoup de taches », « avec l’idée d’imaginer quelque scène » – « incitation à la rêverie éveillée » comme l’appelle André Chastel. Dès lors l’exercice de peindre prend chez Léonard une tournure très étonnante et singulière : tout en privilégiant la dimension processuelle de l’œuvre, il s’agit de faire, pour ainsi dire, de la peinture sans pigment ni pinceau. Autrement dit, la prétention cosmique du peintre n’a d’égale que son aptitude au dénuement. (shrink)

Résumé La non-violence est au principe de la désobéissance civile. Cette caractéristique conduit souvent à dévaloriser cette forme d’action politique en la tenant pour inoffensive. Il ne faut cependant pas confondre non-violence et irrésolution, ni réduire la violence en politique au déploiement d’une force brute et armée. La violence est l’irrémédiable arrière-plan de l’activité politique. Et si son usage direct provoque aujourd’hui l’aversion en démocratie, des mouvements de contestation ne cessent d’inventer des figures de la non- (...) class='Hi'>violence dont l’efficace est attesté. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article porte sur trois textes de Jacques Derrida – Circonfession (1991), Passions (1993) et Force de loi (1994) – qui ont marqué le tournant politique et autobiographique de sa pensée. Il se penche sur la « grammaire imaginative » de la déconstruction et son objectif est de voir quel type de disparition est présupposé par cette grammaire, vue comme un dialogue entre l’appel à ce qui est condamné à ne pas se dire et la réponse de ce qui (...) émerge en cédant sa place à un nouveau non-dit. En passant par les notions de la justice, du secret et de l’idiome, l’article essaie de mettre en place une poétique déconstructive de la disparition. (shrink)

S’inspirant de deux penseurs de la tradition spirituelle ayant voué leur vie au dialogue existentiel entre chrétiens et musulmans, Pierre Claverie et Christian de Chergé, l’auteur met en lumière des points fondamentaux du dialogue existentiel. Alors que le dialogue a souvent été pensé à la lumière d’une éthique de la discussion où le but avoué ou non est de convaincre l’autre par des arguments intellectuels, il s’agit ici davantage d’un dialogue communicatif qui vise à rencontrer autrui et l’accueillir dans sa (...) différence. Un tel dialogue existentiel requiert une attitude de réceptivité et une non-suffisance à soi. Toutefois, il n’implique pas de renoncer à sa propre identité, à ses convictions dans la mesure où la finalité n’est pas de les imposer à autrui. L’auteur met en exergue l’idée de convictions non contraignantes. Le dialogue implique également une attention à autrui dans sa corporéité et sa gestuelle. D’un point de vue épistémologique, il se base sur un jugement d’humanité. Il implique un impératif éthique et un travail d’imagination et de connaissance pour rencontrer autrui et le respecter, à la fois dans son humanité et son altérité essentielles. Enfin, les conditionnements humains, l’histoire narrative, l’univers socio-culturel et politique sont aussi des éléments qui peuvent nourrir ou affecter le dialogue. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "La justice des émotions confine au populisme lorsqu'elle ignore la raison. À l'inverse, l'émotion est nécessaire à la raison pour parvenir à un bon jugement. Afin d'approfondir ce paradoxe et le présenter de manière pédagogique, il convient d'utiliser la forme privilégiée d'expression de l'émotion qu'est la narration. Dans cet essai-fiction les approches rationnelles, relationnelles et émotionnelles sont mêlées. Ce texte est issu d'un atelier nommé Oudropo, (Ouvroir de Droit Potentiel) qui entend imaginer du droit (...) à partir de contraintes en s'inspirant de l'Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle créé en 1960 par Queneau et Le Lionnais. Deux histoires et une série de conférences en résonnance peuvent être lues indépendamment les unes des autres. Une étude a montré que le composant d'un pesticide appelé l'Oudrozine est responsable d'une des formes de la maladie d'Almer. Un recours collectif est intenté par une association de victimes contre le distributeur de cette molécule. L'auditeur de cette société est également le petit-fils d'une femme atteinte de la maladie. Parallèlement, un conférencier tente de comprendre la justice des émotions pendant qu'une magistrate souffre d'angoisse et de frustration.". (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo se propone una reflexión sobre los requerimientos -éticos y teóricos- para la factible superación de situaciones violentas. Situaciones en las que la realidad se impone de manera indefectible y agresiva, bajo las que difícilmente se pueden generar espacios de justicia, dado que en ellos prevalece la desigualdad y marginación social. La persistencia de injusticias constituye el caldo de cultivo para la violencia. El caso específico de este tipo de circunstancias es la matanza de 43 estudiantes de (...) la Escuela Normal Rural en Ayotzinapa el 26 de noviembre de 2014. En estos contextos, para formular alternativas en que la paz sea un horizonte viable, se parte de la reflexión sobre la injusticia real, principalmente, desde la teoría de Luis Villoro. A partir del reconocimiento de esta condición se posibilita la imaginación colectiva de alternativas en pro de la superación de la violencia y el alcance de la paz.This article proposes to reconsider the feasibility of overcoming violent situations. Situations in which reality imposes itself in an indefectible and aggressive manner and in which it is hard to generate spaces of justice, since in them, social inequality and marginalization prevail. The persistence of injustice is the breeding ground for violence. An explicit case of such conditions was the massacre of 43 students of the Rural Teachers' College in Ayotzinapa on November 26, 2014. Under these circumstances, and, in order to formulate alternatives where peace becomes a viable horizon, this paper assumes the perspective about real injustice developed by Luis Villoro. Based on the recognition of this condition, the collective imagination of alternatives for overcoming violence and achieving peace becomes possible. (shrink)

Quand, en 1938, au cri de "Penser nous devons", Virginia Woolf exhorta les femmes à résister à leur assimilation "dans la procession des fils des hommes cultivés", elle ne pouvait pas imaginer qu'à peine trente ans plus tard les interventions féministes sur les savoirs scientifiques allaient non seulement prolonger la lutte pour l'égalité d'accès au savoir, mais inaugurer une critique approfondie des contenus des savoirs. Du dedans des disciplines académiques, cette lutte illumina en profondeur ce que Woolf avait déjà compris (...) : la noble idée du savoir désintéressé sert de justification pour les pires exclusions et injustices. Cet ouvrage propose un parcours original des chemins par lesquels la pensée féministe contesta le caractère "neutre" du savoir, depuis les politiques des mouvements jusqu'aux épistémologies alternatives du standpoint feminism anglo-américain. Ce livre se veut une ressource pour chercheures et chercheurs intéressés par la portée politique et théorique du féminisme mais est aussi, modestement, dédié à toute personne qui aspire à d'autres savoirs possibles, ici et maintenant. (shrink)

Deux préjugés ont grevé la réception de l'œuvre d'Arendt, en particulier en France. L'un : que l'étude des " origines du totalitarisme " et de sa nature (comme modèle politique portant bien au-delà du prototype nazi) ne définirait pas seulement le point de départ de ses questions, mais en bornerait les enjeux. L'autre : qu'à travers les étapes et les détours d'une pensée de la politique et de l'histoire contemporaines, elle n'aurait tendu qu'à rejoindre la tradition philosophique (la méditation sur (...) " la vie de l'esprit "). Convoquant tour à tour l'analyse des révolutions, la critique du travail et du mouvement ouvrier, le questionnement sur la publicité, la société du spectacle et la capacité de juger, le présent ouvrage entend restituer ce qui fait l'originalité de la réflexion d'Arendt sur l'histoire et la politique. Il la replace dans la lignée de Machiavel, de Montesquieu et de Tocqueville, dans la confrontation déterminante avec Marx, dans l'opposition constante à la philosophie politique. Justifiant la posture non-philosophique qu'elle n'a cessé de revendiquer. Démontrant par là même quel bénéfice réel la philosophie peut tirer d'une provocation qui l'expose à la puissance sauvage de l'événement, et à l'étonnement qu'il doit susciter. (shrink)

S’intégrant dans une étude ethnographique du pouvoir pénal à l’épreuve de la violence terroriste, cet article a pour objet d’interroger le rituel des audiences de jugements au prisme de la problématique du secret et de ce qu’elle emporte en termes de recompositions de l’État et de son action judiciaire. À partir de l’observation de plus de 130 procès depuis 2015, la compréhension des enjeux liés à la publicisation des audiences, à la judiciarisation des renseignements en éléments de preuve ou (...) encore à la fabrication des condamnations, nous permettra de dévoiler les dynamiques sociales, juridiques et politiques d’une justice sous urgence. (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 78-91. This article consists of three parts. First, I will review the major themes of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude . Since some of my readers will have read this book and others not, I will try to strike a balance between clear summary and fresh critique. Second, I discuss an unpublished book by Meillassoux unfamiliar to all readers of this article, except those scant few that may have gone digging in the microfilm archives of the École normale (...) supérieure. The book in question is Meillassoux’s revised doctoral dissertation L’Inexistence divine (or The Divine Inexistence ), with its seemingly bizarre vision of a God who does not yet exist but might exist in the future. Without literally accepting this view, I will claim that it is philosophically interesting in ways that even a hardened sceptic might be able to appreciate. Third and finally, I will speculate on the possible future of Meillassoux’s speculative materialism itself. And here I mean its future development not by Meillassoux, but by those readers who might be inspired by his book. Plato could never have predicted the emergence of Aristotle’s philosophy, despite the obvious debt of the latter to the former. Nor could Descartes have predicted Spinoza and Leibniz, nor Kant the German Idealists, and neither could Husserl in 1901 have foreseen the later emergence of Heidegger. How are the works of interesting philosophers transformed by later thinkers of comparable importance? While it may seem that there are countless ways to do this, I think there are only two basic ways in which this happens: you can radicalize your predecessors, or you can reverse them. I will close this article with a few words about these two methods, and try to imagine how Meillassoux might be radicalized or reversed by some future admirer. My view is that the more important thinkers are, the easier they are to radicalize or reverse. This helps explain why the great philosophers of the West have so often appeared in clusters, succeeding one another at relatively brief intervals during periods of especial ferment. 1. After Finitude After Finitude is unusually short for such an influential book of philosophy: running to just 178 pages in the original French, and an even more compact 128 pages in the English version, despite the introduction of roughly eight pages of new material for the English edition. Rather than summarizing Meillassoux’s book in the order he intended, I will focus on six points that strike me as the pillars of his debut book. Along the way, I will offer a few criticisms as well. The first pillar of the book is Meillassoux’s own term “correlationism.”1 Although he introduces this term as the name for an enemy, it is striking that Meillassoux remains impressed by correlationism much more than his fellow speculative realists are. This continued appreciation for his great enemy influences the shape of his own ontology. Is there a world outside our thinking of it, or does the world consist entirely in being thought? Traditionally, this dispute between realism and idealism has been dismissed in continental philosophy as a “pseudo-problem,” in a strategy pioneered by Husserl and extended by Heidegger. We cannot be realists, since following Kant we have no direct access to things-in-themselves. But neither are we idealists, since the human being is always already outside itself, aiming at objects in intentional experience, deeply engaged with practical implements, or stationed in some particular world-disclosing mood. The centuries-old dispute between realism and idealism is dissolved by saying that we cannot think either real or ideal in isolation from the other. There is neither human without world nor world without human, but only a primordial correlation or rapport between the two. This is what “correlationism” means: philosophy trapped in a permanent meditation on the human-world correlate, trying to find the best model of the correlate: is it language, intentionality, embodiment, or some other form of correlation between human and world? Among other problems, this generates some friction between philosophy and the literal meaning of science. When cosmologists say that the universe originated 13.5 billion years ago, they do not mean “13.5 billion years ago for us ,” but literally 13.5 billion years ago, well before conscious life existed, and thus at a time when there was no such thing as a correlate. Meillassoux also coins the term “ancestrality” (10) for the reality that predated the correlate, and later expands this term to “dia-chronicity,” (112) to refer to events occurring after the extinction of human beings no less than to those occurring before we existed. Up to this point, Meillassoux’s focus on ancestral entities existing prior to consciousness might seem like a straightforward realist who wants to unmask correlationism as just another form of idealism. Yet Meillassoux also admires the correlationist maneuver, which can obviously be traced back to Kant. Unlike a thinker such as Whitehead, Meillassoux feels no nostalgia for the pre-critical realism that came before Kant: “we cannot but be heirs of Kantianism,” he says (29). What impresses Meillassoux about correlationism is something both simple and familiar. If we attempt to think a tree outside thought, this is itself a thought . Any form of realism which thinks it can simply and directly address the world the way it is fails to escape the correlational circle, since the attempt to think something outside of thought is itself nothing other than a thought, and thereby collapses back into the very human-world correlate that it pretends to escape. For Meillassoux this step, suggested by Kant but first refined by the ensuing figures of German Idealism, marks decisive forward progress in the history of philosophy that must not be abolished. Any attempt to break free from the correlate must first acknowledge its mighty intellectual power. Realist though he may seem, Meillassoux’s works are filled with praise of such figures as Fichte and Hegel, not of so-called “naïve realists.” It is also the case that for Meillassoux, not all correlationisms are the same. The second pillar of his book is a distinction between various positions that I have termed “Meillassoux’s Spectrum,” though of course he is never so immodest as to name it after himself. He distinguishes between at least six different possible positions, and perhaps we could add even subtler variations if we wished. But in its simplest form, Meillassoux’s Spectrum allows for just four basic outlooks on the question of realism vs. anti-realism. Three of these are easy to understand, since we have already been discussing them. At one extreme is so-called “naïve realism,” which holds that a world exists outside the mind, and that we can know this world. Meillassoux rejects this naïve realism as having been overthrown by Kant’s critical philosophy. At the other extreme is subjective idealism, in which nothing exists outside the mind. For to think a dog outside thought immediately turns it into a thought, and therefore there cannot be anything outside; the very notion is meaningless. In between these two is what we have called correlationism. And here comes a crucial moment for Meillassoux, since he distinguishes between the two forms of “weak” and “strong” correlationism, and chooses the strong form as the launching pad for his own philosophy. Weak correlationism is easy to explain, since we all know it from the philosophy of Kant. The things-in-themselves can be thought but not known. They certainly must exist, since there cannot be appearances without something that appears. And we can think about them, which idealism holds to be impossible. They are simply unknowable due to the finitude of human thought. Strong correlationism is the new position introduced by Meillassoux (though he sees it at work in numerous twentieth century thinkers), midway between weak correlationism and subjective idealism. The major difference between the three positions is as follows. Weak correlationism says: “The things-in-themselves exist, but we cannot know them.” The subjective idealist says: “This is a contradiction in terms, since when we think the things-in-themselves, we already turn them into thoughts.” But the strong correlationist says: “Just because ‘things-in-themselves’ is a meaningless notion does not mean that they cannot exist. No one has ever traveled to the world-in-itself and come back to make a report on it. Thus, the fact that we cannot think things-in-themselves without contradiction does not prove that they do not exist anyway. There may be things-in-themselves, we simply are not capable of thinking them without contradiction form within the correlational circle.” This step is crucial for Meillassoux, since strong correlationism is the position he attempts to radicalize into his own new standpoint: speculative materialism. As I see it, this step of the argument fails. Strong correlationism cannot avoid collapsing into subjective idealism, since the statements of the strong correlationist are rendered meaningless from within. All three of the other positions in the Spectrum make perfectly good sense even for those who disagree with them. The naïve realist says that things-in-themselves exist and we can know them; the meaning of this statement is clear. The weak correlationist can say that things-in-themselves exist but lie forever beyond our grasp; this too makes perfect sense, even though the German Idealists try to show a contradiction at work here. We can also understand the claim of the subjective idealist that to think anything outside thought turns it into a thought, and that for this reason we cannot think the unthought. The strong correlationist, alone among the four, speaks nonsense . This person says “I cannot think the unthought without turning it into a thought, and yet the unthought might exist anyway.” But notice that the final phrase “the unthought might exist anyway” is fruitless for this purpose. For we have already heard that to think any unthought turns it into a thought. But now the strong correlationist wants to do two incompatible things simultaneously with this unthought. On the one hand, he neutralizes the unthought by showing that it instantly changes into just another thought. But on the other hand, he wants to appeal to the unthought as a haunting residue that might exist outside thought, thereby undercutting the absolute status of the human-world correlate found in idealism. But this is impossible. If you accept the argument that thinking the unthought turns it into a thought, you cannot also add “but maybe there is something outside that prevents this conversion from being absolutely true,” because this “something outside” is immediately converted into nothing but a thought for us. In short, Meillassoux here seems to be offering a kind of Zen koan: his “strong correlationism” is reminiscent of the gateless gate, or the sound of one hand clapping, or the command to punch Hegel in the jaw when meeting him on the road. We cannot at the same time both destroy the realist challenge of the things-in-themselves in order to undercut realism and reintroduce that very realist sense in order to undercut idealism. In a world where everything is instantly converted into thought, we cannot claim that there might be something extra-mental anyway, because this “might be something” is itself converted into a thought by the same rules that condemned dogs, trees, and houses to the idealist prison. This brings us to the third pillar of Meillassoux’s argument, which is the key to all the rest: the necessity of contingency. His strategy is to transform our supposed ignorance of things-in-themselves into an absolute knowledge that they exist without reason, and that the laws of nature can change at any time for no reason at all. In this way the cautious agnosticism of Kantian philosophies is avoided, but so is the collapse of reality into thought as found in German Idealism. Meillassoux does try to prove the existence of things-in-themselves existing outside thought; he simply holds that they must be proven after passing through the rigors of the correlationist challenge, not just arbitrarily decreed to exist in the manner of naïve realism. As he puts it, “Everything could actually collapse: from trees to stars, from stars to laws, from physical laws to logical laws; and this not by virtue of some superior law whereby everything is destined to perish, but by virtue of the absence of any superior law capable of preserving anything, no matter what, from perishing” (53). If idealism thinks that the human-world correlate is absolute, for Meillassoux it is the facticity of the correlate that is absolute. He tries to show this with a nice brief dialogue between five separate characters (55-59) which is covered in detail in my forthcoming book,2 but which I will simplify here for reasons of time. In this simplified version, we first imagine a dogmatic realist arguing with a dogmatic idealist. The realist says that we can know the truth about the things-in-themselves; the idealist counters that we can only the truth about thought, since all statements about reality must be turned into statements concerning our thoughts about reality. Here the correlationist enters and proclaims that both of these positions are equally dogmatic. For although we have access to nothing but thoughts, we cannot be sure that these thoughts are all that exist; there could be a reality outside thought, there is simply no way to know for sure. And this latter position is the one that Meillassoux attempts to transform from an agnostic, skeptical point into an ontological claim about the contingency of everything. Consider it this way. How does the correlationist defeat the idealist? The idealist holds that the existence of anything outside thought is impossible. The correlationist, by contrast, holds that something might exist outside the human-world correlate. But this “something might” has to be an absolute possibility. It cannot mean that “something outside thought might exist for thought ,” because that is what the idealist already says. No, the correlationist must mean that something might exist outside thought quite independently of thought. In other words, the correlationist says that idealism might be wrong, and this means it is absolutely true that idealism might be wrong. Thus, correlationism is no longer just a skeptical position. It holds that all the possibilities of the world are absolute possibilities. We have absolute knowledge that any of the possibilities about the existence or non-existence of things-in-themselves might be true, and this means that correlationism flips into Meillassoux’s own position: speculative materialism. As Meillassoux sees it, there are only two options here. Option A is to absolutize the human-world correlate, which is what the idealist does: there absolutely cannot be anything outside thought. Option B, by contrast, is to absolutize the facticity of the correlate: its character of simply being given to us, without any inherent necessity. The correlationist cannot have it both ways by saying: “there absolutely might be something outside thought, yet maybe this is absolutely impossible.” In other words, once we escape dogmatism we can only be idealists or speculative materialists, not correlationists. The human-world correlate is merely a fact, not an absolute necessity. But this facticity itself cannot be merely factical: it must be absolute. Here Meillassoux coins the French neologism factualité , which has been suitably translated into the English neologism “factiality.” (7, 122-3) Factialty means that for everything that exists, it is absolutely possible that it might be otherwise, not just that we cannot know whether or not it might be otherwise. Just as Kant transformed philosophy into a meditation on the categories governing human finitude, Meillassoux wishes to turn philosophy into a meditation on the necessary conditions of factiality, which he calls “figures”—a new technical term for him. (80) One such figure is that the law of non-contradiction must be true, and for an unusual reason. Since everything is proven to be contingent, nothing that exists can be contradictory, for whatever is contradictory has no opposite into which it might be transformed, and thus contingency would be impossible.3 Another such figure is that there must be something rather than nothing: for since contingency exists, something must exist in order to be contingent. It is a daring high-wire act, one that sacrifices realism to the correlational circle in order to rebuild it from out of its own ashes. Some might conclude that the lack of reason in things is a byproduct of the ignorance of finite humans, Meillassoux is making precisely the opposite point. For in fact, the doctrine of finitude usually leads directly to belief in a hidden reason. The fact that it lies beyond human comprehension merely increases our belief in this arbitrarily chosen concealed ground. By defending anew the concept of absolute knowledge Meillassoux evacuates the world of everything hidden. The reason for things having no reason is not that the reason is hidden, but that no reason exists. Thus, even while insisting on the necessity of non-contradiction, he rejects the other Leibnizian principle: sufficient reason. Everything simply is what it is, in purely immanent form, without deeply hidden causes. Or as Meillassoux puts it: “There is nothing beneath or beyond the manifest gratuitousness of the given—nothing but the limitless and lawless power of its destruction, emergence, or persistence” (63).The world is a “hyper-chaos”(64). But this is not the same thing as flux. For the chaos of the world is such that stability might occur just as easily as constant, turbulent change. Let’s now digress a bit, and return to the question of ancestrality, which Meillassoux transforms later in the book into “dia-chronicity.” Correlationism holds that all talk of a world outside the correlate is immediately recuperated by the correlate. The phrase “13.5 billion years ago” becomes “13.5 billion years ago for us ,” and the phrase “the universe following the extinction of humans” becomes “the universe following the extinction of humans for humans .” But notice that whether we talk about the world before or after humans, in both cases it is time that is used to challenge the correlate. Meillassoux has no interest in challenges that might be posed by space. For example, what about a vase in a lonely country house that topples to the floor and smashes when no one is there to watch it? Isn’t this also a challenge to correlationism, no less than the Big Bang or the heat death of the universe long after humans have vanished? In an eight-page supplement to the English translation of After Finitude ,4 possibly in response to my own 2007 review of the French original,5 Meillassoux bluntly denies that space is of any relevance to the question. Spatial distance is a merely harmless challenge to the human-world correlate. After all, even though no one is there in the lonely country house to witness the shattering of the vase, we can say that had there been an observer , that observer would have witnessed the toppling and destruction of the vase. For this event still occurs in a world in which the human-world correlate already exists, whereas the diachronicity of events both before and after the existence of humans makes it impossible to say that had there been an observer they would have witnessed the Big Bang occurring in such and such a fashion. However, it seems to me that Meillassoux merely asserts that the temporal simultaneity of our existence with that of the vase in the lonely country house is enough to render it harmless. It is true that the house does not exist prior to the correlate, but nonetheless it exists outside the correlate, and that is enough to make the same challenge. It is difficult to see why the “had there been an observer” maneuver succeeds in the case of a vase in the countryside in April 2011 but fails in the case of the Big Bang. This is not just a matter of nitpicking Meillassoux’s argumentative style: the fact that he bases his argument on time has at least two important consequences for his position. For in the first place, even though Meillassoux insists that the laws of nature are absolutely contingent, this turns out to be true only in a temporal sense. That is to say, it is a paradoxical feature of Meillassoux’s philosophy that he does allow for the existence of laws of nature, and simply believes that they can change at any moment without reason. Within any given moment, laws of nature do exist. He never suggests that different parts of the universe can have different laws at the same time, nor does he have any interest in the laws of part/whole composition that take place within any given instant. Could it be the case that rather than being made of gold atoms, a small chunk of gold could be made of silver atoms, cotton, horses, or that this same small piece of gold could be made of gigantic vaults filled with even more gold? These are not topics that draw Meillassoux’s attention, since he is focused solely on how the laws of nature might change or endure from one moment to the next . Another implication for Meillassoux’s system is that his concept of things-in-themselves turns out to be to be inadequate. For when he proves that things-in-themselves can exist without humans, this turns out to be true only in a temporal sense as well. Namely, things-in-themselves existed ten billion years ago, and they will continue to exist after all humans have succeeded in exterminating themselves. However, being able to exist before our births and after our deaths is just one small part of what it means to be a thing-in-itself. The more important part is that even if a thing is sitting on a table right now, in front of me, even if I stroke it lovingly or press my face up against it directly, I am still dealing only with a phenomenal version of the thing; the thing-in-itself continues to withdraw from all access. Yet no such thing is acknowledged by Meillassoux. For him finitude is a disaster, and absolute knowledge is in fact possible. Meillassoux’s thing-in-itself exists in independence only of the human lifespan , not of human knowledge. The fifth pillar of Meillassoux’s argument is his use of Cantor’s transfinite mathematics to show that even if the laws of nature are contingent, they need not be unstable, and thus we cannot use the apparent stability of nature to disprove his metaphysics of absolute contingency. What Cantor showed is that there are different sizes of infinity, and that all these infinities cannot be totalized in a single infinite number of infinities. Meillassoux sees this as crucial, since it allows him to discredit any “probabilistic” argument against his theory. The probabilistic argument (as defended quite clearly by Jean-René Vernes)6 would say this: given that the laws of nature seem so stable, it it is extremely improbable that there is no hidden reason for their remaining so stable. As Meillassoux sees it, probability is of value only when we can index an accessible total of cases. These can even be infinite: for example, there are an infinite number of points where a rope can break when stretched tight, but this does not stop us from calculating probabilities for various sections of the rope to break. By contrast, there is no way to sum up the number of possible laws of nature. For here there is no way to totalize; we cannot stand outside of nature and calculate the possible number of laws so as to determine the probabilities that any one of them might change. Therefore, although we can speak of probability when dealing with intraworldly events such as elections, horse races, and coin-flips, we cannot use the words “probable” or “improbable” when describing alterations at the level of nature as a whole. Rather than commenting on the validity of this argument and its use of Cantor, let me simply note that it once again creates a dualistic ontology. We already saw that Meillassoux treats time differently from space. In analogous fashion, he now treats the level of world differently from that of intraworldly events. The emergence of worlds is purely contingent and virtual and governed by no probability at all, while events within the world necessarily follow laws (even if these laws can change at any moment without reason), and thus their probabilities can be calculated. It is a strategy deeply reminiscent of Badiou’s (2005) own dualism between the normal “state of the situation” and the rare and intermittent “event.” The sixth and final pillar of Meillassoux’s book can be dealt with briefly, since we have already touched on it elsewhere. It comes at the very beginning of the book, when Meillassoux says that we must revive the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and that the primary qualities are the ones that can be mathematized. He admits that he has not yet published a proof of this idea, though in fact it is already known as one of his primary doctrines. And here we encounter the familiar problem with Meillassoux’s inadequate conception of things-in-themselves. “Primary qualities” refers to those qualities that a thing has independently of its relations with us or anything else. But if the primary qualities can be mathematized, this means that they are not entirely independent of us, since our knowledge can get right to the bottom of them. The mathematized qualities of things are independent of us only in Meillassoux’s sense that they will still have those qualities even when all humans are dead. But to repeat, autonomy from the human lifespan is not the same as autonomy from human access. Here once more Meillassoux is concerned only with independence from the human-world correlate across time, not in any given instant. 2. L’Inexistence divine In 1997, the same year in which he turned thirty years old, Meillassoux earned his doctorate at the École normale supériuere with a brazen dissertation entitled L’Inexistence divine ( The Divine Inexistence ). The work was substantially revised in 2003. But even then, with typical fastidiousness, Meillassoux decided that the work was not yet ready for press. It has now been scrapped in favor of some future, multi-volume work bearing the same title. While writing my book on Meillassoux for Edinburgh University Press, I was permitted to translate excerpts from this unpublished work for use as an appendix in my own book; in total, the appendix contains approximately twenty percent of Meillassoux’s 2003 manuscript, the first time any of it will be published in any language. Nonetheless, a portion of the argument was already tested in the article “Spectral Dilemma,” published in English in the journal Collapse (2008: 261-75). There the philosophical motives for the virtual God are already made clear. What troubles us most are early deaths, brutal deaths, deaths of especial injustice– the sorts of deaths in which the brutal twentieth century was so abundant. And here, neither the atheist nor the believer can help us. The atheist can offer nothing but a sad and cynical resignation when reflecting on the victims of these terrible crimes. The believer does little better, being unable to explain how God could have allowed such things to happen, due to the famous intractability of the problem of evil. The solution offered to this dilemma by Meillassoux is bold, and all the more so given that he emerges from such a deeply Leftist, materialist, and unreligious background. His solution is that God does not yet exist, and therefore is not blameworthy for these catastrophes. Given that everything is contingent in Meillassoux’s philosophy, this God and divine justice might never exist, but they can at least exist as an object of hope. Let’s begin by jumping to the end of L’Inexistence divine , where the alternatives are laid out so nicely. There are four basic attitudes that humans can have towards God, Meillassoux says. First, we can believe in God because he exists. This is the classical theist attitude, rejected for the simple reason that it would be amoral and blasphemous to believe in a God who allows children to be eaten by dogs, to use Dostoevsky’s example. Second, we can disbelieve in God because he does not exist: the classical atheist attitude. But this leads to sadness, cynicism, and a sneering contempt for the greatness of human capacity. The third option, rather more complex, is to disbelieve in God because he does exist: in other words, to exist in rebellion against God as the one who must be blamed for the evils of the earth. The examples here might range from Lucifer himself, to the more human figure of Captain Ahab in Melville’s Moby-Dick , to Werner Herzog’s even more recent catchphrase, “Every man for himself, and God against all.” That leaves only the fourth option: believing in God because he does not exist. Meillassoux closes his book by saying that the fourth option has now been tried (namely, in the course of his own book), and that now that all four have been specified, we must choose. The first reaction to this theory of the inexistent God will be laughter. Few readers will ever be literally convinced by it, and probably none will immediately be convinced by it. But if we ask ourselves why we laugh, the answer is because it sounds so improbable that an inexistent God might suddenly emerge and resurrect the dead. It obviously sounds more like a gullible theology than a rigorous piece of philosophical work. Yet two things need to be kept in mind. First, Meillassoux’s theories are hardly more unlikely than those of great philosophers of the past such as Plato, Plotinus, Avicenna, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche, or Whitehead. We read the great philosophers not because their systems are plausible in commonsense terms that can be measured by the laws of probability. Instead, we read them precisely because they shatter the existing framework of common sense and open up new window on the universe. Second, and even more importantly, Meillassoux has already rejected probability as a valid measuring stick in philosophy. Or rather, he accepts probability in the intra-worldly realm (where it is linked with potentiality), and rejects it at the level of the world itself (where potentiality is replaced with what he calls virtuality). The virtual God can appear at any moment for no reason at all, just as any other new configuration of laws of nature can appear: in a manner that the laws of probability cannot calculate. Responding to those who might ridicule the idea of a sudden emergence of God and a resurrection of the dead, Meillassoux cites Pascal, who asserts that the resurrection of the dead would be far less incredible than the fact that we were born in the first place. This shifts philosophy onto new ground. Rather than concerning ourselves with what is likely to happen in the world as we know it, we focus instead on the most important things that could happen. For this reason, the expected objection that a virtual God is no more likely to appear than a virtual unicorn or a virtual flying spaghetti monster misses the point. Unicorns and spaghetti monsters could also appear, just like any other non-contradictory thing. But these would just be novel bizarre entities among others, not the heralds of completely new worlds. For Meillassoux, the emergence of matter, life, and thought have been the three truly amazing advents of the world so far, each of them dependent on the advent(s) preceding them. As he sees it, there can be no greater intraworldly entity than the human beings who already exist, since nothing in the world is better than the absolute knowledge of which humans alone are capable. This means that the next great advent must be something that perfects human beings rather than superseding them. And this can only be the world of justice, in which the dead are resurrected and their horrible deaths partially cancelled (Meillassoux never considers the possibility of a God who would literally erase the pre-divine past so that it never happened at all). The only immortality worth having is an immortality of this life, not an existence in some ill-defined afterworld. Human existence, he holds, must always be governed by a “symbol” that gives us the “immanent and comprehensible inscription of values in a world.” And just as cosmic history made the three great contingent leaps of matter, life, and thought, with a leap to justice as the only one still to come, a similar structure occurs within human culture and its symbols, which consist so far of the cosmological, naturalistic, and historical symbols, with a “factial” symbol still to come. We can review each of these symbols briefly. The cosmological symbol refers to the ancient dualism between the terrestrial and celestial spheres. Here below everything is conflict, corruption, and decay; but in the heavens nothing is perishable, all movement is circular, and everything is arranged in mutual harmony. This symbol is ended by modern physics when Galileo discovers such blemishes as sunspots and craters on the moon, and when Newton integrates both celestial and terrestrial movement into a single gravitational law. Next comes the naturalistic or romantic symbol, in which perfection comes not from the sky but from nature itself. The world is filled with pretty flowers (Meillassoux claims that the ancients never discussed the beauty of flowers until Plotinus in the third century) and with living creatures naturally moved by pity, at least until society corrupts them. This symbol collapses in the face of reality as we know it, since pity is no more common than war, corruption, and violence. This brings us to the historical symbol, which only now is passing away. Bad things may happen, but history has an inner logic of its own, such that everything works out in the end. The ultimate form of the historical symbol is the economic symbol, whether in a Marxist or neo-liberal form. Just as the Marxist holds that the inner economic logic of the capitalists will inexorably lead them to self-destruction, the neo-liberal assumes that the sum total of individual selfish actions will lead, in the long run, to the greatest possible good. We worship the economy and let it guide history for us, just as the ancients worshipped celestial bodies and held them to be free from blemish. The final remaining symbol is the factial symbol, which Meillassoux hopes will now emerge. Factiality, we recall, is his term for the absolute contingency of everything that exists. Once we have grasped this absolute contingency, we are free to expect the dramatic advent of the coming fourth World: the world of justice, inaugurated by a virtual God and even mediated by a messianic human figure. There is the added feature, however, that this messiah must abandon all claims to special status once the messianic realm of justice is achieved. The messianic figure will then be no more special than any person on the street, since a reign of human equality will have arisen. Although this focus on human being might seem like a return to standard humanism, Meillassoux holds that human pre-eminence has never truly been maintained. Previously, humans have been treated as special only because they contemplate the Good, because they resemble their omnipotent creator, or because they happen to be the temporary victors in a cruel Darwinian death-match between millions of living species. For Meillassoux, by contrast, humans have value because they know the eternal. But it is not the eternal that is important, since this merely represents the blind, anonymous contingency of each thing. What is important is not knowledge of the eternal , but knowledge of the eternal. We should not admire Prometheus for stealing fire from the gods; Prometheus is simply as bad as all the gods, no matter how much he increased our power. Feuerbach and Marx were wrong to say that God is a projection of the human essence, since for Meillassoux the usual concept of God represents the degradation of the human essence. If the traditional God was allowed to inflict plagues and tsunamis on the human race, the Promethean human of the twentieth century simply assumes the right to inflict death camps and atomic fireballs instead. In this respect, we have simply begun to imitate the degradation of humanity that was formerly invested in an omnipotent and arbitrary God. In response to charges that absolute contingency might lead to political quietism, Meillassoux counters that the World of justice would mean nothing unless we had already hoped for it beforehand. A World of justice that came along at random would merely be an improved third World of thought: indeed, a perfect one. But it would have satisfied no craving, and would therefore have no redemptive power. For this reason, we must actively hope for the fourth World of justice for such a fourth World ever to arise. Not only justice, but beauty is dependent on such hope: for Meillassoux, who is here somewhat dependent on Kant, beauty means an accord between our human symbolization and the actual world, which could never be present in a World of the blessed any more than justice could. And just as a messianic figure is needed to incarnate our hope and then abandon power once the World of justice is realized, it is the figure of the child whose fragile contingency shows us a dignity and a demand for justice beyond all power. 3. Meillassoux Radicalized or Reversed Given the promising reception of Meillassoux’s first book, it would not be groundless to engage in early speculation about what it might take to earn him a place in the history of philosophy. Maybe this will never happen—who knows?—but quite possibly it will: his lucid argumentative methods and sheer philosophical imagination at least make him a good candidate to be read well into the future, especially following further elaboration in print of his mature system. Philosophy is often practiced as thought it were nothing more than the amassing of “knockdown arguments.” But this is no more insightful than saying that good architecture is the amassing of steal beams. It is true that poorly constructed building cannot stand for long, but sound construction is merely the first, indispensable step in building. In fact, I am inclined to say that what really makes a philosopher important is not being right, but being wrong . I mean this in a very specific sense. I once heard the interesting remark about twentieth century culture that “you have to remember that the sixties really happened in the seventies.” That is to say, it was in the 1970’s rather than the more honored 1960’s that civil rights, free love, long hair, and the rock and roll drug culture really took root. With respect to the history of philosophy, we might just as easily say: “you have to remember that Plato really happened in Aristotle,” that “Kant really happened in Hegel” or “Hume really happened in Kant,” or that “Husserl’s phenomenology first achieved its truth in Heidegger.” One becomes an important philosopher not by being right, but by attracting rebellious admirers who tell you that you are wrong , even as their own careers silently orbit around your own. To recruit faithful disciples may be comforting and flattering, but the greatest thinkers have generally had to experience refutation at the hands of their most talented heirs. For this reason, I would propose that we size up the magnitude of living thinkers not by deciding how many times they are right and wrong, but by asking instead: who would take the trouble to refute this author? For this reason I do not ask: “Is Meillassoux right?”, since I do not believe in the virtual God myself, nor am I convinced by any important aspect of Meillassoux’s philosophy. Instead, I ask if there are interesting ways to overturn him. Only by being overturned, by no longer remaining a contemporary, does one become a classic. Let’s begin with a simple model of refutation, which can be refined further at a later date once the basic point is established. One kind of refutation simply consists in saying: “This author is a complete idiot.” The refuter now walks away in celebration, and no link between the present and the future is built; all is reduced to rubble. But this sort of mediocre triumphalism is generally practiced by those who achieve little of their own, and is not especially interesting. Much more interesting is the sort of refutation that does not take its target to be a complete idiot. I would like to suggest that there are just two basic ways in which this can be done: radicalization and reversal . It has not escaped my notice that this is a fairly good match for the Deleuzian distinction between irony and humor. Whereas irony critiques and adopts the opposite principle of what it attacks, humor accepts what it confronts but pushes it into highly exaggerated form. The ironist is like the worker who sows chaos by rebeling and contradicting the boss, while the humorist is like the worker who follows orders to an absurdly literal degree, with equally chaotic results. Let’s start with a few examples. In Aristotle’s treatment of Plato, and Heidegger’s of Husserl, we find reversal. Plato’s eidei are transformed by Aristotle into mere secondary substances, and the individual worldly things despised by Plato become what is primary. For Husserl what is primary is whatever is present to consciousness, while for Heidegger this is precisely what is secondary, since the primary stuff of the world withdraws from any form of presence at all. As for radicalization, it is most easily found in the transformation of Kant by German Idealism: “Kant was right to wall off the things-in-themselves from human access, and simply should have realized that the thought of the Ding an sich is also a thought, and thereby the noumena are just special cases of the phenomena,” with much following from this discovery. It would also be easy to read Spinoza as a radicalizer of Descartes, and Berkeley and Hume as radicalized versions of Locke. Perhaps the distinction is now sufficiently clear. Admiring refutations are not those that say “Professor X is an idiot,” which is merely the flip side of the eager disciple’s fruitless “Professor X got everything right.” Instead, it will be some variant of one of the following two options: “Professor X is important, but got it backwards,” or “Professor X is important, but didn’t push things far enough.” In the history of philosophy these two latter cases have often been painful in purely human terms: Aristotle expresses sadness at refuting Plato, Kant is openly annoyed at Fichte, and Husserl feels betrayed and used by Heidegger. Rude handling from later figures almost seems to be the sine qua non of being a great philosopher. Now, it has already been claimed that Meillassoux is an emerging philosopher of the first importance, and by no less a figure than Alain Badiou: “It would be no exaggeration to say that Quentin Meillassoux has opened up a new path in the history of philosophy…” (Preface, vii). But rather than taking Badiou’s word for it, or rejecting his word, we might experiment by asking how Meillassoux could be radicalized or reversed. Are there interesting ways of doing this that might launch whole new schools of philosophy, unexpected or even condemned by Meillassoux himself? While no one can see the future, the present is poor when it is not riddled with virtual futures. The relation between philosophers and their predecessors and successors is always somewhat complicated, of course. But generally there is one central divergence at stake, which might be taken as the key to all the others. On this basis we could say that new thinkers primarily radicalize or primarily reverse the main ideas of their chief philosophical forerunner. There may be specific historical conditions and perhaps even personality traits connected with these two types, but this question can be left aside for now. More important for us is that radicalizers will generally be followed by reversers, and vice versa. Consider the textbook example of a reversal in the history of philosophy: Kant’s Copernican Revolution, which inverts the so-called dogmatic tradition that addresses the world itself, and makes the world revolve instead around the conditions by which it is known. While it is not completely impossible that Kant’s successors might have re-reversed this principle back into a new and stronger dogmatic realism, conditions were premature for such a move. Anyone doing this too early would likely have been an angry anti-Kantian reactionary rather than an original thinker in command of a genuinely new realist principle. The far more likely outcome is the one that actually happened: Kant’s reversal of his predecessors was viewed as incomplete, or as retaining lamentable bits of the traditional view, which despite his admirable breakthrough he was unable to shake off. This was the view of German Idealism, anyway. In similar fashion, Spinoza could also be viewed as a radicalizer of Descartes, who is equally accused of preserving various Scholastic dogmas in an otherwise radical project of philosophical reversal. The point is this: reversals in the history of thought tend to be followed soon thereafter by radicalizations of those reversals. The same may hold true in reverse: radicalizations might generally be followed by reversals, given that it is not always possible to be more radical than the radicals have already been. Consider the case of Husserl, who radicalizes Brentano’s early vagueness about what lies beyond immanent objectivity, and Twardowski’s assertion that there must be an external object lying outside the intentional content, by collapsing everything into the intentional sphere: there is no difference between the Berlin in my consciousness and the actual Berlin that is home to millions of people. It is difficult to see how one could be even more radical than Husserl’s idealist turn here. And thus the road is paved to Heidegger’s reversal of classical phenomenology, in which the key point is what lies deeper than any presence to consciousness: the Sein whose power and obscurity cannot be made exhaustively present, but only sends itself in historical epochs. In similar fashion we might also read Leibniz as a reverser of Spinoza’s radicalization, retrieving a strong sense of individual substance and a certain validity of what the Scholastics had said. Returning to Meillassoux, we might ask which kind of philosopher he is: a radicalizer or a reverser? At present, Meillassoux looks to me like a radicalizer (though for now his future remains shrouded in mist). He takes the correlationist tradition, which allows us to speak only of the relation between human and world, and tries to raise it into an even more extreme claim about the absolute contingency of everything. But whereas German Idealism did this by trying to collapse the distinction between thought and world entirely into the “thought” side, Meillassoux does it by trying to shift the non-absolute contingency of the thought-world correlate from epistemology to ontology. It is no longer a question of the inability of human knowledge to know what lies outside the correlate, but the inability of reality itself to be rooted in any definite laws. Furthermore, if we look at the various features of Meillassoux’s philosophy identified earlier tonight, all but one are already so radical that there is no obvious way to push them further. The one exception would be his claim that the world as a whole can change for no reason at any moment, coupled with the inconsistent claim that within a given world there are laws of nature that everything must follow. If gravitational attraction between all masses is a current law in our world, then for Meillassoux there can be no exceptions to this law for as long as it remains in force. A toppled vase will fall to the floor every time for sure,unless there is a cosmic change by which the laws of nature as a whole have altered. (This is reminiscent of the late medieval distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God, according to which God has the power to set or change the laws of nature, but not to contravene those laws locally once they are set.) On this point, to radicalize Meillassoux would simply be to say: there are no laws of nature even in the local sense. Everything that happens, even in the world here and now, is purely contingent and not governed by even a trace of law. And while this would be a more consistent development of Meillassoux’s thoughts on contingency, it is difficult to see how it could lead to a new philosophy. Instead, the admiring successors of Meillassoux are more likely to reverse one of his already sufficiently radical points. At least four candidates come to mind: *First, we have seen that Meillassoux thinks correlationism is challenged by a time before or after consciousness, but not by a space lying outside it. Perhaps this could be reversed into saying that spatial exteriority is the really crucial point. The arguments on this point are perhaps the least convincing in After Finitude (and do not even occur in the original French edition), and therefore it might be a candidate for the “blind spot” of which no philosopher is ever free. *Second, Meillassoux uses Cantor to claim that the contingency of laws of nature would not entail that they are unstable. A successor of Meillassoux might claim that it does make them unstable, and celebrate this fact. This person would then have to explain why common sense seems to encounter a relatively stable world despite its truly rampant instability. Whereas Meillassoux’s problem is to show how stability might exist despite contingency, this successor’s problem would be slightly different: to show why actual, full-blown instability might have the appearance of stability. *Third, Meillassoux claims that the primary qualities of things are those that can be mathematized. He might be reversed by a successor who says the opposite: the mathematizable qualities are the secondary ones, and the primary ones are those that elude symbolic formulation. While this is a perfectly valid possible objection to Meillassoux, it is one that is made in advance by some of his predecessors and is still made by some of his peers, making it less interesting for futurology than some of his other points. *Fourth and finally, whereas Meillassoux claims that God does not exist but might exist in the future, a successor might argue even more bizarrely that God has always existed but might vanish in the future. Let’s arbitrarily select the first of these possibilities, and imagine briefly where it might lead, if pursued in the future by admiring detractors. Meillassoux comes from the circle of Badiou, and some of Badiou’s most ardent admirers are found in Latin America. So, let’s imagine that towards mid-century some ingenious reversers of Meillassoux emerge in that portion of the Spanish-speaking world. Just for fun, let’s call them Castro and Chávez. And in order to avoid any confusion with the present-day politicians of those names, we will stipulate that Meillassoux’s great successors are both women. The philosopher Castro (we will suppose she comes from Peru) reverses Meillassoux’s argument that the ancestral or diachronic are what most threaten the human-world correlate. Instead, she claims that the diachronic does not threaten the correlate at all, and that we must instead look at space as what ruins the correlate and demands a strange new realism. What would such a philosophy look like? In order to determine this, we might ask what price Meillassoux pays for doing it the opposite way. As I see it, he pays in two separate ways. One is that laws of nature for him are contingent over time . The laws of nature apply to the universe as a whole at any given moment, and would be changed globally if they are ever changed at all. The second price he pays is that Meillassoux has no mereology , or theory of parts and wholes. Everything for him is on the level of the given, or immanent in experience, with the sole proviso that the laws governing this immanence might change without notice at any given moment. In reversing Meillassoux, Castro makes the following claims in the preface to her stunning debut book of 2045, The Cosmos and its Neighborhoods , rapidly translated from Spanish into all the languages of the world: Despite his brilliant analysis of the contingency of laws of nature over time, Meillassoux gets two important assumptions wrong. First, he allows for only one set of contingent laws to govern nature as a whole. Second, he allows laws to govern only the world that is immanent in experience, and thereby fails to explore the contingency among part-whole relations. In this book I will argue, first, that the laws of nature vary in any given instant between one region of the universe and the next; and second, that the world is made up of layers of parts and wholes that are also contingent with respect to one another. Those are the words of Castro. This may sound like a hopeless free-for-all of chaos, yet the book somehow succeeds in drawing some compelling deductions about how laws must vary from one place or level in the world to the next. Trapped in the limited horizon of 2011, and not yet inspired by the heavily balkanized political and technological situation of 2050 that somehow lends additional credence to Castro’s vision, we can only vaguely grasp what such a philosophy might look like. After this reversal of Meillassoux by Castro, the usual pattern leads us to expect a radicalization by Chávez, a young Argentine student of Castro. How could the already strange theories of Castro be radicalized? Perhaps as follows, in a disturbing new book entitled The Implosion of the Neighborhoods , which argues as follows: Castro was right to shift the Meillassouxian framework of contingency from time to space. However, in this respect she retained a surprisingly traditional opposition between the two. In this book I will show that time and space collapse into one another. This may sound too much like the discredited four-dimensional block universe of twentieth century physics and philosophy. However, the four-dimensional universe is a model biased in favor of space, merely adding an extra dimension to the commonsense spatial continuum while stipulating that the serial passage of time is an illusion. In this book I will argue instead for a one-dimensional space-time modeled after our experience of time, in which there is no simultaneous co-existence at all between different parts of the universe, or ‘neighborhoods’ as my esteemed teacher Castro has called them. Instead, the various portions of the universe link to one another by succession rather than by coexistence. Buenos Aires, New York, and Amsterdam do not exist simultaneously in the same landscape, but one after the other in the mind of some observer, and this observer can only be an observer much larger than any human. Against Meillassoux’s notion of a virtual God that does not exist now but might exist in the future, I will argue for an actual God that surveys the universe in sequence, thereby generating the illusion of spatial diversity and even the illusion of individual minds located within that diversity. Once this divine observer dies, the universe as a whole must perish. Again, these ideas are so bizarre that we of 2011 can barely comprehend them, just as Aristotle would have had a difficult time grasping the theories of Descartes. We could then perhaps imagine a further reversal of this theory, emanating from the intellectually resurgent Philippines of the twenty-second century. The Filipino School might argue that the universe is already dead, given the collapse of its spatial richness into the serial observations of a flimsy and mortal God. The virtual universe does not yet exist, but might exist in fully spatial form in the future, and this would require the death of God and the resulting liberation of God’s succession of images as independent, spatially situated realities. With a bit of sharpening, we might be able to make all of these imaginary thinkers more intuitively clear. Along with the history of philosophy, there might arise a new discipline generating imaginary futures for philosophy. The richness of Meillassoux’s system comes not from the fact that he is plausibly right about so many things, but because his philosophy offers such a treasury of bold statements ripe for being radicalized or reversed. He is a rich target for many still-unborn intellectual heirs, and this is what gives him the chance to be an important figure. NOTES 1. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude . Trans. R Brassier. (London: Continuum, 2008.) Page 5. The word “correlationism” does not appear in his doctoral thesis. As Meillassoux informed me in an email of February 8, 2011, he first coined this term in 2003 or 2004, while editing for publication a lecture he had given at the École normale supérieure on a day devoted to the theme of “Philosophy and Mathematics,” an event including Alain Badiou as one of the participants. 2. Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making . (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming 2011). 3. In an email of December 6, 2010, Meillassoux clarifies that in After Finitude he only deduces the impossibility of a “universal contradiction,” not of a determinate contradiction. In the same email he suggests that he can also prove the latter, though the proof is somewhat lengthier than the one found in After Finitude . 4. After Finitude (18-26), in the passage falling between the two sets of triple asterisks. These pages were sent by Meillassoux to translator Ray Brassier (in French) during the translation process, and do not appear in the original French version of the book. 5. Graham Harman, “Quentin Meillassoux: A New French Philosopher.” Philosophy Today 51.1 (2007): Pages 104-117. The passage where I raise the question of space can be found in the first column of page 107. 6. Vernes is first cited on p. 95 of After Finitude . See Jean-René Vernes, Critique de la raison aléatoire, ou Descartes contra Kant . (Paris: Aubier, 1982).  . (shrink)

À partir des riches registres de la justice pénale de Bologne de la fin du Moyen Âge (les libri maleficiorum), l’article s’intéresse aux violences sexuelles faites aux jeunes filles et aux femmes par des hommes en replaçant le viol dans un ensemble d’atteintes sexistes et sexuelles. Après un essai d’identifier socialement les coupables et les victimes et une analyse du langage notarial stéréotypé utilisé dans ce type de crime, il s’agira de traiter de l’acte de viol lui-même, « connaître charnellement (...) une femme contre sa volonté et avec violence » mais aussi, en amont et en aval du coït imposé et violent, de toutes les atteintes psychologiques, physiques et sexuelles portées à l’encontre des femmes. Avant : pénétration dans la maison de la victime, injures à caractère sexuel et sexiste, menaces, violences physiques (jeter à terre, traîner par les cheveux, frapper, déplacement du lieu d’habitation au lieu du viol, etc.). Après : humiliation, opprobre, vexation de la victime et de sa parenté, nécessité pour la victime de prouver le non-consentement et difficultés de dénoncer. On terminera sur les parties lésées par le crime et les peines infligées au coupable, somme toute relativement légères. L’intégration du viol dans une longue chaîne de violence et d’humiliation subie par les femmes oblige à repenser, pour une période donnée, ce que nous entendons par « violence sexuelle ». (shrink)

Résumé — S’il fallait résumer les thèses défendues par Lessing dans le Laocoon, on arriverait à un résultat finalement malingre. L’idée que la peinture représente au moyen de « signes naturels » des corps coexistant dans l’espace, tandis que la poésie représente au moyen de « signes arbitraires » des actions se succédant dans le temps a été en effet maintes fois développée par d’autres auteurs avant l’essai de 1766. Ce constat n’ôte pourtant rien à l’intérêt du Laocoon. Car cet (...) intérêt réside ailleurs. Il se situe non pas dans l’exposé définitif de la thèse, mais dans la méthode qui y mène, une méthode que Lessing veut d’abord inductive, c’est-à-dire fondée sur l’exemple. Le présent article entend analyser la conception de la critique qui se dégage de l’essai : refus de la méthode déductive, rôle central dévolu à l’imagination, intronisation du public comme instance légitime de jugement – le tout sur fond de polémique antiwinckelmannienne.Zusammenfassung — Wollte man die in Lessings Laokoon verteidigten Thesen zusammenfassen, so würde man zu einem eher spärlichen Ergebnis kommen. Da die Malerei anhand « natürlicher Zeichen » nur koexistierende Körper im Raum und die Poesie anhand « willkürlicher Zeichen » nur sukzessive Handlungen in der Zeit darstellt, wurde in der Tat schon vor der Erscheinung dieses Traktats von anderen Autoren dargelegt. Dies gereicht aber dem Essay keineswegs zum Nachteil, denn seine Bedeutung liegt anderswo. Sie liegt weniger in dem Inhalt der Thesen selbst, als in der Methode, die zur Aufstellung dieser Thesen führt. Lessing sucht nach einer induktiven Methode, die auf der präzisen Analyse von zahlreichen Beispielen beruht. Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es, den Lessingschen Kritik-Begriff zu untersuchen, der sich aus der Methodologie dieses Essays ergibt : Ablehnung der deduktiven Verfahrensweise, Erhebung der Einbildungskraft zum entscheidenden Vermögen sowohl für die Produktion als auch für die Rezeption der Kunstwerke, Inthronisation des Publikums als vollberechtigter Kunstrichter – lauter Aspekte, die vor dem Hintergrund einer scharfen Polemik gegen Winckelmann entwickelt werden. (shrink)

Impaired emotional capacity in antisocial populations is a well-known reality. Taking the dimensional approach to the study of emotion, emotions are perceived as a disposition to action; they emerge from arousal of the appetitive or aversive system, and result in subjective, behavioral, and physiological responses that are modulated by the dimensions of valence, arousal, and dominance. This study uses the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) to study the interaction between the type of picture presented (pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant) and group (...) (adolescents under custody in juvenile justice centers, adolescents under non-custodial measures, and secondary school students) in the emotional assessment of these dimensions. The interaction between the study variables was statistically significant. Statistically significant differences were found between the three types of pictures presented, in the ratings of unpleasant pictures between the custody group and the group of secondary students in regular schooling in valence, and in the ratings of unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant pictures in arousal, between the custody group and all groups. Discriminant analyses of each affective dimension indicate that the unpleasant pictures with violent and/or aggressive content tend to be in the functions that most differentiate the antisocial groups. (shrink)

"Justice, force" : c'est dans ces termes et leur dialectique (fortifier la justice, justifier la force) que Pascal pose la question du politique et qu'elle continue de se poser a nous. Aussi bien vit-il la naissance de l'Etat moderne, et le heurt de la tradition humaniste et chretienne avec l'ideologie du monstre froid qui n'aspire qu'a sa propre perpetuation et transcendance. Faut-il renoncer a incarner les valeurs? Faut-il les imposer par la violence a la violence deguisee du pouvoir? (...) Pascal ne laisse pas la verite sans force devant la force, mais il sait aussi l'injustice de la justice rebelle. Realiste sans machiavelisme, augustinien mais non augustiniste, il n'avance point tant une politique chretienne qu'un usage chretien du politique. (shrink)

La justice prédictive est ici sommairement définie comme une justice prédite par des algorithmes et, partant, envisagée comme une justice simplement virtuelle, c’est-à-dire seulement probable, non acquise dans son existence et dont l’actualisation est laissée à la création, à l’imagination et à l’intuition des utilisateurs qui feront que la prédiction restera « une » solution proposée ou deviendra « la » solution finalement adoptée. La justice prédictive apparaît ainsi comme un espace de prospective juridique pour les justiciables, les professions juridiques (...) et la science du droit. Cette introduction à une justice simplement virtuelle étudie, d’une part, le risque qui reste mesuré d’une domination du virtuel, lorsque celui-ci devient prescriptif pour les professionnels ou dissuasif pour les justiciables ; elle envisage, d’autre part, l’avenir espéré d’une responsabilisation face au virtuel, par une nécessaire compréhension technique de l’outil de justice prédictive et une essentielle respiration éthique de ses acteurs. (shrink)

Théologien, historien, philosophe, sociologue et homme politique libéral, Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) fait partie du groupe des théologiens protestants allemands appelé " Ecole de l'histoire des religions ". Revendiquant l'héritage de Kant et de Schleiermacher, proche de Max Weber et du néo-kantisme de l'Ecole de Bade, Troeltsch est le théoricien classique du néo-protestantisme. Surtout connu en France comme sociologue de la religion, il est redécouvert aujourd'hui comme philosophe et théologien, éclipsé un temps par Barth, l'existentialisme et Heidegger. Les huit essais rassemblés (...) ici sont écrits à l'horizon d'une réflexion sur le religieux marquée par les sciences humaines et sociales et par une conscience accusée de la pluralité des formes de la religion. Troeltsch y dessine un programme qui inscrit délibérément la théologie dans une perspective historique, tout en s'efforçant d'articuler approche empirique et interrogation touchant les jugements de valeur. Il récuse ainsi toute tentative pour faire valoir un domaine théologique réservé : non seulement le christianisme n'est pas la religion dans sa forme achevée ou " absolue ", mais les tentatives pour déterminer une " essence " du christianisme par-delà ses inscriptions socioculturelles diverses devront également être refusées. En désenclavant la réflexion théologique, Troeltsch oblige à redéfinir son objet et son statut : elle ne sera plus explicitation du croire, mais devra esquisser une théorie du christianisme précisant le statut, la fonction et les limites du religieux dans une modernité marquée par la diversification des instances de rationalisation et de légitimité. Ce faisant, son propos tranche avec les discours théologiques dominants dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, tant en protestantisme qu'en catholicisme. Et il ouvre à nouveau la question d'une pertinence sociale et culturelle du religieux et du théologique. A l'heure où les paradigmes modernes se trouvent en profonde interrogation sur eux-mêmes et où la question religieuse fait retour - peut-être pour le meilleur mais souvent pour le pire -, la lecture de Troeltsch peut apporter une contribution bienvenue à un ensemble de questions parmi les plus centrales de notre temps. Publiés pour la première fois en français, les textes présentés ici sont accompagnés d'un important appareil de commentaires historiques aidant le lecteur à reconstituer le contexte et la genèse des débats en cause. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est construit autour d'un chapitre (texte original) de Judith Butler sur l'éthique de la non-violence. En réponse se construisent quatre réflexions philosophiques. Mylène Botbol-Baum présente le collectif à partir de sa traduction du texte de Judith Butler, et aborde la question du sujet et de la norme à partir de la lecture butlerienne de Levinas et Arendt, sur la question des limites de la légitimité de la violence pour une éthique de la relationalité. Jean de Munck (...) traite une lecture croisée de Benjamin et Butler sur la violence. Romildo Pineiro et Jose Erraruz off rent une lecture historique et politique du concept de violence et y confrontent l'interprétation de la non violence dans le texte de Butler. Trois textes plus sociologiques suivent sur l'impact de la non-violence, dans une perspective qui vise à " défaire le genre " dans le cadre sociopolitique critique des vulnérabilités, dans le cadre du travail des femmes migrantes (Ghaliya Dejelloul) ou du travail domestique non rémunéré (Anna Safuta), à partir d'une enquête sur la mobilité spatiale des femmes dans les zones pré-urbaines d'Alger ou de Bruxelles, off rant une analyse sur l'hostilité masculine et le rôle du discours religieux dans la légitimation de cette violence. Matthieu de Nanteuil conclut le volume sur la question de la violence et de la sensibilité politique en mettant à jour la théorie de la démocratie radicale chez Judith Butler. Il sera donc question dans ce volume de penser la non-violence à partir d'une approche fondée sur la normalisation des corps, en réintroduisant le sujet de la vie comme interlocuteur critique du sujet de la norme en démocratie. (shrink)

Les théologies politiques et de la libération semblent de nos jours en voie d'essoufflement, et ce phénomène pose problème.Elles s'étaient situées, en Europe, sur le terrain de la modernité, de la liberté, de la solidarité avec les victimes d'une histoire de violences ; en Amérique Latine, elles s'étaient vouées à l'émancipation socio-économique des classes populaires. La pertinence des unes et des autres ne devrait pas être mise en doute : elles prennent au sérieux la Promesse eschatologique, le souci privilégié que (...) Jésus avait des pauvres et des opprimés, l'expression publique de la foi en toute situation socioculturelle de crise. Comment expliquer, alors, leur déclin actuel ?Trois explications peuvent être avancées : la trop grande généralité de la « réserve eschatologique » lorsqu'elle n'est plus affrontée à quelque situation-limite, et son ambiguïté, partagée qu'elle est entre une exigence de justice et une promesse de pardon ; l'étroitesse du soutien populaire dont ces théologies pouvaient se réclamer ; la résistance, enfin, que leur oppose l'institution ecclésiastique. Mais la dérive mystique de ces théologies, signe de l'excès du Royaume qui vient, les préserve mieux de toute identification à une action politique comme de tout rêve de retour à une chrétienté. Political and liberation theologies seem, these days, to be losing their élan, and this phenomenon poses a problem.In Europe they were built on the grounds of modernity, liberty, and solidarity with the victims of a history of violence; in Latin America they were pledged to the socio-economic emancipation of the lower classes.The relevance of each should not be doubted : they take the eschatological Promise seriously, the special concern that Jesus had for the poor and oppressed, and public expression of the faith in every sociocultural situation of crisis. How does on explain, then, their present decline ?Three explanations can be put forth : the too broad generality of the « eschatological reserve » when it is no longer confronted with a limit-situation, and its ambiguity in so far as it is torn between a demand for Justice and a promise of pardon ; the narrowness of popular support that these theologies could count on ; and finally, the resistance given by the ecclesiastical institution. But the mystical drift of these theologies, a sign of the excess of the Kingdom to come, preserves them better from any identification with political action as well as from any dream of returning to a past Christendom. (shrink)

Résumé Le Messie n’est pas le produit de l’évolution historique, mais surgissement de l’inattendu du Règne de Dieu. Ce que vient interrompre le Messie, c’est la faute. L’histoire entendue comme lieu de la culpabilité conduit à lier souffrance et expiation de la faute. Le lien entre souffrance et expiation est ici rejeté car il ne fait pas droit à la complexité du réel et méconnaît la présence discrète de Dieu qui, par son Esprit, assiste ceux qui œuvrent à la justice. (...) Le jugement entendu comme justice faite aux victimes conclut l’histoire perçue comme procès entre oppresseurs et opprimés; en rejetant le méchant, le jugement n’échappe pas à l’ambiguïté d’une semi-victoire de Dieu. Le projet de Dieu peut-il échouer? Jésus est à la fois le juge et l’avocat pour faire justice aux victimes et entendre la plaidoirie des malfaiteurs. En vertu de cette double fonction christique, la fin de l’histoire apparaît comme indécidable. (shrink)

Si le premier Testament parle beaucoup de violence, il décrit également un chemin pour la traverser. Celui-ci passe par la justice et le droit qui tentent de mettre un frein à la violence. Mais elles s'avèrent incapables de la juguler entièrement, dans la mesure où elles peuvent être corrompues par ce qu'elles sont censées combattre. Aussi un au-delà de la justice est-il à envisager, qui serait plutôt de l'ordre de la sagesse, comme l'illustre l'histoire de Joseph. Cet article (...) envisage la question essentiellement à partir d'un examen de la thématique de la violence telle que la mettent en place les premiers chapitres de la Genèse; il prolonge la réflexion à l'aide de quelques autres textes de la Torah et des prophètes. (shrink)

Les écrits de Kant sur les races humaines, émaillés de caractérisations et de jugements qui heurtent notre sensibilité contemporaine, sont accueillis par un silence gêné des commentateurs. Ceux-ci croient bon de s'abstenir d'analyser ces textes, et d'y voir a priori des opinions mal élaborées, victimes de l'air du temps. Mais en évitant de se confronter à ce tabou, ils jouent aussi un mauvais tour à Kant. Car le lecteur peut avoir l'impression qu'on lui cache quelque chose. Qui plus est, les (...) textes sur les races font preuve d'une cohérence interne et d'une compacité théorique remarquables, et leur puissance explicative est inégalée dans le champ de l'anthropologie physique de son époque - celle de Buffon, de Blumenbach ou de Meiners. Est-ce à dire, comme le craignent d'avance les commentateurs, qu'on trouve chez Kant un authentique racisme théorique? En fait, cette accusation de racisme n'a pas vraiment d'objet à une époque où les modalités d'une pensée non raciste, c'est-à-dire d'une anthropologie non naturaliste, étaient au mieux en cours de constitution. Ce constat nous mène à considérer que seule une analyse dépassionnée des thèses raciologiques de Kant, prises dans toute leur violence, peut rendre justice à la doctrine kantienne. Nous ne cherchons pas à produire une " disculpation théorique " de Kant. Mais inversement, cet ouvrage ne vise pas non plus à formuler des thèses scandaleuses ou à révéler un " Kant non universaliste ". Il entend simplement montrer la tension d'une pensée qui fait de l'histoire un processus de civilisation en principe universel, articulé autour d'un centre de gravité à la fois géographique et spirituel, l'Europe, peuplée d'hommes blancs. Cet ouvrage intéressera les étudiants et chercheurs en philosophie et en histoire des sciences, mais aussi les étudiants et chercheurs en anthropologie. (shrink)

Bien que la Tunisie lutte pour les droits humains, la diversité sexuelle et de l’identité de genre reste frappée par l’exclusion et les discours stigmatisants. Les personnes appartenant à la communauté lgbt continuent à subir un traitement dégradant. Elles sont exposées à un système rejetant qui les place dans les marges et justifie leur maintien dans l’invisibilité et l’illégitimité sociales. Sur la base d’une analyse qualitative de discours de personnes concernées par la diversité de genre, bénéficiant d’une prise en charge (...) thérapeutique et fréquentant le réseau associatif tunisien, les auteurs traiteront de la loi du silence liée à ces systèmes sociaux maltraitants. Les stratégies élaborées par les homosexuels face à la violence subie viennent interrompre ce non-dit et se laissent voir à travers l’accablement et l’introversion et/ou la révolte, la revendication et le militantisme. (shrink)

Le Yaoundé PhD Seminar-Theories of Justice est un séminaire international et pluridisciplinaire qui se tient depuis 2012 à Yaoundé. Il réunit des professeurs et des doctorants africains et non africains ainsi que des professionnels et des représentants de la société civile autour de questions de justice sociale et de politique publique. À l'initiative de doctorants africains et non africains, il a été mis en place conjointement par la Chaire Hoover de l'Université catholique de Louvain et par le Centre d’études et (...) de recherches sur la justice sociale et politique de l’Université catholique d’Afrique centrale dans le but de bâtir une véritable solidarité entre le Nord et le Sud dans le domaine de la formation académique et de la recherche. The Yaoundé PhD Seminar-Theories of Justice is an international and multidisciplinary seminar which is held since 2012 in Yaoundé. It brings together teachers and African and non-African doctoral students as well as professionals and representatives of civil society around issues of social justice and public policy. At the initiative of African and non-African students, it has been implemented jointly by the Hoover Chair of the Catholic University of Louvain and the Centre of studies and research on social justice and political of the Catholic University of Central Africa in order to build a genuine solidarity between the North and the South in the field of academic training and research. (shrink)

The impact of Catholic Titles on figurative paintings depicting violence were studied using both explicit and implicit measures. When paintings were described as Catholic, they were significantly rated as more beautiful and interesting, and less violent than when they were described as Non-Catholic. Therefore, demonstrating that Catholic themes associated with these artworks overshadow their violent content. This was demonstrated via hedonic ratings. Thus, suggesting an aestheticisation of violent imagery when connected to Catholic themes. Implicit responses, assessed using the Implicit (...) Association Test, showed faster responses when Violent Catholic Paintings were associated Positive Adjectives and slower responses were associated when violent Non-Catholic Paintings were associated with Negative Adjectives. These implicit responses confirm previous explicit results. (shrink)

Les règles de la justice sont, d'après Friedrich Hayek, l'effet d'un ordre spontané et non de la volonté délibérée des hommes. Cette thèse renvoie à une conception de la règle abstraite et générale dont ce livre montre le lien avec les limites de la raison, l'abstraction constituant, selon Hayek, le moyen pour l'esprit de s'occuper d'une réalité que celui-ci ne peut entièrement comprendre. Une "primauté de l'abstrait" s'applique ainsi non seulement à l'ordre social - guidé par les règles abstraites de (...) la justice, mais également à l'ordre sensoriel, c'est-à-dire à notre perception du monde extérieur et aux dispositions à agir qui en résultent. Comment comprendre le lien entre cette primauté de l'abstrait et le libéralisme de Hayek, en particulier concernant sa conception de la "morale du marché" comme discipline des règles abstraites et son rejet de buts particuliers guidant l'action publique? Enfin, Hayek a-t-il eu raison d'attribuer au philosophe empiriste David Hume une telle conception de l'abstraction?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

À moins de définir la justice ou le droit de telle manière qu’il existe entre eux un rapport intrinsèque parce qu’on les a déjà conçus comme indiscernables, le rapport entre eux ne peut être que contingent d’un point de vue conceptuel et ontologique. Puisque la justice au sens matériel constitue toujours une conception particulière de la distribution des biens au sens le plus large, la réalisation d’une telle conception est en revanche toujours subordonnée à la technicité du droit qui la (...) concrétise en réglant les comportements sous des conditions non idéales, faisant intervenir sous certaines conditions, entre autres éléments, des actes de violence. Si le droit est de ce point indifférent par rapport à la justice, toute théorie de la justice doit tenir compte des contraintes de sa réalisation juridique. (shrink)

Selon Rawls, le PD permet de regarder les différences de talents comme un « atout commun ». Le libertarien Nozick y a vu l’aveu par Rawls que sa société se rend propriétaire de nos personnes, faites de nos talents propres. C’est un sophisme : seule la distribution des dons peut être vue comme un bien commun, fournissant une palette de complémentarités possibles qui est un atout commun (voir Smith sur la division du travail, comme le note Arrow). Arrow a peut-être (...) hésité sur ce point, mais il a finalement opté, comme Rawls et Nozick, pour l’idée que nous possédons nos talents, à ceci près que nous ne pouvons les développer que dans un cadre social qui rend légitime (contra Nozick) que l’impôt nous reprenne une partie de nos bénéfices pour aider les plus démunis à sortir de leur misère. Le PD éloigne de la pure méritocratie. Via Pascal, cité par Arrow, on en revient à l’importance de la notion de personne dans toute approche non utilitariste, plaidant pour la coopération entre économie et philosophie, par exemple pour généraliser le PD à plus de deux classes, si c’est possible sans entamer la souhaitable simplicité cognitive des principes de justice, ni détruire le système des incitations. Classification JEL : I13. (shrink)

Nature always refers to something inasmuch as it relates to something else. This « something else » is highly variable. The role of Nature as the respondent of judgements which are both hierarchical and moral is always present in modern science, without thereby being deducible from modern science. Today it presents new contrasts, new oppositions which involve multiple natures, interlinked and historical, which does not result in anything like a neutral Nature. The best example, linked to the idea of Gaia, (...) is the greenhouse effect. Our interventions, even if they take place over a very short period of time, might disturb situations which arose over very long periods. Gaia is a new figure of Nature which must be respected because we are dependent on her, not in the sense that she must be respected as a goddess, but in the sense of her sensitivity. Now, a Nature that could thus be defined once and for all, with an identity that could be opposed to humanity’s, does not exist. Nature in the other sense does not exist objectively either, but is more interesting because it participates in human historicity. It exists in the sense in which it forces us to think, negotiate, take into account, imagine, take note without saying that Nature, too, thinks, negotiates, takes into account, imagines, and takes note. We must think and imagine with something that does not do so. This is the beginning of a culture of non-symmetry. If Nature as Gaia teaches us something, it is that we must take care : the fact the current regimen of interdependence suits us is in no way a privilege of this regiment. Gaia has no innate reason to care about us ; rather, we must care about her. Non-symmetry, then, is this interesting situation in which Nature interests us while we do not interest her. (shrink)

Les procès pour viol sont rares dans les archives judiciaires de l’Ancien Régime européen. Ils ont néanmoins été étudiés suivant des approches quantitatives qui ont mis en évidence le profil des plaignantes et des inculpés (milieu social, âge, état matrimonial) ainsi que la typologie des scénarios de la violence sexuelle (lieu, temporalité, gestes). Cet état de la recherche s’intéresse plutôt aux approches qualitatives de ces sources et plus particulièrement aux méthodes développées pour lire et interpréter les récits judiciaires rapportés (...) par les professionnels de la justice. Un premier type de travaux s’est attaché à replacer le récit judiciaire dans le cours de la procédure criminelle afin de reconstituer ses conditions d’élaboration et d’en spécifier la nature exacte. Ce faisant, ils ont cherché à évaluer la manière dont les justices d’Ancien Régime, inquisitoires ou accusatoires, prenaient en compte le récit des victimes. Un second type de travaux a cherché à interpréter la parole des parties en présence en mettant en évidence les stratégies, les non-dits, les silences : il s’agit alors de s’intéresser aux représentations et aux imaginaires de la sexualité et du genre, telles qu’ils s’expriment à travers l’expérience de la violence. (shrink)

Telle qu’elle se décline dans la théorie de la pitié du livre IV de l’Émile, la philosophie morale de Rousseau réconcilie deux traditions : les morales dites de l’amour-propre et celles du sentiment moral. La présence de l’imagination, dans la morale dite égoïste, mêle le sentiment moral à l’intérêt et donc à l’amour-propre. A contrario, ne pas recourir à l’imagination dans les morales du sentiment moral doit permettre d’éviter cette perversion. L’originalité de la philosophie morale de Rousseau est de concilier (...) le recours à l’imagination, qui seule permet la mise en place de rapports affectifs entre soi-même et autrui, et l’existence d’un sentiment moral véritable non teinté d’égoïsme. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est dans la continuite de la reflexion de Santiago Espinosa, qui etend ses vues sur la musique a l'art en general, et qui aborde des sujets plus vastes comme la science physique (l'auteur fait observer que les scientifiques contemporains adoptent la perspective critiquee des lors qu'ils cherchent a faire une image de l'univers). A cette perspective, Espinosa oppose la perception auditive, plus prompte a saisir le mouvement et le changement, non susceptible par surcroit d'en faire une image ou (...) meme une chose. Il fait remarquer l'interet de certains philosophes pour l'intuition du silence de l'interpretation, aucune chose ne pouvant etre le signe (ou l'image) d'une autre, n'etant que ce qu'elle est, ou plutot devient. Il revient enfin a la mise en rapport de la perspective imaginative et les affections de l'angoisse, la melancolie et la nausee afin de montrer que ces dernieres relevent parfois de l'illusion que les choses semblent, dans la mesure ou elles sont prises pour des images, se repeter sans cesse. Pour l'ouie, sensible a la singularite de ce qui passe, tout ce qui arrive est en revanche d'une surprenante nouveaute, ce qui, pour l'affirmateur de la realite, peut se reveler etre aussi une source de joie. (shrink)

Résumé — S’il fallait résumer les thèses défendues par Lessing dans le Laocoon, on arriverait à un résultat finalement malingre. L’idée que la peinture représente au moyen de « signes naturels » des corps coexistant dans l’espace, tandis que la poésie représente au moyen de « signes arbitraires » des actions se succédant dans le temps a été en effet maintes fois développée par d’autres auteurs avant l’essai de 1766. Ce constat n’ôte pourtant rien à l’intérêt du Laocoon. Car cet (...) intérêt réside ailleurs. Il se situe non pas dans l’exposé définitif de la thèse, mais dans la méthode qui y mène, une méthode que Lessing veut d’abord inductive, c’est-à-dire fondée sur l’exemple. Le présent article entend analyser la conception de la critique qui se dégage de l’essai : refus de la méthode déductive, rôle central dévolu à l’imagination, intronisation du public comme instance légitime de jugement – le tout sur fond de polémique antiwinckelmannienne.Zusammenfassung — Wollte man die in Lessings Laokoon verteidigten Thesen zusammenfassen, so würde man zu einem eher spärlichen Ergebnis kommen. Da die Malerei anhand « natürlicher Zeichen » nur koexistierende Körper im Raum und die Poesie anhand « willkürlicher Zeichen » nur sukzessive Handlungen in der Zeit darstellt, wurde in der Tat schon vor der Erscheinung dieses Traktats von anderen Autoren dargelegt. Dies gereicht aber dem Essay keineswegs zum Nachteil, denn seine Bedeutung liegt anderswo. Sie liegt weniger in dem Inhalt der Thesen selbst, als in der Methode, die zur Aufstellung dieser Thesen führt. Lessing sucht nach einer induktiven Methode, die auf der präzisen Analyse von zahlreichen Beispielen beruht. Ziel des vorliegenden Artikels ist es, den Lessingschen Kritik-Begriff zu untersuchen, der sich aus der Methodologie dieses Essays ergibt : Ablehnung der deduktiven Verfahrensweise, Erhebung der Einbildungskraft zum entscheidenden Vermögen sowohl für die Produktion als auch für die Rezeption der Kunstwerke, Inthronisation des Publikums als vollberechtigter Kunstrichter – lauter Aspekte, die vor dem Hintergrund einer scharfen Polemik gegen Winckelmann entwickelt werden. (shrink)

PEUT-ON penser et rendre effective l'exigence de la justice et de la démocratie en faisant l'hypothèse que nous sommes tous essentiellement des calculateurs impénitents, avant tout soucieux de leur seul intérêt personnel? Oui, répond le libéralisme politique contemporain qui, de John Rawls à John Harsanyi ou David Gauthier, s'efforce de dessiner les traits d'une juste démocratie réduite à des règles de coexistence pacifique entre ces sujets " mutuellement indifférents ", si caractéristiques de l'actuelle société de marché. Non, objectent les " (...) communautariens " et les républicains, qui en appellent à la nécessité d'une conception du bien commun partageable par tous, au risque de sembler vouloir ressusciter le fantôme de la société close d'antan. Tout en soumettant la théorie politique contemporaine à un examen aussi pédagogique qu'exigeant, Philippe Chanial montre comment nombre des débats actuels les plus cruciaux et des écueils sur lesquels ils achoppent, trouvent leur solution dans une tradition de pensée trop oubliée mais si près de renaître aujourd'hui : l'associationnisme civique qui a constitué l'une des matrices principales de la pensée politique et des sciences sociales du XIXe siècle et du premier tiers du XXe siècle (au moins en France et aux États-Unis). Sous cet éclairage inédit, Tocqueville, Saint-Simon et Pierre Leroux, Jaurès, Durkheim ou John Dewey apparaissent unis par une commune intelligence de ce que Marcel Mauss appelait la " délicate essence " de la cité. Cet associationnisme civique, constellation assurément hétéroclite, vient nous rappeler qu'il existe une forme de bonheur dont la raison libérale et utilitaire est incapable de rendre compte, ce bonheur public que nous éprouvons dans l'engagement civique et associatif. Ce livre qui marque sa redécouverte devrait parler en profondeur tant aux philosophes, aux politistes ou aux sociologues qu'aux militants associatifs. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous examinons deux critiques différentes de la démocratie libérale. En analysant la pensée politique slovène contemporaine de Slavoj Žižek et de certains de ces adeptes, qui ces derniers temps redonnent un nouveau souffle à « l’idée du communisme », nous allons d’abord réfléchir de manière critique sur le potentiel émancipatoire de ce courant de la philosophie slovène contemporaine. La partie intermédiaire se concentre sur l’emploi ainsi que sur la logique de la violence et plaide pour une (...) nouvelle culture politico-éthique de non-violence. Dans la deuxième partie de cet article, nous allons discuter – en abordant la critique éthique par Levinas de la démocratie libérale et en nous concentrant sur sa notion d’une temporalité différente à l’intérieur de l’éthique politique – de quelques possibilités alternatives pour le progrès futur de la démocratie. (shrink)

Nous proposons de voir dans le Chant III de l’ Enfer une explication éminemment philosophique de l’Enfer, en montrant que ce que Dante y met en place n’est rien moins qu’une théodicée. Dante proclame ainsi ouvertement que non seulement l’Enfer est l’œuvre de Dieu, mais peut-être même ce qu’il y a de plus réussi dans la création. Se dessinent dans ces vers une théorie grandiose de la justice et du libre arbitre, mais aussi une théorie de l’histoire, puisque c’est au (...) titre de l’usage de son libre arbitre que l’individu peut exister et entrer dans l’histoire pour s’inscrire, ensuite, dans le récit dantesque. D’où l’exclusion des « pusillanimes » qui refusent de choisir entre le bien et le mal et n’usent point de leur libre arbitre – lâcheté qui leur vaut de ne pas même être admis en Enfer. Il y a peut-être là comme la racine de l’extraordinaire violence dont est capable Dante et qui fait la puissance de La Divine Comédie. (shrink)

Etienne Balibar se réfère à l’idée arendtienne de la citoyenneté pour montrer que la démocratie se construit nécessairement au travers d’une aporie. D’une part, la démocratie évoque l’idéal isonomique de l’égalité pour fonder la communauté ; d’autre part, elle inscrit la différence dans l’éventualité d’une contestation permanente des principes unificateurs. Ce que je propose, c’est de contribuer à développer le dialogue entre E. Balibar et Hannah Arendt en m’interrogeant sur la possibilité d’aller au-delà de l’horizon de la violence. Le (...) concept d’agon qu’Arendt utilise pour qualifier le vivre ensemble isonomique n’est pas la concurrence entre artisans, ni le conflit entre ennemis, mais renvoie plutôt à l’institution d’un monde commun grâce aux différences. L’agir agonistique comprend le risque de se distinguer, d’être en désaccord, de se différer, non seulement par rapport aux autres mais aussi par rapport a soi-même. Il faudrait alors définir la violence comme une force qui agit sur l’agon, c’est-à-dire, sur la capacité de « devenir-autre ». C’est justement ceci qu’aussi bien la loi que la notion moderne de droits oblitère. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous établissons d’une part que l’usage du concept de capabilité comme une simple « métrique » du développement humain est une vision réductrice de la proposition intellectuelle de Sen. D’autre part, nous montrons qu’il est vain d’attendre de la part de Sen une théorie de la justice en termes de droits à certaines capabilités. Notre démonstration passe par deux types d’arguments : 1) en reprenant l’hypothèse standard et originelle de la capabilité comme ensemble de vecteurs de fonctionnements (...) accessibles ( e.g., Sen 1987), nous mettons en évidence quatre implications théoriques de l’approche de Sen que la perspective du « welfarisme formel » (Fleurbaey 2003 ; D’Aspremont 2011) ne permet pas de saisir ; 2) nous confortons cette lecture en examinant l’hypothèse – sous-explorée jusque là – de la capabilité comme « pouvoir effectif » d’agir dans le sens de résultats que l’on valorise (Sen 2008, 2010). Dans les deux cas, il s’agit de montrer que la capabilité pour Sen est bien autre chose qu’une « métrique » de l’avantage personnel et de confirmer l’idée que Sen n’est pas un théoricien des capabilités tel que l’attendent la plupart des commentateurs (Baujard et Gilardone 2017). De surcroît, la seconde hypothèse amène à intégrer d’emblée la question de l’obligation morale dans le concept de capabilité. Dès lors, la capabilité non seulement n’est pas une métrique de l’avantage personnel, mais elle n’est même plus une représentation de l’avantage personnel. C’est ici qu’apparaît selon nous la véritable révolution conceptuelle de Sen qui, contrairement à ce que Ricœur (2004) avait cru lire, ne se trouve pas dans le couple droit-capabilité, mais dans le couple responsabilité-capabilité. Finalement, il ressort que Sen partage l’idée des tenants d’une économie de la personne (Ballet et al. 2014) selon laquelle une théorie de la justice en termes de droits à certaines capabilités resterait prisonnière d’une vision purement fonctionnelle de la liberté. Surtout, la mise en lumière de ce couple responsabilité-capabilité ouvre des perspectives nouvelles pour appréhender la liberté et la rationalité des personnes, au cœur notamment des questions de justice et de choix collectif. (shrink)

Les historiens grecs se sont préoccupés des actions (praxeis) humaines dans l’ordre politique et militaire. Pourtant, la conception qu’ils se font de la justice (dikè, dikaion) – à laquelle ils rapportent plus ou moins directement l’ordre du monde et le cours des choses – comme d’un mécanisme de stricte rétribution et de rétablissement des équilibres rompus; leurs définitions de la nature humaine qui permettent de verser tout débordement au compte de ce qui n’est plus totalement ou plus du tout humain; (...) enfin, la manière dont ils construisent leur autorité d ‘historien : non par l’établissement critique des faits, mais grâce à l’identification de leur point de vue avec celui de la puissance de justice organisatrice du monde, sont autant d’obstacles à une problématisation éthique de l’action. Les notions d’équité, de bienveillance à l’égard des êtres humains, de mesure, de pitié interviennent bien dans leurs jugements, mais finissent toujours par se mouler dans le cadre de pensée dominant de la justice rétributive. (shrink)

L’utilisation de techniques prédictives dans le processus de la justice, avec le développement des techniques de fouille et d’analyse des données, est considérée non seulement comme une évolution nécessaire mais encore plus comme une révolution de nature à optimiser et à rationaliser la gestion du justiciable. Cet article se propose d’exposer en quoi cette évolution est porteuse de risques, quels sont les enjeux, certains importants et surtout pourquoi il est illusoire d’espérer quelque chose de positif pour les procédures judiciaires.